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SUMMARY
Microfinance has attracted, since its inception at the end of the seventies, the attention
of many people and institutions, both at academic and donor levels. However, evidence
is mixed so far and no definitive conclusion has yet emerged with respect to the positive
effects of microfinance, in part because of the great differences among the different
microfinance schemes but also because of methodological issues. This work aims to add
some further evidence to the impact debate, with three studies in two different rural
areas from Bangladesh and India.
The first study is based on the second round of a survey in Bangladesh undertaken by
the World Bank. A Propensity Score Matching approach was chosen to study the impact
of borrowing on household income and expenditures per capita. In this case positive
impact can only be seen in extraordinary expenditures, in particular in house extensions
and investments in houses and land, but not in current expenditures or food
expenditures
The second and third studies analyse a dataset collected in five districts of Andhra
Pradesh, India. The former tries to answer the question of whether borrowing from Self-
Help groups (SHGs) has any effect on income and income per capita at household level.
Pooled ordinary least squares and difference in differences approaches are used to that
end. A significant impact is found in this study on income and income per capita.
In the last empirical work the main interest is focused on the distributional impact, on
the understanding that anti-poverty measures should be focused on households at the
bottom tail of income and income per capita distributions. Its analysis is based on
quantile regression, with cross sectional and panel data approaches. Distributional
impact shows, however, that the poorest might not be benefitting from these
interventions as much as better-off or not-so-poor households.
iv
Acknowledgements
I am deeply indebted to both my supervisors Andy McKay and Mike Barrow for
guiding me through this PhD. Their constant support, encouragement and constructive
feedback have been invaluable. I also would like to thank Edoardo Masset for providing
the Andhra Pradesh dataset. He also was quite supportive and was always willing to
help. Barry Reilly also gave me good suggestions about the quantitative parts. I was
especially happy to see him back at the department again. I am quite grateful to all of
them.
I would like to thank my wife, Carolina, for all her patience and support while I was
writing my thesis. She also took care of the kids when I had to come to the university.
And this was too often. Probably I could not have finished this without her. Needless to
say, our sons Diego and Nicolas are the cutest children in Europe (UK included).
I would also like to thank my parents for their love and support. Especially my mum,
who has suffered a lot this year. I would also have liked to have my father now to
celebrate with both.
My family in Spain helped and gave a lot of support to my parents. I guess I will never
thank this enough. Estrellas, Javi, Raquel, Canijo, Olalla, Arancha, Jose Carlos, Ana,
Alvaro, Sefi, Arturo, Alvaro, Frutos, Carmen, Juan, David. "Mi Manolito" (my brother)
and Vicente are not family strictly speaking but I love them as if they were. I also
remember some of them that are not with us but they were very important in my life;
my grandma, Curra; my great aunt, Vicenta and their cousin Curra.
My family in law was also quite supportive. Especially my mother in law who stayed
with us a few months and took care of everything at home. Without her this would have
lasted considerably longer. Also Chise, Carmen and Adolfo, who was a great person.
I would also like to remember two friends who died in last few years. Nacho Garcia and
Nacho Santamartina. I miss them much. I also deeply admire their mothers, Asuncion
and Mari Paz for their strength.
And in Spain many people helped in these difficult times. Antonio y Angela, Tolo,
Antonio Aparicio y Antonio Aranda, Marquez, Paquita. Thanks to them all.
To have a lot of friends is quite good because they cheer you up when you need it. The
bunch from Guadalupe: Adri, Churum, Juanmi, Jaimito, Bea, Rafa, Andres, Sandra,
Josito, Nica, Fatima, Gabriela, Manu, Chelis, Cabaleiro, Antonio Lopez, Richard,
Gonzalo, Gabriel Luis. From BBVA-Sirio friends: Rosana, Loli, Tono, Juan Antonio,
Perico, Alvaro. From my uni years, Patricia and from Cordoba, Angel, Pilar, Jarca,
Rafa. I wish I had had time to meet them more often.
vHere at Sussex others had to suffer me with immense patience: Julian, Karla, Genner,
Cyntia, Susy, Ashish, Juan, Ana, Hector y Mariana. My neighbours were also very kind
with us, Marco and Maido. Thanks.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES..................................................................................................................................... IX
TABLE OF FIGURES .............................................................................................................................. XII
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................. XIII
INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................... 1
MICROFINANCE EVOLUTION AND MAIN TOPICS ................................................................................................... 1
IMPACT EVALUATION ..................................................................................................................................... 4
IMPACT EVALUATION IN MICROFINANCE ........................................................................................................... 6
THE PRESENT STUDY ...................................................................................................................................... 9
CHAPTER 1: IMPACT EVALUATION AND MICROFINANCE: REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND TECHNIQUES.14
PART I: IMPACT EVALUATION AND MICROFINANCE............................................................................................ 14
Impact evaluation and the counterfactual problem. .......................................................................... 17
Microfinance impact studies:Randomized and Quasi Experimental approaches ............................. 21
Randomized approaches.................................................................................................................................24
Example of randomized studies.................................................................................................................27
Quasi-experimental approaches .....................................................................................................................32
Group 1: Pitt and Khandker(1998) and subsequent regression discontinuity design approaches. ............33
Group 2: DID and Panel Fixed Effects......................................................................................................35
Group 3: ANCOVA approaches from AIMS’s Core Impact Assessment studies .....................................38
Group 4: OLS approaches .........................................................................................................................40
Group 5: General Equilibrium models, Two Stage Least Squares(2SLS) and Propensity Score Matching.
..................................................................................................................................................................42
Conclusion......................................................................................................................................... 47
PART II: TECHNIQUES OF IMPACT EVALUATION ................................................................................................. 49
Matching estimators and Propensity Score....................................................................................... 49
Assumptions...................................................................................................................................................49
Bias.................................................................................................................................................................51
Propensity score vs. OLS in handling selection bias. ......................................................................................53
Sensitivity analysis..........................................................................................................................................55
OLS, DID and Panel Data ................................................................................................................... 57
DID .................................................................................................................................................................59
Panel data ......................................................................................................................................................64
Instrumental Variable........................................................................................................................ 65
MM estimators and Outliers ............................................................................................................. 69
Distributional Impact......................................................................................................................... 71
Quantiles and Quantile regression.................................................................................................................72
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................. 76
CHAPTER 3: REVISITING BANGLADESH MICROFINANCE IMPACT EVALUATION STUDIES: A PSM
APPROACH...........................................................................................................................................78
INTRODUCTION, DESCRIPTION OF THE SURVEY AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS. ........................................................... 78
Description of the survey ................................................................................................................... 81
Descriptive statistics .......................................................................................................................... 83
Income ...........................................................................................................................................................83
Expenditures per capita .................................................................................................................................89
Income and expenditures as proxies for welfare ...........................................................................................94
PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING PROCESS......................................................................................................... 96
Covariates choice, logit model and choice of the Common Support Area......................................... 97
Covariates choice ...........................................................................................................................................97
vii
Logit regression............................................................................................................................................101
Common Support (CS)..................................................................................................................................106
Maxima and minima................................................................................................................................106
Trimming method....................................................................................................................................107
Application of Common Support.............................................................................................................107
Matching algorithms, matching process and matching quality assessment................................... 108
Matching algorithms ....................................................................................................................................108
Nearest Neighbour (NN henceforth) estimator ......................................................................................108
Radius Matching and Caliper Matching...................................................................................................109
Kernel matching ......................................................................................................................................109
Mahalanobis Metric Matching ................................................................................................................110
Matching process .........................................................................................................................................111
Matching quality ..........................................................................................................................................113
Matching quality assessment ..................................................................................................................114
ATT CALCULATED WITH THE DIFFERENT ALGORITHMS....................................................................................... 116
Robustness of estimates to the presence of negative per capita income values............................. 120
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................................ 121
Sensitivity analysis applied .............................................................................................................. 123
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................... 126
CHAPTER 3: MICROFINANCE IMPACT IN INDIA: A CASE STUDY IN ANDHRA PRADESH. ......................129
WATERSHED PROGRAMS AND VILLAGE BANKING............................................................................................. 129
Watershed programs....................................................................................................................... 129
Microfinance in watershed programs: Village Banking................................................................... 130
SURVEY AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ............................................................................................................ 131
Survey .............................................................................................................................................. 131
Migrants .......................................................................................................................................... 136
Descriptives of the outcome variables............................................................................................. 138
Credit sources .................................................................................................................................. 145
Borrowing from SHGs at different time periods .............................................................................. 148
ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................................................ 152
Negative values. .............................................................................................................................. 159
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................... 162
CHAPTER 4: DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF MICROFINANCE IN VILLAGE BANKS IN ANDHRA PRADESH,
INDIA .................................................................................................................................................164
INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................................... 164
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ............................................................................................................................. 167
Descriptives of the dependent variables. Percentiles and other statistics....................................... 167
Descriptives of differenced dependent variables............................................................................. 169
Dynamic descriptives by quintiles and districts. .............................................................................. 171
Shocks.............................................................................................................................................. 177
Borrowing ........................................................................................................................................ 181
ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................................................ 184
Cross sectional quantile regression for years 2005 and 2007 ......................................................... 185
Cross sectional: Income per capita...............................................................................................................185
Quantile regression over differenced variables ............................................................................... 186
Quantile regression applied to panel datasets. ............................................................................... 190
Correlated random effects model (CRE). ......................................................................................... 191
Basics of the model ......................................................................................................................................191
Estimation of effects on conditional quantiles with panel data with two time periods ..............................193
viii
Panel Correlated Random Effects .................................................................................................... 195
Evolution of variables for income per capita................................................................................................196
Test of the correlated random effects and difference in estimates for SHG size.........................................202
Outcomes withdrawing the negative income per capita observations ........................................... 203
CONCLUSION......................................................................................................................................205
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................................211
APPENDIX 1: CHAPTER 2 ....................................................................................................................222
APPENDIX 2. CHAPTER 3 ....................................................................................................................236
APPENDIX 3. CHAPTER 4. ...................................................................................................................244
ix
List of tables
Table 1 Summary table of reviewed papers 45
Table 2 Income per capita descriptives, by MFIs borrowing status 87
Table 3 Income per capita quantiles by MFIs borrowing status 87
Table 4 Percentage of borrowers by income per capita quintiles 88
Table 5 Mean loan size by income per capita quintile 89
Table 6 Expenditures per capita descriptives by MFIs participation 92
Table 7 Expenditures per capita quantiles by MFIs borrowing status 92
Table 8 % borrowers by expenditures per capita quintiles 93
Table 9 Mean loan size by expenditures per capita quintiles 93
Table 10 Two-way table quintiles income-expenditures per capita 94
Table 11 Q_income - Q_expenditures 95
Table 12 Coefficients for gender in the different treated - control specs 100
Table 13 Logit regression for propensity scores 102
Table 14 Mean differences before matching 105
Table 15 Matching quality MFI borrowers vs. MFI non-borrowers 116
Table 16 Impact effects for three groups specifications 119
Table 17 ATT with no negative observations for income per capita 121
Table 18 Sensitivity analysis MFI borrowers vs. MFI non-borrowers 126
Table 19 Mean test repeating vs. migrant households 137
Table 20 Quantiles income per capita distribution 142
Table 21 Mean & Median income p.c. by district and year 144
Table 22 Rainfall (in mm) by district 144
Table 23 Income per capita by watershed 145
Table 24 Borrowing households 146
Table 25 Sources in terms of amount borrowed (millions of rupees) 146
Table 26 Mean outcome variables by source and year 147
Table 27 Outcome variable by nr. of credit sources used 148
Table 28 Evolution of proportion of borrowers 149
Table 29 Proportion of SHG borrowers by social extraction 150
Table 30 Income per capita Mean &Median, by SHG-borrowing status 150
Table 31 FE, IV and MM approaches. Income per capita including negative values. 155
Table 32 Tests of the IV approach 159
Table 33 FE, MM and IV with no negative income values 161
Table 34 Quantiles Income Income PC 168
Table 35 Other statistics of distributions 169
Table 36 Descriptives differenced dependent variables 170
Table 37 Correlation coefficients differenced income per capita 171
Table 38: Quintile mobility. Income per capita. All districts 172
Table 39 Swings 05 - 07 by district 173
Table 40 Mean test swingers/not swingers 174
Table 41 Plot area mobility 176
Table 42 Asset index mobility 177
Table 43 Shocks by quintiles 2005 178
Table 44 Shock by quintiles 2007 178
Table 45 Shock by districts 2005 and 2007 179
Table 46 Rainfall by district (% over mean rainfall) 180
Table 47 Δ Quintiles over shocks 181
xTable 48 Nr of borrowers per source and quintile 182
Table 49 Mean loan size by quintiles, source and year (take into account non borrowing households)
182
Table 50 Cross sectional quantile regression income per capita. Years 2005-2007 186
Table 51 Quantile regression Δ income per capita without and with 2005 level variables. 188
Table 52 CRE Income per capita 201
Table 53 CRE test and equality test 203
Table 54 CRE Income per capita. Negative income per capita values withdrawn 204
Table 55 Mean test before - after matching 228
Table 56 Alternative logit models for different treated / control groups 229
Table 57 Logit regression for the three different specifications of treated-control. Negative income per
capita values dropped 229
Table 58 Matching quality in model Borrowers vs. non borrowers 231
Table 59 Matching quality MFI borrowers vs. non borrowers at all 231
Table 60 Rest of the algorithms MFI borrowers vs. MFI non-borrowers 231
Table 61 PSM Borrowers from any source vs. Non borrowers at all 233
Table 62 PSM MFI Borrowers vs. Non borrowers at all 234
Table 63 Sensitivity analysis Borrowers vs. Non Borrowers at all 235
Table 64 Sensitivity analysis MFI borrowers vs. Non Borrowers at all 235
Table 65 Mean test in 2005 Whole sample vs. Panel sample 236
Table 66 Mean & Median of outcome variables by year 237
Table 67 Quantiles income distribution 237
Table 68 Mean & Median income, by district & year 238
Table 69 Income per watershed area 239
Table 70 Median outcome variables by year and credit source 239
Table 71 Income Mean & Median, by SHG-borrowing status 240
Table 72 Pearson's & Spearman's correlation coefficients instruments - outcome variables. Dataset
with negative income values. 240
Table 73 Pearson's & Spearman's correlation coefficients instruments - outcome variables. Dataset
dropping negative income values 240
Table 74 Regresssion instruments over quintiles of dependent variables 241
Table 75 Relevance, orthogonality and exogeneity test. Dataset with no negative income values. 242
Table 76 Income outcomes. Dataset including negative income observations 242
Table 77 outcomes. Dataset NOT including negative income observations 243
Table 78 Quintile mobility Income per capita Prakasam 244
Table 79 Quintile mobility. Income per capita. Kurnool 244
Table 80 Quintile mobility. Income per capita. Anantapur 245
Table 81 Quantiles for plot area and asset index 245
Table 82 Land quintile mobility 246
Table 83 Asset index mobility 246
Table 84 Cross sectional Q-reg Income per capita 2005 247
Table 85 Cross sectional Q-reg Income per capita 2007 248
Table 86 Differenced variables Q-regression Income per capita 249
Table 87 Differenced variables Q-regression Income per capita (including 2005 level variables) 250
Table 88 Cross sectional Q-regression Income 2005 251
Table 89 Cross sectional Q-regression Income 2007 252
Table 90 Differenced variables Q-regression Income 253
Table 91 Differenced variables Q-regression Income (including 2005 level variables) 254
Table 92 CRE Income 259
Table 93 λ parameter. Income per capita 2005 260
xi
Table 94 λ parameter. Income per capita 2007 261
Table 95 λ parameter. Income 2005 262
Table 96 λ parameter. Income 2007 263
Table 97 Cross sectional Q-regression Income per capita 2005. Negative income per capita
observations withdrawn. 264
Table 98 Differenced variables Q-regression Income per Capita. Negative income per capita
observations withdrawn. 264
Table 99 Cross sectional Q-regression Income 2005. Negative income observations withdrawn. 265
Table 100 Differenced variables Q-regression Incom. Negative income observations withdrawn. 265
Table 101 Table 23 CRE Income. Negative income values withdrawn 266
xii
Table of figures
Figure 1 Causal chain for microfinance impact on poor people. Source: Stewart et al. 2010 7
Figure 2 Household types by eligibility and villages. Source: Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch,
2010. 35
Figure 3 Common Support Area. Source: Caliendo (2006), page 37 55
Figure 4 DID approach graphically. Souce: Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010 61
Figure 5. Outliers classification. Source: Verardi and Croux (2008) 70
Figure 6 Income components 84
Figure 7 Income per capita by mfi borrowing status 86
Figure 8 Expenditures components 90
Figure 9 Box & Whisker graph expenditures per capita by MFI borrowing status 91
Figure 10 Districts 133
Figure 11 Income variable composition 139
Figure 12 Box & Whisker Income per capita by year 141
Figure 13 Quantiles income per capita distribution 142
Figure 14 Mean & Median Income per capita by year and district 144
Figure 15 Year 2007 dummy. Income per capita. 197
Figure 16 Household variables. Income per capita 198
Figure 17 Loan size variables. Income per capita 199
Figure 18 SHG loan sum. Income per capita 200
Figure 19 Histogram Income per capita by MFI borrowing status 224
Figure 20 Histogram current expenditures per capita by MFI borrowing status 224
Figure 21 Common support Kernel graph 225
Figure 22 Common support histogram 225
Figure 23 Box & Whisker Income by year 237
Figure 24 Quantiles income distribution 238
Figure 25 Mean & median income by district and year 239
Figure 26 Year 2007 Income 255
Figure 27 Household variables. Income 256
Figure 28 Loan size variables. Income 257
Figure 29 SHG loan size. Income 258
xiii
Table of abbreviations
2SLS Two Steps Least Squares
AIMS Assessing the Impacts of Microenterprise Services
ANCOVA Analysis of Covariance
APRLP Andhra Pradesh Rural Livelihood Project
ATE Average Treatment Effect
ATT Average Treatment on the Treated
BIDS Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies
CIC Changes In Changes
CRE Correlated Random Effects
DFID British Department For International Development
DPAP Drought Prone Area Program
FE Fixed Effects
ITT Intention To Treat
IV Instrumental Variable
LAD Least Absolute Deviation
LATE Local Average Treatment Effect
MFI Microfinance Institution
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
PSM Propensity Score Matching
QDID Quantile Differences In Differences
QR Quantile Regression
QTE Quantile Treatment Effect
RCT Randomised Control Trial
RDD Regression Discontinuity Design
RLP Rural Livelihood Project
ROSCAS Rotating Savings and Credit Associations
SGH Self Help Group
USAID United States Aid Agency
WB World Bank
1Introduction
Microfinance evolution and main topics
It has been traditionally argued that a lack of credit really frustrates the aspirations of
the poor who are unable to finance their projects. As stated in Todaro and Smith (2009),
the main problem with the poor is the lack of collateral. Lenders refuse to lend to the
poor also because they cannot assess their risk quality. This is a problem of asymmetry
of information which is more difficult to surmount in the informal sector. Finally, the
costs of lending small amounts of money are greater.
A solution to this led some countries to cap interest rates or create development banks
that lent to strategic sectors at capped interest rates. This limitation in interest rates has
been called credit rationing in the literature and has been a matter of great concern for a
long time. Although these measures were intended to make credit available to those
who otherwise would be considered too great a risk or not profitable to lend to, credit
ended up reaching mostly well established companies and wealthy people and financing
low yielding projects.
This phenomenon is explained in Fry (1978). Riskier projects could not be financed
because banks were not allowed to charge the risk premium due to these interest rates
ceilings. Thus, they were advised to abolish these interest rate caps. However, Stiglitz
and Weiss(1981) proved how even in the presence of financial liberalization in markets
with imperfect information these credit restrictions still persist and the poor still have
difficulty in obtaining credit.
Muhammed Yunus was a professor at Chittagong University who worried about the
poverty he could see all around him. He started lending money to poor people and his
initiative was quite successful. He later founded the Grameen Bank working with group
lending schemes. Loans were available only to groups that had to self-select to be
eligible for borrowing. Members of the groups were jointly liable in the case of any
member failing to pay. Thus, borrowers tried to look for those peer borrowers whom
they really trusted. This solved the lender’s problem regarding asymmetry of
information. They also had an incentive to repay loans as this gave them access to
further loans. Thus, all members in the group applied pressure when one member did
not repay the loan. Overall, problems with collateral as well as screening costs and
2moral hazard issues were overcome to a great extent thanks to this methodology. This
was praised by many very well-known economists (Stiglitz, 1990, Ghatak, 1999,
Ghatak, 2000).
The success of microfinance spread around the world, and some other initiatives
flourished that used different techniques: to mention a few of the most successful,
Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA henceforth) through
village banking or Bancosol and Caja los Andes, in Bolivia, that used individual rather
than group lending (Navajas et al., 2003). The latter institutions belong to a trend within
microfinance that started to claim that microfinance institutions (MFIs) should not be
subsidized. They contended that self-sustainability was essential to provide the poor
with reliable sources of credit that had to be independent of a donor’s generosity.
This stress on self-sufficiency and making MFIs commercial banks operating in the
market like any other financial institution is a point of great controversy that was very
well summarized in Morduch (2000). Commercialization had its main theoretical
support in the Ohio School, composed of academics at the Ohio State University. They
also argued that these commercial microfinance institutions proved to be quite resilient
to crisis (Patten et al., 2001, Rhyne, 2001, Robinson, 2002, Calderón, 2006). All these
sources contain examples of commercial microfinance institutions that were successful
in this crisis scenario. They also argue that that well assessed commercial microfinance
has to be separated from charitable institutions and also from greedy institutions that
just pursue profits and maximize their loan portfolio no matter at what cost.
The crisis of Bolivian microfinance is very well described in Rhyne (2001). In a good
economic situation the number of microfinance lenders grew and some agents entered
the market providing easy loans, even consumption loans for the poor. At some point
the numerous agents started to compete fiercely for new customers and this led to a
relaxation of the credit scorings. After some time, many households were too indebted
and had to borrow from different microfinance institutions to pay for their loans. This
phenomenon has been replicated in Andhra Pradesh, where an excessive expansion of
microfinance resulted in overindebtedness and social unrest with microfinance
institutions (Rhyne, 2010).
On the other hand, commercialization is considered for others as a clear sign of
neoliberals taking over. In fact, the microfinance crisis that occurred in Bolivia and its
3replica at the beginning of this decade in Andhra Pradesh were due to many
microfinance agents lending money to borrowers who could not repay their loans. And
they should have been aware of that. Also, they were carrying out consumer lending
rather than lending to microentrepreneurs, bringing to poor countries consumer credit
models that might work in middle or high income countries but that in poor countries
would just drive households to household overindebtedness.
Commercial microfinance showed its worst image in April, 2007 with Compartamos
Initial Public Offering (IPO). Compartamos was a commercial MFI that grew at a very
fast pace thanks to its capacity to charge interest rates that were close to 100%. The IPO
was quite successful and 13 times oversubscribed, raising the stock price 22% on the
first trading day. The founders made profits of several millions out of a bank that in the
past had also received generous subsidies from public institutions (Harper, 2011).
Muhammed Yunnus himself, the father of microfinance, also thought that this was
setting a bad precedent as microfinance was created to liberate the poor from loan
sharks, not to take their place.
However, the main point of this story is whether microfinance is making a difference
and, therefore, whether a donor’s or private investor’s contributions are justified. The
argument for making profit out of the poor could only be supported if it can be proved
that there now exists a customer base that is economically active and also, that this is so
because microfinance has ended the capital constraints that have traditionally kept the
poor from accessing credit. If credit does not prove to have any effect on the poor,
donors will step out of the market, and they will divert their funds to other interventions
in which the effect can be proved.
This thesis initially intended to test whether microfinance actually had an effect in times
of crisis, allowing households to smooth consumption after shocks had taken place, but
ended up trying to cast some light on microfinance impact evaluation. When searching
for impact literature in order to have an idea about the evidence of microfinance at a
household level, the only thing that we could conclude is that there was no definite
conclusion or that there were too many different ones.
A first source of concern was the different types of microfinance reality, Grameen
schemes, village banks, individual lending in commercial institutions such as Bancosol
or BRI. Also, impact can be measured regarding different dependent variables and,
4therefore, other classifications can be made. In addition, the approaches for measuring
the effects of microfinance were also quite diverse and there were a great number of
papers, reports and more informal sources that needed to be systematically narrowed
down. These methods ranged from OLS to DID but also qualitative studies and
techniques that are not statistically robust like monitoring along time or comparisons
before-after.
Fortunately, when this thesis started to take shape in 2008 there were already some
sources that had undertaken this task, such as Goldberg (2005) and Armendariz de
Aghion and Morduch (2005), although the former is a thorough revision of previous
literature while the second is not. The criterion adopted when approaching the questions
that we wanted to answer was to use as the theoretical background those impact
evaluation works that have a robust statistical/econometric background. They will be
enumerated and discussed in depth in the next chapter.
The main questions of this thesis are described in more detail below where the contents
of each chapter are discussed. In brief, we wanted to test whether microfinance is
having a statistically significant impact on several dependent variables. We chose two
different datasets from Bangladesh and India and studied the impact of microfinance at
household level. In Bangladesh we found significant impact only in extraordinary
expenses. In India the outcomes show also significant impact on income and income per
capita using different methodologies. However, in the case of the poorest households
the effects were not found significant.
Impact evaluation
Apart from microfinance literature, the other great input of the theoretical pillars of the
studies is impact evaluation techniques. White (2007) contends that impact analysis has
in practice taken many different meanings and Baker (2000) enumerates the different
parts that compose impact evaluation. But currently the main challenge is to find a valid
counterfactual. The counterfactual is what would have happened had the intervention
not taken place.
In social studies traditionally there was no random allocation of treatment. This was
quite problematic and Baker (2000) mentions up to five reasons for why this was very
difficult to implement. However, lately Randomized Control Trials (RCTs), in which
5treatment is dispatched randomly, have rocketed in two ways: in reputation, first, as
they are considered the “gold standard” to which any impact evaluation should aspire;
and second, the number of studies using the technique, as it has boosted and funds are
quite likely to go to this kind of studies.
Provided that allocation into treatment or control group is random, impact evaluation is
quite simple as both groups are considered equal and therefore they only differ in their
participation status. Impact is calculated by just finding the average differences in
outcome variable between the treated and the controls.
However, for some reasons that will be discussed in the theoretical chapter, this
technique might be currently over-rated and it is being applied even in cases where
doing a proper random allocation of the treatment is quite problematic. An important
issue when dealing with microfinance is that the individuals have to take a step forward
to be granted a loan and therefore to belong to the treatment group, and this desire to
borrow is hardly randomized.
On the other hand, there are studies that do not depart from a randomized dataset and try
to solve the problem of the counterfactual using econometric techniques. These control
covariates or observed variables and make assumptions about unobserved variables.
These might sometimes be quite complex or, as contended in Cameron and Trivedi
(2005) with respect to Instrumental Variables (IVs), “heroic” but on many occasions
there are also tests that allow rejection or underpinning of the outcomes and inferences.
These techniques have evolved as well in recent years and are now applied more
soundly and studies are currently more refined than they used to be.
Another concern with respect to these quasi-experimental studies is the quality of the
datasets. Sometimes the sampling techniques are not the most adequate and also there
are problems in the design of the questionnaires, with questions in the first round of the
survey that are formulated in a different way in the second, for example.
In the particular field of microfinance, RCTs are relatively recent and the literature is
not as rich as the case of quasi experimental studies. There are also some concerns with
randomization as it is quite difficult to assume in many occasions that the attribution of
the treatment-control status is purely random. The main drawback for quasi
experimental is the quality of the data with poor design of surveys that lack proper
6control groups or baseline surveys run before the intervention takes place (Roodman
and Morduch, 2009, Copestake et al., 2011).
This kind of impact studies focuses on very narrow questions. Qualitative data have
proved to be of invaluable help when understanding the processes taking place at a
household level as is seen in Collins et al. (2009). They provide inside information,
helping to understand outcomes and raising additional questions.
Impact Evaluation in Microfinance
Microfinance essays are crammed with individual examples to illustrate microfinance.
The best known is the case of Sufiya, mentioned in Yunus (2007). She was a poor
woman who needed to buy bamboo in order to produce stools that she would later sell
in the local market. She needed to borrow from a moneylender who fixed the interest
rate himself and Sufiya had to survive on just a few pennies a day. Yunus felt that he
needed to do something to end slave labour and decided to start his microcredit
experiment in the town of Jobra. Armendariz and Morduch (2010) mention the case of
Braulia Parra, a woman living in a poor dwelling, who after ten loans was able to install
a toilet and a shower at home. Rhyne (2001) also speaks about the thriving knitting
sector in Bolivia, and describes how she visited a house that hid German knitting
machinery worth more than half a million dollars. They were customers of Bancosol, a
microfinance institution.
Despite the power of these images they could be showing a rosy picture of microfinance
and impact should be measured with a more scientific approach. The interest is not
whether a few individuals are benefitting from microfinance but whether, on average,
microfinance is lifting people out of poverty. For that reason, it is important firstly to
establish the means through which access to microfinance can improve customers’
lives. In addition, it is important to acknowledge the possible presence of selection bias
and endogeneity in the analysis which might lead to wrong conclusions.
Access to microfinance allows the poor to have a reliable source of funds that in general
is more affordable than moneylenders. Also, they are able to buy their supplies in bulk,
getting better prices, increasing their profits, and so on. However the channels through
which microfinance contributes to increasing the welfare of the poor are complex. An
outline of causality relations (Figure 1) is contained in Stewart et al. (2010). They try to
7consider all the possible impacts of microfinance. On the positive side, microfinance
can become a virtuous circle where access to loans leads to increasing income, which
allows expansion in business, education, health and so on (blue arrows and frameworks
in Figure 1). Group lending may also increase social cohesion or women’s empowerment
when group lending is present (green arrows at the top right corner, discontinuous
signifies that they found no evidence of that). Microfinance can also end up in
decreased income and defaulted loans, which in the graph is represented with red
arrows.
Figure 1 Causal chain for microfinance impact on poor people. Source: Stewart et al. 2010
In their theoretical framework they contend that money can be saved or spent in
business, training, or worker’s nutrition; also, in productive assets or assets that retain
value. In these cases, the reward of higher income can be obtained in the short term or
immediate future. Rewards for spending on children’s health or education might take
longer and in the meantime foregone income might lead the household to default. This
might happen as well when too much extra income is diverted to consumptive
8expenditure. The diagram is schematic and might oversimplify some causal relations.
For instance, expenditure in nutrition or worker training might not necessarily lead to
higher income. Nonetheless it is an illustrative way of showing mainly the income
effect of microfinance.
Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2010) also warn about the substitution effects that
might arise. The increased opportunity cost of females staying at home taking care of
the children might lead to decreasing fertility rates. But consequences of access to
microfinance are not limited to this, which might be interpreted as a positive outcome.
The rise in cost of foregone income can also bring about a reduction of schooling hours
of children as they might need to take on household tasks. Some evidence of this is
mentioned in Stewart et al. (2010). This substitution effect might counterbalance the
income effect and jeopardize the future of the younger members of the household.
Establishing a causality relationship between microfinance and an increase in
expenditures, income, female labour supply or bargaining power has been the aim of
numerous studies that seek to better understand the way microfinance can improve
living conditions for the poor. This task is, however, difficult mainly because a plain
comparison between borrowers and non-borrowers can be misleading. The act of
borrowing involves the individual deciding to take a step forward with the aim of
improving his/her living conditions. Thus, borrowers are self-selected and they might
have different characteristics to non-borrowers and therefore the estimates obtained
from this simple comparison might be biased. This type of bias is called selection bias
and is explained because individuals with more entrepreneurial spirit, business skills,
tenacity, perseverance or risk-willing are more prone to take loans. Even in the absence
of microfinance programmes, these individuals might on average be better off than non-
borrowers.
This take us to the problem of counterfactual, that will be discussed further in the next
chapter: what would have happened had this individual not borrowed from
microfinance. Given the fact that the same individual cannot be compared at both status
( borrower and non-borrower) we need to find a credible counterfactual in order to
compare them and to establish the causality between microfinance and the dependent
variable.
9Another issue when evaluating the impact of microfinance is endogeneity. This can also
delude the researcher because the impact observed might not be caused by microfinance
increasing individual income, for example, but rather by the fact that the higher an
individual’s income, the more prone they are to borrow from microfinance institutions.
This reverse causality, thus, could be leading the evaluation results and bring the
researcher to overoptimistic conclusions.
Randomized Control Trials (RCTs henceforth) are considered to be the best way to
overcome these bias and endogeneity issues. In them, the intervention is assigned
randomly to different individuals, households or areas and then treated and controls are
compared. There are some issues to do with ethical and other concerns regarding this
technique that will be discussed below. In the particular case of microfinance, the main
problem is that borrowing involves the decision of an individual and therefore it is more
difficult to randomize. Recent literature on impact evaluation of microfinance has tried
to sort this problem through measuring, for example, the effect of the Intention To Treat
(ITT), which tests whether the availability of credit can improve the life conditions of
the poor (Banerjee et al., 2009). Other approaches try to assign randomly the loans or
grants to individuals or microenterprises (Karlan and Zinman, 2007, De Mel et al.,
2008, Karlan and Zinman, 2009).
However, most of the literature is still based on quasi-experimental designs where the
samples of treated and controls are not randomly selected. Our work is a set of studies
based on quasi-experimental techniques. Issues of self-selection or endogeneity are
approached through the use of econometric techniques such as Propensity Score
Matching or Instrumental Variables that try to overcome these problems.
The present study
The core of the present study is the development of three different impact studies using
different techniques over two different datasets. The first dataset is a very well known
survey taken in Bangladesh in 1991-92 and 1998 which was the base initially for two
important sources of microfinance impact: Khandker (1998) and Pitt and Khandker
(1998). In both it is claimed that microfinance impact is positive and significant. These
outcomes were amply contested in the microfinance impact evaluation literature. The
second round in 1998-99 tried to track the first round’s households and also extended
the survey area to additional thanas increasing the number of households.
10
The second dataset comes from a survey in Adhra Pradesh, India. The survey was not
purposely developed to study microfinance impact but rather the effect that watershed
projects can exert on surrounding villages. These projects in some cases also involved
the implementation of a microfinance scheme as a complementary tool against poverty.
In areas where the project did not include this microfinance component, the possibility
of borrowing was provided by the World Bank (WB) initiative called Velugu. In all
areas the microfinance schemes followed the village bank model.
The source is panel data that occurred in five inland districts of Andhra Pradesh in 2005
and 2007. They are overall poorer than coastal districts. The main flaw of this survey is
that the microfinance projects were already present in the field when the survey took
place. Therefore, it was not possible to control for differences between borrowers and
non-borrowers before microfinance was available. This dataset is the base for the
second and third empirical chapters.
The structure of the thesis follows with the explanation of the reasons and the questions
answered in the three papers.
The present Introduction
Chapter one, which is split into two main parts. The first part is a necessarily brief
literature review of impact evaluation in the field of microfinance interventions, starting
with RCTs and following with quasi experimental studies. The second part of the
theoretical background describes the main techniques used in the core applied chapters,
although within these chapters more succinct discussion about some details is included
as well as an explanation of some additional techniques used to underpin the outcomes.
Chapter two contains the first empirical approach. The intention was to try to replicate
the outcomes of Khandker (2005) using both 1991/92 and 1998/99 rounds of the
Bangladeshi dataset but using a difference-in-difference matching estimator, which had
proved to perform very well in Smith and Todd (2005).
However, the dataset for the first round was very poorly documented and the Propensity
Score Matching approach had to be restrained to the second round. In fact, since we
started working on this paper in 2007 two sources have appeared that attempt a
Propensity Score Matching on the first round: Chemin (2008) and Duvendack and
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Palmer-Jones (2011). In the latter, the authors mention the problems obtaining the data
and their poor documentation.
The main question of this chapter is to find whether borrowing from microfinance has
an effect on per capita income or expenditures of different types at household level and
test whether our outcomes agree with the previous literature. We split expenditures in
different categories, differencing between current expenditures and expenditures in
household repairs or investment in home/land. Although this split in expenditures could
not be found in the previous literature, we thought that this distinction was relevant
given that expenditures (investment) in land are hardly comparable to others such as
haircuts. There are other points in which the study is innovative. First, it uses the whole
sample of households included in the second round of the Bangladeshi survey. In the
literature only the 1,638 households that could be retraced from the first round have
been studied whereas the total sample is of 2,599 households. Regarding the
methodology, we study the impact at household level and we use a more thorough
application of the Propensity Score Matching technique than Chemin (2008) and
Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011). In particular, we test for matching quality for all
different algorithms, and find that only the kernel algorithm kept consistently its good
quality figures across the different models and dependent variables. Finally, a sensitivity
analysis suitable to this kernel algorithm is carried out.
A consistent and significant impact was found only in those extraordinary or non-
current expenditures per capita, in particular in home extensions and investments. The
absence of impact in current or food expenditures per capita fails to confirm the
outcomes found in Khandker (2005) with panel data techniques.
Chapter three contains the second empirical chapter. The dataset used is the Andhra
Pradesh survey.
The main question in this chapter is to test the impact of microfinance at household
level on income per capita and income. For this purpose the econometric techniques
used are panel fixed effect, panel instrumental variable and MM estimator. The
instrumental variable attempts to control for potential endogeneity. In addition, the
implementation of the MM estimator is explained because of the presence of many
outliers that could be biasing the estimates of the former two techniques.
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In summary, the impact of borrowing from microfinance is found to be positive and
significant and results are robust to the presence of outliers and to the withdrawal of
observations with negative income per capita The main contribution of the study is to
apply these techniques to an original dataset that had not yet been the subject of
published studies.
Chapter four is the third and final empirical chapter. The methods used in the first and
second approaches assume a homogeneous impact for the whole outcome distribution.
However, this assumption might be too strong as some other sources had pointed before
(Hulme and Mosley, 1996, Copestake et al., 2005, Coleman, 2006, Kondo et al., 2008).
They tried to find if microfinance shows different effects for poorer or less influential
individuals. The question that this chapter tries to answer is whether the effect of
microfinance varies at different quantiles of the income per capita and income
distribution – in other words, whether microfinance is complying with its target of
bringing welfare to the poorest.
The main contribution to the previous literature is the methodological approach. With
quantile regression we do not limit the impact evaluation to different groups of
individuals, as was the case of Coleman (2006) or Kondo et al. (2008). Also, it avoids
the potential truncation problems that could arise in Copestake et al. (2005) and Hulme
and Mosley (1996). In addition, quantile regression allows not only for improvement on
these former attempts but it is also less sensitive to outliers than least squared methods
and thus quite convenient given the characteristics of our dataset. We also combine
quantile regression with panel data using the Correlated Random Effects model,
borrowing from the theoretical framework contained in Chamberlain (1982) and
Chamberlain (1984) and following the empirical application to birthweights in
Abrevaya and Dahl (2008). As far as we are aware there are no studies that use this
approach in the field of microfinance impact evaluation, although we also consulted a
source that applied it to the impact evaluation of road construction in developing
countries (Khandker et al., 2009).
The analysis confirms a positive and significant impact at the middle of the outcome
variables’ distribution. Thus, the positive impact in the first paper is clarified in this
second approach where it can be limited to households that are neither at the top nor at
the bottom of the distribution. This is of great importance from a policy point of view as
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it makes it possible to establish in what part of the population the interventions are
effective. Confirming the previous literature, the poorest do not seem to be getting any
advantage of the microfinance blessings.
Conclusion: This summarizes the findings and discusses what can be learnt from the
present study. First, our outcomes only show consistent impact effect on extraordinary
expenditures per capita and never on current or food expenditures per capita as in
Khandker (2005). In the second paper we also find a significant and quite robust
positive impact. This is slightly moderated when the method less sensitive to outliers is
applied. We find also that even when the impact is significant, it is not noticed by the
poor as had been suggested in some of the previous sources.
Thus, evidence of impact is found on some extraordinary expenditures, suggesting that
loan funds might be diverted to alternative ends. Also, evidence of positive impact is
found on income and income per capita. However, households at the bottom of income
and income per capita distributions did not seem to notice this impact. Therefore, the
utility of microfinance to pull the poorest of the poor out of poverty might be put into
question.
14Chapter 1: Impact Evaluation andMicrofinance: Review of literatureand techniques.
The present chapter intends to describe and discuss the theoretical background and
review the literature on which the thesis is based. The chapter is divided into two parts.
The first part is in turn divided into two main bodies. The former explains the main
issue of impact evaluation which is the problem of the counterfactual and how selection
bias can be avoided. The latter discusses two different approaches to overcome the
selection bias problem: Randomized Control Trials (RCTs) and quasi experimental
methods. In particular, the literature on RCTs and quasi experimental methods applied
to microfinance impact evaluation is reviewed.
The second part of this first chapter tries to describe in more depth a few quantitative
techniques used in the empirical chapters so that the datasets can be described and the
main outcomes discussed in later chapters rather than discussing the methods in detail in
the empirical chapter.
Part I: Impact Evaluation and Microfinance.
Impact evaluation intends to find the effects of a particular intervention. The main
difficulty in this task is to isolate its effect from other factors that can also affect the
outcomes but cannot be attributable to the intervention. High quality impact evaluations,
in the words of the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) 1, “measure the
net change in outcomes amongst a particular group, or groups, of people that can be
attributed to a specific program using the best methodology available, feasible and
appropriate to the evaluation question(s) being investigated and to the specific context”.
Impact evaluation is one of the components of a comprehensive evaluation, which also
includes other tasks: monitoring, process evaluation and cost-benefit analysis (Baker,
2000). Although they are quite important parts of the whole evaluation process, the
following studies are strictly concerned with impact evaluations and other components
will be only mentioned when necessary.
1 http://www.3ieimpact.org/doc/principlesforimpactevaluation.pdf accessed 13/10/2011.
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With the spread of microfinance, the increase in the number of sponsors or donors and
the allocation of increasing sums of funds to support these activities, impact studies
started to be necessary. The aim was to study the effectiveness of microfinance and see
whether it is preferable to alternative interventions, such as cash transfers, that
otherwise could have been undertaken with the same resources. As said above,
evaluation is composed of other analysis and the cost of the interventions also had to be
taken into account. Cost-benefit analysis has also been developed in microfinance to put
into comparison with alternative uses of resources (Chemin, 2008).
Microfinance impact studies can be very diverse and attempts to classify them have
been developed in literature. A popular classification of microfinance impact literature
is given by Copestake et al. (2001), with regard to the sophistication of the approaches.
This has been quoted in (Goldberg, 2005) and (Tedeschi, 2008), among others. It splits
impact studies into three groups. The first is composed of “statistically rigorous studies”
with a heavy load of quantitative work. The second, by contrast, relies more on
qualitative monitoring and is closer to market research. Finally, the third takes from
both approaches but it is still statistically consistent to be considered as a “scientific”
research.
The three empirical chapters in this study will basically deal with the first group that
intend to be statistically robust. The second type is widely used by practitioners. An
example on the latter could be reflexive evaluations in which households are compared
before and after the program and for a period of time. Important agents in the
microfinance world such as Grameen Bank or Imp-Act use them. They provide insights
on the mechanisms through which interventions might work or fail and sources such as
Collins et al. (2009) have proved how important qualitative information is. However,
they neither solve the counterfactual problem (what would have happened had the
program not taken place?) nor are statistically robust (Goldberg, 2005). Hulme (2000)
does a similar classification and defends the superiority of the third approach that allows
room for rigour in the techniques but is also enriched with the know-how of the staff. In
fact, a complementary qualitative component would have been desirable in our studies
but there was not any information of this kind available.
Others classifications have arisen, such as Sharma and Buchenrieder (2002) which
distinguish between “investment-led” and “insurance-led” studies. The former tries to
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find out the effect of microfinance on income, wealth or consumption. In the latter the
outcome variables are consumption smoothing or others that measure some sort of
attenuation of domestic shocks. It is a measure of the “palliative” effects of
microfinance. Nonetheless, there might be as many classifications as criteria. For
example, classifications regarding whether the approach is randomized or quasi-
experimental or classification by the technique used (PSM studies, DID studies...) or
regarding the outcome variable. Discussions about these different approaches will be
tackled later in this chapter.
Apart from these classifications, there is a clear need for new studies casting light on the
effects of microfinance. The task is vast, given the difficulties in having appropriate
datasets, the different types of microfinance schemes, the hugely different contexts
where microfinance is developed and the different outcomes that can be measured. Our
approach restricts the study to two different and well known microfinance schemes, the
Grameen approach and village banks. The datasets come from Bangladesh and India
(Andhra Pradesh) and the dependent variables are narrowed down to a few: income,
income per capita and expenditures of different types, all at household level.
In order to find out the impact of microfinance on these outcome variables, we studied
the Andhra Pradesh dataset through two different methodologies. In a first instance,
given the controversy with the impact evaluations in Bangladesh developed in
Khandker (1998) and Khandker (2005) we question whether some of the impact
evaluation outcomes in the latter would be the same if we use Propensity Score
Matching and extend the sample to all the surveyed households.
After that, following Khandker (2005) and Tedeschi (2008) we applied a panel fixed
effects approach in our aim of isolating the impact estimates from selection bias. In the
final empirical paper, a more focused picture of the impact at different points of the
outcome distributions was sought through a quantile regression inspired by Abrevaya
and Dahl (2008).
The present chapter intends to be a literature review of quantitative microfinance impact
studies and also a theoretical background of the techniques that will appear in the
empirical chapters. It is organized as follows. The second section contains a discussion
about causality, internal validity and the counterfactual problem in impact evaluation.
The third section is split into two main parts. The first reviews some RCTs studies. The
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second focus on quasi-experimental ones. In the fourth part the techniques used in the
quantitative chapters are explained and discussed.
Impact evaluation and the counterfactual problem.
Impact evaluation is about establishing the effects of interventions in the targeted
population. The main issue is to establish whether the differences in the outcome
variables between the treated and controls can be attributed to the intervention or to
some kind of circumstance or variable that can potentially be controlled for. This
involves the causality problem or whether the variable A is the cause of variable B.
Correlation does not necessarily imply causality. Guo and Fraser (2010) explain that A
and B might be correlated because:
 C determines both A and B: this is called spurious correlation. When C
disappears, the correlation ceases to exist.
 A causes B: Even when we control for a set of covariates, the correlation
between A and B remains.
 B causes A and in this case correlation doesn’t say anything about the direction
of causality.
Literature has established three conditions that have to be complied for when causality
takes place. They are enumerated in Guo and Fraser (2010), quoting Lazarsfeld (1959):
 For A to be the cause of B, A has to happen before B.
 Both variables have to be correlated.
 This correlation cannot be spurious correlation.
These main conditions are the pillars for the concept of internal validity. It can be said
that internal validity holds when the impact measured in an evaluation can be attributed
to the intervention itself and not to changes in alternative covariates that can also affect
the outcome. If these covariates exist and affect the outcome, the estimation is not
internally valid any more and it is said that the estimation is biased. Bias can be due to
many factors, enumerated in Shadish et al. (2002) but they are normally broadly
referred to as “bias” as a general term. Guo and Fraser (2010) use the term “selection
bias” in broad sense, including in it different types of bias such as self-selection,
bureaucratic selection, geographic selection, attrition selection, instrumental selection or
measurement selection.
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In the search for the value of the impact of a policy, the main issue is the search for the
counterfactual. This is a potential outcome, what would have happened had the
treatment-assigning event not happened. Obviously, it is impossible to compare one
observation with itself under two different circumstances: participation and non-
participation. Therefore the comparison has to be done over other individuals or
households.
The Neymar’s-Rubin counterfactual framework of causality represents the two possible
statuses of each individual as follows:
௜ܻ= ܦ௜ܻ ௜,ଵ + (1 − ܦ௜) ௜ܻ,଴ (1.1)
Where ௜ܻ is the value of the outcome variable for the ith observation, ௜ܻ,ଵ is the outcome
of the ith observation under participation and ௜ܻ,଴ under non-participation (the first
subscript ݅stands for the ith observation, the second 1 or 0 stands for its participation
status). The treatment and non-treatment is given by ܦ௜which takes the value of one for
participants and zero for nonparticipants. Thus, the outcome variable ௜ܻwill take the
value of ௜ܻ,ଵ or ௜ܻ,଴ depending on how the terms ܦ௜and (1 − ܦ௜) “switch” the formula
(1.1), giving the “on” or “off” to ௜ܻ,ଵ or ௜ܻ,଴.
This theoretical framework contends that program impact is found by subtracting the
mean outcome of the control group from the mean outcome of the treatment. Thus, the
impact of the intervention would be given by the formula:
ܶ݁ݎ ܽ݉ݐ ݁݊ ݐ݂݁ ݂݁ ܿݐ= ܧ൫ܻ ௜,ଵหܦ = 1൯− ܧ൫ܻ ௜,଴หܦ = 0൯ (1.2)
According to this, the impact can be found out from the observed outcomes of treated
and nontreated observations. However, the interest of the researcher would be exactly
not on ܧ൫ܻ ௜,଴หܦ = 0൯but on ܧ൫ܻ ௜,଴หܦ = 1൯or the non-participant outcome but in the
participation status, which is nothing else than the counterfactual of ܧ൫ܻ ௜,ଵหܦ = 1൯but
this is not observable in the real world.
This plain comparison between participants and non participants is very likely to
provide with a biased impact estimation due to some characteristics or covariates that
can affect systematically the outcome variable. Participants and non participants are not
two groups which differ only in their participation status. Rather than that, there are
other characteristics that make them different and affect both their decision to
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participate and the outcomes. They would also be different in the absence of
intervention. Thus, before attributing differences to intervention it has to be discarded
that they are not explained by confounding characteristics.
Another important point when starting an evaluation study is to decide the object of the
study or what is the type of impact that we want to get. The two most important
measures of interest are the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) and the Average
Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT). The former is concerned with the average effect
of the treatment on the whole population. The latter measures the effect of the treatment
on target individuals for the program. In the discussion about the most convenient
measure, Heckman, in some of his works has contended that finding out the ATE would
not be correct if the aim is to study the impact of a particular policy (Heckman et al.,
1996; Heckman et al., 1997). This policy will normally be focused on some targeted
population and therefore it would be the effect on this target that should be studied.
ATE would provide the effect of the policy for the whole population including even
those whom the policy is not aimed at.
We are more concerned about those for which microfinance is designed and therefore in
ATT. Following the definition in Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008, page 34), the expected
value of ATT is “the difference between expected outcome values with and without
treatment for those who actually participated in treatment”.
In general the ATE is written as in (1.2). The expected value of the ATT, however,
would be written as follows:
ܣܶܶ = ܧ൫ܻ ௜,ଵ− ௜ܻ,଴หܦ = 1൯ = ܧ൫ܻ ௜,ଵหܦ = 1൯− ܧ൫ܻ ௜,଴หܦ = 1൯ (1.3)
As already stated, ܧ൫ܻ ௜,଴หܦ = 1൯is not observable in the real world. In real world we
only see:
ܧ൫ܻ ௜,ଵหܦ = 1൯− ܧ൫ܻ ௜,଴หܦ = 0൯ (1.4)
or the average difference of the participation outcome for those who participate and the
non-participation outcome for those who don’t participate.
Observed difference in the outcome
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We can manipulate the equation adding and subtracting the same term, ൫ܻ ௜,଴หܦ = 1൯to
(1.4), resulting in:
ܧ൫ܻ ௜,ଵหܦ = 1൯− ܧ൫ܻ ௜,଴หܦ = 1൯ + ܧ൫ܻ ௜,଴หܦ = 1൯− ܧ൫ܻ ௜,଴หܦ = 0൯ (1.5)
Following the explanation in Angrist and Pischke (2009), if we apply this theoretical
framework to a microfinance intervention, thus, the ATT would be the average causal
effect of microfinance on expenditures (assuming that expenditures is the dependent
variable) for those who actually borrowed, while the ATE would be the average causal
effect of microfinance on the whole population.
The observed difference between borrowers and non borrowers also includes the last
term, the selection bias, which might be great. Even in the presence of a positive ATT, a
negative average difference might be observed if the selection bias is greater than ATT
and of opposite sign. It can be also the case that a positive selection bias might make the
observed difference positive when the actual ATT is null. Thus, assessing properly the
selection bias is a vital issue in order to trust the impact outcomes.
In this aim of controlling for selection bias, the sampling method is essential. If
observations are randomly assigned to treated and control groups we would face a
Randomized Control Trial (RCT). However, in most occasions the treated are selected
in advance and a control group is picked afterwards to match the treated, and thus
assignment is not random. In the former case, RCTs, a simple comparison between
controls and treated will assess the impact effect. For RCTs ܧ൫ܻ ௜,଴หܦ = 1൯=
ܧ൫ܻ ௜,଴หܦ = 0൯and therefore the selection bias in (1.5) is equal to zero. This is because
the distribution of covariates in treated and controls are equal thanks to the
randomization.
Whether these randomized experiments are applicable to observational studies is
something that is still under discussion. Supporters of Randomized Control Trials
(RCTs henceforth) called also “randomistas” argue that these are the best way of
evaluating social behaviours. Some academics think on the opposite and contend that in
Selection biasAverage Treatment effect on the Treated
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these evaluations ܧ൫ܻ ௜,଴หܦ = 0൯ cannot be adopted as the counterfactual of
ܧ൫ܻ ௜,ଵหܦ = 1൯(Heckman and Smith, 1995).
In the case of quasi-experimental studies, the control groups are not found out randomly
and actually on many occasions the treated are selected first and the sample of controls
is found afterwards. As no random allocation precedes the group allocation, a simple
comparison between treated and controls would result in a biased estimation. This
brings about normally an oversampling of treated observations that has to be corrected
afterwards.
In order to counteract this bias, several techniques are normally used in impact
evaluation literature. Among them are Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Difference in
Difference (DID), Fixed Effects (FE) panel data, Regression Discontinuity Design
(RDD), Quantile Regression (QR), Instrumental Variable (IV), Propensity Score
Matching (PSM) and others. The feasibility of each technique needs of some conditions
to be complied with and their assumptions are also different. The core techniques in the
present studies will be OLS, DID, QR, IV and PSM and they will be discussed in depth
in this chapter.
Microfinance impact studies:Randomized and Quasi Experimental approaches
Until 2007 microfinance impact studies were qualitative or quasi experimental but
RCTs had not been published yet. In 2005 there were two good reviews of the
microfinance impact literature up to that date. One was Armendariz de Aghion and
Morduch (2005) which is focused only in research with a robust statistical background.
The second, Goldberg (2005) is a compendium of more than 100 microfinance impact
studies, in which both qualitative and quantitative approaches are contained. These two
are invaluable for researchers as they provide with the main sources to be consulted
when tackling a microfinance impact investigation.
To that date, the type of microfinance impact literature more relevant for the coming
papers could be classified with the criterion of bundles around some sources. The
pioneer robust statistical paper (Pitt and Khandker, 1998) brought about some other
studies that challenged its methodology and outcomes. Pitt and Khandker (1998) is
based on a cross sectional survey that took place in Bangladesh carried out by the World
Bank (WB) and the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) in 1991-92.
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The second round of the survey took place between 1998-99 and it also was the source
of some ulterior papers. The second group is constituted by Coleman’s 2 studies
(Coleman, 1999, Coleman, 2006) based on a pipeline survey in Thailand. Finally, the
third is a set of studies funded by USAID under the Core Impact Effect initiative. In
these, the same technique, analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), is applied to three
different surveys from India, Zimbabwe and Peru.
However, in 2010 Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) and Goldberg (2005)
were getting out of date. Some works had been published after them that had to do with
the groups of articles above, Chemin (2008) with the Bangladesh group and Tedeschi
(2008) with Coleman’s and AIMS studies. Some others were not related to these groups
at all, as they did not challenge their outcomes nor used their datasets to apply a
different technique. But most importantly, RCTs studies mushroomed and introduced a
new and powerful tool that needed an explanation and a review of the outcomes
obtained to that date.
Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) and Goldberg (2005) were revised in 2010.
In the case of Armendariz & Morduch’s it is contained in the second edition of the book
(Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010). Goldberg (2005) has its continuation in
Odell (2010) who was assigned the updating task by the Grameen Foundation.
Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2010) includes a theoretical framework about the
problem of the counterfactual and adds the outcomes of some RCTs in microfinance,
taking a pro-RCT stand. Odell (2010) is more comprehensive and together with the
RCTs studies it includes additional quasi-experimental examples that were not included
in Goldberg’s version plus other works that are more focused at the macro level
(Burgess and Pande, 2005; Kotikula et al., 2010) and out of the scope of this research
which is micro-oriented.
Both updated reviews split the studies into two main groups, RCTs and quasi-
experimental approaches. This division is also followed in the present chapter. In it,
2 Although the reference used in this paper refers to the article published in World development (Coleman,
B. E. 2006. Microfinance in Northeast Thailand: Who Benefits and How Much? World Development, 34,
1612.), the outcome had already been published as a working paper from the Asian Development Bank in
2002: Coleman, B. E. 2002. Microfinance in Northeast Thailand: Who Benefits and How Much? [Online].
Asian Development Bank. Available: http://www.adb.org/Documents/ERD/Working_Papers/wp009.pdf
[Accessed 20/10 2011]. Obviously Armendariz & Morduch’s and Goldberg’s literature reviews refer to
this working paper rather than to the article published in 2006 in World Development, although the
outcomes are the same.
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RCTs are introduced first by a discussion about their strengths and weaknesses. This is
followed by a more detailed explanation of Banerjee et al. (2009) in order to illustrate
how an RCT is implemented. This part is completed with the explanation and
discussion of some other examples of RCTs so far. For the quasi-experimental
approaches, we divide them into groups according to the techniques used in the papers.
The latest reviews of microfinance impact evaluation at the moment of writing were
Orso (2011) and Copestake et al. (2011). They were only recently available and a bit
late for us to take full account of but a brief overview of them can be outlined. The
former is mainly a review of some of the evaluation techniques used in microfinance
impact studies and raises the difficulties of assessing the impact with quasi experimental
approaches. They are, first, that microfinance programs are normally developed in poor
areas (allocation bias). Also, participants have to self-select themselves by applying for
loans. Finally, that the causation linkages might be more complicated than just
establishing a plain relationship of cause-effect between borrowing and the dependent
variable.
Copestake et al. (2011) is a systematic review in the form used in other scientific fields,
mainly in health literature. They conclude that microfinance impact literature so far has
not provided any serious and robust analysis from which we can infer that microfinance
has a positive and significant impact on welfare. Studies, they contend, are based on
poorly designed surveys and this lack cannot be compensated for with complicated
econometric techniques.
Our classification of quasi-experimental studies follows a methodological criterion in
order to organize studies around their technical approaches. There are six groups which
include regression discontinuity design, difference in difference and panel data fixed
effects, OLS, Analysis of covariance, two-stage least squares and propensity score
matching.
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Randomized approaches.
RCTs have had, for a long time, the reputation of “the gold standard” establishing
causality in other fields such as medicine, agriculture, etc. In economics its application
is fairly recent but it still holds this reputation. When these RCTs are implemented the
effect of the program can easily be found without having to make complicated or
implausible assumptions. Basically it can be assumed that the treated and the control
groups differ only in the treatment. This prestige may have been fuelled by the classical
medical test for drugs in which a part of the sample takes the medicine and the controls
take the placebo, although none of them know what they are having (double blind).
RCTs are put into practice in two stages. First the sample of potential participants is
drawn at random from the population of interest. In the second the intervention is
assigned randomly to a number of subjects in the sample, the treated, leaving out the
rest as controls. In the first stage we are guaranteeing the external validity of the
experiment, that is, that the outcomes of the experiment can be applied to that
population of interest. In the second, it is the internal validity that is guaranteed. As
mentioned above, this internal validity is guaranteed as long as it can achieve that the
distribution of characteristics in treated and non-treated is the same. This, however, is
not often strictly observed in RCTs and issues with internal validity arise that are
discussed below. The same happens with external validity as the outcomes of the
analysis cannot be extrapolated to other samples as the same intervention could have
very different effects for different groups, even in no remote geographical locations.
Duflo et al. (2007) describe how randomization can be incorporated into a research
design resembling clinical trials. They also describe four different strategies to tackle
the randomization when the pure clinical trial model cannot be implemented:
oversubscription, randomized order of phase-in, within-group randomization and
encouragement designs. In the first case limited resources allow to allocate them
randomly to only a part of the targeted population. In the randomized phase-in type the
program is deployed gradually in different areas, allowing us to use as controls those in
which the intervention is delayed. In the within-group randomization, randomized
assignment is made in the targeted areas, avoiding in some cases the ethical concerns in
the former approach that might bring about a great delay in the intervention. In this case
the intervention affects only some groups of the targeted population. Finally, in the
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encouragement design the researchers inform or encourage, previously and at random,
some of the possible subjects of the intervention.
Within-group randomization and encouragement design are clearly the weakest
methods. In the former the contamination risk is enormous as control and treated groups
are very close. In the encouragement design the invitation to participate could be used
as a proper IV as long as invitations are random, a mere comparison between
participants and non participants would not be adequate.
Despite their prestige RCTs have scarcely been practiced in development until a few
years ago, when the number of studies has rocketed. Randomized interventions have
been frowned upon for a long time due to many ethical and economic concerns. But
other criticisms of RCTs have aroused with the spread of these studies: external
validity, compliance, selective attrition and spillovers (Khandker et al., 2010).
The ethical issues arise when randomization come to a point in which for the sake of the
experiments services have to be denied to some people that would be entitled to them
otherwise (Baker, 2000). The counterargument is that in these projects the budget is in
any case limited so that there will always be some excluded subjects, no matter whether
the approach is randomized or not. Randomization uses these “unavoidably” excluded
subjects as controls taking advantage of this limitation in order to make a better
assessment of the intervention and hence to improve policies. White (2007) and Karlan
and Goldberg (2007) agree that randomly allocated interventions do not necessarily
have to be ethically reprehensible. Political problems are also argued as it might be very
difficult to convince some public institutions of the convenience of a randomization
approach when they have vested interests in a particular distribution of funds that may
eventually optimize their electoral results.
As stated in Rodrik (2008), the internal validity of the papers published in peer-
reviewed journals are strictly scrutinized and academics have to devote whole sections
in them to justify it. On the contrary these requisites for the external validity are not so
tight and the arguments about it or the possibility of generalizing the results are just
mentioned or even omitted. According to Deaton (2010) this is of particular concern
and he quotes Worral (2007) to mention the case of Opren, a medicine that treated
arthritis and musculo-skeletal pain. The drug passed the RCTs tests to be
commercialized but then had to be withdrawn from the market because of the high death
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rate. The reason was that the trial sample was composed of adults between 18 and 65
years old while the medicine was prescribed mainly to elderly. In the same vein, he
argues, a randomized educational program in one country might show successful but in
the trial there are some characteristics assumed to be constant which are probably not
when the program is taken to another country in another continent or even to another
region within the same country. Thus, with respect to external compliance, the
outcomes cannot be extrapolated to other similar interventions in other countries or
even to other regions and therefore this cannot be contended as an advantage over
Quasi-experimental methods.
Compliance problems arise when a part of the subjects selected as treated does not take
the treatment or when the controls end up being treated. To surmount this problem,
Imbens (2010) contends that if the random assignment to treated/control is used as an
instrumental variable and the IV model is used, we can obtain the ATT. This method
has been called Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE).
Spillover effects happen when the controls benefit from the intervention as well. In
both cases the estimates of a RCT will be biased if they are not taken into account.
Finally, selective attrition might cause also what is known as the “survivor bias” and
this leads to an under or overestimation of the program impact, depending on the
dropout patterns. In practice, however, dropout problems have also been handled by
RCTs (Banerjee et al., 2009, Copestake et al., 2009).
Summing up, on one hand RCTs supporters argue that RCTs is a better approach to
impact evaluation because it relies on fewer assumptions to establish causality. In
addition it is not as “data hungry” a technique as other methods and therefore it can be
set up with a considerable saving of funds. Contrary to the critics, they claim that there
are currently many situations in which the research can be developed as a RCT and this
is not being done. The “random” criterion when assigning the resources of the project
can be as valid as the “first come first served” in a scenario where resources are scarce
and cannot reach the whole population.
On the other hand, for instance, it is argued that “randomistas” seem to try to set up the
research agenda around the questions that are suitable to RCTs diverting the focus from
other important issues that still need further research. Even worse, they compete for
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resources to fund their studies that in some occasions do not deal with other pending
essential questions in the research agenda (Copestake et al., 2009).
With regard to technical problems, it can be seen that many issues arise at the time of
setting up the RCTs and noncompliance, spillover effects and external validity are
questions that have to be discussed in many studies. Development surveys are not as
straightforward as drug tests and it is very difficult to replicate a pure random
experiment because in almost all occasions some conditions are not met and therefore
further assumptions and corrections have to be made to apply RCTs methods.
Regarding the cons of RCTs see Deaton (2010) and Rodrik (2008). For the pros, Imbens
(2009) and Copestake et al. (2009) contain a good discussion of the convenience of
RCTs within microfinance impact analysis framework.
Example of randomized studies
Banerjee et al. (2009) did an experiment with a microfinance institution located in
Adhra Pradesh. This institution is Spandana Bank, which started at the end of the
nineties and it had by the time of the study, about 1.2 million clients. The authors claim
that so far there had been not an experimental approach in which the impact measured
was the new access to microfinance due to this activity coming into the market.
Although it can be argued that Coleman’s approach could be considered as such and
Roodman and Morduch (2009) do so, they do not consider this possibility.
The Spandana bank was in the process of expansion and they selected 120 slums or
neighbourhoods (bastis) in Hyderabad, the capital of Andhra Pradesh. Spandana offers
the traditional group credit in which the members of the group are jointly responsible
for repayment and doesn’t involve further with business training or any other activities.
The eligibility requirements are that the member has to be female, between 18 and 59,
resident in the area for at least one year (proof of residence or valid identification
required) and at least 80% of the women must own their home.
Within the neighbourhoods, the requirements were: no presence of previous
microfinance institutions, neighbourhoods with a share of poor people but
predominantly not the poorest of the poor and finally they avoided areas where the
concentration of migrant construction workers was not high as residency was
considered an incentive for repaying, given the fact that they may need a stable source
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of funding and their growth might be subject to the availability of future, bigger loans.
When dealing with delinquency, it is also easier to find people who have been settled
for years.
A first baseline survey in 2005 was done over 2800 households in a first round. After
this baseline survey, 16 out of the 120 surveyed areas in the baseline were dropped.
Thus the experiment is based on 104 areas only. The bank expanded randomly to 52 of
these areas between 2006 and 2007. It has to be noted, however, that at the same time
there were also microfinance institutions that expanded both to treatment and control
areas and therefore pure control areas were not available. The measured impact is done
here through the Intention To Treat (ITT), which is somehow shadowed because of the
presence of microfinance in control areas as well.
It has to be stated that ITT does not measure the impact of treatment itself but rather it
studies what is the impact of having the possibility of taking advantage of an
intervention or the impact of the presence of a project on a community. Thus, what it is
compared in this study is the exposure to microfinance rather than strictly borrowing
from microfinance.
Early in 2007 a comprehensive census was taken. This census was conceived to enhance
the baseline survey in 2005 as this was not random and it was focused in the central
areas of slums. It did not try to be a follow up of the 2005 survey either because some
households were included but others were not.
In addition, a follow-up survey started in August 2007 in order to question about what
were the outcomes after the program had been implemented. Eventually, households
were followed up between the 12th and the 18th month after funds were available to be
borrowed.
One of the issues of this study is that the control areas were contaminated by the
presence of new Microfinance Institutions (MFIs). The authors claim that the important
point in order to compare treated and control areas is that borrowing from MFIs (not
just from Spandana) has to be significantly higher in the case of the treated areas, which
it is, 18.6% vs. 5.3%. Then the ITT, rather than strictly the impact of microfinance, is
measured averaging differences in both areas over customers and non-customers of
MFIs. The model would be (following the paper notation):
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ݕ௜= ߙ+ ߚܶ݁ݎ ܽݐ௜+ ߝ௜ (1.7)
where ݕ௜ is the outcome variable (these were diverse: revenues, business profits, etc.),
ܶ݁ݎ ܽݐ௜ is a binary taking the value of one when the household is in a treatment area and
the ITT is given by the ߚ coefficient. The standard errors are cluster-robust at area level
and corrections were made to acknowledge for the oversampling of Spandana
customers. The ߚ coefficient gives, in percentage points, the differences in y between
the treatment and the control area.
In terms of outcomes, the study finds that Spandana areas have 32% more new
businesses than controls. The impact on revenues, profits and employees is not
statistically significant. The treated spend more on durable goods and less on
“temptation” goods, such as gambling or eating and drinking out. Regarding welfare
indicators, the study finds differences neither in women empowerment nor in school
enrolment or expenditures in education. The outcomes regarding the effect of
microfinance is far from being impressive but it still seems that microfinance fuels
entrepreneurship.
Dupas and Robinson (2009) deal with microsavings in Kenya. They randomly provide a
saving account to the subjects of the treated group. They exploit the information of the
log books that participants had to keep, in a similar fashion to Collins, Morduch et al.,
(2009). The main findings of this study is that women who had had a saving account for
more than 6 months increased their daily private expenditures by 37-44% and the food
expenditures by 14-29%. Also, treated women were less likely to sell their assets to face
shocks. They did not find any crowding out effect with respect to ROSCAS3.
In their studies for Philippines Karlan and Zinman (2009) and for South Africa Karlan
and Zinman (2007) loan applications that were marginally creditworthy or marginally
rejected. In the South African case, there was a final discretional capacity of the loan
officer to accept or reject the application. The main outcomes in the Philippines were a
positive and significant increase in profits for male borrowers and also a decrease in
labourers in the microenterprises. Also, investment in business decreased in favour of
education in the case of participants. Finally, the increase in profits was higher in
3 ROSCAS stands for Rotating Savings and Credit Associations. In them different individuals contribute
regularly to a common fund which is given to one of the members that wins the lottery. This is repeated
until all the members have received the pot.
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households above the median income. In South Africa a positive impact was found on
self-sufficiency, food consumption and some well-being measures such as an index for
optimism. On the contrary the index of depression was higher among participants and
this is a common feature with the Philippines study.
In De Mel et al. (2008) the authors randomly assigned grants to microenterprises in
three districts in Southern Sri Lanka and studied their evolution in 11 subsequent waves
of surveys. They made up a lottery in which some of the microenterprises were given a
grant in kind or cash ranging from 10,000 LKR and 20,000 LKR, equivalent to 3 and 6
times the median profits respectively. The impact was measured on capital stock, profits
and hours worked by the owner. The main findings are that these randomized grants
increase profits by at least 60% per year, with significant higher impact when the
owners are more able, the enterprise has fewer workers and males are in charge of the
business. Spillovers effects seem to be negative in the surrounding enterprises, although
they could not be assessed for other businesses not included in the sample. The grants
also increase the capital stock and the time worked in the business by the owner.
In De Mel et al. (2009) they used the same dataset to test the difference in returns
between male owned and female owned businesses. Male owned businesses increased
their returns by more than 11% per month. They claim, thus, that they are more prone to
be able to face the repayments of microfinance loans.
So far randomized studies are relatively scarce although they will most likely flourish in
the coming years. However, some concerns can be raised about them. Compliance
problems force Banerjee et al. (2009) to measure ITT or impact of the exposure to
microfinance rather than the impact of borrowing. De Mel et al. (2008, 2009) study the
effects of randomly assigned grants, but avoid the issue of self-selection or
unobservables that lead some entrepreneurs to borrow. A smart study is Dupas and
Robinson (2009) although it just deals with the saving side of microfinance. Internal
validity, thus, is a great issue because the pure randomization becomes very difficult to
achieve when becoming a member of the treated group involves some kind of self-
selection.
In the case of Karlan and Zinman (2007; 2009) the impact is only measured on
marginally creditworthy applicants, and therefore conclusions about the clearly credit-
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unworthy or undoubtedly creditworthy customers cannot be made. Also, randomization
was not strict.
Overall the arrival of RCTs to the impact analysis of microfinance has to be welcomed
as it can contribute greatly with new insights to contrast older studies. The simplicity of
the technique, not based on sometimes too complicated and unlikely assumptions is a
plus that cannot be overlooked. But not everything is suitable for randomization and, as
seen above, problems arise with regard to the questions that could be answered or not
through this method. To overstate this limitation, Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch
(2005) argue that it is better an unbiased estimation of the impact of exposure to
microfinance or ITT than a biased estimation of the impact of microfinance. Likewise,
Imbens (2010) argues in favour of using the random criterion of assignment as an IV as
this can at least provide with LATE (“Better LATE than nothing”) . He also contends
that the interaction with other impact measurement technique will enrich the knowledge
of the microfinance effectiveness.
It is in this context of complementarity where we think that RCTs can be a valuable
resource but given the mentioned limitations with regard to internal and external
validity, we can hardly share the enthusiasm when dealing with any kind of social
study.
Next, some of the quasi-experimental approaches so far will be described and some of
their most relevant outcomes commented.
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Quasi-experimental approaches
Randomized studies in microfinance have sprung up since 2007 but were very scarce or
inexistent before then. The unavailability of this kind of sources in microfinance
programs forced the academics to turn to quasi-experimental methodologies instead. In
these, the treatment is not assigned randomly. The first and main step in these
methodologies is to identify a treatment and a control group. This can be done
prospectively, when both groups are identified in advance, or retrospectively if they are
selected after the intervention. In many occasions the treated are picked in advance and
a group of controls is found afterwards. It is also common to have an overrepresentation
of treated individuals in the sample. So far the majority of the impact evaluations in
microfinance belong to the latter group (Karlan and Goldberg, 2007).
The identification of the control group in microfinance is vital but particularly difficult.
First, because the non random localization of the program might make the analysis be
biased. This can be the case when they are placed in worse off rural areas or, on the
contrary, better off urban localizations, as can be seen in Latin-American schemes.
Second, the plain comparison between customers versus non customers introduces the
problem of selection bias as the borrowers choose to be customers themselves. Thus,
individuals would probably be different even in the absence of microfinance. Finally,
the risk of a biased estimation does not end when the selection bias is sorted, as it can
also arise if the dropout cases or the spillover effects are mishandled.
The search for the adequate control group that could sustain a proper impact analysis
showed some weaknesses in the early impact studies. Hossain (1988) compared
Grameen Bank members with non members and found a great impact of microfinance
on members. There was no control for other characteristics of the individuals and
therefore these results might well be overstated.
Hulme and Mosley (1996) developed impact studies in several countries. They found
that although microfinance has a positive effect on participants on a range of variables,
its effect is not so clear when the customers are poorer. However, their work has been
criticised from the methodological point of view, in particular regarding their choice of
the control group. They used new customers as the control group. As pointed out by
Karlan (2001), just self-selection does not necessarily imply that the groups are
comparable. Moreover, dropouts are not taken into account and the characteristics of the
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“survivor borrowers” deserve a deeper study (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch,
2005; Tedeschi and Karlan, 2007). In our studies, three different approaches were
tackled to give an impact estimation which intends to get rid of this bias.
In the present work, the quasi-experimental literature is grouped by its methodological
approach. This division is not perfect as some include more than one econometric
technique. In this case the main approach is picked for the classification. The first group
is composed of works using a regression discontinuity design approach, in the same
fashion as the pioneer work by Pitt and Khandker (1998). The second group includes
those works that attempt a difference in difference approach or a fixed effects panel
data. The reason for mixing these two techniques is that in all the fixed effects panels
the dataset had two time periods. In this case, applying a fixed effect or a difference in
difference obtains the same estimates. In the third group the technique used is Analysis
of Covariance (ANCOVA), and includes three studies funded by the United States Aid
Agency (USAID) that tried to set impact evaluation standards with their approach in the
field of microfinance with little success. In the fourth, the methodology is a simple
OLS, which includes Coleman’s studies and others inspired by them. The fifth group
contains a set of studies with different approaches, general equilibrium models, two
stage least squares and propensity score matching.
Group 1: Pitt and Khandker(1998) and subsequent regression discontinuity design
approaches.
Pitt and Khandker (1998) (PK hereafter) was the first important paper with a rigorous
load of quantitative work aimed at overcoming selection bias. This work, based on the
cross-section survey in Bangladesh in 1991-1992, takes advantage of the landholding
eligibility criterion. According to this, only households with less than half an acre of
land could become microfinance customers within program villages. This analysis, then,
relies on the fact that there should be no discontinuity in income (or other dependant
variables) of those just below and above the eligibility rule (Chemin, 2008).
The approach is a Regression Discontinuity Design which is basically a comparison
between observations just above and below the eligibility criterion. In this case, the cut-
off threshold has been defined through the instrument of the eligibility rule, which was
to have 0.5 acres of land or less. This is a smart approach that is based on the supposed
exogeneity of two of the necessary conditions to become a borrower. The first of these
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conditions was to be eligible: the 0.5 acres or less intends to target poorer people. The
second was to form a group with individuals of the same gender. However, Roodman
and Morduch (2009) question the exogeneity of these two facts that lead the individuals
to borrow: the group formation and the eligibility rule. In the first case PK do not
explain how the credit groups are formed by village and gender. In addition, regarding
the eligibility rule, they question the argument contained in PK about the condition of
the exogenous regressor of landownership in previous literature. Eventually, none of
these arguments are formally tested in PK.
The non-compliance of the eligibility rule by a significant share of the borrowers is
another main flaw in the study. As Chemin (2008) points out, when the landholding
criterion is not strictly complied, the regression discontinuity design cannot longer be
considered as “sharp”, but has to be treated as a “fuzzy” discontinuity design or
otherwise it might well be overestimating the effect of microfinance4. Finally, Roodman
and Morduch (2009) contend that, in general, regression discontinuity approaches use
observations within a particular range around the eligibility rule, while in this particular
study all the observations are used.
PK found that 100 additional takas of credit increased household annual expenditure by
18 takas in the case of females and 11 in the case of males. They also found positive
impact on non-land assets or schooling of children. These results were also shown in
Khandker (1998) and propelled the idea of microfinance as a miraculous tool against
poverty. Their estimations, for the reasons above, are considered to be overstated
(Chemin, 2008; Roodman and Morduch, 2009).
The grouping of the different individuals regarding this landholding criterion is shown
in Figure 4, inspired in a chart contained in Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch
(2010). In treated villages there are three different groups:
 A: eligible households (0.5 acres of land or less) that borrow.
 B: eligible households that do not borrow.
 C: non-eligible households.
4 Theoretical background in Regression Discontinuity Design in Hahn, J., Todd, P. & Klaauw, W. V. d.
2001. Identification and Estimation of Treatment Effects with a Regression-Discontinuity Design.
Econometrica, 69, 201-209. and Angrist, J. D. & Pischke, J.-S. 2009. Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An
Empiricist's Companion, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press., Chapter 6.
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Control villages have two groups:
 D: eligible households.
 E: non eligible households.
These outcomes in any case were striking and have been amply quoted in microfinance
literature. The first agnostic commentator on these outcomes was Morduch (1998) who
argues that many borrowers did not comply with the eligibility rule. He tests the impact
of having access to microfinance, finding the difference between eligible and non
eligible individuals [(A&B – D) – (C – E)], controlling for other covariates. His
analysis did not find any significant impact of borrowing on expenditures.
Pitt (1999), in turn, challenges Morduch (1998) by criticising that comparing A & B
with D is not completely accurate as A still contains non-eligible households that had
access to credit. Another main criticism is that Morduch does not account for program
allocation bias. The access to credit was given mainly to worse-off villages and not
accounting for that would lead to underestimating the effects of microfinance.
Group 2: DID and Panel Fixed Effects
This group of works contains studies that have been designed as difference in difference
or panel data. They are bundled together because in all cases except Morduch (1998)
Participants or borrowers
A
Eligible but non
participants B
Non eligible C
Eligible D
Non eligible E
Program Villages Control Villages
Figure 2 Household types by eligibility and villages. Source: Armendariz de Aghion and
Morduch, 2010.
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they were implemented in two periods of time. In this case, DID and panel FE should
produce identical estimates.
Both approaches suppose that there are time invariant unobservables that are correlated
with the covariates and that can bias the impact effect. In the case of microfinance, it is
usual to assume that these unmeasured characteristics are entrepreneurship, negotiation
skills, perseverance and others that would make borrowers systematically different from
non-borrowers. Assuming that these characteristics are constant over time, by
differencing the variables they are swept out and it is possible to get rid of the bias
source.
In the simplest case of two groups (treated-control) and two time periods, the usual
approach is to run a baseline survey for the whole sample before the intervention and a
second survey after the intervention. The difference in gains from the two groups would
be the impact of the program. The time invariant differences between the groups are
swept out.
The first study quoted in this group is Morduch (1998), already briefly outlined above.
It takes advantage of the particular design of the Bangladeshi database and tackles an
approach that is similar to the Difference in Difference (DID) technique but without a
time component, which is essential in DID. In his own words “a clean estimate of the
average impact of access may be more useful than a biased estimate of the impact of
participation” (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010 p. 285). This is, actually, the
impact of the Intention To Treat (ITT) as in Banerjee et al. (2009). He does not find an
increase of household consumption due to access to microfinance but a lower disparity
in consumption along seasons. Thus, he concludes that microfinance has a positive
effect on household consumption smoothing.
Khandker (2005) uses a second round of the same Bangladesh survey that took place in
1998-99. This second round covered not only the villages of the first round but also
included villages from three additional thanas. He estimates fixed effects panel data
with the households that could be traced to the second round. In this second survey
there were no control villages as the program had extended to all villages. His main
findings for 1998-99 are that each additional 100 taka borrowed by females increase
annual total expenditures by 20.5 takas, attributing 16.3 to past borrowing (1991-92
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survey) and only 4.2 to present borrowing. This might be a sign of decreasing marginal
returns to borrowing. Male marginal returns are statistically insignificant.
Given the long period in between, however, the assumption of time invariant
unobservables is questionable. In order to avoid measurement errors and reverse
causality problems, Khandker (2005) also attempts a panel IV approach. The instrument
is the eligibility rule. The Wu-Hausman test rejects the endogeneity of the credit
variable, so the DID model is adopted.
Roodman and Morduch (2009) challenges P&K, Morduch (1998) and Khandker (2005).
It casts doubts over all of them. They try to replicate these studies and conclude that
reverse or omitted-variable causation are leading to wrong estimates. They also contend
that the instrumentation strategy is failing and that there is a substantial change in the
different subsamples in the credit consumption relationship as well as in borrower’s sex
and this can explain the differences in impact by gender. Analysis of these three papers
leads them to conclude that in social sciences where the endogeneity problem is
normally present, RCTs can provide a simpler and neater approach as long as they can
get rid of this bias.
Two additional sources can be included in this group, although they are not connected
to the Bangladeshi studies. They both use DID. Copestake et al. (2005), mixes
qualitative and quantitative approaches. The dataset is gathered in Peru and the
microfinance institution is Promuc. The sample is rather smaller than those of other
studies mentioned so far. As in Coleman (2006), they first study the impact for the
whole sample and then they split it into different groups. In this case it is not rank-and-
file members versus committee members but the sample is divided into households
below and above the median income level. They find an overall significant impact of
microfinance on income. Also, they conclude that the impact of participation for
wealthier individuals is around 80% higher compared with poorer individuals.
Nonetheless, they clearly state that some selection bias issues might not have been
properly addressed. Finally, this splitting and analysing by subsamples might bring
about some truncation issues that could have been avoided applying a quantile
regression.
The last piece of research in this group is a DID found in Bruhn and Love (2009). The
study takes advantage of the simultaneous opening of all the branches of Banco Azteca,
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using the premises of a well established chain of domestic appliances, Grupo Electra.
The opening took place in all those municipalities in which Gupo Electra had a retail
shop, as the branches were opened within the shops themselves. They obtained the
dataset from the Mexican National Employment Survey (ENE). It contains information
collected before and after the appearance of the bank branches and therefore is the only
DID approach with baseline information described so far. The other particularity is that
the impact is not studied at individual, household or microenterprise level but at
municipality level.
It controls for initial differences between municipalities with and without an Azteca
branch. The main findings are 7.6% increase in the proportion of informal business,
although the increase is only statistically significant for male-owned enterprises. On the
contrary, the increase in waged employees is significant only in the case of females.
Overall, the increase in total employment, counting new businesses and new waged
employees is about 1.4%. The figure is statistically significant but the outcome is not
encouraging. It, however, reinforces other studies that find a positive impact and
underpins the argument that access to credit in the informal sector can have a positive
effect on the welfare of the individuals.
Group 3: ANCOVA approaches from AIMS’s Core Impact Assessment studies
Another of the main sources of microfinance impact literature is the “Assessing the
Impacts of Microenterprise Services” (AIMS) project which was sponsored by USAID
between 1995 and 2002, within the framework of the Core Impact Assessment
initiative. They aimed not only at doing studies and publishing reports about the impact
of microfinance, but also at settling a “good practice standard” to be followed by future
researchers. Among their publications, there are three main reports that were based on
longitudinal surveys that took place in Zimbabwe (Barnes et al., 2001), India (Chen and
Snodgrass, 2001) and Peru (Dunn and Arbuckle, 2001). All three of them used a
common research design and approach.
The studies are based on surveys that were taken in two rounds. In the first round
customers from microfinance institutions were randomly selected from a list. Then,
samples were picked as controls from the same areas. The impact is measured using
Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA). This method first differentiates between
moderating and outcome variables. Moderating variables are those which can influence
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the levels of the outcome variables. In the first period there is a matching approach in
which treated and controls with similar levels in the moderating and the outcome
variables are paired together. The assumption is that observations with these similar
levels are comparable. In the second period, the effects are measured by finding the
differences between the matched observations in the outcome variables.
In terms of regression lines, in the first round ANCOVA estimates two different
regression lines, one for the controls and one for the treated. In this period the intercepts
of both lines are similar as long as the matching is done between treated and controls
with similar levels in the variables of interests. In the second period, however, if the
group of participants has on average higher values in the outcome variables, its
regression line will have a higher intercept than the regression line of the control group.
Therefore, the impact measure will be given by the difference between these two
regression lines. The studies measured impact at microenterprise, household and
individual levels (Dunn, 2002).
Regarding the attrition bias, AIMS studies distinguish two types of dropouts: panel
leavers (households that could not be traced in the second round) and program leavers (
borrowers in the first round but gave up in the second). The main aim of the attrition
analysis was to test whether the characteristics of panel/program leavers were
significantly different from non-leavers at the initial levels with respect to several
variables: participation status, gender, sector, location and employment status group. In
addition to this, when dropouts were clients in the baseline, some information about
these loans was also studied.
In India the study was carried out with Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA)
bank customers. Permanency in borrower status was associated with positive effects on
food expenditure, household improvements, consumer durables and school enrolment
for girls. In Zimbabwe the study was done with the Zambuko trust. Second-time
borrowing was associated with an increase in some measures of food and school
enrolment for boys, but was found to be insignificant for many other impact variables.
Finally in Peru the institution under study was Mibanco. The most remarkable finding
in this case was the great positive impact found on income, days of employment and the
creation of new jobs.
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Criticism can be levelled at these studies. Some of their flaws were already
acknowledged in the reports themselves. For example, all the institutions worked with
urban but no rural clientele. They did not target the same social strata, and Peruvian
Mibanco’s customers, for instance, were better off than customers from the other two
banks. Finally the baseline survey was not carried out before the intervention and
therefore the samples might already be biased, although this is common to most of the
DID studies reviewed in this study.
The methodology has also been questioned. Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch
(2005) contend that a DID technique would have been more appropriate because
ANCOVA cannot control for unobservables and DID, at least, eliminates time invariant
unobservables. In fact, none of the relevant works in microfinance impact has used this
methodology since then. Probably Tedeschi (2008) contributed definitely to show that
this approach was not assessing some sorts of bias properly.
Group 4: OLS approaches
The iconic studies in this group are two papers by Brett E. Coleman, Coleman (1999)
and Coleman (2006), which have also been quite influential in later publications. He
conducted a survey in 1995-96 in Northeast Thailand in which he gathered information
in villages with already established FINCA-methodology village banks and also in other
villages where customers and non customers had already been self-selected but the
funds were to be disbursed in a year’s time, without the knowledge of the borrowers. He
found that there were not differences in observables between members and non
members in treatment and control villages, thus assuming that selection allocation and
self-selection bias was overcome.
He controls for self-selection bias with a member dummy variable. This member
variable controls for the unobservables that lead individuals to borrow such as
entrepreneurship, willpower and so on. Program allocation bias is accounted for through
a village level set of variables. The impact is measured, free of bias, on the covariate of
program availability per month.
Coleman (1999) concludes that the impact of microfinance is only significant for two
variables: negative on expenditures on men’s healthcare and positive in women’s
indebtedness. He claims that this might be due to the fact that peasants have access to
greater loans at lower interest rates at a government bank, BAAC. The size of village
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bank loans might therefore be too small to be productive and could be diverted to
consumption.
The former study is refined in Coleman (2006), using the same dataset. He had
observed that most of the relevant positions in the organization of the village banks
were undertaken by influential people. Thus, Coleman divided the participant’ sample
with a status criterion. He changed the specifications and splits the member dummy that
controls for selection bias into two different dummies. The first states whether the
household had a rank-and-file member and the second whether the household had a
committee member. Similarly, access time to microfinance is divided into two “access
time” variables depending on whether the household had a rank-and-file member or a
committee member.
He concluded that the impact of microfinance on “rank-and-file” members is mostly
insignificant. The effects on “committee members” are quite different. They were
normally influential people in the village who got involved in questionable practices
such as borrowing in the name of individuals who no longer belonged to the bank or in
the name of relatives. Coleman reports a positive and significant impact on several of
the variables regarding assets, working hours, expenditure on education and even
money-lending for these committee members. The outcome of microfinance benefitting
wealthier people to a greater extent is consistent with Hulme and Mosley (1996) and
Copestake et al. (2005).
In Kondo et al. (2008) we find another pipeline approach. The survey took place in the
Philippines, on the islands of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, and the intervention was
the Rural Microenterprise Finance Project (RMFP). There were two groups of villages
(barangays), one in the zones where the program had been functioning for some time
and expansion zones in which the program was yet to be implemented. In the latter,
borrowers had already self-selected but funds had not yet been released. Controls are
not new microfinance centres in the same barangays in order to minimize the bias due
to spillover effects. They also include some old customers such as graduates and
defaulted borrowers in the participant’ group in order to minimize the attrition bias. The
impact of program availability is found positive on income per capita, per capita total
expenditures and per capita food expenditures. However, the impact is not significant
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for the poorer which is in tune again with Hulme and Mosley (1996), Copestake et al.
(2005) and Coleman (2006).
Finally, Tedeschi (2008) borrows from Coleman’s approach to control for selection bias
and applies it to the Peruvian AIMS study dataset (Dunn and Arbuckle, 2001). She
contends that some sources of bias are not properly addressed in any of these AIMS
studies and this causes an overstatement of microfinance impact.
She first runs an OLS regression in the first round of the survey and she finds no
geographical allocation bias. However, the participation dummies are significant, which
accounts for a positive selection bias. She later runs a pooled OLS with the two periods
and includes borrowing dummies again to control for bias. Her main finding is that
there is actually a positive and significant effect of microfinance on weekly and monthly
profits of microenterprises, although the impact is lower than in Dunn and Arbuckle
(2001). In the latter, she claims, the impact is overstated by selection bias. Finally, her
panel approach confirms the main outcomes. A similar approach will be applied to our
Andhra Pradesh dataset.
Group 5: General Equilibrium models, Two Stage Least Squares(2SLS) and Propensity
Score Matching.
The last classification group is composed of a set of works with miscellaneous
approaches from a methodological point of view.
In Thailand, through structural general equilibrium models of growth, Kaboski and
Townsend (2005) study the effect of the presence of (pseudo) financial institutions on
households that otherwise would have limited access to credit or savings facilities.
These economic models are different from all the previous techniques that are also
known as reduced-form estimations. They study the direct relationship between an
intervention and the outcome variable in the population under examination. The
economic models include the interrelationships among different endogenous and
exogenous variables and provide a schematic view of the effects of interventions within
this created framework. They can show a more holistic view of the possible effects of
the policies. They can also become very complex as in the case of macroeconomic
frameworks modelling financial regulation or taxes, as the effects are dynamic and
heterogeneous in different sectors of the population (Khandker et al., 2010).
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The institutions studied are Production Credit Groups (PCGs), which lend mostly cash
and also provide saving facilities, women’s groups and rice and buffalo banks. PCGs
are the most similar to an MFI. The outcome variables under study are growth in assets,
the probabilities of consumption smoothing, starting a business, switching the main job
or becoming a moneylender customer.
Cash loans (PCGs and women’s groups) are associated with stability or expansion of
services. These institutions can be associated with growth in assets, in contrast to
buffalo or rice banks. Institutions providing extra services such as training, emergency
attendance or savings increase the probability of consumption smoothing. Membership
of the women’s groups increases the probability of switching jobs, having pledged
saving accounts and it also increases job mobility and business start-ups. Finally,
institutions overall contribute to lessen the reliance on moneylenders.
Kaboski and Townsend (2009) measure the impact of a program called Million Baht
Village which consisted of transfer of one million baht to 77,000 Thai villages. The
sudden boost in credit availability is a good opportunity to have pre and post-program
information using a panel data approach. They use a 2SLS. The impact found is an
increase in borrowing, consumption and investments in agriculture. Income from
business and market activities is increased. Finally, the increase in wage rates reveals
general equilibrium effects that can be extended to non-borrowers as positive spillovers.
Finally, in Chemin (2008) we come back to the first round of the Bangladesh survey
(1991-92) to challenge PK outcomes using a Propensity Score Matching approach. The
characteristics that a dataset has to comply with in order to be adequate for a PSM study
are enumerated in Heckman et al. (1997). Controls and participants should come from
the same economic area. All the individuals should respond to the same questionnaire
and the set of questions should be rich in order to gather as much information as
possible of the relevant variables conditioning participation. The database complies with
all of them.
His argument to use this technique is that it does not rely on the eligibility criterion that
might bias the calculations in Pitt and Khandker (1998), Morduch (1998) and
Madajewicz, (2003). In all of them the underlying assumption is that the eligibility rule
is strictly observed when delimiting a group, which is erroneous. It does also neutralize
the allocation bias that could have been mishandled in Morduch, (1998), comparing
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individuals from poorer program villages to the ones from better-off non program
villages. In addition, PSM is a non- parametric approach so it does not assume any
underlying structure as linear regression would and will only match comparables. His
conclusions agree with PK on the positive effect of microfinance on expenditure but to
a lesser extent. The impact is estimated as a 3% increase of consumer expenditures, a
higher figure than Morduch (1998) but lower than PK whose calculations, Chemin
contends, might be upwardly biased.
Finally, Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011) use the same dataset and also PSM and
point out some limitations of Chemin’s analysis, mainly regarding its lack of sensitivity
analysis of the estimates to a potential bias from unobservables. They find positive
impact on some outcome variables but the estimates were quite sensitive to
unobservables. From the methodological point of view, they do not report any test for
the matching quality of the different algorithms, which might cast some doubts over
some of the estimates.
Table 1 below lists the papers reviewed. The range of dependent variables in these
studies is vast and in some papers its number is higher than one hundred. Some kind of
grouping was needed in order to tabulate the outcomes. We follow the one used in
Copestake et al. (2011) who divided the different dependent variables into three groups,
economic, social and empowerment indicators, including some of the following
example covariates (in the table the group number is used):
1. Economic outcome variables, including business profits and revenues, sales,
income/income p.c., consumption/expenditure, assets, employment, savings,
debts, poverty indices and others.
2. Social outcome indicators: children’s school enrolment, school attendance,
nutritional status, vulnerability to shocks, social capital, contraceptive use and
other.
3. Political outcome indicator: women’s empowerment.
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Table 1 Summary table of reviewed papers
R
C
T
s
Study Dependent variable groups Technique Main outcomes
(Banerjee et al., 2009)
[India]
1, 2, 3 RCT
Measures the ITT. The likelihood of new businesses is higher and statistically significant in treatment
areas. No significance is found with respect to business profits, inputs, revenues and employees. Impact on
per-capita overall expenditures and non-durable expenditures is insignificant but it is positive and
significant on durables, business related durables. No increase in health and education expenditures is
found either.
(Dupas and Robinson,
2009)[Kenya] 1, 2 RCT
Measures ITT, the effect of having assigned to the treatment and of using the account. The main findings
are a positive and significant impact on investment in business for women and food and private
expenditures. Non-significant impact is found on labour supply, overall expenditures and male investment
and expenditures. No crowding out effect with respect to ROSCA is found
(Karlan and Zinman,
2007) [South Africa] 1, 2 RCT
Profits are increased when owners are males, but not for female-owned. Male owners also increase the
school enrolment of children and are more likely to be employed at the family business. Increase of stress
is also significant for males. No impact is found on fixed assets, income and expenditures. Formal credit
seems to complement rather than substitute informal.
(Karlan and Zinman,
2009)
[Philippines] 1, 2 RCT
They create some indexes. Economic self-sufficiency index, including current employment status and
income experience a positive and significant increase for borrowers. The impact on index including
decision power and optimism is positive and significant but not so the impact on “investment and
durables” index. Borrowers also increase their stress and their consumption. Customers selected randomly
did not fall into a debt trap
(De Mel et al., 2008)
[Sri Lanka]
1 RCT
Grants increase profits by 5% per month or 60% per year. Marginal returns highest for more able
entrepreneurs and businesses with fewer workers. Impact is higher for male owned businesses and non-
significant for female-owned. Grants are also associated with an increase in capital stock and hours
worked by the owner. They find also negative spillovers in the economy in the neighbourhood of the
granted businesses.
(De Mel et al., 2009)
[Sri Lanka] 1, 2 RCT
They research further the differences between male and female-owned businesses. They do not find
significant differences in investment on education, groceries or health. Neither they do on ability, risk
aversion or the capacity to increase their hours worked. Male-owners tend to make profitable investment
in their enterprises while females did not generate, on average, a sustained source of income from grants.
Q
ua
sie
xp
er
im
en
ta
lA
pp
ro
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s
(Pitt and Khandker,
1998)[Bangladesh] 1, 2, 3 Regression discontinuity design
Female borrowers increase expenditures by 18 takas per 100 takas borrowed, males by 11 takas only. They
also found an increase in school enrolment and health indicators in borrowing households.
(Pitt, 1999)[Bangladesh] 1, 2 Regression discontinuity design Questions Morduch 1999 approach. Recalculates impact with additional land specifications and finds PKoutcomes quite robust to these changes.
(Morduch, 1998) [
Bangladesh] 1, 2 DID
Criticised PK approach and did not find any significant impact on expenditures as claimed in PK.
Microcredit is found to smooth consumption and labour income.
(Khandker,
2005)[Bangladesh] 1, 2 Panel Fixed Effects
The annual impact of female borrowing on expenditures is 21 takas per 100 extra takas borrowed. Impact
of past borrowing is higher than present borrowing. Moderate poverty is reduced by 1.6% per annum and
extreme poverty by 2.2% among participants. Attributes 40% of the village-level poverty reduction to
microfinance.
(Roodman and Morduch,
2009)[Bangladesh] 1, 2 Regression discontinuitydesign, Panel Fixed Effects
Replicate PK, Morduch 1999 and Khandker, 2005. Finds evidence neither of impact on consumption nor
of consumption smoothing. Khander’s 2005 approach is criticised for its weaknesses in its statistical
approach and therefore its outcomes are questioned.
(Copestake et al.,
2005)[Peru] 1 DID
Being a microfinance customer is associated with a higher monthly income. This impact is estimated to be
80% higher for wealthier individuals. Concerns were raised with respect to the methodology.
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(Bruhn and Love,
2009)[Mexico] 1 Panel FE
Impact studied at municipality level. Opening of Azteca branches increased the fraction of informal
business owner, male in particular. It also increases the fraction of female wage-earners but not males and
impact on income is significant after controlling for time trends. No significant impact is found with
respect to the share of people above the minimum wage.
(Barnes et al.,
2001)[Zimbabwe]
1,2,3 ANCOVA
Compares continuing clients with new clients and non-clients. Impact is positive and significant on the
number of household durable assets. Departing and continuing clients experience a rise in the education of
boys between 6-16 years old, but not for girls. Consumption smoothing effect also observed on departing
clients. Limited impact on monthly revenue and assets of enterprises and none on employment. Also
training was associated to improvements on management and participation in MFIs increases confidence.
(Chen and Snodgrass,
2001)[India] 1,2,3 ANCOVA
It compares borrowers vs. only savers vs. non-clients. Overall, borrowers and savers are better off than
non-clients. Borrowers show higher income in both periods and savers the highest rate of growth.
Borrowers increase their poverty rate in the second period, not the rest of groups. Repeating borrowers
have greater income and food expenditures.
(Dunn and Arbuckle,
2001)[Peru] 1,2,3 ANCOVA
Great impact at enterprise level. Shows a positive and significant impact on net revenues, enterprises fixed
assets, employment, sources of input supplies. At household level, income is increased for treated and
education expenditures are decreased for new entrant households. At individual level, the feel of being
more prepared to face the future is increased among participants.
(Coleman,
1999)[Thailand] 1, 2, 3 OLS
Finds no significant impact on physical assets, savings, production, sales, productive expenses, labour
time, and most measures of expenditure
on health care and education. The impact is positive and significant for women’s high interest debt,
women’s lending out with interest and negative and significant on men’s health care.
(Coleman,
2006)[Thailand] 1, 2, 3 OLS
No remarkable impact on rank-and-file members. Committee members experience positive and significant
impact on household wealth: women’s wealth, nonland assets and consumer durables. It is also positive on
savings, women’s self-employment sales and expenses and educational expenses for boys at committee
member households.
(Kondo et al.,
2008)[Philippines]
1,2 OLS
Impact of the presence of microfinance is positive and mildly significant on income, total expenditures and
food expenditures, all in per capita terms. It becomes insignificant and even negative when households are
poorer. Also increases also savings accounts and amounts in those accounts. Also increases program
client’s activities and their number of employees. No significant impact was found on household assets,
health or education.
(Tedeschi, 2008)[Peru] 1 OLS (pooled) & panel FE Challenges Dunn & Arbuckle, 2001. Increase in enterprises net revenues is still positive and significantbut much lower than reported in the former.
(Kaboski and Townsend,
2005)[Thailand] 1, 2
General Equilibrium Models, 2
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) &
Simultaneous Equation,
Maximum Likelihood
Production Credit Groups (PCGs similar to credit institutions) and women’s groups can be associated with
a positive impact on asset growth. Women’s group membership increases also consumption smoothing,
job mobility and moneylender reliance. PCGs, on the contrary, decreases job mobility, the likelihood of
starting a business and is not significant with respect to moneylender reliance.
(Kaboski and Townsend,
2009)[Thailand] 1,2 2SLS
Million Baht program: boost the availability of credit without crowding out other sources. There is an
increase in consumption levels and income growth but the impact on asset growth is negative. No
differences between female and male headed households with respect to credit or agricultural income but
female-headed show higher business income and lower probability of education expenditures.
(Chemin,
2008)[Bangladesh] 1, 2 Propensity Score Matching
Estimates impact on expenditures is 3%. Consumption smoothing is not found significant.
(Duvendack and Palmer-
Jones, 2011)
[Bangladesh] 1,2 Propensity Score Matching
They replicate Chemin (2008) and add some additional treated and control groups. Their conclusion is that
the estimates cannot be trusted as they are extremely sensitive to potential unobservables. They do not test
for matching quality and their sensitivity analysis could have been applied to the kernel instead to the
nearest neighbour.
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Conclusion
This review discusses many of the main references regarding microfinance impact
effect. Random studies are a promising alternative or complement to quasi
experimental approaches. Some issues have been raised regarding their validity and the
randomization processes that have to be considered before taking for granted the
randomized experiment assumptions. They are however at a quite early stage with
regard to social sciences but their repetition will allow us to test whether the
reservations put forward by some top academics (Rodrik, 2008; Deaton, 2010) are
confirmed or not. Quasi-experimental studies have a richer background of techniques
that try to improve in the quest for unbiased estimates although they need more complex
assumptions. However, this is not enough reason to state that they are inferior as impact
evaluation techniques.
Outcomes show that overall microfinance makes a difference in some variables and not
in others. Although they can be contradictory for the same variable in different studies,
the fact that it shows significant in many of them should encourage further study
regarding the extent of these effects. The pointed concerns with respect to internal
validity of all these studies in Copestake et al. (2011) also have to be taken into account.
Better surveying techniques are needed to confirm this optimistic view of microfinance,
as in their opinion almost none of the studies so far can support the argument of a
positive impact. Another question would be the effect of microfinance at different strata
of the targeted population. This has been pointed out by Coleman (2006), Copestake et
al. (2005), Hulme and Mosley (1996) and Kondo et al. (2008) and will also be
addressed in one of the studies of the present set of papers.
The following sections comprise a brief description of the theoretical background of the
techniques used in the present set of studies to find the impact of microfinance. In the
first section Propensity Score Matching is described and some differences with respect
to OLS are discussed. PSM is applied to the second round of the Bangladeshi dataset in
1998-99 . In the second empirical chapter OLS and DID or panel Fixed Effects are used
as in Tedeschi (2008). This will be the first chapter dealing with the Andhra Pradesh
dataset. In addition, the second empirical chapter on Andhra Pradesh dataset tries to
describe the quantile regression approach. In particular it will be found the distributional
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impact of microfinance basing on the analysis done in (Abrevaya and Dahl, 2008). The
latter, in turn, is based, on Chamberlain (1982) and Chamberlain (1984).
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Part II: Techniques of impact evaluation
There are several methods to estimate the impact and each method tackle the problem of
the missing counterfactual in a different way. Regarding Blundell and Costa Dias
(2000), the appropriate methodology depends on three factors: the information
available, the model and the parameter of interest. Khandker et al. (2010) enumerate and
explain in detail seven different approaches in their book:
 Randomized evaluations
 matching methods
 double difference methods
 instrumental variable methods
 regression discontinuity methods
 distributional impacts
 structural and other modelling approaches.
In our work some of these are used to some extent and a description of the essential
theoretical background of the most relevant techniques used in the empirical chapter is
included below.
Matching estimators and Propensity Score5.
Assumptions
As already seen, in the absence of random experiments, researchers have to turn to
quasi-experimental methods to solve the problem of selection bias. Within these,
matching is one of the most popular and Propensity Score Matching in particular has
been widely used in the last few years. In essence, it tries to resemble a random
experiment. Basically the method assumes that, once observables have been controlled
for, the differences between the treated and the control group is just participation. Thus,
differences in the dependent variable (income, expenditures or any other) between the
treated and the control group can be attributed to intervention.
Both OLS and matching methods and PSM in particular rely on this Conditional
Independence Assumption (CI) in the sense that they assume that bias is avoided by just
5 This section relies heavily on Caliendo, M. 2006. Microeconometric Evaluation Labour Market Policies.
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems No. 568, Berlin, Springer-Verlag., Chapter 1
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controlling for observables. But they also have differences, the main being that OLS
assume an underlying linear functional form and that PSM is a non-parametric method.
This CI assumption could be described more formally saying that outcomes values are
independent of the participation, given a set X of covariates:
௜ܻ,ଵ, ௜ܻ,଴ ⊥ ܦ௜|ܺ௜ (1.8)
where  means “statistically independent of”. Thus:
ܧ൫ܻ ௜,଴หܺ ௜,ܦ௜= 1൯= ൫ܻ ௜,଴หܺ ௜,ܦ௜= 0൯ (1.9)
and therefore the selection bias is not present any more. Apart from Conditional
Independence this assumption has been named in literature as Ignorability,
Unconfoundedness or Selection on Observables.
However, a great size of ܺ௜(number of covariates) might bring about difficulties in the
matching process. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983a) showed that matching can be done
more easily conditioning on ܲ(ܺ௜) = Pr(ܦ௜|ܺ௜). In order to do this, they establish a
second condition that has been called Overlapping Assumption or Common Support6
(CS) condition: 0 < ܲ(ܦ௜= 1|ܺ௜) < 1 (1.10)
This second condition entails that all the individuals have a positive probability of
belonging to both the treatment and the control group. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983a)
name these two conditions, unconfoundedness and common support, as the “strong
ignorability” condition.
When only the ATT is of interest, these conditions can adopt a laxer form. In the case of
the unconfoundedness assumption, the following will be enough:
௜ܻ,଴ ⊥ ܦ௜|ܺ௜ (1.11)
also called “unconfoundedness for controls”.
6 Support is a statistical concept that includes the values where the density function is found to be
different from zero. In this case it would be the values for which the probability is not zero. Ibid.
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In the case of CS:
ܲ(ܦ௜= 1|ܺ௜) < 1 (1.12)
also called “weak overlap”.
These are enough to calculate ATT, as the ܲ(ܦ = 1) with participation is directly
observable.
The overlapping condition establishes that individuals with the same propensity score
can be observed in both states. However, Heckman et al. (1997) showed that matching
is only justified in the common support range, where the propensity scores of both
treated and controls are positive.
Bias
The selection bias is already defined in (1.5) above. Conditioning on covariates and
omitting ݅subscripts, bias is defined as ܤ(ܺ):
ܤ(ܺ) = ܧ( ଴ܻ|ܺ,ܦ = 1) − ܧ( ଴ܻ|ܺ,ܦ = 0) (1.13)
The bias is defined over the group of covariates X that are shared by both participants
and non participants. Heckman et al. (1996) establish that the support of X for
participants is different from that for non-participants. The former is referred to as ଵܵ௑
or ݏݑ݌݌݋ݎݐ(ܺ|ܦ = 1) and the latter as ଴ܵ௑ or ݏݑ݌݌݋ݎݐ(ܺ|ܦ = 0). The mean of the
bias can be defined as follows:
ܤതௌ೉ = ∫ ܤ(ܺ)݀ܨ(ܺ|ܦ = 1)ௌ೉
∫ ݀ܨ(ܺ|ܦ = 1)
ௌ೉
(1.14)
where ௑ܵ = ܵ ௑ଵ∩ ௑ܵ଴ the common support area or the area where density of X is
positive for both participants and non participants. ܨ(ܺ|ܦ = 1) is the conditional
density of X given participation or ܦ = 1.
The selection bias can be rewritten as:
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ܤ = න ܧ( ଴ܻ|ܦ = 1,ܺ)
ௌభ೉
݀ܨ(ܺ|ܦ
= 1) −න ܧ( ଴ܻ|ܦ = 0,ܺ)
ௌబ೉
݀ܨ(ܺ|ܦ = 0) (1.15)
and they decompose the formula further until they end up contending that selection bias
is composed of three different sources of bias:
ܤ = ܤଵ + ܤଶ + ܤଷ (1.16)
The first source, ܤଵ can be written as:
ܤଵ = න ܧ( ଴ܻ|ܦ = 1,ܺ)
ௌభ೉\ௌ೉ ݀ܨ(ܺ|ܦ = 1)
−න ܧ( ଴ܻ|ܦ = 0,ܺ)
ௌబ೉\ௌ೉ ݀ܨ(ܺ|ܦ = 0) (1.17)
where ଵܵ௑\ ௑ܵ is the support of X given ܦ = 1 that is out of the overlap area ௑ܵ and
଴ܵ௑\ ௑ܵ is the same for ܦ = 0. This first source of bias comes from the fact that it is
sometimes difficult to find good matches or counterparts in the overlapping or common
support area ௑ܵ.
The second source of bias, ܤଶ is expressed as follows:
ܤଶ = න ܧ( ଴ܻ|ܺ,ܦ = 0)
ௌ೉
[݀ܨ(ܺ|ܦ = 1) − ݀ܨ(ܺ|ܦ = 0) (1.18)
In this case the problem is of weights within the common support area ௑ܵ . This is
caused because even within this common support area there might be great differences
in the distribution of covariates X for participants and controls.
Finally, the third bias source is given by ܤଷ:
ܤଷ = ௑ܲܤതௌ೉ (1.19)
where ௑ܲ = ∫ ݀ܨ(ܺ|ܦ = 1)ௌ೉ is the proportion of density of X given ܦ = 1 in the
common support area. This third source of bias is given when the unconfoundedness
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assumption doesn’t hold because the observables don’t explain participation or the
outcomes properly. They are also affected by non-observed characteristics.
How does PSM deal with these sources of bias? The first source, ܤଵ is avoided by
matching observations that are within the common support area only and therefore
treated and controls outside Common Support area (belonging to ଵܵ௑\ ௑ܵ or ଴ܵ௑\ ௑ܵ ,
respectively) are discarded. The second problem of reweighting (ܤଶ) is fought through
the matching process. In it, the weights of controls would depend on the algorithm used
in the matching process. Finally, Heckman et al. (1998) contend that the only source of
bias that cannot be avoided in this process is the third (ܤଷ), although they contend that
it is the smallest source and therefore outcomes might well be relied upon.
Propensity score vs. OLS in handling selection bias.
Propensity Score Matching and OLS techniques are both based on the Conditional
Independence assumption, that is, they rely on the observables to handle the selection
bias. The main difference with PSM is that OLS assumes a linear functional form.
According to Caliendo (2006), in the case of OLS in the Neymar’s Rubin formula (1.1)
(omitting the subscripts i) the term ଵܻ is substituted by ܺߚଵ + ܷଵ and ଴ܻ by ܺߚ଴ + ܷ଴,
where ܷ refers to the error term. In this case the Conditional Independence is given by
the formula:
ܷ଴,ܷଵ ⊥ ܦ|ܺ (1.20)
that is, the error term has to be independent of participation given the set of covariates.
The main differences between the PSM and OLS approaches are described below:
 First, PSM is a non parametric estimator and therefore the underlying functional
form is not important. In the case of OLS, it is assumed that this functional form
is linear. Thus, even when the appropriate covariates are used the estimates
could be biased if we fail to include the proper higher order or interaction terms.
On the other hand, if the outcome equation happens to be linear and we correctly
set up the model, the estimates are more efficient.
 Also, assumptions for the bias are different for PSM and OLS. In the case of the
former, it is only necessary that mean of error in the treated, given X, has to be
equal to the mean of error in the controls. This means that:
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ܤ௑ = ܧ(ܷଵ|ܺ,ܦ = 1) − ܧ(ܷ଴|ܺ,ܦ = 0) = 0 (1.21)
Thus, as long as this holds, it is possible to use covariates that are correlated
with the error term. This is not possible in the case of OLS, as it has to hold that:
ܧ(ܷଵ|ܺ,ܦ = 1) = ܧ(ܷ଴|ܺ,ܦ = 0) = 0 (1.22)
in order to guarantee independence between covariates in the outcome equation
and the error term.
 Another important difference is that PSM takes place only over the common
support area. PSM discards observations in ଵܵ௑\ ௑ܵ (C in Figure 3) and ଴ܵ௑\ ௑ܵ
(A in Figure 3) and calculates impact only in the common support area ௑ܵ (B,
also in Figure 3). On the contrary, OLS is not limited to observations that are
close with respect to the set of covariates X (B in Figure 3) but it uses all of
them (A + B + C). When no observations are present, the linear function
substitutes them and extrapolates to ଵܵ௑\ ௑ܵ or ଴ܵ௑\ ௑ܵ . In the graph, no
conditional mean outcome with no treatment is present in C, but OLS will
calculate it with the observations in A and B and extrapolate to C.
 Finally, PSM is more adequate to catch heterogeneity in the impact effect and it
is less problematic with regard to the scale of the outcome variable.
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Figure 3 Common Support Area. Source: Caliendo (2006), page 37
The choice of the PSM approach in the first paper rather than OLS is justified mainly
because being a non-parametric technique and given the difficulty of knowing the
appropriate functional form, we do not need to know the underlying outcome function.
Also, we can use covariates in the model that are related to the error term in the
outcome equation. The common support area is not such a concern as, as will be seen
later, only a marginal share of observations lie out of its bounds.
Sensitivity analysis
Different types of bias were described above. While the first was handled by matching
in the common support and the second reweighting the treated observations, the bias
due to unobservables (ܤଷ) cannot be avoided through PSM. Despite the fact that it is
assumed by a literature that this is the minor source of bias, it has been attempted to
model the possible effect of these unobservables.
The main source for the handling of hidden bias is Rosenbaum (2002), where the
theoretical background of other attempts to assess this bias are based (Becker and
Caliendo, 2007). He distinguishes between overt bias and hidden bias. The first is
observable from the data. The latter is one that “cannot be seen because the required
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information was not observed or recorded”. In the case of randomization we end up
with two samples, treated and controls, with equally distributed observables and
unobservables and this hidden bias can be discarded.
The theoretical framework created in Rosenbaum (2002) is briefly described as follows.
There are two individuals i and j and the set of observables for each of them are ݔ௜and
ݔ௝ respectively. They have the same observables and therefore ݔ௜= ݔ௝. The chance of
receiving treatment is different, though, and therefore ܲ(ݔ௜) ≠ ܲ(ݔ௝). These
observations can be matched in order to control for bias on observables. The odds of i
and j receiving treatment are, respectively ܲ(ݔ௜)/(1 − ܲ(ݔ௜)) and ܲ(ݔ௝)/(1 − ܲ(ݔ௝))
and the odds ratio:
ܲ(ݔ௜)1 − ܲ(ݔ௜)
ܲ(ݔ௝)1 − ܲ(ݔ௝) =
ܲ(ݔ௜)(1 − ܲ(ݔ௝))
ܲ(ݔ௝)(1 − ܲ(ݔ௜)) (1.23)
It is also assumed that the odds ratio has at most a value of Γ ≥ 1 for units with the
same x. Thus: 1
Γ
≤
ܲ(ݔ௜)(1 − ܲ(ݔ௝))
ܲ(ݔ௝)(1 − ܲ(ݔ௜)) ≤ Γ (1.24)
In the case in which Γ = 1, ܲ(ݔ௜) = ܲ (ݔ௝) and therefore the estimation is not biased
due to hidden bias. However, when Γ = 3, for example, despite the fact that ݔ௜= ݔ௝ the
odds of receiving treatment change dramatically and one is three times more likely than
the other. In these circumstances the sensitivity bias will look at the estimates with
different values of Γ. If the odds are quite different and the estimates do not change
much, the estimation would be said to be robust to big departures from the standard of
no hidden bias or Γ = 1. On the other hand, for values of Γ not quite high where the
estimates change a lot, it would be said they are quite sensitive to the presence of hidden
bias.
Rosenbaum (2002) established techniques to find out the bounds of inference quantities,
p values and confidence intervals and a few methods of sensitivity analysis. Some other
approaches have been developed with regard to sensitivity analysis but all are based on
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Rosenbaum’s theoretical background. (Nannicini, 2007, Becker and Caliendo, 2007,
Gangl, 2007, Ichino et al., 2007) are all based on the former. We adopt the approach
contained in Ichino et al. (2007) and Nannicini (2007).
OLS, DID and Panel Data
The main issue with the quasi experiments is that they are not random. In the case of the
India dataset, it would have also been desirable that the pipeline dataset, corresponding
to 2005, would have been collected before having implemented the microfinance
scheme. However the dataset was collected long after the microfinance schemes had
been introduced. Therefore, there was no way of studying some households before and
after the implementation of the projects. This characteristic is, though, common to many
of the studies based on two periods databases reviewed so far: Khandker (2005),
Copestake et al. (2005), AIMS projects and Tedeschi (2008).
The base for Tedeschi (2008) is Coleman (1999 and 2006) in terms of theoretical
ground and Dunn and Arbuckle (2001) for the dataset. In Coleman (1999), the model is
the following:
௜ܻ=∝ +ܺ௜௝ߚ+ ܯܧܯܤܧܴ௜௝ߜ+ ܣܿܿ ݁ܶݏ ݅݉ ௜݁௝߶ + ௝ܸߠ+ ߝ௜௝ (1.25)
where
 ௜ܻ is the dependent variable related with income, consumption, health and others.
 ܺ is a set of HH level variables
 ܯܧܯܤܧܴ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for participants and self selected
households in those areas where the village banks are not serving money yet.
 ܣܿܿ ݁ܶݏ ݅݉ ݁ is a time variable which is the total time that the program has been
available to members who have self selected. This is positive for participants in
program villages only. It is zero for non participants in program villages and for
all the individuals in control villages, both those self-selected to receive loans in
the future plus those who did not show any interest in being village bank
members.
 ௝ܸ is a vector of village fixed effects (dummies) variables that corrects
programme allocation bias.
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Basically Coleman controls for observables through some covariates. Village variables
(ܸ ) control for allocation bias and finally he controls for unobservables that lead
individuals to borrow with a dummy (ܯܧܯܤܧܴ ) that takes the value of one for
borrowers and zero for non-borrowers. Thus, the estimate for the variable containing the
access time to credits (ܣܿܿ ݁ܶݏ ݅݉ ݁), he contends, gathers the unbiased impact of
program availability per month.
In Coleman (2006) he changed the specifications and split ܯܧܯܤܧܴ into 2 different
categories, ܯܧܯܤܧܴ݇ݎ if the houshehold had a rank and file member and
ܯܧܯܤܧܴܿ݉ if the household had a committee member. Similarly, ܣܿܿ ݁ܶݏ ݅݉ ݁ is
divided into ܣܿܿ ݁ܶݏ ݅݉ ݁݇ݎ and ܣܿܿ ݁ܶݏ ݅݉ ݁ܿ ݉ expressing the different length of time
of access to the program by rank and file members and committee members
respectively. The model is:
௜ܻ=∝ +ܺ௜௝ߚ+ ܯܧܯܤܧܴ݇ݎ ௜௝ߜ+ ܯܧܯܤܧܴܿ݉ ௜௝ߛ+ ܣܿܿ ݁ܶݏ ݅݉ ݁݇ݎ ௜௝߶+ ܣܿܿ ݁ܶݏ ݅݉ ݁ܿ ݉ ௜௝ߟ+ ௝ܸߠ+ ߝ௜௝ (1.26)
This is interesting because it allows estimation of the impact for subsamples of
participants, which will be relevant in one of our works.
Tedeschi (2008) follows Coleman’s model but applies it to a panel dataset with two
time periods from one of the AIMS studies (Dunn and Arbuckle, 2001). She first
discards allocation bias and then runs a pooled OLS model which includes a dummy for
the second year round (1999) and that is basically Coleman’s equation (1.26):
௜ܻ௧ = ܺ௜௧ߚ+ ݁ݕ ܽݎ99߳+ ܰݑ݉ܦ ܽݕݏܥݎ௜௧߶ + ܣ݉݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௧߰+ ܧ݁ݒ ܾݎ ݋ݎݎ௜ߜ+ ߝ௜௧ (1.27)
where
 Y: In Tedeschi’s case is microenterprises profits, either weekly or monthly and
X is a group of several variables including credit variables and
household/entrepreneur’s variables. The loan variables are dummies
categorizing the subjects by their borrowing behaviour.
 ܺ includes a set of variables at individual level
 ݕ݁ܽ ݎ99 is a dummy for year 1999
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 ܰݑ݉ܦܽݕݏܥݎ is a variable with the time length of credit,
 ܣ݉݋ݑ݊ݐis the quantity borrowed and the variable
 ܧ݁ݒ ܾݎ ݋ݎݎ is a dummy that takes the value of one if the subject has borrowed at
least once and zero otherwise.
The latter variable controls for those unobservables that lead the household to borrow. If
we compare with Coleman’s model above (1.26), the variable ܧ݁ݒ ܾݎ ݋ݎݎdoes the same
as ܯܧܯܤܧܴ. Everborrow takes the value of one when the observation borrowed at
least once. Thus, it considers as treated not only those that borrowed twice (survivors),
but also those that borrowed only in the first or the second period.
She compares this model with another “naïve” model. They are called naive because
they plainly compare borrowers vs. non borrowers not taking into account that
borrowers have unobserved characteristics that make them better off than non borrowers
even in the absence of microfinance. These are gathered by the member (or everborrow)
dummy. In the naive model ܧ݁ݒ ܾݎ ݋ݎݎ is not present and therefore the impact of
microfinance is overstated but it is reduced when this dummy is included.
To underpin this conclusion, she finally does a fixed effects panel data approach:
௜ܻ௧ = ܺ௜௧ߚ+ ܰݑ݉ܦܽݕݏܥݎ௜௧߶ + ܣ݉݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௧߰ + ߩ௜+ ߝ௜௧ (1.28)
where time invariant variables are withdrawn from X and ߩ௜ is a household fixed effect.
She finds a positive and significant effect of microfinance on weekly and monthly
profits of microenterprises, although the impact is lower than in Dunn and Arbuckle
(2001) as in the latter, she claims, it is overstated due to the selection bias.
Given the assumption that the unobservables that can influence both the outcome
variable and participation are controlled with the participation dummy, differences in
evaluations between panel and pooled OLS approaches are not expected to be great.
This is so in Tedeschi (2008) and also in our study. Both the DID approach and panel
data fixed effects approach provide with exactly the same estimates in this context of a
panel with two time periods.
DID
The DID approach is clearly described in Figure 4 taken from Armendariz de Aghion
and Morduch (2005). In particular, in the field of microfinance impact studies, this
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technique has been used by Morduch (1998), Copestake et al. (2005) and Kondo et al.
(2008). Its main point is to assume that unobservables influencing both participation in
microfinance and the outcome variables (called ܽ above) are time invariant so they can
be swept out by differencing and therefore end up with a clean, unbiased estimation of
the impact of microfinance.
61
Figure 4 DID approach graphically. Souce: Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010
Treated Non Treated
Microfinance impact
Broad economic
changes
Broad economic
changes
Unmeasured
attributes Unmeasured attributes
Unmeasured
attributes Unmeasured attributes
Measured attributes Measured attributes Measured attributes Measured attributes
Village attributes Village attributes Village attributes Village attributes
T1 T2 C1 C2
Year 0 Year 1 Year 0 Year 1
The idea is to isolate the effect of the shadowed area (Microfinance impact) on income.
In a first stage, two subtractions are done: (T2 – T1) in the case of the treated and (C2 –
C1) in the case of the control group. In the case of the treated, we are left with the
effects on income caused by the broad economic changes plus the microfinance impact.
In the control group, just with the effects caused by the economic changes. This is the
first difference. The second difference that isolates the effect of microfinance is given
by (T2 – T1) – (C2 – C1), resulting in the effect of the shadowed cell on income. Again,
as is warned by these authors, it is assumed that the effects of personal characteristics
such as entrepreneurial vocation, negotiation skills, ability or education are constant
along time. In the present dataset, with information collected within a two years period,
this is not a strong assumption.
The difference in difference model is explained more technically following Wooldridge
(2002, chs. 13 & 14). Suppose we have the following equation in a pooled dataset:
௜ܻ,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܻ݁ܽ ݎ2 + ߚଶܲݎ݋݃ ܽݎ ݉ ௜,௧+ ߚଷܺ௜,௧+ ௜ܽ+ ݑ௜,௧ (1.29)
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for t = 1, 2 and where i refers to observations, the units studied: individuals, households,
states…, t stands for time and ௜ܻ,௧ is the outcome variable. On the right hand side:
 ߚ଴ the intercept,
 ܻ݁ܽ ݎ2 is a dummy variable taking the value of 0 for observations in the first
period and 1 for those in the second period.
 ܲݎ݋݃ ܽݎ ݉ ௜,௧ is also a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the observation i
belongs to the treated group and 0 otherwise, in time period t.
 ܺ௜,௧ is the vector for observed variables such as age, sex, religion, household size
and others.
 ௜ܽdoes not have the t subscript because it gathers those unobservables, time
invariant factors that influence ௜ܻ,௧. It is known as “unobserved effect” or “fixed effect”
to remind that it is constant over time and “unobserved heterogeneity”. Therefore,
model (1.29) is also known as “unobserved effects models” or “fixed effects models”.
 ݑ௜,௧is called the idiosyncratic error, unobservables that affect ௜ܻ,௧ and that change
over time.
In order to estimate the impact of the program or the intervention, a “naïve” approach,
as named in Tedeschi, (2008) would be to run a standard OLS regression:
௜ܻ,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܻ݁ܽ ݎ2 + ߚଶܲݎ݋݃ ܽݎ ݉ ௜,௧+ ߚଷܺ௜,௧+ ݒ௜,௧ (1.25)
for t = 1, 2 and where ݒ௜,௧ = ܽ ௜+ ݑ௜,௧ and is often called the composite error.
This approach would not provide with consistent estimators as ݒ௜,௧ is not uncorrelated
with ܺ௜,௧ due to the correlation between ܺ௜,௧with ௜ܽ. This is true for single or pooled
OLS regression for both years. Although this kind of error has been named
“heterogeneity” bias, it is not more than a bias due to omitted (time constant) variables
(Wooldridge, 2002). In Tedeschi (2008) the inclusion in the pooled OLS of the
“everborrow” variable is the equivalent to controlling for ௜ܽ and it avoids this
“heterogeneity bias”.
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Having the equations for years 1 and 2, a simple operation can be done to sweep out the
unobserved, time invariant factors:
௜ܻ,ଶ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ + ߚଶܲݎ݋݃ ܽݎ ݉ ௜,ଶ + ߚଷܺ௜,ଶ + ௜ܽ+ ݑ௜,ଶ (1.26)
௜ܻ,ଵ = ߚ଴ + 0 + ߚଶܲݎ݋݃ ܽݎ ݉ ௜,ଵ + ߚଷܺ௜,ଵ + ௜ܽ+ ݑ௜,ଵ (1.27)
Subtracting (1.27) from (1.26), we end up with:
௜ܻ,ଶ− ௜ܻ,ଵ = ߚଵ + ߚଶ(ܲݎ݋݃ ܽݎ ݉ ௜,ଶ− ܲݎ݋݃ ܽݎ ݉ ௜,ଵ)+ ߚଷ(ܺ௜,ଶ− ܺ௜,ଵ) + (ݑ௜,ଶ− ݑ௜,ଵ) (1.28)
also written as
Δ ௜ܻ= ߚଵ + ߚଶΔܲݎ݋݃ ܽݎ ݉ ௜+ ߚଷΔܺ௜+ Δݑ௜ (1.29)
This is called the first differenced equation. Thanks to this simple operation the time
invariant unobservables are wiped out. A standard OLS regression would provide with
consistent estimators of the parameter of interest, ߚଶ which will be the impact of the
program. This is called the first-difference estimator or difference in difference
estimator.
The former is true provided that the error term ݑ௜,௧ is uncorrelated with the observable
characteristics ܺ௜,௧ in both periods, and therefore, Δݑ௜ is uncorrelated with Δܺ௜. This is
called the strict exogeneity assumption, and can be expressed as
ܧ(ܺ௜௦ݑ௜௧) = 0 (1.30)
for s,t = 1, 2, …T and s≠t and where explanatory variables in each time period have to
be uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error at any time period.
This method has an advantage for the present study due to its simplicity and easiness
when omitting the selection bias. However, some comments have still to be made:
 The unobserved characteristics such as entrepreneurial abilities, negotiation
skills and others are assumed to be constant, when they might improve with
experience, for example. Therefore, this might be a strong assumption when
working with a long period of time. In a 2 years period this assumption seems
quite sensible.
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 When subtracting one equation from the other, it is not only time invariant
unobservables that are wiped out, but also observables that do not change over
time or rarely do: gender, religion or mainly a district location. Therefore, the
influence of these time invariant factors cannot be identified and this might be a
problem from a policy point of view.
Panel data
In order to avoid the fixed effect, ௜ܽ, an alternative technique is used in econometrics,
the fixed effects transformation within the framework of panel data. As stated in
Wooldridge (2002)7 when there are two periods of time and the same observations in
both times, fixed effects estimation and DID produce identical estimates and inference.
For illustrative purpose we briefly introduce the technique.
The transformation in this case is slightly different. We depart from the following
equation:
௜ܻ,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܺ௜,௧+ ௜ܽ+ ݑ௜,௧ (1.31)
We can find the average per observation i over time and write:
തܻ
௜= ߚ଴ + ߚଵ തܺ௜+ ௜ܽ+ ݑത௜ (1.32)
where
തܻ
௜= ܶିଵ෍ ௜ܻ,௧்
௧ୀଵ
, തܺ௜= ܶିଵ෍ ܺ௜,௧்
௧ୀଵ
ܽ݊݀ݑത௜= ܶିଵ෍ ݑ௜,௧்
௧ୀଵ
Subtracting (1.32) from (1.31)
௜ܻ,௧− തܻ௜= ߚଵ൫ܺ ௜,௧− തܺ௜൯+ ൫ݑ௜,௧− ݑത௜൯ t = 1, 2, … T (1.33)
also expressed as
ܻ̈௜௧ = ߚଵܺ̈௜௧+ ̈ݑ௜௧ t = 1, 2 … T (1.34)
7 Chapter 10, exercise 10.3 proving that DID estimates are equal to panel FE when there are
two time periods.
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where ܻ̈௜௧ = ܻ ௜,௧− ܻത௜, ܺ̈௜௧ = ܺ ௜,௧− തܺ௜ܽ݊݀ݑሷ௜௧ =ݑ௜,௧− ݑത௜.
This transformation is also called the within transformation and it also allows us to
remove ௜ܽ. Equation (1.34) can be estimated through a pooled OLS estimator also
called fixed effects estimator or within estimator. This permits correlation between ௜ܽ
and the explanatory variables. Under strict exogeneity, (idiosyncratic error ݑ௜,௧
uncorrelated with each explanatory variable across all periods 1, 2… T) the fixed effects
estimator is unbiased. The same drawbacks with respect to time invariant variables
apply.
Instrumental Variable8
The design of the model in the second study is quite sensitive to the possibility of
reverse causality. This is explained because of the relationship between per capita
income and microfinance borrowing with higher income households borrowing more
than lower income households.
In formal terms, one of the axial assumptions of the OLS model, that the variables are
not stochastic (E(u|X) = 0), does not hold. When the dependent variable is correlated
with the error term, the OLS estimator ߚመ= ∑ ݔ௜ݕ௜௜
∑ ݔ௜ ௜
ଶ൘ is not consistent, that is, it
does not converge to the population parameter when the number of observations in the
sample grows (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). In this case, the instrumental variable
approach provides consistent and unbiased estimates for the variables of interest (Reilly,
2009a).
This instrumental approach uses a variable, called z, whose main characteristic is that its
variations are linked to changes in x, the endogenous regressor, but it is independent of
the dependent variable (ݕ) variations.
Formally, if the error term is defined as ݑ௜= ݕ௜− ߚݔ௜, then the variable ݖ௜should be
such that :
ଵ
௡
∑ ݖ௜(ݕ௜− ߚݔ௜) = 0௡௜ୀଵ or ݋ܿݒ(ݖ௜ݑ௜) = 0. (IV.1)
8 The description of the IV theoretical background relies heavily on Reilly (2009a).
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From the above estimator, the instrumental variable estimator ߚሙcan be expressed as:
ߚሙ= ∑ ݖ௜ݕ௜௡௜ୀଵ ∑ ݖ௜ݔ௜௡௜ୀଵ൘ (IV.2)
This is the Two-Stage Least Squares procedure (2SLS). If both numerator and
denominator are divided by ∑ ݖ௜ଶ௡௜ୀଵ , then it can be seen that the 2SLS estimator is the
ratio of a bivariate regression of ݕ௜on ݖ௜(numerator) and the denominator of ݔ௜on ݖ௜.
In the 2SLS approach, there are two equations, the structural equation and the reduced
form equation. The structural equation can be defined as follows:
ݕ௜= ߚ଴ + ߚଵݔ௜+ ߚଶݓଵ,௜+⋯+ ߚ௞ݓ௞,௜+ ݑ௜ (IV.3)
where ݕ௜ is the dependent variable and ݔ௜ is the endogenous variable which has to be
substituted by the instrumental variable, correlated with ݔ௜but independent of the error
term.
The reduced form equation is:
ݔ௜= ߨ଴ + ߨଵݖଵ,௜+⋯+ ߨ௠ ݖ௠ ,௜+ ߨ௠ ାଵݓଵ,௜+⋯+ ߚ௠ ା௞ݓ௞,௜+ ݒ௜ (IV.4)
where ݔ௜ is a function of all exogenous variables in the structural equation plus a set of
instrumental variables ݖଵ− ݖ௠ . When the number of instrumental variables is equal to
the number of endogenous regressors ݔ௜, it is said that the model is exactly identified.
When the number of instruments is higher than the endogenous regressors, the model is
said to be overidentified.
The OLS regression is applied to the reduced form equation to obtain the estimates of
the endogenous variables, ݔଵෞ …ݔ௡ෞ . These estimates are then inserted into the structural
equation in substitution of the problematic variable(s), ݔ௜:
ݕ௜= ߙ଴ + ߙଵݔపෝ + ߙଶݓଵ,௜+⋯+ ߙ௞ݓ௞,௜+ ݑ௜ (IV.5)
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Again, an OLS is run. If the instrument (ݖ௜) is independent of the error term and
correlated to the endogenous or problematic variable, then ݔపෝ is independent of the error
term and therefore the estimates are consistent.
When implementing the instrumental variable approach, the main difficulty is to find a
proper instrument. In theory, if the instruments satisfy the conditions they should be
suitable for this approach. The main difficulty is, however, that testing independence
from the error term has proved to be non-conclusive. In addition, the independence tests
can only be run in the presence of overidentification, when the number of instruments is
higher than the number of endogenous variables. There have been a number of tests for
independence, the best known of which is the Sargan test. In it, even when the null of
orthogonality to the error term cannot be rejected, we cannot conclude that the
instruments are valid.
For this reason, the validity of the instrument has to be supported by strong arguments
based on economic theory or prior empirical evidence (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
Also, instruments that are created through some sort of random process, such as sending
invitations randomly to potential participants, have become popular.
However, validity also depends on the degree of correlation between the instrument and
the endogenous variable. When the association between them is not relevant the
instruments are said to be weak. The main drawback in the presence of weak
instruments is that the estimation is less precise, standard errors grow larger and t
statistics remain much smaller. When the association between the instrument and the
endogenous variable is high, the instrument is said to be relevant. The relevance of the
instrument is tested with an F-test in the reduced form equation:
ܪ଴:ߨଵ =ߨଶ = ⋯ = ߨ௠ = 0
ܪ௔:ܪ଴ is not true
As a rule of thumb, if the F value is less than 10, the instrument set is said to be weak
and if above 10, the instrument can be considered relevant.
With respect to orthogonality to the error term, the Sargan test is implemented as
follows:
1. We derive the residuals, ݑపෝ, obtained from equation (IV.5)
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2. Then these residuals are regressed over the instruments and the exogenous
regressors:
ݑపෝ = ߶଴ + ߶ଵݖଵ,௜+⋯+ ߶௠ ݖ௠ ,௜+ ߶௠ ାଵݓଵ,௜+⋯+ ߶௠ ା௞ݓ௠ ା௞,௜+ ௜݁
(IV.6)
The Sargan test (ST) is defined as:
ܵܶ = (݊− ݃)ܴଶ~ ௠߯ ି௥ଶ
where
 n is sample size
 g is the number of parameters in the structural equation
 r is the number of endogenous or problematic variables
 m is the number of instruments.
The null hypothesis show potential independence of the instrument(s) from the error
term, although failing to reject the null does not necessarily imply that the instrument is
exogenous.
Finally, when we are before a relevant and independent instrument, an exogeneity test
can be done over the potentially endogenous variable. One of the best known is the Wu-
Hausman test. In it, the residuals from (IV.4), are named ݒపෝ . They are included
afterwards as a dependent variable in the following OLS regression:
ݕ௜= ߚ଴ + ߚଵݔ௜+ ߚଶݓଵ,௜+⋯+ ߚ௞ݓ௞,௜+ ߛݒపෝ + ݑ௜ (IV.7)
The test is implemented as a t-test, with the following hypothesis:
ܪ଴:ߛ = 0
ܪ௔:ߛ ≠ 0
Under the null hypothesis we cannot reject exogeneity and therefore the original OLS
model is more adequate than the IV approach.
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An Instrumental Variable approach will be used in the second empirical chapter, the
first on the Andhra Pradesh dataset. This intends to test for potential endogeneity but the
Wu-Hausman test eventually rejects endogeneity.
MM estimators and Outliers
The presence of outliers in a dataset challenges the estimates obtained through Least
Squares methods, as they are sensitive to these abnormal values. The presence of a good
number of outliers in the Andhra Pradesh dataset lead to the implementation of a MM
estimator regression. The main reason is that when outliers are present the least squares
estimation gives much more importance to observations with large residuals and this
can bias the estimation of the parameters (Verardi and Croux, 2008).
Outliers can be sorted according to their abnormal values. There can be abnormal values
of Y, which has been already shown in the graphs as income/income per capita outliers.
Also, there might be observations with combinations of explanatory variables that
strongly influence the estimates. The former have been given the name of vertical
outliers. They mainly influence the estimated intercept and their effect on the least
squares estimation is termed “discrepancy”. The latter are called bad leverage points
(Rousseeuw and Leroy 2003). They affect the least squares estimation by changing not
only the intercept but also the slope of the regression line (Verardi and Croux, 2008).
This effect is called “leverage”. Therefore, the effect of outliers can be summarized as
follows (Kohler and Kreuter, 2005):
Influence = discrepancy x leverage
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Figure 5. Outliers classification. Source: Verardi and Croux (2008)
There have been several alternative methods to surmount the drawbacks of Least
Squares methods (LS) in the presence of outliers. In LS the process of squaring gives
more weight to those observations with greater deviation from the regression line.
Median regression, also known as Least Absolute Deviation (LAD), minimizes the sum
of the absolute values of the residuals and can be adopted as a solution to this problem.
However, although this method is efficient against vertical outliers, it is not so against
bad leverage points. Therefore, it solves the problem of discrepancy but not the leverage
issues.
Another option is the M-estimators. They basically identify the outliers and use a
Weighted Least Squares (WLS) approach to find the estimates. The implementation of
the method is an Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares (IRLS) algorithm which reduces
the weights of observations identified as outliers. However, the outlier identification
process has some inconsistencies that make this option not robust in some instances,
especially in the presence of clusters of outliers. Therefore it does not solve the problem
of bad leverage points in all cases. Finally, S-estimators try to solve the problem of LS
by replacing the square function in the former by a loss function that gives less
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importance to large residuals. Its drawback is that it has a Gaussian efficiency of only
28.7%.
MM-estimators, proposed by Yohai (1987), is an option that combines S-estimators
with M-estimators and surmounts the problems of robustness and efficiency. In a first
stage, the estimates and residuals are found through an S-estimator, which has a high
resistance to outliers. The M method is used later to estimate the scale of the former
residuals and then to iterate weighted least squares to find M-estimates of the regression
coefficients (Andersen, 2008). Its name of MM estimator refers to the fact that the M
method is used twice, first to estimate the scale of the residuals from the first step and
then for the iteration process. The MM method used in our study was implemented by
Verardi and Croux (2008). Its aim is to test for the robustness of the panel and IV
estimates in the second empirical chapter to the presence of these outliers.
Distributional Impact
The above approaches (PSM, OLS, DID, Fixed Effects panel) and impact analysis in
general has been generally developed within a framework of homogeneity across the
subjects under study: individuals, households, etc. Khandker et al. (2010) quoting
Heckman et al. (1997) state that the mean impact can only justify a study if the total
output increases total welfare. When negative effects are present on part of the
population, this has to be compensated with a transfer, either from a social program or
from family or acquaintances.
The impact is often not uniform for all the households and the interest is to find out how
microfinance impacts at different levels of the dependent variable distribution. This
concern has been raised in impact literature of other programs which try to catch if the
programs suffer from “elite capture”. This phenomenon takes place when the better off
or the more educated households take advantage of the programs while the poorer rarely
or do not benefit at all. In studies focused on populations characterized by great
inequalities this is of special relevance as the programs need to ensure that they correct
these inequalities and do not increase them.
In microfinance impact literature this issue has been raised by Hulme and Mosley
(1996) who find that microcredit mostly benefits the less poor. Coleman (2006) revisits
his Thai dataset and finds that committee members of the village banks, normally more
influential and better off village dwellers, are the only ones who reap benefits from the
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programs. The issue is also mentioned in Copestake et al. (2005) which concludes that
the impact for the upper income median is massively greater than the impact for the
lower. Finally, Kondo et al. (2008) also discard impact on the poorest.
Quantiles and Quantile regression
In order to study the possibility of an heterogeneous impact across the distribution of
the dependent variable the option was to use quantile regression. It started with Koenker
and Basset (1978) and has showed some other convenient properties apart from a more
accurate characterization of the data. Quantile regression has been mostly developed in
labour economics in which the interest is to find the impact of education or training at
the different points of the distribution of the dependent variable, normally the log wage
(Koenker and Hallock, 2001; Koenker, 2005). It has also been used, for example, to find
out the effects of pre-natal circumstances or conducts in the birthweight of the babies
(Abrevaya, 2001).
The idea of a uniform impact for all households has proved to be inaccurate in some of
this literature. OLS and DID/Panel provide a single estimate for the whole distribution
as PSM does. However, our interest is to check whether this impact is really
homogenous for the whole sample or there are differences at different points of the
distribution. As a graphical image of the quantile analysis developed in our study it
could be said that the conditional distributions of these variables are first sliced up into
several pieces. Then, the impact of microfinance is found for each of these pieces. This
cannot be done by just finding an OLS for the observations within each quintile as will
be explained below. All observations are needed though, when tackling quantile
regression.
The explanation of the quantiles and quantile regression will follow the notation and
pace from Cameron and Trivedi (2005) . Having one continuous random variable y, the
population qth quantile is the value μq so that y is smaller or equal to μq with probability
q. In mathematical notation:
ݍ= Pr ൣݕ≤ ߤ௤൧= ܨ௬(ߤ௤) (1.35)
In the formula, therefore, ܨ௬ is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of y, which
has been also noted in other occasions as Φ௬. Therefore if ݍ= ܨ௬(ߤ௤), inversely:
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ߤ௤ = ܨ௬ିଵ(ݍ) (1.36)
As an illustrative example, if the median of y is equal to 30, it would be said that
ݍ= 0.5 because we are looking for the median and ߤ଴.ହ = 30. The CDF of 30 would
be ܨ௬(30) = 0.5 = ݍ. Finding out the inverse of the CDF of the quantile results in the
value of the median of y: ܨ௬ିଵ(0.5) = 30. If the variable of interest is income and an
individual is said to be at the, say, q = 0.25 quantile (also known as the first quartile) of
the distribution, the 25% of the individuals will have a lower wage while (1-0.25 =
0.75) 75% will have higher wage.
The importance of Koenker and Basset’s work is that they adapted the quantile concepts
to the regression framework and allowed us to estimate conditional quantile functions
(Reilly, 2009b). Within this framework the quantiles of y are expressed conditional on
x. Following the same notation, ߤ௤(ݔ) is the function of the quantile of y conditional on
x so that y is equal or less than ߤ௤(ݔ) with probability q, given that the probability is
calculated with the conditional distribution of y given x (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
Again, the inverse of the conditional CDF of y given x can be used to find out ߤ௤(ݔ)
given the quantile q:
ߤ௤(ݔ) = ܨ௬|௫ିଵ(ݍ) (1.37)
where ܨ௬|௫ିଵ is the inverse of the conditional CDF of y given x.
One example of quantile regression is the median regression where q = 0.5 which is also
named as Least Absolute Deviation regression. The main difference between OLS and
quantile regression is that in the former the value to minimize is the sum of the squared
errors while in the latter minimizes the weighted sum of absolute errors.
In the case of OLS, the ߚ vector is chosen to minimize:
SSE = ∑ [ݕ௜− ݔ௜ᇱߚ ]ଶ௡௜ୀଵ (1.38)
where y is the dependent variable, i refers to individuals and x is the vector of
covariates. In the case of quantile regression the minimization is done over:
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ܳ௡൫ߚ௤൯= ෍ ݍหݕ௜− ݔ௜ᇱߚ௤ห+௡
௜:௬೔ஹ௫೔ᇲఉ ෍ (1 − ݍ)หݕ௜− ݔ௜ᇱߚ௤ห
௡
௜:௬೔ழ௫೔ᇲఉ (1.39)
where the ߚ௤ is used as different quantiles will result into different estimators. The
formula assigns a weight q to observations that are above their predicted values or (1-q)
otherwise. Therefore, positive residuals are weighted by q and negative residuals are
weighted by (1-q).
In the case of median regression or LAD q = (1-q) = 0.5 and all the observations receive
the same weight and therefore the formula simplifies to:
ܳ௡(ߚ଴.ହ) = ෍ |ݕ௜− ݔ௜ᇱߚ଴.ହ|௡
௜ୀଵ
(1.40)
It has to be noted that quantile regression uses all the observations of the dependent
variable. It is not accurate to split the sample into different groups with regard to the
unconditional distribution and then try to fit these groups with OLS. This procedure
brings about a problem of truncation on the dependent variable that will provide
confusing results (Koenker and Hallock, 2001).
The objective formula (1.39) cannot be differentiated and therefore the minimization
process to find ߚ௤෢ has to be done through a linear programming (LP) approach. This is
an iterative process which departs from set or parameters that are refined in each
iteration until it has found the ߚ௤෢ that minimizes (1.39). The latter is achieved, in the
case of median regression, when 50% of the computed residuals are negative. In general
for the qth quantile, the iteration process find its optimum when (q x 100)% of the
computed residuals are negative. Thus, in the case of q = 0.4, the optimum is achieved
when (0.4 x 100 = 40)% of the residuals are negative (Reilly, 2009b).
Buchinsky (1998) enumerates some of the convenient features that make quantile
regression more desirable in some cases. Apart from being able to find different
estimates at different points of the distribution of the outcome variable, the technique
deals better with the presence of outliers. In the particular case of LAD, it has been used
as a complementary or alternative approach in their presence. When dealing with
heteroscedasticity problems, quantile regression might also be a more efficient method
than OLS. However, this is not always true. As stated in Reilly (2009b), the variance-
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covariance matrix contained in Koenker and Bassett (1978) has been proved to be
erroneous in the presence of heteroscedasticity.
This problem is solved by using the bootstrapping method. It consists of a series of
random withdrawals with replacement from the original sample in order to approximate
the true sampling distribution. In the quantile regression method the re-sampling is done
by picking the dependant variable with the corresponding row of the X matrix in a way
that is known as “paired bootstrap”. Once the sampling distribution is found out, it can
be used for the conventional test statistics.
The coefficients have been proved to be consistent and asymptotically normal and
therefore the conventional test statistics are valid. It has been also shown that the
accuracy of the estimations depends on the points density at each quantile. This means
that those quantiles with less observations, normally at the top or at the bottom of the
conditional distribution, might not be accurately calculated. This leads to a weaker
power of test statistics and therefore more cases of not rejecting the null when false.
Another interesting property of quantile regression is its equivariance to monotone
transformation.
Not all the properties are convenient in the quantiles. The conditional expectation is a
linear operator and this is very useful in the case of the DID approach with two time
periods. This property implies that
ܧ൫ݕ௜,ଶหݔ௜ଶ ௜ܽ൯− ܧ൫ݕ௜,ଵหݔ௜ଵ ௜ܽ൯= ܧ൫ݕ௜,ଶ− ݕ௜,ଵหݔ௜ଵ,ݔ௜ଶ, ௜ܽ൯,
where, in the present study, i stands for the household, 1 and 2 for periods, x is the
vector of covariates and ௜ܽ is the time invariant unobservables specific for each
household. This property allows to use the DID approach. However, conditional
quantiles are not linear operators so that ܳ௤൫ݕ௜,ଶหݔ௜ଶ ௜ܽ൯− ܳ௤൫ݕ௜,ଵหݔ௜ଵ ௜ܽ൯≠
ܳ ௤൫ݕ௜,ଶ− ݕ௜,ଵหݔ௜ଵ,ݔ௜ଶ,ܽ൯ and therefore the time invariant unobservables cannot be
differenced out. This rules out the use of a DID or fixed effect approach in the case of
quantile regression.
Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) try to solve the problem with a different approach. The fixed
effects model allows for the unobserved, time invariant characteristics to be correlated
with the covariates. Once differenced out, the former are wiped out. Given that this is
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impossible to do with conditional quantiles, they turn to another approach within the
panel data framework: random effects. The random effects approach assumes these
unobservables to be uncorrelated with the covariates. This might be considered
implausible in this particular study as the households are quite likely to have some
characteristics that make them more prone to participate or to succeed. Nonetheless,
they base their study in a type of random-effects model that allows them to explain the
time invariant unobservables in terms of the covariates. They use the “Correlated
Random Effects model” developed in Chamberlain (1982;1984) which explains the
unobserved fixed effects as a linear function of the covariates in both time periods. Its
particularities will be discussed further in its corresponding chapter.
Conclusion
Three different techniques will be used in the empirical chapters. All are quasi-
experimental methods and therefore rely on assumptions that vary with the model. In
the first empirical approach, PSM is used to revisit one of the best known microfinance
surveys. PSM makes use of the assumption that matching on observables is enough to
get rid of unobservables. It is a useful technique that follows the same principles as
random experiments and it is non parametric, and therefore there is not any underlying
functional assumption and this is less restricting to researchers.
In the second, a DID/Panel approach will be attempted, replicating the way that
Tedeschi (2008) studied the AIMS dataset in Peru formerly studied by Dunn and
Arbuckle (2001). In the panel, unobservables are wiped out through differentiation.
Outliers in the sample and possible endogeneity issues were also dealt with through
MM and IV estimations, respectively.
These two methods assume an uniform effect over the whole sample, which might
possibly be inaccurate. A more focused picture of the impact of the program is possible
through quantile regression, in its Correlated Random Effects in order to apply to panel
data. In this model the unobservables are controlled for assuming that they are linearly
related to the observed covariates. This will allow us to test for a uniform or
heterogeneous impact along the dependent variables distributions.
Thus, in all three techniques some assumptions are required and at some points they are
possibly more complicated than the relatively simple assumptions in RCTs. However,
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given the difficulties found in doing proper randomization in social studies, quasi-
experimental techniques do have an essential role in impact evaluation. Two of them
have already been used in the impact evaluation of microfinance. The Correlation
Random Effects model has not yet been used to study the distributional impact of
microfinance as far as we are concerned. All three aim to cast light on the impact
evaluation literature. Limitations are acknowledged regarding the datasets, as they are
surveys that are probably not properly designed for our purpose. Adequately designed
surveys, as stated in Copestake et al. (2011), are scarce but this should not deter
research evaluating the impact of microfinance even at the risk of poorer estimations.
78Chapter 3: Revisiting BangladeshMicrofinance Impact EvaluationStudies: a PSM approach.
Introduction, description of the survey and descriptive statistics.
This study is based on the original Bangladeshi dataset exploited first in PK. Its
conclusions were quite controversial and they were soon challenged by other studies,
the first of which was Morduch (1998). Further published and unpublished studies,
followed, some underpinning the positive impact findings in PK, (Khandker, 1998; Pitt,
1999; Khandker, 2005; Chemin, 2008) and some finding no significance in the impact
of microfinance (Roodman and Morduch, 2009; Duvendack and Palmer-Jones, 2011).
Khandker (2005) from the second round gathered the households that could be traced
back to the first round of the survey and constructed a fixed effects panel data approach,
with findings that confirm the positive effect of microfinance on expenditures or the
reduction of extreme poverty. Roodman and Morduch revisit PK, Morduch (1998) and
Khandker (2005) and find no evidence of the positive impact of microfinance. Works by
Chemin (2008) and Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011) are of special interest for the
present study from a methodological point of view as they implemented a PSM with the
first round of the sample, in order to challenge the impact evaluation contained in PK.
The present chapter contributes to the microfinance literature in several ways. First,
previous iconic studies have mostly sought to study the impact of microfinance at
individual level, whereas the present approach is at household level. In addition, the
reference dataset has always been either the first round of the survey (PK; Morduch,
1998; Chemin, 2008; Duvendack and Palmer-Jones, 2011) or the sample of households
that could be surveyed in both years (Khandker, 2005; Roodman 2009). In the present
chapter the research is based on the whole second round of the survey, with 2,599
households. The study also uses a different approach regarding the dependent variables.
With respect to the previous PSM studies, the present chapter includes a sensitivity test
that is not included in Chemin (2008). It is also a more adequate test when using the
kernel algorithm than the one attempted in Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011).
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The impact is calculated at household level and therefore the results are not strictly
comparable, given the fact that all the previous works on this Bangladeshi dataset have
studied the impact at individual level, distinguishing between males and females.
Impact so far had been found to be higher for females. At household level, we intended
to control for the gender of the household head, but the variable was not significant in
any of the different specifications and it was withdrawn.
So far the second round of the survey has been underexploited. An additional number of
households was taken in addition to those surveyed in the first round. They were
sampled within the same villages where the first round took place and also in three
additional thanas not included in the first survey (Khandker, 2005). In total, our sample
contains 2,599 households, 36.3% more than the 1,798 in the first survey used in PK,
Morduch (1998), Chemin (2005) and Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011). The only
studies taking into account the second round are limited to the 1,638 households that
could be retraced in the second round (Khandker, 2005 and Roodman, 2009). Still,
around 37% of households from the second survey remained unstudied.
In the definition of dependent variables we focused on income and expenditures. The
former had not yet been used in any of the studies related to this Bangladeshi dataset.
Khandker (2005) uses headcount poverty at village level as one of the dependent
variables. This is a variable that uses income at the background and the different scales
of poverty are defined by setting different thresholds of income. However, it had not yet
been used as a dependent variable by itself in the set of Bangladeshi studies. Also, we
divided expenditures into three categories as some of the non-food expenditures defined
in the survey were not actually current expenditures. Thus, the survey included
expenditures on home extensions or home/land purchases, which can be interpreted as
investments rather than expenditures. In our approach the impact is measured on food
expenditures, current expenditures and two different definitions of non-current
expenditures.
We also test the impact of microfinance using different treated and control groups, as
done in Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011). We agree on the argument that having
households with access to different sources of funds is quite relevant when defining
treated and control groups and thus comparing different specifications of borrowers and
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non borrowers will help cast light over the impact of borrowing from microfinance and
other funding sources.
Finally, a sensitivity test is implemented in order to find the likelihood of the existence
of unobservables that can challenge the estimates obtained. This test is not found in
Chemin (2008) but Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011) attempts it in their study.
However, they did not test for the matching quality of the algorithms. This theoretically
would not let them choose the best match possible. Their sensitivity test also should
have been chosen according to the best possible matching algorithm but they just apply
a sensitivity test on the Nearest Neighbour estimate. Our sensitivity test is also based on
the theoretical background developed in Rosenbaum (2002) but we adopt a more
adequate approach when using a kernel algorithm, whereas the one in Duvendack and
Palmer-Jones (2011) is only suitable for the nearest neighbour algorithm.
As mentioned above, our first intention was to mix PSM and Difference in Difference
(DID) and apply them to the Bangladeshi dataset, similar to what Smith and Todd
(2005) did with Lalonde’s (1986) dataset. They found that a difference-in-difference
matching estimator provides with the best performance when trying to replicate
Lalonde’s experimental outcomes. Reconstruction of the first round of the Bangladeshi
dataset from files contained in the World Bank (WB) website was quite difficult and
will be discussed later. Eventually, a PSM was attempted on the second round of the
survey, exploiting the households that had not yet been subject of research.
Smith and Todd (2005) contend that the main contribution of the PSM-DID approach is
to get rid of the geographical mismatches and problems of measurement in the
dependent variable. Unlike Lalonde’s data, in the Bangladesh survey treated and
controls are taken from the same geographic area and all individuals were interviewed
with the same questionnaire. Thus, these sources of bias would not be as important and
therefore PSM should perform well avoiding it. This will be tested through sensitivity
analysis following Ichino et al. (2007) and Nannicini (2007), a slightly different
approach from that used in for example Caliendo (2006) or Duvendack and Palmer-
Jones (2011).
The aim of this study was to find the impact of microfinance on income per capita and
expenditures per capita at household level, including current expenditures and also some
extraordinary expenses. Our evidence suggests that there seems not to be a significant
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impact of microfinance on income per capita or current expenditures per capita. In the
case of the former, the effect, if any, would be negative rather than positive. The
estimates, however, are only marginally significant and they are not consistent across
the different treatment and control group definitions. However, the effect of borrowing
from microfinance and other sources consistently shows a great increase in expenditures
on home repairs or home/land investments.
The chapter follows with a description of the survey. Then the variables income and
expenditures per capita are described. Then the PSM process is explained and applied to
the dataset. Finally conclusions are stated.
Description of the survey
The two rounds survey was implemented by the Bangladesh Institute of Development
Studies (BIDS) and the World Bank. Descriptions of the first round can be found in Pitt
and Khandker (1998), and for both rounds in Khandker (2005). An additional
description is contained in the accompanying documentation to the database available in
the World Bank (WB) website.
One of the main issues when undertaking the research work was the bad quality of the
dataset and documentation available. In the case of the first round, the dataset was
incomplete and documentation was almost illegible. The documentation for the second
round was better although still a lot of work was needed as the documentation was poor.
For example, information about household weights was not contained in either datasets
or in the documentation. Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011) managed to reconstruct
this first round but they refer to the same issues in their work. Finally, we decided to
restrict the analysis to the second round of the survey.
The baseline survey took place in 1991/1992. One of the administrative levels of
division in Bangladesh is the thana. A thana contains several villages and a district
contains several thanas. Twenty nine of these thanas were selected for the study. Out of
them, 8 were targeted by Grameen Bank, 8 by Bangladesh Rural Advanced Committee
(BRAC) and another 8 by the “Rural Development-12” program of the Bangladesh
Rural Development Board (BRDB). This adds up to 24 and the remaining 5 were non
microfinance-targeted thanas and villages within these thanas operated as control
villages.
82
Within these 24 microfinance thanas, 3 villages were randomly selected from those
where the program had been running at least for three years. Among the 5 non-program
thanas 3 were also picked, adding a total of (24 x 3) + (5 x 3) = 87 villages. Villages
with less than 51 and more than 600 households were discarded. Altogether, 1,798
households were selected in those 87 villages. Data was collected during the three rice
seasons: Aman, Boro and Aus and in the last season 29 households dropped leaving a
total of 1,769.
In order to guarantee that they observe their aim of targeting the poor, Grameen, BRAC
and BRDB shared an eligibility criterion: all those owning half an acre of land or less
were the target household within a village. Obviously in the 15 non program villages
those fulfilling this condition were the “would be eligible” had the program been
running in the village. This was the criterion used by Pitt and Khandker (1998) in order
to implement their approach. The fact that not all participants complied with this half an
acre requisite is one of the reasons of controversy regarding the techniques applied.
This study was based in the second round, which took place in 1998/99. In it, the same
87 villages were visited again but only 1,638 households out of the original 1,769 could
be re-interviewed resulting into an attrition rate of 7.4%. 237 of these 1,638 had split
into 546 new households but they were treated as single households, adding up to 1,947
households9.
In addition to the previous households new ones were selected among the original 87
villages. On top of that 3 new thanas were selected, adding up to a total of 29 + 3 = 32
thanas. In each new thana 3 villages were picked and 20 households, both eligible and
non eligible were drawn from each of these 9 new villages. In total the second round
included 2,599 households, 2,226 from old villages and 373 from new villages.
The main point in this second round of the survey was that by this time there were not
any control villages since in all the villages there was at least one microfinance scheme
going on. Apart from the three mentioned microfinance institutions (MFIs), others such
as Proshika and Asa were already present in the field. Thus with no control villages
available the study cannot be based on the Intention To Treat as all villages are exposed
9 1,638 – 237 (hh. that split) + 546 (amount into which those 237 split) = 1,947 households.
83
to microfinance. However, the study controls for village level characteristics in order to
avoid bias due to program allocation.
The criterion for eligibility is still to own half an acre of land or less. The fact that some
of the participant’s households show greater landholdings is due to two main reasons.
First the criterion is accounted for individually so that the overall amount of land within
the same household might add up to more than half an acre. Second, the criterion is not
strictly observed and some of the non-eligible households were borrowing.
Descriptive statistics
The study is mainly focused on the impact of borrowing from microfinance or credit
from other sources on income per capita and expenditures per capita. First it is
explained how income and current expenditures are created and then the descriptives of
income and expenditures per capita are discussed. Per capita variables are just created
dividing income/expenditures by the household size.
Income
Income is composed mainly of two groups. The first is composed of revenues obtained
by farm and non-farm enterprises. In the former case, the revenues come from collected
crops and are net of normal costs such as fertilizer, irrigation, seeds and labour costs.
Crops are varied. The main is rice but also other products such as wheat, spices,
sugarcane or oilseeds are cultivated. In the case of non-farm enterprises the revenues are
net of regular expenses. These are defined in the survey as expenses that are paid at
least once a week when the enterprise is operating. Any non-regular expenses were not
withdrawn from revenues as they were not properly reported in the dataset10.
10 Expenses on non regular inputs were reported but the frequency was not documented and therefore
frequency codes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 could not be matched with a temporal frequency: daily, monthly, quarterly...
assumptions in this case might have lead to very wrong conclusions. The absence of these expenses
makes revenues to be less accurate and therefore income and income per capita.
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Figure 6 Income components
The second part of income is split into several headings. The first is wages from farm
employment in Aush, Aman and Boro rice seasons, non-farm jobs, other salaried jobs
and pensions. The second includes income from poultry or fisheries activities. This
could be understood also as farm revenues but the criterion of the survey was to split
them and this was done also in this study. The third group is income from rent and
mortgages. With respect to the fourth group, income from farm and forests resources, it
could be understood as overlapping with the above farm revenues, but no crops are
included here, just milk, eggs, fruits and trees. The remaining groups are self-
employment revenues from activities such as rickshaws, boats, fishing, doctors or
lawyers and goods received for free including vegetables, fish, left-over crops. Income
from rents, farm/forests and self employment activities are accounted net of costs. The
income variable is constructed such that it doesn’t include the amount of money
borrowed from the different credit sources.
The inputs in income variable were mostly given in monthly terms and their value was
multiplied by 12 in order to transform it into annual terms. There are some issues that
makes the variable income quite volatile. The first is that the calculation of net revenues
is sometimes subject to accounting rules that can in some occasions be questionable.
For example animals that are consumed at home are accounted as an animal sale at
market price. Also animals that are born at home are accounted as a purchase of an
income
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+ crop revenues
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irrigation, etc
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+ revenues - regularexpenses
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animal at market price. In addition to these rules, the presence of many inputs
aggravates the measurement error that is pervasive in this kind of household surveys in
poor areas as no records are normally kept. Finally, profit reversals in a particular year
might place better off households in lower quantiles than that which would correspond
to them in their normal economic situation.
The sample showed a small number of negative income values, just 34 observations,
around 1.3% of the total sample. In most cases the negative values resulted from the fact
that revenues in agriculture were sufficient to cover the costs. There were also a few
occasions in which the negatives were given by a great negative figure in the losses of
fisheries/poultry accounts. These negative values are problematic and will be dealt with
in the analysis separately as done in Shaefer and Edin (2012) and Hunter et al. (2002),
dropping the negative income values and rerunning the models afterwards. Not
surprisingly, outcomes are very similar in terms of the estimates and their significance
and we conclude that these negative values do not unduly influence our results. This
should be remembered when studying the descriptive statistics and the later analytical
results.
These drawbacks have to be taken into account when studying the descriptives and in
the analysis approach.
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Figure 7 Income per capita by mfi borrowing status
Figure 7 shows the graph by MFI borrowing status. Income per capita shows some negative
values for both groups. There are numerous outliers at the top of the distributions. MFI
non borrower distribution also shows a single negative outlier that can clearly be
distinguished in the graph. The maximum values of both groups are quite close though.
Table 2 below shows some of the descriptives in income per capita. Means are well
above the medians and MFI borrowers have lower mean income. The skewness and
kurtosis have the expected values given Figure 7. Inter-Quartile Range (IQR) and
standard deviation inform of a higher dispersion in the distribution of MFI non
borrowers. An histogram can be seen at the appendix (Figure 19).
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Table 2 Income per capita descriptives, by MFIs borrowing status
Income per capita
MFIs non borrowers MFIs borrowers
mean 8,160 7,297
median 5,231 5,326
sd 11,668 8,704
min -11,798 -2,862
max 149,247 153,104
range 161,045 155,966
iqr 6,092 5,283
skew 6 8
kurtosis 51 97
Regarding the distribution by quantiles, Table 3 shows that the figures are higher for the
quantiles corresponding to the participants in the first three quintiles although this turns
the other way round from that point towards the top of the distributions. Differences are
especially remarkable at the 95th and 99th percentiles.
Table 3 Income per capita quantiles by MFIs borrowing status
Income per capita
MFIs non borrowers MFIs borrowers
p1 - 35 308
p5 800 1,337
p10 1,435 1,952
p20 2,503 2,912
p25 2,908 3,340
p30 3,297 3,775
p40 4,254 4,464
p50 5,231 5,326
p60 6,240 6,366
p70 8,030 7,625
p75 9,000 8,623
p80 10,548 9,954
p90 15,816 12,958
p95 22,676 16,713
p99 55,865 38,986
With respect to borrowing from different sources Table 4 shows that the proportion of
households borrowing from microfinance programs is clearly higher than the rest of
sources. This is not abnormal given the spread of microfinance in this area by the time
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the second round of the survey was done. With respect to this source not great
differences are seen among quintiles two to four. It is only remarkable the lower
proportion in the first quintile. For the rest of the sources, the pattern is on the contrary
to microfinance borrowers. Borrowers are more concentrated at the first quintile of
income per capita. Households non borrowing from any of the sources (no borrow
column) are more frequent in the first quintile. Percentages rows add up to more than
100% due to the fact that there are some households borrowing from more than one
source.
Table 4 Percentage of borrowers by income per capita quintiles
Percentage borrowers by income per capita quintile
MFIs Bank Informal Relatives No borrow
q1 38.1% 10.1% 10.1% 19.7% 38.9%
q2 51.3% 5.8% 6.2% 18.6% 31.5%
q3 52.8% 4.6% 6.8% 16.1% 32.7%
q4 57.4% 4.4% 6.4% 15.1% 29.8%
q5 50.0% 9.3% 5.4% 18.0% 33.5%
In Table 5 the mean loan size is shown taking into account only borrowers. In the case
of microfinance the mean loan size roughly increases progressively with the quintile. In
the rest of sources the first quintiles show a high mean loan size and the highest figures
are shown in the fifth quintile. In the case of informal loans the mean at the fifth
quintile is four times the value at the fourth quintile. The mean loan size for the whole
sample, including non MFI borrowers, is found multiplying the values in Table 4 by
values in Table 5.
It doesn’t seem plausible that the poorest households can borrow on average even more
than households at the fourth quintile. Thus, the reason for these high mean loan sizes at
the first quintile might well be the above mentioned issue of households that are located
at the first quintile due to profit reversals. They have a better credit scoring and they
have access to greater loans than households that are in the first quintile because they
are poor. It is just that they are more heavily indebted and a reversal makes them look
poorer than what they actually are.
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Table 5 Mean loan size by income per capita quintile
Mean loan by income per capita quintile
MFIs Bank Informal Relatives
q1 20,032 10,385 11,377 10,910
q2 19,607 6,463 6,375 9,484
q3 23,586 8,042 5,980 6,627
q4 29,545 21,304 10,545 19,314
q5 36,272 37,521 45,482 25,423
Expenditures per capita
First we need to define the current expenditures variable. Its original composition is
found in Figure 8. Expenditures in the survey are split into two main categories, food
expenditures and non food expenditures. Food expenditures are given in the survey in
weekly terms so they had to be multiplied by 52 to get the annual figures. Non-food
expenditures were in monthly terms so they were multiplied by 12. Non-food
expenditures are split into three different groups. The first is just the amount spent on
different domestic items. The second is the amount spent on gifts, dowries or
inheritance. Finally the third category is composed of these same items received for
free. These are different from the “Free goods” accounted for in the income variable
(see Figure 6). Free goods in income were referred to seeds, fertilizers and other goods
that could be used for farm or business activities.
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Figure 8 Expenditures components
Not all the elements within the expenditures section were included in the calculation of
our current expenditures variable. As long as the interest in expenditures is to have a
proxy of normal or current consumption, amounts spent on items to be given out were
not considered. Thus the second leg in the graph above is excluded from the calculation.
Interest paid on loans is not included in the expenditures variable. Also some of the
items accounted as expenditures in the survey should not be considered because they
can be assumed as investments or extraordinary disbursements that do not reflect
consumption in normal circumstances. These are expenditures in
1. Extension / repair of homes
2. Investment in new houses or plots11
3. Dowries
4. Social or religious ceremonies such as marriages, births or deaths.
Henceforth unless said otherwise, the (current) expenditures variable will be composed
by items bought and consumed at home and items received for free and will not include
the above four extraordinary expenditures (or investment). Some analysis will be
developed for the latter to test whether borrowing from MFIs or other credit sources has
any effect on these expenses.
11 How much was invested in houses and how much in plots cannot be separated in the dataset
Expenditures
Food
expenditures Non-food expenditures
Items
purchased and
consumed at
home
Items
purchased to
be given out to
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Figure 9 Box & Whisker graph expenditures per capita by MFI borrowing status
Figure 9 shows the box & whisker graph for expenditures per capita, split by MFI
borrowing status. In general non participants show greater outliers and interquartile
range. Table 6 shows that medians are lower than the means for both MFI non
borrowers and borrowers but in the latter differences are not so noticeable. As happened
with income per capita, the mean is lower for the MFI non borrowing group. The
expenditures per capita distribution is also right-skewed. A histogram can be seen at the
appendix (Figure 20). MFI non borrowers show higher values for dispersion statistics,
IQR, standard deviation and range. There is an outlier that might clearly be leading
some of the statistics for MFI non borrowers. If the outlier is withdrawn, the skewness
drops to three and the kurtosis to 16. Not any zero values are found, which is consistent
with the fact that a minimum of consumption level has to be kept in order to survive.
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Table 6 Expenditures per capita descriptives by MFIs participation
In Table 7 quantiles of expenditures per capita show that the MFI non borrowers have
consistently higher expenditures per capita figures from the 25th and then at all the
upper percentiles calculated. In the case of income per capita this started to be so at the
70th quantile. The difference in expenditures per capita between MFI borrowers and non
borrowers increases at the top quantile but not to the great extent that was seen in
income per capita.
Table 7 Expenditures per capita quantiles by MFIs borrowing status
Current expenditures per capita
MFIs non borrowers MFIs borrowers
p1 1,518 1,802
p5 2,504 2,622
p10 2,930 3,073
p20 3,678 3,704
p25 3,939 3,925
p30 4,206 4,141
p40 4,725 4,666
p50 5,416 5,161
p60 6,162 5,620
p70 7,131 6,279
p75 7,606 6,645
p80 8,106 7,200
p90 10,530 8,862
p95 12,943 10,649
p99 19,658 15,607
expenditures per capita
MFIs non borrowers MFIs borrowers
mean 6,344 5,692
median 5,416 5,161
sd 4,434 2,863
min 977 1,122
max 79,701 45,477
range 78,724 44,355
iqr 3,666 2,720
skew 6 3
kurtosis 88 31
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Current expenditures quintiles could also be tabulated with borrowing variables. Table 8
shows the percentage of borrowers per quintile for the different credit sources. With
respect to microfinance, quantiles at the middle of the distribution tend to show higher
proportion of borrowers. Unlike income per capita the proportion of MFI borrowers is
not clearly lower in the first quintile. More importantly, the rough evolution in the rest
of the sources is that the proportion of borrowers rises as the quintile rises. This
progression is smoother than in the case of income per capita and the first quintiles do
not show higher proportion than others. This can be a clear sign of a lower volatility in
expenditures per capita. The proportion of non borrowers is clearly higher in the first
quintile, which is coherent with the income table.
Table 8 % borrowers by expenditures per capita quintiles
% borrowers by expends. per capita quintile
MFIs Bank Informal Relatives No borrow
q1 45.6% 3.1% 5.4% 12.0% 42.2%
q2 50.3% 6.4% 7.0% 16.1% 33.3%
q3 58.2% 4.8% 7.7% 15.9% 26.9%
q4 51.8% 9.9% 7.9% 19.7% 28.0%
q5 43.6% 10.1% 6.8% 23.8% 36.0%
Table 9 contains the mean loan size by expenditures per capita quintile, not taking into
account non-borrowing households. The greatest mean sizes at all quintiles but the fifth
are found in the case of microfinance and overall mean size increases as quintiles rise in
this case. For the rest of the sources, the progression is not as smooth as in Table 8 but it
is clear that loan sizes are higher at the top quintiles and the lowest values are found at
the first quintile. The top quintile is showing as well a great difference with respect to
the rest.
Table 9 Mean loan size by expenditures per capita quintiles
Mean loan by expends. per capita quintile
MFIs Bank Informal Relatives
q1 18,147 6,750 6,679 9,210
q2 23,650 15,364 8,306 8,152
q3 24,504 10,820 8,753 12,078
q4 28,884 9,939 10,610 11,378
q5 36,292 35,106 38,723 24,760
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Income and expenditures as proxies for welfare
The use of income per capita and current expenditures per capita tries to mimic welfare
at household level. However, they are different variables and there might be some
discrepancies between them when placing households at different quintiles. In the case
of income, for instance, there will be some households with negative income that are at
the first quintile but they might not be at the first quintile of expenditures and therefore
would not be considered so poor in expenditures terms.
Table 10 is a two-way matrix with households and quintiles for income and
expenditures. The rows correspond to quintiles by income and the columns to quintiles
by expenditures. In each cell, the first row is the number of households and the second
is the percentage that this number represents with respect to the total number of
households within that income quintile. The diagonal, therefore, gives information
about the households that are in the same quintile for both income and expenditures
variables. In other words, those households for which quintiles overlap. For example at
quintile one for income per capita and expenditures per capita, 42.4% of the
observations overlap and around a 54% in the case of the last quintile.
Table 10 Two-way table quintiles income-expenditures per capita
Quintiles
income p.
capita
Quintiles current expenditures p. capita
1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 219 116 70 71 41 517
42.4 22.4 13.5 13.7 7.9 100
2 166 139 107 63 42 517
32.1 26.9 20.7 12.2 8.1 100
3 74 131 152 116 44 517
14.3 25.3 29.4 22.4 8.5 100
4 47 92 119 148 111 517
9.1 17.8 23.0 28.6 21.5 100
5 11 39 69 119 278 516
2.1 7.6 13.4 23.1 53.9 100
Total 517 517 517 517 516 2,584
100 100 100 100 100 100
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Table 10 might not be so clear for households that move by one quintile only. Maybe a
better way of seeing this is showing Table 11. It shows the difference between income
p/c quintile and expenditures p/c quantile following the equation [ܳ௜௡௖௢௠ ௘௣/௖−
ܳ ௘௫௣௘௡ௗ௜௧௨௥௘௦௣/௖] . It can be seen that 936 households coincide in income and
expenditures quintiles, which represent the 36% of all households. This can also be
obtained adding up the figures in the diagonal of Table 10. About a 38% of the
households differ just by ∓1 quintile between income and expenditures distribution, so
around a 74% of the households are within a range of plus/minus one quintile which can
be considered a good overlapping.
Table 11 Q_income - Q_expenditures
Q_income p/c- Q_expenditures p/c
Qinc-Qexp Freq Percent
-4 41 1.6
-3 113 4.4
-2 177 6.9
-1 450 17.4
0 936 36.2
1 535 20.7
2 235 9.1
3 86 3.3
4 11 0.4
With regard to the big differences between distributions almost a 10% of households
differ by three or four quintiles. Households with a value of four in Table 11 are
households that despite being at quintile five in income distribution, they are placed at
the first quintile of expenditures. For values of minus four this would be on the contrary.
Regarding these greater leaps between quintiles, it seems more likely to have
households that score at high quintiles in expenditures per capita but low at income per
capita than the other way round. These might correspond with households that are not
poor but score at the lowest quintiles of income because they spent on the inputs and a
bad year of crop or business didn’t allow them to get their returns.
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Finally, the correlation coefficient between income per capita and expenditures per
capita was calculated in 0.3681 and it was significant at 1% level. Also the non
parametric Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient was significant at 1% level with a
value of 0.5128.
Overall there is a good overlapping and we can think of these variables as not distant
proxies. There are a number of reasons that make us to trust more expenditures per
capita figures than income per capita ones, though. There are a high number of inputs in
the calculation of income per capita and also the mentioned accounting rules might
value some assets/stocks in ways that bring volatility to the variable. Also, expenses in
non regular inputs could not be included in the calculation of revenues because they
were not correctly shown in the dataset.
In addition to this, profit reversals in one year might make a household to move down to
an income per capita quintile that would not correspond to its wealth. Given the
quintiles tables for income per capita (Table 3 and Table 4), the relatively high
proportion of borrowers and mean loan sizes at the first quintile might be a sign of this
happening.
Propensity Score Matching process
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) tries to resemble a random experiment. In it the
random choice of treated and controls, if done properly, leads to the existence of two
samples that are equally distributed and they just differ into the treatment. Therefore
descriptives of treated and controls from random experiments should show similar
values and no statistically significant differences.
Matching methods are used when randomization is not possible and the statistics of
treated and controls are different. It is assumed that once the observables (covariates
vector X) have been controlled for, the treatment and control groups differ just in their
participation status. Thus comparing treated and controls will result into the treatment
effect. This assumption is called Conditional Independence.
The process of PSM follows some steps. The first would be to find the covariates that
will be used in the logit model to find the propensity scores. Once propensity scores are
found and before going on with the matching, the Common Support area has to be
defined choosing one of the alternatives. Then the matching can be undertaken adopting
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one or more of the matching algorithms. Depending on which of these algorithms is
chosen, the quality of the matching will need to be assessed following different
alternatives. The reliability of the impact estimate will depend on this assessment.
Finally, when the estimates for impact effects show statistical significance, it makes
sense to test for sensitivity to unobservables that can affect the outcome variable or the
participation status.
Sensitivity analysis is based on (Rosenbaum, 2002) work and try to test whether the
unobservables are leading the impact estimates. However, this analysis does further
assumptions about unobservables and therefore brings more assumptions to the model.
The explanation of the PSM process, for the sake of clarity, is split in the paper as
follows. In all parts first there is a theoretical discussion followed by the application to
the particular case of our dataset12:
1. Covariates choice, logit model and choice of the Common Support area
2. Matching algorithms, matching process and matching quality assessment
3. ATT calculated with the different algorithms
4. Sensitivity analysis
Covariates choice, logit model and choice of the Common Support Area
Covariates choice
When facing matching techniques, increasing the number of covariates X can easily
become an insurmountable difficulty. This has been referred to in the literature as “the
curse of dimensionality”. In their seminal paper, Rosenbaum and Rubin, (1983b) show
that the matching can be done over a balancing score b(X), which is a function of X. In
the case of PSM, b(X) is the probability of participating in the microfinance scheme,
P(X). This probability is calculated with a logit model, although a probit is also feasible.
Other transformations of P(X) can be used and the same authors (Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1985) suggest to use q(x) = log[(1-P(X))/P(X)], because it shows more
convenient properties. One of them is that even when the correct weight of the
12 This section relies heavily on the steps and theoretical background provided in Caliendo, M. &
Kopeinig, S. 2008. SOME PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING. Journal of Economic Surveys, 22, 31. and Caliendo, M. 2006.
Microeconometric Evaluation Labour Market Policies. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical
Systems No. 568, Berlin, Springer-Verlag. as a guide to discuss the relevant issues and implement the
technique.
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observations are unknown, matching on q(x) = log[(1-P(X))/P(X)] provides with a
correct probability of participation. In practice P(X) is normally used and this is our
choice as well, with the exception of the kernel algorithm where the log odds ratio is
used.
These covariates have to be such that the Conditional Independence condition is
complied with, that is, participation has to be independent of the outcome variable given
P(X). Caliendo (2006) establish the characteristics of the covariates. First, they have to
be picked among those which influence both participation and the outcome variable at
the same time. Second, no variables that affect just participation are to be part of the
outcome model. Besides, perfect predictors should not be included as some variation is
needed. Thus, those variables in which P(X) is always either 0 or 1 for some values
should not be included into the model. This has to do with the support condition, 0 <
P(X) < 1, that would not be observed in this case.
Sianesi (2004) establishes the arguments that should guide the choice of variables when
building the model. Economic theory, a priori considerations, institutional set-up and
previous literature should give the foundation when tackling with the inclusion of
variables.
When there is not a clear-cut criterion, some authors recommend keeping the model as
parsimonious as possible. This is argued by Bryson et al. (2002) who contend that too
many parameters increase the risk of including irrelevant variables that might aggravate
the support problem. The variance might also be increased. On the contrary, Heckman
et al. (1997) argue that leaving aside relevant variables can increase the bias in the
resulting estimates. Following this argument, Rubin and Thomas (1996) contend that
variables are only to be discarded if they are clearly irrelevant or they have no influence
on the outcome. Otherwise, their opinion is that variables should be taken into account
when attempting the model.
The dependent variable has three different versions, following the different
specifications that were also included in Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011). In the
first specification (spec 1) the treated group is composed of households that borrowed
from MFIs and the controls are those that did not borrow from them. Included in the
controls are households that borrowed from other sources together with those that did
not borrow at all from any source. In the second specification (spec 2), the treated are
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borrowers that got their loans from any source (MFIs but also banks, moneylenders and
family or relatives) and controls are households that did not borrow at all. Finally, in the
third specification (spec 3) the comparison is between borrowing households that got
their loans strictly from MFIs vs. households that did not borrow at all. In this case the
sample is reduced because those borrowing from alternative sources are dropped from
the study, and therefore the sample is reduced to 1,878 observations.
Following the advice in Sianesi (2004), the covariates included in the model that finds
the scores were chosen according to the previous literature, such as PK, Coleman
(1999), Tedeschi (2008), Chemin (2008) and Duvendack and Palmer Jones (2011). The
latter could not exactly replicate the outcomes in Chemin (2008) due to the different
reconstructions that they made from the original PK dataset, although they are very
similar. The configuration of the models is similar in all these sources, adding
covariates that control for individual characteristics of the individual, such as age,
gender, religion and so on. Also, other variables are added that control for the
composition of the household, education, labour and assets that proxy for individual’ or
household’ wealth. Finally, covariates controlling for village characteristics or village
dummies are also normally present in these set ups.
The description of the model is approached splitting it into groups of variables. First,
the variables that have to do with the characteristics of an individual: in this case we
take the characteristics of the household head: age, gender, religion. The gender of the
household head was initially included in the logit regressions. Only in 262 households
out of the 2,599 in the sample was there a female household head. This represents
around 10%. Using the three different treatment specifications (specs 1-3) as the
dependent variable in the logit, five versions of the model were run in the same way as
in Table 13. In none of the five versions of the model used for each of the specs of the
dependent variable was the gender covariate significant. The coefficients obtained for
the less parsimonious version of the model (Table 13, model 5) in the three different
specs of the treated-control groups are shown below in Table 12. The rest of the
covariates were quite similar. Thus, the variable was withdrawn from the model while
keeping household characteristics that showed significance in most of the models, such
as the presence of children.
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Table 12 Coefficients for gender in the different treated - control specs
Treated - control specs
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3
Gender of houshehold head (dy/dx) 0.019 -0.020 -0.063
z -0.71 -0.41 -0.99
The models also include variables regarding education. In our case, we used the highest
education level of an individual within the household as well as a set of dummies with
the different levels: primary, secondary and higher secondary or university education.
The category corresponding to non-educated was omitted.
Former models also include variables that have to do with employment and
entrepreneurial activities13. Our model includes dummy variables that state whether the
household head is self employed in agriculture, self employed in other type of activities,
wage employed in agriculture or wage employed in non agricultural jobs. The category
of unemployed household head was omitted in this case.
Other variables are proxies for household’ wealth. We include a proxy for home quality
which is “no toilet” (homes without toilet facilities) given the fact that only wealthier
households tend to have a toilet.
The presence of children is included in order to capture whether the household is more
likely to borrow when they face childcare or education expenses. In addition, given the
fact that microfinance is strongly related to entrepreneurial employment, we found that
it would also be relevant to control for the distance from a market, bazaar or any kind of
business centre where commercial activity could be developed. Village level
characteristics are also controlled through the inclusion of average wages for females,
prices of staple foods and average interest rates charged by moneylenders. Finally,
capturing borrowing from alternative sources is included in the case of the first
13 In the case of labour information, the criterion is to classify a household under the activity to which the
household head devotes more time. In the small number of cases in which the time was equal for
agricultural and non agricultural activities, the prevalence was given to the agricultural one. When this
conflict happened between self employment and wage employment, the prevalence was given to self
employment, understanding that people are more prone to be identified with their own businesses.
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specification of treated and controls. For the second and third specs, these variables
were perfect predictors of participation or non-participation and thus they were dropped.
The sample size and the numerous questions contained in the questionnaire satisfy the
appetite of this “data-hungry technique” (Heckman et al., 1997). In addition, the dataset
complies with the requisites that make the CIA plausible. First, the data was gathered
with the same questionnaire for all the individuals, treated and controls. Second, there
was not a difference between the areas from which the controls and the treated came
from and third the survey took place within a short period of time for all the
interviewed.
All this makes less likely to have the biases due to geographical mismatch and
measurement differences in the outcome variables, for which Smith and Todd (2005)
claim that PSM is not designed. Hence, conditions under which the PSM is undertaken
are favourable and the CIA is perfectly plausible.
Logit regression
The choice to find out the propensity scores was the logit model. A probit model could
also have been used in this case. The dependant binary variable is participate, which
takes the value of 1 when the household has a member that has borrowed from
microfinance at least once in the past and 0 otherwise. The logit will result into the
probability of participation of the household. This will be the propensity score of the
household to participate and it is on this score where the matching is done.
For spec. 1, Table 13 contains the coefficients for the different models iterated, from the
simpler one (model 1) to the final (model 5). The fifth version resulted into the highest
pseudo-R2, which gives information about the explanatory power of the model
regarding the participation probability. Caliendo (2006) and Chemin (2008) adopt the
same criterion when selecting the final specification. These low values for pseudo-R2
are not unusual in these kind of surveys.
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Table 13 Logit regression for propensity scores
Dep variable: Participate in microfinance
Model1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 5 (dy/dx)
Age of the h.
head
0.098*** 0.115*** 0.123*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.025***
(4.80) (5.45) (5.79) (5.67) (5.67) (5.67)
Age squared of the
h. head
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000***
(-4.93) (-5.50) (-5.47) (-5.37) (-5.35) (-5.35)
Nr. Children < 6 -0.084* -0.110** -0.130** -0.118** -0.105* -0.021*
(-1.65) (-2.12) (-2.47) (-2.21) (-1.95) (-1.95)
Nr. Children 6-15 0.136*** 0.149*** 0.148*** 0.153*** 0.162*** 0.033***
(3.44) (3.69) (3.60) (3.71) (3.88) (3.88)
H. head
married
0.187 0.268** 0.116 0.077 0.084 0.017
(1.41) (1.97) (0.79) (0.52) (0.57) (0.57)
H. head islamic -0.354** -0.391*** -0.372** -0.444*** -0.430*** -0.088***
(-2.41) (-2.61) (-2.45) (-2.87) (-2.77) (-2.77)
Village avg. wage male
for no agric job
-0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.001***
(-2.82) (-2.79) (-3.14) (-3.34) (-3.00) (-3.00)
Village avg. price rice 0.069*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.015***
(3.44) (3.56) (3.53) (3.56) (3.55) (3.55)
Village avg. price flour -0.108*** -0.104** -0.099** -0.132*** -0.149*** -0.030***
(-2.60) (-2.46) (-2.29) (-2.95) (-3.31) (-3.31)
Village int. rate 3mths -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.000
(-0.71) (-0.76) (-0.70) (-0.45) (-0.54) (-0.54)
Int. Rate 3-6mths 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.35) (0.37) (0.18) (-0.10) (-0.00) (0.00)
Hat/Bazar village -0.421*** -0.424*** -0.377*** -0.338*** -0.332*** -0.068***
(-4.73) (-4.67) (-4.06) (-3.60) (-3.52) (-3.52)
FoodXeducation -0.063 -0.090 -0.065 -0.039 -0.006 -0.001
(-0.52) (-0.73) (-0.52) (-0.31) (-0.05) (-0.05)
HH highest education -0.231*** -0.231*** -0.264*** -0.244*** -0.050***
(-3.81) (-3.72) (-4.19) (-3.83) (-3.83)
HH head primary -0.097 -0.147 -0.166 -0.159 -0.032
(-0.90) (-1.32) (-1.48) (-1.41) (-1.41)
HHhd secondary -0.380** -0.388** -0.411*** -0.399** -0.082**
(-2.54) (-2.53) (-2.66) (-2.57) (-2.57)
HHd secondary+ -1.003*** -0.895*** -0.922*** -0.906*** -0.185***
(-3.30) (-2.87) (-2.95) (-2.86) (-2.86)
Main s-emp agric 0.076 0.106 0.117 0.024
(0.53) (0.74) (0.81) (0.81)
Main s-emp no-agric 0.881*** 0.889*** 0.896*** 0.183***
(6.25) (6.27) (6.28) (6.28)
Main wage agric 0.109 0.204 0.188 0.038
(0.64) (1.19) (1.09) (1.09)
Main wage no-agric 0.843*** 0.868*** 0.846*** 0.173***
(4.64) (4.75) (4.61) (4.61)
No toilet -0.353*** -0.384*** -0.078***
(-3.17) (-3.43) (-3.43)
Dist Pucca rd -0.038 -0.045 -0.009
103
Dep variable: Participate in microfinance
Model1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 5 (dy/dx)
(-1.12) (-1.31) (-1.31)
Dist busns centr -0.043** -0.046** -0.009**
(-2.08) (-2.18) (-2.18)
Source bank -0.000* 0.000
(-1.95) (-1.95)
Source mlender -0.000 0.000
(-0.10) (-0.10)
Source relative -0.000*** 0.000**
(-3.51) (-3.51)
Constant -0.004 -0.087 -0.843 -0.049 0.033 0.033
(-0.01) (-0.10) (-0.99) (-0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 2,508 2,508 2,508 2,508 2,508 2,508
Pseudo R-squared 0.038 0.061 0.084 0.09 0.096 0.096
chi2 125.519 201.875 278.212 296.063 317.936 317.936
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* p<0.10 ; ** p<0.05 ; *** p<0.01
Table 13 also shows the logit coefficients and marginal effects of the fifth specification
in the last column. Out of the total of 2,599 households, 2,584 could be used for the
descriptives and only 2,508 for the analysis. The remaining 91 households had at least
one missing value for the variables used. This represents a 3.5% of the sample, but it
was not considered important for the outcomes. Also, in the third specification of
treated-controls, there are some households that had to be withdrawn because they were
borrowing exclusively from non-MFI sources.
Further analysis will be carried out dropping households with negative per capita
income values in order to test whether the results are much affected by these abnormal
income values. The logit models used to find out the scores when these negatives are
withdrawn are shown in Table 57 for the three different specifications of models. No
remarkable differences were found with respect to the previous estimates.
With respect to the logit model in Table 13, household maximized its probability of
participation when the age of the household head is around sixty years old. The signs of
variables were outlined before when commenting the mean test. The null of all the
coefficients being jointly equal to zero can be rejected in all the specifications (p = 0).
After matching, however, this null should not be rejected if the matching is properly
done.
The presence of children below 6 years decreases the probability of participation by 2.1
percentage points on average and ceteris paribus. Also, the increase of one taka in the
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average wage male for non-agricultural jobs decreases the probability of borrowing
from microfinance by 0.7 percentage points. This is very low but it makes sense as with
high wages people might want to work instead of risking their money. Interest rates of
moneylenders’ loans seem to have no significant effect.
With respect to education, the more educated the household head, the less likely the
household is to participate by borrowing from an NGO. Both secondary and secondary+
(which includes higher secondary and tertiary) education has negative signs but the
coefficient is larger in the latter. This is consistent with previous literature (Pitt and
Khandker, 1998; Khandker, 2005) and it is a clear indicator of how microfinance targets
households with less educated members. Also, household heads not employed in
agriculture increase their probability to participate in microfinance to a similar extent
than waged and self-employees. Alternative credit sources show negative signs as
expected, although estimates are very close to zero.
There are two additional specifications of treated and controls, however. The second
would be borrowers from any source vs. non borrowers at all (spec. 2). Basically it is
borrowers vs. non borrowers. Finally, a third specification (spec. 3) is MFI borrowers
vs. non-borrowers at all. In this third spec, households that are borrowing only from non
MFIs sources are dropped from the analysis and therefore the sample is reduced to
1,878 observations14.
Once we have selected the model that will be used to find the propensity scores, it is
common to do a t-test of the differences between the treated and the control groups.
This can be seen in Table 14, regarding spec. 1.
14 All outcomes for spec 2 and spec 3 are shown in Table 56
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Table 14 Mean differences before matching
Variable Mean t-test
Treated Control t p>|t|
ho
m
e
HH. head age 45.3 45.1 0.29 0.768
HH. head age2 2,206 2,260 -0.97 0.334
Children 1-5 0.73 0.79 -1.74 0.083
Children 6-15 1.44 1.19 5.21 0.000
HH. head married 0.89 0.87 1.72 0.086
HH. head islam 0.88 0.91 -2.44 0.015
No toilet facility 0.25 0.27 -0.71 0.477
Distance to pucca road 1.20 1.38 -2.98 0.003
Distance to business centre 3.55 3.81 -2.57 0.010
Vi
lla
ge
Average wage male no-agricultu 72.49 75.50 -3.45 0.001
Average rice price 15.29 15.01 2.92 0.004
Average flour price 12.74 12.80 -1.58 0.115
Int. rate mlender 3 months 26.23 27.34 -0.64 0.525
Int. rate mlender 3-6 months 23.35 24.12 -0.53 0.597
Hat/Bazar in village 0.43 0.33 5.04 0.000
FoodxEducation in village 0.16 0.14 0.95 0.343
ed
uc
at
io
n HH head highest educ 1.25 1.49 -6.25 0.000
HH head primary educ 0.25 0.26 -0.51 0.613
HH head lower secondary educ 0.12 0.18 -4.58 0.000
HH head above secondary educ 0.01 0.05 -5.14 0.000
jo
b
HH head self employed agric 0.19 0.25 -4.11 0.000
HH head slf-employed no-agric 0.40 0.27 6.93 0.000
HH head wge-employed agric 0.14 0.16 -1.33 0.183
HH head wge-employed non-agric 0.13 0.08 3.41 0.001
cr
ed
it Bank/coop loan size 694 2,217 -2.89 0.004
Informal loan size 716 1,552 -1.85 0.065
Relative loan size 1,670 3,952 -4.60 0.000
In the table it is tested whether the mean (in the case of dummy variables, the
proportion) of the treated (MFI borrowers) is equal to that of the control group (MFI
non-borrowers) or not. The p values corresponding to the variables for which the null of
equal means can be rejected at 5% significance level is shadowed in grey. Thus, the
sample is unbalanced between treated and it cannot clearly be assumed that treated and
controls have the same distribution as it would be the case if there had been a random
allocation of the treatment.
The aim of propensity score matching is, using the observables, to try to find a sample
of controls as similar as possible to the treated and then to match treated with controls.
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For the former step it is necessary to match on the Common Support area. Doing so we
are avoiding the ܤଵ component of bias as explained in the theoretical chapter (Caliendo,
2006). For the latter step, different algorithms choices will give different weights to the
controls used and thus ܤଶ component of selection bias is avoided.
Common Support (CS)
0 < P(X) < 1 implies that “perfect predictors” (P(X) = 0 or P(X)) = 1) should be avoided
and matching has to be done in the region of common support, where a counterpart of
the treated can be found among the non treated.
The relevance of the CS condition is also related to the matching algorithm choice.
Kernel matching uses all the control observations when matching and therefore it needs
to be defined which ones have to be discarded. In the case of Nearest Neighbour or
Radius matching the matching is against the closest p-score in the control group and this
might not be such an issue but for participants at the tails of the distribution.
(Caliendo, 2006) mentions two different methods to establish the CS area. Although a
simple histogram of the distribution of the propensity scores of both groups could give a
clear idea of the overlapping, two different approaches have been used in the literature.Maxima and minima
This method establishes the bounds of the CS with the lower and upper bounds of the
distributions of the propensity score of participants and controls. The limits of the CS
area will be those within which both control’s and participant’s distributions have
positive density values. If the propensity scores of the control group ranges within the
interval [0.1, 0.85] and the participant’s [0.05, 0.99], the CS will be given by [0.1, 0.85]
as below and above those only the participant’s distribution of propensity score.
There are two main drawbacks with this method. The first is that there might be voids in
the overlap interval (bin voids in the histogram). The case might be, for example, when
there are not controls within the interval [0.20, 0.30] and, nonetheless, the participants
in that range are matched. The second is not taking into account observations with
propensity scores that might be very close to the limits but outside the range.
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Trimming method.
This method is used by (Smith and Todd, 2005). They first study both distributions and
discard all the observations which density is equal to zero. They continue their
“trimming” by eliminating also the observations that in spite of having a positive
density, it does not surpass a minimum threshold. Therefore, in addition to those with
null density, a q percent of observations with low density are discarded. This method
would solve the above mentioned problem with “bin voids” by discarding those
observations.Application of Common Support
As discussed above, the matching has to be done between observations within the CS
area, as doing otherwise increases the bias of the estimation. In this area of common
support the propensity scores of controls and treated are overlapped. Figure 21 at the
appendix shows this clear overlapping and it suggests that most of the observations lie
within this common support area. Another graphical representation is found in Figure
22, in this case in histogram form. In the latter it is seen that there are not any “empty
bins” in the common support area. Only a small number of observations are left out of
common support, at the tails. Thus the main drawback of the maxima and minima
criterion to establish the common support area is not present and this method will be
used instead of the trimming method. (Nannicini, 2007) suggests that when the option
adopted is minima and maxima method there should be a test of the sensitivity of the
results to matching with observations that are very close to the bounds of the common
support area. However, given the scarce number of observations left outside the bounds,
their effect are likely to be negligible.
Output from the pscore command (Becker and Ichino, 2002) command for the
implementation of the propensity score is found at the appendix, under the heading
“Outcomes from the propensity score using pscore command” which is just a
transcription of the results after executing that command in Stata. It can be seen that the
range of the common support is eventually established between the values [.06616695,
.935185]. This area leaves 919 controls to match with 1,584 treated households. The
rest will not be considered in the matching process. After that, it is established whether
participants and non participants are balanced. This has to do with the matching quality
and will be discussed later when dealing with this issue.
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Summing up, in this first stage we have first followed previous literature to find the
covariates. These were found through a logit model, choosing the one that maximized
pseudo-R2. Finally, the CS area was established through the maxima-minima criterion
as graphs did not show any issues that would suggest using the trimming method
instead.
Matching algorithms, matching process and matching quality assessment
Matching algorithms
The models used to obtain the propensities scores are normally probit or logit model,
although other options are also used. Once the propensity scores have been found, each
treated individual has to be matched with others in the range of values within the
common support.
There are several algorithms that have been developed when matching propensity
scores. Once the CS area has been defined, the core point is to decide what weights are
to be assigned to the matched controls (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000). A general
expression for the matching estimator is given by (following notation in the former
paper):
ߙெෞ ෍ ቐ ௜ܻ− ෍ ܹ ௜௝ ௝ܻ
௝ఢ஼
ቑ
௜ఢ்
where T and C are the set of Treated and Controls, i and j denote observations in T and
C respectively, ܹ ௜௝ is the weight given to the jth observation in the control group
matching the ith observation in the treated group and ݓ௜ is the weight to shape the
distribution of the outcome for the control group. Different combinations of this general
form lead to different matching estimators:Nearest Neighbour (NN henceforth) estimator
The ith observation is matched with one or, less commonly, a set of observations in the
control group whose estimated propensity score pj is the closest to the one of the
observation in the treated pi:
||||min)( jij ppiC 
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The matching can be done with or without replacement. The first is considered to be
more adequate and operationally useful as better matches can be done for each
treatment and the bias will be lower (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Multiple Nearest
Neighbour matching can be seen as a way of reducing variance because more controls
are available. But it also allows for worse matches, increasing the bias.Radius Matching and Caliper Matching
They have the common feature that the matching is done with controls that lie within a
neighbourhood (or caliper or radius) of the propensity score of the treated. This value is
arbitrarily low. The difference is that caliper matching is a one to one matching and
radius matching is done with all the controls that comply with the radius condition.
|{ ji pC  | }|||| rpp ji 
where r is the value of the tolerance level.The caliper estimator keeps away the risk of
bad matches if the NN is not close enough, but also might impede some matches that
could have be done had this tolerance level not been established (although increasing
the variance). The radius reduces the risk of bad matches but also might reduce the
variance15 when several good matches are available (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).Kernel matching
In this case all (or nearly all) the observations in the control group are used and the
matching is done over a weighted average where the closest are given the highest
weights and the most distant the lowest ones.
Algebraically:
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Where TN is the number of elements in the treated sample, G(.) is a kernel function and
nh is the bandwidth parameter. As stated in (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008), the choice
of the kernel function is not of great importance but the case of the bandwidth parameter
15 The higher the number of matches the lower the variance of the estimate but also is more biased.
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is indeed. Higher bandwidth may lead to a better fit and lower variance but can increase
the bias and therefore the trade-off has to be balanced when doing the bandwidth
choice. In this study bandwidths of 0.02, 0.04 and 0.06 will be used.Mahalanobis Metric Matching
The Mahalanobis technique was invented before PSM. The technique is based in the
distances between treated and controls. The first step is to sort randomly observations
from both groups. Then, all the distances ݀( ,݅ )݆ between the each treated and all
controls are found. This distance is defined as:
݀( ,݅ )݆ = (ݑ− ݒ)ᇱܥିଵ(ݑ− ݒ)
Where ݑ is the matrix of the matching variables for participants ݅and ݒ are the
corresponding for non participants .݆ ܥ is the covariance matrix of all variables for the
control group. After finding all distances, the treated i݅s matched with the control ݆that
minimizes this distance and both observations are dropped from the sample. This goes
one until all treated have been matched. The problems mentioned above with respect to
no replacement are applicable as well. This algorithm becomes less convenient as the
number of covariates rise as the distance, as well as the calculation burden, rises with it.
Other versions of this algorithm are found for different versions of ܥ and when the
propensity score variable is included as an additional covariate (Guo and Fraser, 2010).
The above methods are to be used in the analysis of the microfinance impact and they
should produce similar results or otherwise the impact analysis would not be reliable.
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Matching process
Once the samples have been delimited and before applying the algorithms, there is still
another issue to handle. When randomization is not the sampling strategy, the share of
treated in the survey are normally well above the proportion in the population.
Therefore, treated tend to be overrepresented. This is the case for the present survey.
(Smith and Todd, 2005) contend that not knowing the correct weights would result in
wrong estimation of the probability of participation. Nonetheless, (Heckman and Todd,
2009) state that only a monotonic transformation of the propensity scores is needed to
surmount this problem, even when these propensity scores have been found without the
proper weights. According to them the odds ratios found with mispecified weights can
be used as scores. This is applicable just to match algorithms in which the absolute
distance between observations is considered (Kernel and Local Linear Regression
matching). In order to avoid this problem, in the case of the kernel algorithm the
matching is done on the log odds ratio of the propensity score, log(ܲ(ܺ) 1 − ܲ(ܺ)൘ )
This is not applicable to NN or caliper, though, as long as in them the rank of proximity
is what determines the matching.
The first of the matching algorithms16 used was one-to-one NN with replacement in
order to increase the quality of the matches and reduce bias. This, however, reduces the
number of controls matched and increase the variance of the estimator. (Smith and
Todd, 2005; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).
Also the caliper method was attempted within 0.01, 0.001 and 0.0001 neighbourhoods.
The restriction of matches to a particular caliper is nothing else than establishing a more
restrictive common support. The idea is to keep the matches as close as possible.
Caliper matching, on the contrary to radius matching, is a 1-1 technique. Radius
matching is a 1 to N match, where N is the total number of controls within the
“propensity range”. The reduction in the size of the neighbourhood also limits the
number of matches and increases their quality.
16 See section 4 for an ample description and discussion about the implementation of the different
matching algorithms.
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Finally, the kernel algorithm matches on the log odds ratio of the propensity score,log(ܲ(ܺ) 1 − ܲ(ܺ)൘ ). The approach uses a Gaussian kernel, although other options are
available such as Epanechnikov or tricube. Literature states that this choice has not any
effect on the final outcome of the impact analysis. The other main choice when dealing
with kernel algorithm is the bandwidth. Bandwidth is the proportion of observations of
the sample that are taken to do the local averaging in the kernel. This choice has a
consequence in the shape of the fitted curve and therefore on the estimates. It is
advisable to use more than one bandwidth specification. In our approach it is used 0.02,
0.04 and 0.06 bandwidths. The higher the bandwidth the smoother is the curve and the
lower the variance. In kernel algorithm all controls are used.
Testing the significance of the ATTs is another cause of concern when approaching
PSM. The main issue is that the variance of the ATT does not take into account the
variance of the calculation of the propensity scores or the choice of the common support
area (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The most common choice in the literature and the
ones that are easily available in the software are bootstrapping. This is used in
(Heckman et al., 1997; Sianesi, 2004), for instance. However, Abadie and Imbens (
2008) find that bootstrapping is not adequate to establish statistical significance of the
estimates in the case of NN, radius and caliper matching. In these cases, only when the
number of controls is higher than the treated in the sample the bootstrapped standard
errors are a conservative estimation of the real standard errors.
In the case of NN and caliper matching the option taken is to use the matching variance
estimator suggested in Abadie and Imbens (2006)17. Although this solution relaxes the
homoskedasticity of the approximated standard errors, it still doesn’t consider properly
the estimation of the propensity score through the logit or probit models. Another
solution is suggested in their working paper, Abadie and Imbens (2011), but no software
implementation is available yet. In the case of the kernel algorithm, correct inference is
obtained from bootstrapped standard errors (Abadie and Imbens, 2008).
17 PSM was implemented with psmatch2 command: Leuven, E. & Sianesi, B. 2003. PSMATCH2: Stata
module to perform full Mahalanobis and propensity score matching, common support graphing, and
covariate imbalance testing". http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html Version 4.0.4. The
option for Abadie and Imben’s solution is “ai” and it will be used in both NN and caliper matching.
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Matching quality
The process of matching should be able to balance the covariates in both groups. The
different approaches to test the matching quality have been summarized by (Caliendo,
2006). The main point of these tests is to confirm that once we have conditioned on
P(X), there should be not any dependence on X. Therefore, an additional condition on X
should not provide with any additional information.
).|1(| XDPDX i 
Caliendo (2006) mentions four different indicators that have been used so far by
different academics:
 T-test: Based on doing a two sample t-test that show if the difference between
the means of each covariate is significant. This is the way shown in Table 14
and Table 55, at the appendix.
 Stratification tests: observations are divided into strata attending to their
propensity scores. At each strata the means of propensity should be equal for
controls and participants and later t-test are implemented to check that the
distributions of variables in both groups are the same, checking first and second
moments. Stata command pscore (Becker and Ichino, 2002) not only finds the
propensity score of each variable but also split the sample into strata and tests
for the means to be equal between the different groups. If they are, it is said that
the balance property holds and the CI assumption is more plausible.
 Standarised bias, used in (Sianesi, 2004). For each variable X, it is found out the
difference of the sample means over the square root of the variances of both
groups, in percentage terms. The same is calculated after the matching, and it is
considered enough if the reduction is around or below the 5%.
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after where X stands for mean, V for
variance, T for treated C for control and M for matched.
 Joint significance and Pseudo-R2: The Pseudo-R2 measures the degree to which
the covariates explain the probability of participation. Therefore, the covariates
should explain participation before matching but not after the match, as the
differences in distributions of variables of participants and controls should not
be different any more. Hence, Pseudo-R2 will be low after matching. By the
same token an F-test implemented to test the null of joint insignificance of all
regressors should be rejected before matching but not after matching.
If the quality tests fails the explanation could be either a bad specification of the model
or that the CIA doesn’t hold. In the first case, new specification should be made,
including even higher order covariates. In the second, the approach should be to explore
additional techniques to do the impact analysis. (Caliendo, 2006)Matching quality assessment
Quality is normally assessed after the matching because different matching algorithms
result into different outcomes for the different quality indicators above mentioned.
However, quality is discussed first and then the ATT shown in the paper will come from
the algorithm/s with best performance while the rest will be shown in the appendix.
We can start where we left when the outcomes of the pscore command (Becker and
Ichino, 2002) were used to set the Common Support area. In the appendix, under the
heading “Outcomes from the propensity score using pscore command” close to the
bottom it is reported that the sample has been split into seven blocks and that the
balancing property is satisfied. This command follows (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999,
Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) in their approach to test the quality of the matching. Is is a
stratification test. But they tested also the second moments and the pscore command
only tests for means.
In Table 15 the remaining techniques are shown (pseudo-R2, the p-value when testing
the joint insignificance of the covariates and the median absolute bias) all before and
after the matching. It has to be stated that these tests depend on the propensity scores
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and the common support area, which has been fixed already in the interval [.06616695,
.935185] and are independent of the outcome variable (income, expenditures, etc)
because they only care about the matching and not about the mean differences in the
dependent variable.
The first column of the table contains the pseudo-R2 before and the second after the
matching, the p-value after the matching is in column three and the last two are devoted
to the median absolute bias before and after the matching. The first pseudo-R2 and the
first median bias are common to all algorithms because they are calculated in the same
way. The after-matching measures show that calipers 0.01 and 0.0001 together with
Mahalanobis have a high pseudo-R2 of more than 0.01 after the matching. This agrees
with their p-values. The null of joint insignificance of coefficients can be rejected for
these algorithms at 5% level even after the matching. This means that the covariates still
have some explanatory power and therefore matching is not as good as we would have
expected. Finally, there is not a threshold value with respect to the median of absolute
bias to assess if the matching is good or bad. In the table it is clear that the values are
lower after the matching. (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008) state that a value between 3%
and 5% could be adequate. It is also clear that the highest values of absolute bias
correspond to the algorithms that had higher p-values.
These matching quality indicators provide with some guidance about how reliable are
the outcomes shown in the tables with respect to algorithms. Judging by them, the ATTs
calculated with NN, caliper 0.01 and kernels would be the most reliable.
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Table 15 Matching quality MFI borrowers vs. MFI non-borrowers
Matching quality model MFI borrowers vs. MFI noborrwers
Pseudo-R
square before
Pseudo-R
square after
P-value
after
Median
absolute bias
before
Median
absolute
bias after
NN 0.097 0.007 0.219 10.44 2.05
Radius .01 0.097 0.007 0.225 10.44 1.97
Radius .001 0.097 0.010 0.046 10.44 2.79
Radius .0001 0.097 0.028 0.003 10.44 4.02
Kernel .02 0.097 0.004 0.888 10.44 2.10
Kernel .04 0.097 0.004 0.896 10.44 2.38
Kernel .06 0.097 0.004 0.899 10.44 2.34
Mahalanobis 0.097 0.014 0.000 10.44 2.49
Finally, Table 55 (appendix) shows what was seen in Table 14 but after the matching. It
can be realised that after the matching there is only two variables for which the null of
equal means can be rejected at 10% significance level, but none at 5% level. These
variables are distance to Pucca Road and average rice price in the village. The matching
in Table 55 is done with a kernel with 0.02 of bandwidth18.
A final comment about matching quality is that some papers just report how good an
estimate is regarding these matching quality parameters. They do not go on with
sensitivity analysis. They just trust the quality parameters and do not add further
assumptions in the model. This is the case in (Blundell et al., 2005, Sianesi, 2004).
Other sources resort to sensitivity analysis to test whether the unobservables might be
leading the estimation (Caliendo, 2006, Duvendack and Palmer-Jones, 2011, Ichino et
al., 2007).
ATT calculated with the different algorithms
After all these steps and knowing that the kernel algorithms show the best matching
quality, outcomes of these algorithm are shown in Table 55. Also, they had not the
inference problems as happened with NN, caliper or radius. The tables contain the ATT
estimates, the t value and the lower and upper bound of the confidence interval in order
to inform about the statistic significance of these estimates.
18 Additional tables with 0.04 and 0.06 bandwidth and the outcomes were quite similar.
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Outcomes obtained from other algorithms are reported at the appendix but they do not
differ much from what it is shown in other algorithms. The outcomes shown refer to
several variables and to the different treated and control groups created. All the steps so
far have been illustrated with MFI borrowers versus MFI non borrowers. In this case,
differences that might come from borrowing from another credit source were accounted
for by including the loan size variables. These are the treated and control groups for
which the descriptives and all the steps involving covariates choice, logit, matching, etc
has been explained so far.
However, it is of interest also to create different groups of treated and controls. In order
to study the impact of borrowing from any credit source, we just compared borrowers
from any source (banks/cooperatives, MFIs, moneylenders and relatives) vs. non
borrowers at all. In a third stage the comparison was done between MFI borrowers vs.
non borrowers at all. In this last one, households that borrowed from MFIs and any
additional source were not taken into consideration.
Each time the treated and control groups change, the logit model has to be rerun in order
to find the propensity scores. Also, the matching quality has to be tested again. The logit
regression outcomes for these other two definitions are found in Table 56 (appendix).
The matching quality for the case of Borrowers vs. Non borrowers at all is in Table 58
(appendix) and when the comparison is between strictly MFI borrowers vs. Non
borrowers at all the table is Table 59 (appendix). Non remarkable differences are found
in the logit with the new definition of treated and controls and again the kernel
algorithms show overall better matching quality parameters.
Contrary to the two previous PSM approaches, (Chemin, 2008; Duvendack and Palmer-
Jones, 2011) the outcomes do not show any significance in the case of expenditures per
capita. This difference is most likely given because of the different samples used. They
use the first round of the survey and our outcomes are based on the second round, where
the households were questioned many years after and there is a large number of
households that were not present earlier.
There are three variables showing statistical significance. It is shown a negative impact
effect on income per capita in the first two specifications of the treated and control
groups. In the case of MFI borrowers vs. MFI non borrowers it is negative and
marginally significant at 5% using kernel 0.06. With a mean income per capita or
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around 7,233 thakas, the impact represents a 13.04% decrease in annual income. It
shows also negative and significant when testing borrowers vs. non borrowers and the
estimates become non significant when the comparison is between MFI borrowers and
non borrowers at all.
Significance at 5% level is marginal and disappears when we exclude borrowers from
alternative sources from the comparison and purely MFI borrowers are matched with
non borrowers. This might be a sign of credit from other sources leading the decrease in
income. In any case, the given that it doesn’t show significance in all estimates and the
problems in the construction of the income variable no strong conclusions can be made
from these outcomes.
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Table 16 Impact effects for three groups specifications
Algorithm ATT t-statistic
Lower
bound
C.I.
Upper
bound C.I.
M
FI
bo
rr
ow
er
sv
s.
M
FI
no
n
bo
rr
ow
er
s
Income per capita kernel_02 -987 -1.86 -2127 8
kernel_06 -943 -1.98 -2065 -101
Expenditures per capita kernel_02 -106 -0.62 -545 188
kernel_06 -128 -0.89 -382 121
food expenditures per
capita
kernel_02 52 0.55 -153 222
kernel_06 42 0.44 -118 375
expenditures 5up kernel_02 222 1.44 -112 510
kernel_06 270 2.05 18 481
home
repairs/investment
kernel_02 466 2.81 197 816
kernel_06 485 2.59 156 838
Bo
rr
ow
er
sa
ny
sr
c.
vs
.n
on
bo
rr
ow
er
s
Income per capita kernel_02 - 1019 -1.96 -2170 -41
kernel_06 - 983 -1.85 -2066 -8
Expenditures per capita kernel_02 -82 -0.40 -514 302
kernel_06 -86 -0.44 -484 249
food expenditures per
capita
kernel_02 74 0.73 -115 254
kernel_06 65 0.63 -125 294
expenditures 5up kernel_02 527 3.71 247 792
kernel_06 516 3.59 211 795
home
repairs/investment
kernel_02 646 3.47 297 1010
kernel_06 612 3.25 222 930
M
FI
bo
rr
ow
er
sv
s.
N
on
bo
rr
ow
er
s
at
al
l
Income per capita kernel_02 - 853 -1.47 -1774 395
kernel_06 -756 -1.41 -1836 236
Expenditures per capita kernel_02 -198 -1.06 -570 128
kernel_06 -226 -1.26 -572 113
food expenditures per
capita
kernel_02 27 0.26 -202 215
kernel_06 019 0.00 -209 220
expenditures 5up kernel_02 345 2.75 103 599
kernel_06 340 2.74 93 589
home
repairs/investment
kernel_02 487 2.42 134 876
kernel_06 482 2.48 76 835
Also, borrowing from MFIs or other sources seem to have a positive and significant
impact on extraordinary expenses and expenses on home extensions/investments. In the
former case, the significance is found at all group specifications, although in the
comparison between MFI borrowers and MFI non-borrowers, the ATT calculated with
the kernel 0.02 algorithm is not significant. The maximum impact is found in the
19 Value 0.2 ,but all figures in the table are rounded to integer values.
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comparison between borrowers vs. non borrowers at all. In this the impact is estimated
at a rise of 44.5%-47% calculated over the mean in extraordinary expenses, 1,375 takas.
Among these extraordinary expenses, those referred to home repairs, extensions and
investments are the ones which show the most consistent positive and significant impact
in all models. The extent of the impact is also quite remarkable and again the maximum
impact is found when comparing borrowers from any source versus non borrowers at
all, with a 47%-48% increase in these expenditures with respect to the mean of 1,094
takas. Impact on these extraordinary expenditures, thus, seems to be quite robust and
increases when the treatment group includes borrowers from all sources.
Finally, in none of the models borrowing had any effect on (current) expenditures per
capita or food expenditures per capita. This is clearly against the conclusion contained
in Khandker (2005) where this impact was clearly positive and significant. Therefore,
we reach to the same conclusion as Roodman and Morduch (2009) who cannot find a
significant impact either, although they replicate the panel approach in Khandker
(2005).
Robustness of estimates to the presence of negative per capita income values.
A further calculation was carried out after dropping the negative values. In the second
specification of the treated and control groups the number of observations is decreased
further as those borrowing just from alternative sources are not taken into account.
Once tested for the quality of the match, again the kernel algorithms performed best,
while radius and NN were the worst. The ATT calculated is almost the same for all the
specifications of the treated and controls (see Table 17) . For all the specifications the
ATT is quite similar whereas the only differences are shown in the significance. In the
first specification the kernel with 0.06 bandwidth is not significant, unlike in Table 16.
For the second spec, the 0.06 kernel also loses significance. It should be noticed that
this significance was marginal. There are no changes in the third specification. This
confirms the inconsistency of the impact of borrowing on income per capita in the
present study, in contrast with the repeated significance in the case of home repairs and
investment expenditures. There might be a negative impact on per capita income but the
outcomes are not conclusive. Following Caliendo (2006) no sensitivity analysis is
carried out as the evidence of significance is weak.
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Table 17 ATT with no negative observations for income per capita
Algorithm ATT t-statistic Lower bound C.I. Upper bound C.I.
spec 1 kernel_02 -916 -1.80 -1831 127
kernel_06 -891 -2.01 -1744 47
spec 2 kernel_02 -1033 -2.09 -2109 -77
kernel_06 -974 -1.74 -2133 153
spec 3 kernel_02 -827 -1.59 -1838 216
kernel_06 -756 -1.40 -1881 212
Sensitivity analysis
The PSM analysis is based on the CIA assumption that states that once matched on the
P(X) outcomes are independent of the participation status. Thus, a comparison of these
outcomes between these treated and controls would result into the impact effect. As
stated above, the assumption was like this:
଴ܻ , ଵܻ ⊥ ܦ|ܲ(ܺ) (1.41)
This assumption is not testable but there have been some attempts to try to model the
effect that one unobservable might have on participation and outcome variables. Most
of these approaches are based on the works by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983a),
Rosenbaum (1987) and Rosenbaum (2002). They are not so widespread and some
references used in this study do not use them (Sianesi, 2004, Blundell et al., 2005).
Eventually, this kind of sensitivity analysis also relies on assumptions about the
unobservables. Thus, more assumptions are called into the estimation. Applications of
this analysis can be found in Caliendo (2006); Ichino et al., (2007) and Guo and Fraser
(2010).
The sensitivity approach assumes the presence of a variable, U, which is unobservable.
The assumption in (1.46) is not valid any more as long as U can affect participation and
outcome variables. Thus, the new CIA should take into account not only X but also U
and thus:
଴ܻ ⊥ ܦ|ܺ,ܷ (1.42)
In the new framework the outcomes of the controls are independent of participation
given the covariates and the unobservable U. Hence,
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ܧ[ ଴ܻ ⊥ ܦ = 1|ܺ] ≠ ܧ[ ଴ܻ ⊥ ܦ = 0|ܺ,ܷ] (1.43)
and it has to be changed by:
ܧ[ ଴ܻ ⊥ ܦ = 1|ܺ,ܷ] = ܧ[ ଴ܻ ⊥ ܦ = 0|ܺ,ܷ] (1.44)
The unobservable U is also assumed to have some characteristics. It is a binary variable
and it is conditionally independent of treatment. In the theoretical framework used in
Ichino et al. (2007) the outcome variable is also assumed to be binary ( ଴ܻ, ଵܻ ∈ {0,1}).
This is not incompatible with continuous variables as they are transformed using a
threshold (mean, median) above which the outcome variable switches from zero to one.
The confounder U is characterized by the different combinations of treatment and
outcome variables taking the value of one or zero. Its distribution is fully characterized
by these parameters:
݌௜,௝≡ ܲݎ(ܷ = 1|ܦ = ,ܻ݅ = )݆ = ܲݎ(ܷ = 1|ܦ = ,ܻ݅= ,݆ܺ)
where D refers to the treatment and Y to the outcome and ݌௜,௝ is the probability of U
being equal to 1 for D =݅and Y = ݆where ,݅ ݆∈ {0,1}.
They result into different probabilities of U = 1 that are attributed to each observation
(household). These values are included in the model as a new variable and then the
propensity score together with the ATT are calculated applying matching algorithms as
usual.
The approach also calculates the odds ratio of U for outcome and selection effects, Γ
and ߉ respectively, as follows:
߁ ≡
ܲݎ(ܻ = 1|ܶ = 0,ܷ = 1,ܺ)
ܲݎ(ܻ = 0|ܶ = 0,ܷ = 1,ܺ)
ܲݎ(ܻ = 1|ܶ = 0,ܷ = 0,ܺ)
ܲݎ(ܻ = 0|ܶ = 0,ܷ = 0,ܺ)
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and
߉ ≡
ܲݎ(ܶ = 1|ܷ = 1,ܺ)
ܲݎ(ܶ = 0|ܷ = 1,ܺ)
ܲݎ(ܶ = 1|ܷ = 0,ܺ)
ܲݎ(ܶ = 0|ܷ = 0,ܺ)
In the case of the outcome effect,߁ is interpreted how much U increases the relative
probability of Y taking the value of one (or being above the threshold used to transform
it into a binary if Y is continuous). Λ is interpreted as how much U increases the relative
probability of D taking the value of one, or, in other words, the relative probability of
participation.
The interpretation of the sensitivity analysis has to take into account then not only the
recalculated ATT estimates but also the outcome and selection effects. Estimates will be
much more robust when they do not deviate much from the original when the outcome
(߁) and selection effects (Λ) are high. Confounders that don’t increase the mentioned
relative probabilities are less informative as they are not expected to cause much change
in the point estimates. The approach attempted in the present study is based in Nannicini
(2007) and Ichino et al. (2007) through the stata command sensatt20.
Sensitivity analysis applied
Sensatt command allows creating binary confounders (or binary transformations of
continuous variables). These confounders are nothing else than new variables added to
the model that are thought to cause changes in the outcome and selection variables. One
advantage of this approach is that it allows keeping all the variables in the original
model on the contrary to other sensitivity analysis in which some different
specifications of the model are compared.
The confounders were found among variables that were considered to have an effect
over both outcome and selection variables. At household level they are:
20 Other commands are available in stata for this sensitivity analysis. At the time of writing the command
called mhbounds, by Marco Caliendo and Sascha O. Becker is used only when the outcome variable is
binary and ours is continous. In the case of rbounds (by Markus Gangl) the dependent variable can be
continuous but it only calculates the sensitivity of the NN one-to-one algorithm. The matching quality of
the kernel algorithms was far better and therefore the choice was to test sensitivity for these estimates.
The only command that allowed testing estimates found out with a kernel algorithm was senssatt.
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 Old household head: taking the value of one when the age of the household head
is above the 75th percentile, 55 years old.
 Electric: the home has electricity or not.
 Agricultural job: if the household head has an agricultural job.
 High value for domestic assets: the value of domestic assets is above the 75th
percentile.
 High extension of land: the extension of land of the household is above the 75th
percentile
And at village level:
 Average price rice: whether it is above the 75th percentile or not.
 Development activities: whether in the village or around there are some
development activities such as construction of a road.
Old household heads and homes with electricity would be expected to be less likely to
participate. Also, old household heads would as well be expected to get less out of the
loans and households with electricity would be expected to have higher returns from the
money borrowed. On the other hand, households with high extensions of land and high
value of domestic assets should also be less likely to participate as they are not target
clientele for MFIs. At village level, villages with high rice price might increase the
likelihood of participation as dwellers have to keep consumption levels even when
staple foods are expensive. On the contrary, in villages with food for education
programs households should ease their needs of buying food as some are covered by
these programs.
Outcomes can be seen in Table 18 for the case of MFI borrowers vs. MFI non
borrowers. The table contains all the confounders and the variables that showed
statistical significance. Outcomes are limited to the kernel algorithm (for 0.06
bandwidth). The column ATT(target) refers to the values originally calculated
(contained in Table 16). The ATT (conf) are the estimates after adding the confounder
U. The column % is the percentage calculated with the following formula:
୅୘୘(୲ୟ୰୥ ୲ୣ) –୅୘୘(ୡ୭୬୤)
୅୘୘(୲ୟ୰୥ ୲ୣ) . And the confounder effects columns refer to how much the
confounder increases (or decreases) the relative probability of having the outcome
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variable above the mean (in this case as continuous outcome variables are dealt with). In
the case of the treatment variable it refers to the relative probability of participating (D
= 1).
Hence, for instance, let’s see the case of income per capita the confounder electric
(electricity at home or not). We assume that the unobservables follow a distribution like
this confounder. This confounder breaks the CIA because it affects the relative
probability of having income per capita above the mean by a factor of 3.64. Also
decreases the relative probability of being borrower by more than 30%. Under these
circumstances, that deviate from CIA, the ATT is calculated as -594. This is higher than
the originally calculated at 943 with kernel .06. This is a remarkable swing that led us to
question the significance of the ATT estimates with respect to income per capita.
Overall, in this case, what it is seen is that the income per capita estimates are more
prone to swing around the ATT calculated without confounders. This means that the
outcomes are not so robust. These confounders, apart from “electric” and “asset high”
do not pose an extreme challenge on the original estimates as they do not make relative
probabilities to increase very much. Thus, a more stable behaviour would be expected if
the estimates were robust.
The case of extraordinary and housing expenditures is slightly different as no such
swings are found, meaning that the estimates are more robust in this case. This pattern is
repeated in the sensitivity tables for Borrowers vs. Non borrowers at all and MFI
borrowers vs Non borrowers at all (Table 63 and Table 64 at the appendix, respectively)
which underpins the argument that expenditures estimates are less sensitive to
unobservables than income per capita outcomes. In the last table income per capita is
not included because the estimates are not statistically significant.
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Table 18 Sensitivity analysis MFI borrowers vs. MFI non-borrowers
MFI borrowers vs. MFI non borrowers
estimates & sensitivity Confounder effect
ATT(target) ATT(conf) % U Outcome Selection
In
co
m
e
p/
c
Hhead Old -943 -863 8.5% 0.53 0.76
Electric -943 -594 37.0% 3.64 0.63
Agriculture job -943 -934 1.0% 0.32 0.73
Asset high -943 -1,045 -10.8% 5.71 1.47
Land high -943 -1,088 -15.4% 1.02 0.22
Av. Rice price high -943 -792 16.0% 1.33 1.23
Development activities -943 -787 16.5% 1.31 1.66
Ex
tr
ao
rd
in
ar
y
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
sp
/c
Hhead Old 270 281 -4.1% 0.80 0.77
Electric 270 269 0.3% 1.72 0.65
Agriculture job 270 257 4.8% 1.29 0.67
Asset high 270 303 -12.0% 1.90 1.52
Land high 270 265 2.1% 1.59 0.21
Av. Rice price high 270 309 -14.2% 1.13 1.10
Development activities 270 289 -7.1% 1.98 1.67
Ho
us
in
g
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s
p/
c
Hhead Old 485 488 -0.6% 1.28 0.76
Electric 485 471 3.0% 1.60 0.62
Agriculture job 485 492 -1.3% 0.88 0.71
Asset high 485 491 -1.2% 1.34 1.60
Land high 485 484 0.3% 1.48 0.22
Av. Rice price high 485 480 1.0% 1.26 1.16
Development activities 485 478 1.5% 1.24 1.99
Some literature doesn’t include this kind of analysis as it eventually relies on
assumptions that can be as correct or as wrong as the assumptions used in the PSM
technique. Examples of these are Sianesi (2004) and Blundell et al. (2005) in which
they just turn to the tables of matching quality indicators to support their estimates. On
the contrary, Caliendo (2006) and Ichino et al. (2007) turn to this sensitivity analysis.
Conclusion
The present chapter tries to apply PSM to find out the impact effect of microfinance
borrowing or borrowing from any source on income per capita and on current and
extraordinary household expenditures per capita at household level. First MFI
borrowers are compared with MFI non-borrowers but given the presence of other
sources of credit, it was also tried to estimate the impact of borrowing from any source
and the impact of MFI borrowers vs. non borrowers at all.
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The impact on income per capita is negative and marginally significant at 5% when
MFI borrowers are compared with MFI non-borrowers and when borrowers are
compared with non borrowers at all. Thus, this can be interpreted that the negative
impact happens when borrowing is done strictly from other sources than MFIs.
However, no strong statements could be done on either of these outcomes. First because
we found problems in the construction of the variable and it remains quite volatile.
Also, estimates are marginally significant and the sensitivity analysis pose some doubts
on them as they tend to swing when confounders are included in the model, even when
the confounders are not quite challenging. This means that unobservables might be
leading these outcomes.
In the comparison with the past literature, the most remarkable outcome in the study is
that no impact of borrowing from microfinance or any other source is found on
household current expenditures per capita in general or on household food expenditures
per capita. This is in contradiction with the conclusions of Chemin (2008), Duvendack
and Palmer-Jones (2011) and Khandker (2005). It might be due to the fact that we use
different datasets. With respect to the former two the sources are completely different
and in the case of Khandker (2005), its sample from the second round of the survey is
only two thirds of the households that we use. Additional problems of reconstruction of
the dataset might be possible, as happened with Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011),
due to the complexity of the configuration of the datasets and their poor documentation.
The dataset reconstructed by Roodman and Morduch (2009) is now available and an
interesting approach would be to use both rounds to implement a DID-matching
approach in the same fashion as Smith and Todd (2005).
The main outcome of the study is that when splitting the expenditures into current and
non-current, there are some extraordinary expenses that increase when households
borrow from MFIs but also from the rest of the sources available. In fact the rise is
higher when borrowers from any source are compared with non borrowers at all. When
extraordinary expenses refer to house extensions and investments in home/land the
estimates show significance in all the specifications of the treated and control groups.
The sensitivity analysis underpins this significance as the estimates are quite stable in
the presence of confounders and not great swings are found around the original
estimates.
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Thus, the study finds a positive and significant impact, although not in the variables in
which previous literature had found it. It also contributes to microfinance impact
evaluation showing that extraordinary expenses and specially expenses per capita in
housing repairs, extension and investments are strongly increased when households
borrow from microfinance and other sources. This is a sign of how households might be
diverting funds to non entrepreneurial activities.
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Watershed programs and village banking
Watershed programs
The main aim of the present chapter is to find out the impact of microfinance on income
and income per capita at household level. For that purpose, a panel dataset with two
time periods, 2005 and 2007, is used. The database at hand comes from surveys that
tried to evaluate watershed programs in five districts of inland Andhra Pradesh, India,
under two different approaches: the Drought Prone Area Programme (DPAP
henceforth), developed by the Indian Ministry of Rural Development and the Andhra
Pradesh Rural Livelihood Project (APRLP or RLP henceforth), developed by the
Department For International Development (DFID).
In the definition by Kerr (2002), a watershed is “an area from which all the water drains
to a common point”. Watershed programs basically create infrastructures that allow to
store this water so that rain fed crops do not need to rely so heavily on the weather
conditions, mainly in drought-prone regions. In India, these watershed programs date
back to the sixties and seventies when they were basically top-down designed with no
participation of the communities. This approach changed progressively to a bottom up
configuration, in which participation is a key element of the projects.
The relevance of microfinance within this watershed framework comes from the fact
that these projects don’t foster just to ease the effects of variations in rain patterns, but
also involve other measures such as road construction, regeneration of common lands,
encouragement of participation for all social groups and the issue of rights and bans.
In both projects, DPAP and RLP, microfinance is one of the key measures adopted. In
the former as a complementary project originally designed by the World Bank called
Velugu. In the latter, the creation of Self Help Groups (SHGs henceforth) is encouraged
and assessed by project personnel and members also have access to capacity building
and microfinance. These SHGs also cluster themselves in Village Organizations (VO)
which, in turn, participate in the decision organs of the project and suggest measures at
village level. In these organizations there is a minimum share of target groups such as
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women, or the poorest in order to guarantee their participation in decisions about the
projects.
Other measures to grant a correct distribution of benefits from the project are training
programs that increase the employability of the less favoured individuals, exclusive
fishing rights in water bodies for the landless or rights to tank/lift irrigation to landless
and exclusive grazing rights to shepherds and others. All these measures, together with
the minimum quotas in the project decision organs are thought to distribute equally the
benefits of these watershed interventions.
In this dataset, general information at household level and credit data in particular
allows to do a proper assessment of the impact of credit sources on the outcome
variables, with a particular interest in microfinance.
Microfinance in watershed programs: Village Banking.
The microfinance scheme followed both in DPAD and RLP is “village banking”, that
has some differences with the Grameen approach, for example, and also differs from
others as some examples seen in Latin America that focus on individual loans.
These SHG are mainly created for the credit scheme but other reasons such as capacity
building for women and program participation are encouraged. The groups are formed
by around 10-20 women from a similar socioeconomic background in order to avoid
discrimination within the SHG. Once the group is formed, they start to meet regularly to
assimilate the rules and objectives of the SHG and then they start saving and keeping
records of the meetings and amounts saved.
The amount can be very small but contributes to inculcate financial discipline and
reduces the dependence on moneylenders. Also special savings can be accepted in the
group and the decision about the interest paid to them should be decided by the group.
The savings are deposited into one account in the bank and the first source of loans to
the members will be these savings. In addition to this, with the passage of time and
provided that the SHG runs smoothly its lending activities, there will be additional
sources for the loans. These are interests accrued from the lending activities, grants or
even bank loans (made to the SHG, not to individuals).
These credit activities within SHGs have several advantages Masset and White ( 2006):
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 The interests paid for the loans do not end up in the moneylender’s pockets (or
banks, landlords, traders, etc) but go back to the group fund.
 Money is quickly available, the process relies on trust and peer monitoring so
there is not so much paperwork.
 There is a prioritisation to the neediest in terms of group training and quicker
access to funds.
SHGs are also a forum to exchange opinions and knowledge. In the particular case of
RLP watershed projects, SHGs are encouraged to submit proposals to Watershed
Committees in order to involve them in the implementation of measures. The main
interest of this study is the credit schemes but they are incorporated within this
watershed framework and, therefore, some discussion of them will be necessary in the
following sections.
This chapter intends to measure the impact of microfinance on income and income per
capita at household level. For this, Coleman’s model is used in the same way as done in
Tedeschi (2008). She runs a pooled OLS and a Fixed Effects (FE) panel data approach.
In order to control for the possible effects on the estimation of outliers or endogeneity,
we also attempt alternative methods. Overall, it is found that the impact of microfinance
on income per capita is positive and significant, even using methods less sensitive to
extreme values.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section the sampling strategy is
discussed, together with some descriptives of the outcome variables and credit sources.
The third part includes the main analysis of microfinance impact using a a panel fixed
effects, MM estimator and IV approaches. Then, the negative values for income per
capita withdrawn and the same models are run to test the robustness of the outcomes
when these abnormal values are not present. The final section revises the results and
concludes.
Survey and descriptive statistics
Survey
The survey was thought up with the watershed programs in mind and therefore a
description of this general framework is needed. The interest of the study, however, is
not on watershed areas but on microfinance. The sampling strategy includes a control
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area where watershed projects are not present. However, this does not apply to
microfinance services. Microfinance was present in all villages and thus no control
group was available. This happened also in the case of the second round of the
Bangladesh survey because microfinance organizations were present in all villages. It
follows a description of the sampling strategy that is mainly focused on the watershed
issues. This does not affect the main aim of the study, though, which is the assessment
of microfinance impact.
The survey was implemented in order to compare the approach of the Rural Livelihood
Project (RLP), designed by the British Department for International Development
(DFID) with the DPAP approach by the Indian Ministry of Rural Development that
started in the mid-1980s. Although the latter methodology greatly increased the
autonomy of villages in the decision-making with the new 1994 guidelines, the RLP
insists on some measures that encourage the participation of the poorer and ensure more
egalitarian distribution of benefits. An additional control group which had not had any
watershed interventions at all in the last 5 years or more was also included.
The survey took place in the state of Andhra Pradesh. Indian states are divided into
districts which, in turn, are sub-divided into mandals. Each mandal is made up of a
number of villages. The RLP was operating in five districts of Andhra Pradesh
(Prakasam, Kurnool, Anantapur, Mahabub Nagar and Nalgonda), seen in Figure 10,
mainly in the south of the state, the most drought-prone area. In each district 2 RLP
villages, 2 DPAP villages and 2 non-project villages were selected, producing a total of
30 villages.
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Figure 10 Districts
The RLP is implemented in 500 watersheds within these five districts. In the selection
of watersheds, the RLP chose mandals in a first instance and then the villages within
these mandals in a second stage.
Firstly, the criteria to select mandals were based on a score which includes two different
parts:
 One part is based on resources degradation, which includes rainfall and land
degradation data, based on graphical information obtained from satellite
pictures.
 The other is based on a social deprivation index, including inputs of income
poverty, services access, etc.
The aim was to have a range of mandals with uniform characteristics within and across
districts.
The RLP targeted villages within these selected mandals. An additional score was used
to pick the project villages. It was based on nine criteria: among them, for instance, the
percentage of small and marginal farmers, the percentage of women organized in SHG,
status of groundwater, livestock population, etc. Each of these nine characteristics was
given a different weight and their combination provided a score. Villages with a higher
number of watersheds or villages where leaders belonged to the ruling party were
prioritized in the case of equal scores. Information from the census of 1991 was used
for this score selection.
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Some exclusions were applied:
 Villages already covered by watershed programs
 Villages of less than 300 hectares
 Urban villages and Mandals headquarters
Finally, there was a further validation of the selection based on qualitative techniques
and consultation with the authorities at village and district levels. This was aimed at
confirming that all the chosen villages were actually deprived in geographical and social
terms.
Thus, the RLP first selected mandals and, in a second stage, villages within these
mandals. In the survey used for this study, the sampled RLP villages were picked in the
following way. First there was a random selection of two RLP villages in each district.
For each of the RLP villages a DPAP and a “non-watershed” village had to be pulled
out. The intention was to have control DPAP and “non-watershed” villages that had
similar characteristics to the RLP ones.
For this purpose, those control villages located within the same mandal of the RLP
village were first prioritized, assuming that they would be more similar in terms of
micro-climatic characteristics and ground water levels. There was more than one
eligible village in each mandal. Therefore, within each mandal the matches were
selected among those DPAP and “non-watershed” villages that had the same nine-
criteria score previously used to appoint RLP villages within the selected mandals. Even
after matching on this score, there was normally more than one eligible DPAP or “non-
watershed” control.
Whenever more than one potential match for the RLP village was available for
selection, a propensity score was used, estimated from data based on the 2001 census. In
this way, the matching was not based only on level characteristics but also on trend
similarities. This second score included ten variables, among them population size,
literacy rate, percentage of farmers or distance to the nearest town (Masset and White
2006).
The population of the districts where the project is present differs. Districts also differ in
terms of geographical and social characteristics but for practical reasons the number of
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villages selected by districts is the same, although it could have been done in proportion
to district population size. Thus the sampling of project villages is stratified by district
and the analysis requires sampling weights that are defined below.
The weight (w) of the ith household is the inverse of its probability of selection (݌௜) :
ݓ௜= 1݌௜
where the probability of selection is the product of the probability of district selection
(݌௜ௗ) times the probability of village selection for household i (݌௜௩) :
݌௜= ݌௜ௗݔ݌௜௩
In turn, the probability of selection at the district level is the fraction of the district
population (ܰௗ) over the total project population (ܰ ). The probability of selection at
village level is the ratio of village population (ܰ௩) to the district population:
݌௜ௗ = ܰௗܰ
݌௜௩ = ܰ௩ܰௗ
The survey took place twice during the years 2005 and 2007. Due to the seasonal
characteristics of agriculture, the time in the year when the surveys take place is crucial.
Hence, surveys were done at the same time of the year in order to minimize the effect of
seasonality. The first round was conducted in June 2005, covering the 2004 kharif and
2005 rabi season. The second had to be done in June 2007, gathering information from
the same seasons in 2006 and 2007 (Masset and White 2006).The number of total
households interviewed was normally 50 per village, with some exceptions: in one
village the number of households interviewed was 43 (Penchikala Pahad), in another
there were 46 (Nela Marri), there were 2 villages with 48 (Amangal, Kambhan Padu)
and 3 with 49 households (Chiramandoddi, Muddinayapalle, S. Kothapalli). This adds
to a number of 1,482 households in 2005, 21 of which had migrated when the second
round took place. These migrant households could not be traced back and therefore are
not present in the second round of the survey.
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The breakdown of these villages is given as follows. The survey used 30 different
villages, 10 RLP projects, 10 DPAP projects and 10 where there had not been a
watershed project in the previous 5 years at least. The number of household interviewed
in each project is 495 for RLP, 500 in DPAP and 487 in non-watershed areas.
Migrants
As mentioned above, 21 out of the 1482 households present in the first period could not
be traced back in 2007. In Table 19 means of the subsample of households that did not
migrate are compared with means of the migrants in 2005. The migrant households tend
to be smaller in size and this drives the fact that also the rest of the household
composition variables such as number of males, females, etc. are different and
statistically significant.
Migrants are also less prone to be self employed, and the total time they work in the
household is lower. However, this difference is accounted for by the differences in
sizes, as there are not significant differences in the time worked per working member of
the household. They are also poorer in terms of assets. They had suffered fewer shocks
in the last 12 months and their mean loan sizes were in general smaller than those of
non-migrants. The household income is clearly similar, but the income per capita is far
higher in the case of migrants, which has to do with the fact that their mean household
size is scarcely greater than half that of the non-migrants.
The share of migrant households is small and excluding them is unlikely to cause any
significant differences in the estimations. In Table 65 (appendix) the mean test is done
for 2005 between the mean calculated with all households and the mean calculated after
dropping the migrants. It can be seen that the mean differences are small and in all
cases quite far from being statistically significant even at 10% level. Thus, they are
dropped and will not be included in the statistics henceforth.
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Table 19 Mean test repeating vs. migrant households
ttest Panel sample = 1461 Migrants = 21
Panel migrants t_value p_value
HH head age 45.8 50.2 1.13 0.26
HH head age2 2,232 2,703 1.23 0.22
HH head sex (1 = male) 0.90 0.75 1.18 0.24
HH head married 0.90 0.60 2.01 0.05
HH head muslim 0.96 1.00 6.69 0.00
HH size 4.86 2.77 4.85 0.00
HH nr of males 2.53 1.36 4.19 0.00
HH nr of females 2.33 1.41 3.06 0.00
HH nr child <=6 0.23 0.12 1.88 0.06
HH head education 1.40 1.11 4.58 0.00
Female max education 1.62 1.27 1.49 0.14
Male max education 2.12 1.25 3.41 0.00
HH max education 2.24 1.73 2.50 0.01
Scheduled caste 0.22 0.30 0.52 0.60
Scheduled tribe 0.12 0.00 12.36 0.00
Backward caste 0.48 0.50 0.26 0.79
Upward caste 0.18 0.21 0.20 0.84
HH head unemployed 0.10 0.18 0.72 0.47
HH head main job agric 0.77 0.61 1.11 0.27
HH head main job non-agric 0.13 0.21 0.63 0.53
HH head no job 0.10 0.18 0.72 0.47
HH head self employed 0.55 0.22 3.32 0.00
HH head wage employed 0.35 0.60 1.90 0.06
HH head job time21 1,193 1,202 0.03 0.98
HH job time22 3,439 2,302 2.70 0.01
Job time per capita23 1,278 1,335 0.17 0.86
Walls of composite material
Time spent to get water
0.13
21.01
0.03
18.33
4.05
0.40
0.00
0.69
Value of Jewelry 5,174 6,291 0.33 0.74
Asset Index
Land area (acres)
0.72
3.37
0.64 0.45 0.65
1.89 1.90 0.06
Land value (rupees) 32,080 16,343 2.28 0.02
Livestock value (rupees) 3,367 1,034 4.60 0.00
Suffered shock 0.61 0.23 3.72 0.00
Borrowed from bank y/n 0.36 0.18 1.78 0.08
Borrowed from SHG y/n 0.29 0.16 1.36 0.18
Borrowed from NGO y/n 0.01 0.02 0.44 0.66
Borrowed from moneylender y/n 0.49 0.53 0.25 0.81
Borrowed from family-friends y/n 0.15 0.03 3.64 0.00
Borrowed from others y/n 0.09 0.02 3.36 0.00
Loan size bank 16,685 17,971 0.25 0.80
Loan size SHG 6,144 2,131 4.19 0.00
21 Time worked by the household head
22 Time worked by all members of the household
23 Total number of hours worked by all members of the household divided by the number of household
members
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ttest Panel sample = 1461 Migrants = 21
Panel migrants t_value p_value
Loan size NGO 18,970 3,000 1.16 0.27
Loan size moneylender 19,689 10,673 4.01 0.00
Loan size family-friends 23,399 5,000 4.78 0.00
Loan size others 15,566 6,000 4.81 0.00
Total amount borrowed all sources 26,465 15,773 2.81 0.01
Income (rupees) 26,552 26,484 0.02 0.99
Income per capita (rupees) 5,768 12,216 2.11 0.04
Descriptives of the outcome variables.
The present study intends to find out the impact that borrowing from SHG schemes
might have on income per capita and income. These variables are normally skewed to
the right due to the high values of the wealthiest observations, households in this case.
Henceforth, descriptives and analysis outcomes of income per capita will be normally
be shown and discussed in the text while, in many occasions the ones referred to income
will be contained in the appendix.
As happened with the calculation of income in the Bangladeshi study, there are several
households that show negative values for income and income per capita. Income per
capita is calculated by dividing the total income by the number of household members
and thus we will first describe the composition of the income variable.
The survey includes personal information about the members of the household as well
as the activities in which they are involved. Income is made up as follows:
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Figure 11 Income variable composition
The variable is composed of two main blocks: The first is composed by the revenues
obtained from businesses and the second by revenues from other activities. In the
former group the most important activity is farming, although there is information about
other activities that are under the “non farm revenues” heading. In both cases we found
the net revenues, subtracting the cost of inputs from the sales of the harvests or any
other products.
The second block of the income variable is divided into three different parts. The first is
composed of salaries from waged jobs and pensions. The second is the income obtained
from raising livestock and finally the third includes the resources obtained from rentals
of land or other kind of properties. Livestock could have been considered as a part of
farm revenues but it was separated in the survey.
As happened with the Bangladesh dataset, there exists a number of observations that
show negative income (and therefore income per capita) values. This was also discussed
earlier and it is mainly due to the fact that households invest in inputs such as fertilizers,
seeds or others and then the revenues obtained from the sales of the crop or any other
product is not enough to cover the costs. In this case there is an actual inflow and
outflow of cash and this is measured to find the net income.
income
revenues from businesess
farm revenues
+ crop revenues
- costs: seeds,
fertilizers,
irrigation, petrol,
el
Non farm revenues
+ revenues - expenses
other sources of income
salaried jobs /
pensions
Income from
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poultry
Income from
renting
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onwnership:rent
mortgages
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In the case of livestock, accounting rules were followed that might be questionable.
Animals consumed at home are accounted as a sale at market price and animals born at
home as purchases at market price. In these cases there were not outflows or inflows of
cash and therefore it brings to the variable an element that might add to measurement
error issues.
In the survey there was no section on expenditures which would have been a more
adequate dependent variable for our impact evaluation purposes. The presence of
negative values might pose some questions about the validity of the regressions and this
will be dealt with in the analysis section. In total, there were 284 households that
reported negative income/income per capita in one of the years under consideration, 173
in 2005 and 111 in 2007. Apart from that 31 households had negative income in both
years. Thus, in total in 2005 we had 173 + 31 = 204 (almost 14%) households and in
2007 111 + 31 = 142 (9.7%) households with negative values.
Mean and median of both income and income per capita can be seen in Table 66
(appendix). In the case of income per capita, the mean was 5,768 rupees while the
median was 3,866, which means that the median is 49% lower than the mean. This
confirms the skewness of the distribution in 2005 and this pattern continues in 2007. In
this year the mean slightly decreases with respect to 2005 and the median does on the
contrary. A similar evolution is seen in income.
In order to observe the possible presence of outliers or extreme values that might be
skewing the distribution box and whisker graphs are used. The outliers and extreme
values24 lie outside the whiskers. The graph (Figure 12) includes all the observations
and this aim of including the whole range squeezes extremely the Interquartile Range
(IQR henceforth) which becomes small in comparison with the whole range although it
contains 50% of the observations. Observations taking the most extreme values are the
wealthiest households, although there are also extreme values for negative income per
capita. A similar result is shown when the graph is about income, in Figure 23
(appendix).
24 Strictly speaking, outliers are those observations between 1.5 and 3 times the interquartile range (in the
forthcoming IQR) above (below) the 3rd (1st) quartile. Extreme values are those observations 3 times the
IQR or more above (below) the 3rd (1st) quartile. However, we will use both terms henceforth without
distinction.
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Figure 12 Box & Whisker Income per capita by year
Table 20 and Figure 13 try to show more clearly the positions of some quintiles of the
income per capita distribution. It is clear that at the tails of the distribution the
differences between the 1st and 10th percentiles or between the 90th and the 99th are
great. This is really clear at the top of the distribution where the difference between the
90th and the 99th percentiles is more than four times the IQR. There are also great
differences at the bottom of the distribution, where income per capita takes quite
negative values. This is less extreme than at the top of the distribution though. With
respect to years, 2005 shows the highest extreme value at the top of the distribution
while 2007 does at the bottom. It is remarkable that at the middle of the distribution the
values of 2007 are bundled more closely, with a lower IQR but also lower difference
between p90 – p10.
Table 67 and Figure 24 in the appendix show the same information regarding income.
Outliers and extreme values are problematic as they might make ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimates biased and some other techniques have been implemented to surmount
these problems. Among them, Least Absolute Deviation (LAD), M-estimator25 and
25 M is not an abbreviation itself, it just stands for “Maximum likelihood type”
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MM-estimator methods or quantile regression, for example. In the present study an MM
estimator will be used to contrast the panel fixed effects estimates, which are more
sensitive to outliers. In the next chapter the technique will be quantile regression, which
is less sensitive and also aims at answering a different question.
Table 20 Quantiles income per capita distribution
p1 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p99
year
2005 -9,556 -1,096 1,069 3,866 7,934 13,839 42,448
2007 -14,400 -115 1,983 4,271 7,200 11,448 35,980
Figure 13 Quantiles income per capita distribution
-20,000 0 20,000 40,000
2007
2005
Years 2005 and 2007
Percentiles for income_pc
p 1 of income_pc p 10 of income_pc
p 25 of income_pc p 50 of income_pc
p 75 of income_pc p 90 of income_pc
p 99 of income_pc
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The outcome variables can also be studied by district and year. Table 21 shows the
mean and the median (the latter shadowed in grey, below the mean figure) for income
per capita by district and year. The most striking feature is the low figures in Anantapur
district in 2005. Although this is the driest and the poorest district of all, the difference
is still too high. The explanation for this difference seems to be the drought suffered in
the area in 2005, as Anantapur is the most vulnerable district of all. But other reasons
are not found in the survey information. As can be seen in the rainfall26 table (Table 22)
2006 was a better year, with all districts above normal figures. In 2007 rainfall figures
are again closer to those in 2005, and this would not be coherent with the rise in
Anantapur figures for outcome variables.
Among the rest of the districts, the best figures are showed by Prakasam, Kurnool and
Mahabub Nagar for year 2005. These three districts experience an overall decrease in
the statistics in 2007. The case of Anantapur and Nalgonda is on the contrary. They
started from below in 2005 and experience a rise in their figures in 2007. This makes
Nalgonda overtake Mahabub Nagar in the ranking of all figures in 2007. The median
values do not change so widely between years, with the exception of Anantapur.
Median values, thus, might be more reliable than means in this case.
This can be seen more clearly in a bar chart (see Figure 14) where the levels of bars is
overall more alike between years in the case of medians. Given the fact that the median
is less sensitive to changes at the extremes of the distribution, changes in means could
be predominantly driven by the changes of observations at the top and bottom of
income per capita distribution, as suggested by Figure 13 above. For income, see Table
68 and Figure 25 at the appendix, with similar overall patterns, although the changes in
median are more noticeable.
26 http://www.apdes.ap.gov.in/Dist@glance/rainfall.htm 22/09/11 @ 11.00 am and
http://www.apdes.ap.gov.in/publications/Outline%202006-2007.pdf 22/09/11 @ 11.00 am.
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Table 21 Mean & Median income p.c. by district and year
mean income p.c. year Δ2005- 
2007median income p.c. 2005 2007
1_PRAKASAM 8,136 6,882 -15.42%
5,086 5,090 0.07%
2_KURNOOL 7,752 5,306 -31.56%
5,005 4,532 -9.46%
3_ANANTAPUR 2,336 4,099 75.47%
1,533 3,667 139.21%
4_MAHABUB NAGAR 7,607 4,897 -35.63%
4,929 4,000 -18.85%
6_NALGONDA 4,558 5,145 12.89%
3,988 4,383 9.90%
Table 22 Rainfall (in mm) by district
Rainfall
District 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 Average
PRAKASAM 550 1010 709 871
KURNOOL 543 840 543 670
ANANTAPUR 437 791 407 553
MAHABUB NAGAR 413 973 484 604
NALGONDA 519 1000 547 751
Figure 14 Mean & Median Income per capita by year and district
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The dependent variables can be tabulated with respect to their watershed location, given
the original purpose of the survey. Areas with watershed projects are better off in terms
of both outcome variables in 2005, although this difference becomes very small in 2007
(income per capita in Table 23, income in the appendix, Table 69).
Table 23 Income per capita by watershed
mean income_pc
median income_pc 2005 2007 Δ 2005 - 2007 
non-watershed 4,531 4,907 8.3%
3,086 4,156 34.7%
watershed 6,307 5,289 -16.1%
4,190 4,383 4.6%
Credit sources
As stated in Masset and White (2006), the normal sources of credit in the rural areas had
been so far moneylenders, landlords, family or relatives. Formal banks did have a scarce
presence in these areas, in which they were operating mostly as deposit entities.
However, the emergence of SHGs initiatives and the “bank linkages” has brought up the
appearance of formal financial entities in the rural areas in India. Thanks to these “bank
linkages”, village banks can open an account in a commercial bank once they are
created. This opens the possibilities to have access to bank services to other individuals
or other groups. Therefore, the presence of village banks broadens the potential clientele
of commercial banks that are willing to open new branches in areas that were not
considered before because they were not profitable.
In Table 24 the evolution of the number of borrowing households for the five districts
can be observed. The common pattern is an overall decrease of the borrowing activity.
The number of households borrowing from the different sources clearly decreased in
2007 by around one million households, a 21.3%. The only exception of this decrease is
the number of households borrowing from family and friends, which increase by around
120,000. In the case of SHG borrowers, the figure remains stable while the decreases in
the case of banks, NGOs, moneylenders-landlords and others are higher than 30%. In
terms of source share, the main source is moneylenders-landlords in both years. SHG is
the third in 2005 and second in 2007.
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Table 24 Borrowing households
Nr. of Borrowing Households Share per source
Δ in nr. households 
2005 2007 2005 2007
Bank 1,281,391 891,044 25.7% 22.7% -30.5%
NGO 34,736 19,931 0.7% 0.5% -42.6%
SHG 1,026,335 1,020,629 20.6% 26% -0.6%
Moneylender-Landlord 1,772,616 1,120,788 35.5% 28.54% -36.8%
Family-Friend 548,353 667,085 11% 17% 21.6%
Other 325,318 208,024 6.5% 5.3% -36.1%
Total 4,988,749 3,927,500 -21.3%
When proportions are observed in terms of amount borrowed from each source, the
figures change due to the differences in loan sizes. Table 25 shows how, in quantitative
terms, the main source of credit is still moneylenders and landlords. They represent
around the 40% of the total loan volume in the area. The banks are the second source,
followed by family and friends. In terms of loan volume, the share of SHG ranged
between 7.8 and 10.6 per cent. This is in contrast with the share of households that
borrowed from SHG, which ranged between 20.6 and 26 per cent. SHG is the only
source that increases the amount of money lent between the surveys. However, Table 24
clearly explains that although more than 20% or 25% of the households turn to SHG,
the total amount borrowed from this source is more than 3 times lower than that
borrowed from moneylenders or banks, due to the smaller size of SHG loans, as can be
seen in Table 25.
Table 25 Sources in terms of amount borrowed (millions of rupees)
Total Amount borrowed Percentages Δ in amount 
borrowed
2005 2007 2005 2007
Bank 21,400 17,700 26.5% 27.9% -17.3%
NGO 649 90 0.8% 0.1% -86.1%
SHG 6,280 6,730 7.8% 10.6% 7.2%
Moneylender-Landlord 34,700 24,900 42.9% 39.3% -28.2%
Family-Friend 12,800 11,500 15.8% 18.1% -10.2%
Other 5,060 2,490 6.3% 3.9% -50.8%
Total 80,889 63,410 -21.6% -21.6%
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In order to find out more about the households borrowing from different sources, mean
income and income per capita are calculated by credit source at both years. The overall
decrease in means in 2007 is consistent with the descriptives seen above, but again the
medians seem to be slightly higher at 2007. The most remarkable feature is that means
are slightly higher for SHG borrowers than for other sources. This would have been
more expected for bank borrowers, but these do not score second but normally a bit
below. Thus, this kind of microfinance programs might not be serving the most
deprived households, although the areas where the sample was taken were poor rural
areas. The table with the medians can be seen in the appendix (Table 70) and
comparatively again SHG show the higher medians for income and income per capita.
Table 26 Mean outcome variables by source and year
Income per capita Income
2005 2007 2005 2007
Bank 5,154 4,255 25,836 22,089
NGO 5,737 3,399 22,837 19,824
SHG 6,060 5,142 30,598 24,876
Moneylender-Landlord 5,082 4,792 22,491 22,354
Family-Friend 5,092 5,304 23,134 24,694
Other 4,431 3,558 18,698 20,886
It could be also of interest to have a look at the means or medians for these outcome
variables by the number of sources. There are households that do not borrow at all from
any of the sources and others that borrow from more than one source. In the following
table (Table 27), mean income for borrowers is shown by year. The highest values are
seen in households that did not borrow from any source, followed by those that
borrowed from one only. Households using two or more show overall lower income and
income per capita means. Thus, households that use credit sources more intensively
tend to be poorer. This would be coherent with the fact that they need to keep
consumption levels and therefore they turn to any source of credit. However, they might
have also a lower repayment capacity and therefore heavy indebtedness could make
them fall into a debt trap.
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Table 27 Outcome variable by nr. of credit sources used
Income per capita Income
2005 2007 2005 2007
No source 7,150 5,856 31,200 25,496
One source 6,085 5,425 27,207 25,009
Two sources 5,038 3,920 25,082 20,192
Three or + 4,761 5,638 21,731 27,572
Borrowing from SHGs at different time periods
The main issue in studies where there is not randomization is the handling of bias, in
our case the selection bias is of particular interest. This is because in order to borrow,
individuals have to somehow self-select themselves. Borrowers, thus, might be
composed by individuals that are systematically more entrepreneurial, for example, than
non-borrowers and they would have higher income per capita even in the absence of
microfinance.
Another important issue is the treatment of households that give up borrowing. Among
the first impact evaluations of microfinance, there were studies that compared new
borrowers vs. old borrowers (Hulme and Mosley 1996). The latter might suffer from the
survivor bias. This kind of bias has been studied in Karlan (2001) and he suggests that
all the borrowers, dropped or not, should count as members of the treated group.
The panel structure of the present study is like the one used in Tedeschi (2008) with a
range of households interviewed in 2 periods. Despite the fact that in the analysis
outcomes for all credit sources are also shown, the main interest of the study is about
borrowers from Self Help Groups (SHGs).
As seen in Table 28, some households kept their SHG-borrowing status throughout the
surveys, either by SHG-borrowing in both years or by borrowing in none of them. There
are also some households that borrowed from SHGs only in one of the years. Following
Tedeschi’s nomenclature, households that never borrowed from SHG are under the
category “never” and those that borrowed both times under “always”. Those which did
only in 2005 will be “drop” and the rest borrowing from SHG only in 2007 are named
“new”. Also following Tedeschi (2008) a very important variable is created with the
name “everborrow”. This will be a dummy with the value of one in case the household
is under “always”, “drop” or “new” and zero otherwise.
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Table 28 is expressed in percentages. In it, the share of “always” households is 13.03%,
15.38% in the cases of “drop” and “new”, with a 55.20% of households that never
borrowed and belong to the “never” group. The category “everborrow” for SHG
borrowers will add up to 13 + 15.4 + 15.4 ≃ 43.8% of the sample. Migrants are
included in this case only for illustrative purposes, adding up to around 1% of the total
sample.
“Everborrow” is of great importance in the theoretical framework in Coleman (1999);
Coleman (2006) and Tedeschi (2008). It is assumed to gather the unobservables that
characterize borrowers and therefore it contributes to avoid selection bias. It also
includes in the treated group “drop”, “new” and “always” borrowers. This contributes
also to avoid “survivor bias” as recommended in Karlan (2001). Finally, as long as there
are several alternative sources of loans, there will be one “everborrow” variable for each
of these credit sources together with “always”, “drop”, “new” and “never”: banks,
moneylenders and landlords, NGOs, family and friends and others.
Table 28 Evolution of proportion of borrowers
2007
Borrowers Non Borrowers Migrants Total
2005
Borrowers 13% 15.4% 0.2% 28.6%
Non Borrowers 15.4% 55.2% 0.8% 71.4%
Total 28.4% 70.6% 1% 100%
Focusing on our variable of interest, SHG borrowing, descriptives of interest would be
the borrowing patterns by social groups. There are four of them in the dataset. The
group “scheduled caste” is composed by the untouchables, the lowest caste. The second
group, “scheduled tribe”, normally live out of the villages, have their own cultural
traditions and tend to be the poorest households together with the “untouchables”. A
third group would be composed by households in backward castes. In the context of this
survey, taken in a rural area, these backward castes are normally better off than the
former two groups. Finally the last group corresponds to the upward castes.
Their borrowing patterns are shown in Table 29. Its first column informs about the
composition of the sample by social extraction. It can be seen that the most numerous
group is composed by backward castes, while the most deprived households,
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“scheduled” groups represent only around a 35% of the sample. The second and third
columns show the proportion of SHG borrowers by social group. As expected, the
highest proportion of borrowing households comes from the most numerous social
group.
It is also interesting to have a look at columns four and five. In them is shown the
percentage of households that are borrowing within each social group. It is seen that the
social group with by far the highest share of borrowing households is the scheduled
tribe. Around 43% of these households borrow from SHGs. On the contrary, the lowest
percentage is shown by upward castes.
Table 29 Proportion of SHG borrowers by social extraction
Proportion over
total sample
% SHG borrowers over
total borrowers
% SHG borrowers
within each group
2005 2007 2005 2007
Scheduled caste 22.1% 20.1% 22.0% 29.4% 29.7%
Scheduled tribe 12.4% 16.3% 17.8% 42.5% 43.1%
Backward castes 47.9% 48.6% 44.9% 32.9% 28.0%
Upward castes 17.5% 15.0% 15.3% 27.7% 26.2%
Income and income per capita can be tabulated in conjunction with SHG “everborrow”
variable. Table 30 shows the mean and median of income per capita corresponding to
SHG “ever-borrowers” and SHG non-borrowers. Median income per capita is
consistently lower for SHG borrowers. However, the mean was higher in 2007. This
might suggest that SHG borrowers might be poorer than SHG non-borrowers which
points to selection bias. In the case of income (Table 71, appendix) SHG borrowers
show the highest values for mean and median at both years. This suggests the
importance of household size when comparing treated and controls.
Table 30 Income per capita Mean &Median, by SHG-borrowing status
Household income per capita
mean median
SHG non-borrow SHG everborrow SHG non-borrow SHG everborrow
year
2005 6,041 5,424 3,961 3,699
2007 4,951 5,453 4,365 4,222
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Summing up, the median figures show that the apparent decrease in income and income
per capita in 2007 might be driven by the values at the tails of the distributions in this
latter year. Also, although all districts had bad rainfall figures in 2005 and 2007, the
poorest and the driest one, Anantapur, suffered them more intensively and are expected
to show a negative coefficient. For the contrary reasons Prakasam should show a
positive one. Changes between 2005 and 2007 are more remarkable at district means
than at the medians.
The number of borrowers from SHG microfinance remains almost equal to that of 2005
and it is the only source that increases its amount of money lent in 2007. However, it is
still neither in terms of borrowers nor in loans volume the first source of credit. From
the means of the outcome variables, it seems that SHG borrowing households might be
slightly better off than the rest of borrowing households. The majority of them come
from a relatively better off social background. SHG borrowers show higher figures in
income than SHG non-borrowers but lower at income per capita, indicating that
household size might be an important covariate in the analysis
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Analysis
The methodologies used in the analysis will be three. First, a panel fixed effect. The
possibility of reverse causality leads to the implementation of an IV approach and a
check as to whether the amount borrowed from SHGs is endogenous. Finally, a MM
estimator is attempted in order to test whether the outcomes are robust to the presence
of outliers;
The panel data approach could also be a DID given that we have a panel with two time
periods. We used the proper fixed effects as in Khandker (2005), Tedeschi (2008) and
Bruhn and Love (2009).
The model is set up as follows:
௜ܻ௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵݕ_07௜+ ߚଶܺ௜௧+ ߚଷ ܵܪܩ௜௧+ ߚସܮ௜௧+ ߤ௜+ ߝ௜௧
௜ܻ௧ is the outcome variable, mainly income per capita although outcomes for income are
also reported in the appendix. y_07 is a dummy for year 2007. ܺ௜௧ is a vector of
household characteristics. In particular, the choice of variables is taken among those
used in previous panel approaches (Khandker, 2005; Tedeschi, 2008) including also an
asset index described below. In a similar way, Chemin (2008) includes variables such as
livestock value or savings. There was no information about savings and livestock value
is included in the calculation of income and therefore should not act as an independent
variable.
It has to be stressed that the fixed effects approach strictly limits the variables that can
be used in the equation. Time invariant variables such as gender, religion, geographical
location (districts, for example) or social extraction cannot be taken into account. In
addition, variables that do not vary much over time will suffer from large standard
errors.
The household characteristics variables included in X are:
 age of the household head,
 size of household
 a dummy expressing whether or not the household has suffered any shock in the
last 12 months.
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 an asset index is a variable created with 6 different assets: radio, television,
fridge, bicycle, motorcycle and car. The variable takes the value of 0 if none of
these assets are present in the household. It can take up to the value of 6 when
the household owns all the mentioned assets. The most expensive asset of this
index is the car. The number of cars is small in the sample, only four households
in 2005 and nine in 2007. The correlation between the asset index (with no car)
and the binary for car ownership is positive and significant27 and thus it was
included in the index.
With respect to the remaining variables, ܵܪܩ௜௧ is the amount of money borrowed by the
household and the impact of microfinance on income per capita is measured by ߚଷ. ܮ௜௧ is
a vector of variables that include the amount of money borrowed from other sources:
banks, moneylenders/landlords, NGOs, family and friends and others. The last includes
cooperatives, suppliers, etc. Finally, ݅ߤ gathers the unobservables specific to each
household (entrepreneurship, tenacity, etc) that might be biasing the impact estimation.
In this fixed effects approach they are swept away, leaving the impact estimation free of
this type of bias.
Despite the fact that unobservables are eliminated in the fixed effects approach, one of
the drawbacks of the dataset is that microfinance schemes were already present in the
first round of the survey. However this is an issue in most of the microfinance impact
literature using this fixed effects approach (Kandkher, 2005; Tedeschi, 2008; Copestake
et al., 2005).
Table 31 shows the outcomes for income per capita. Under the FE (panel fixed effects)
column can be seen the impact of SHG borrowing on income per capita at household
level. The mean amount borrowed from SHG is then multiplied by the estimate and this
product gives the average increase in income per capita. Thus, this is estimated as
[6,36828 x 0.086] = 548 rupees per year. This is around 10% of the mean income per
capita. With respect to the rest of the sources, the NGOs are the only one showing
statistical significance.
27 Pearson correlation coefficient: 0.1011. P-value: 0.000.
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient: 0.0833. P-value: 0.000.
28 Mean SHG loan size.
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An important issue in this regression would be that reverse causality between amount
borrowed from SHG and income might arise because those with higher income borrow
more money. At the same time, the fact of borrowing more might cause higher income.
Therefore, SHG borrowing, inter alia, determines income and, inter alia, income
determines SHG borrowing. This leads to a biased estimation of the impact. This comes
from the fact that the variable amount borrowed from SHG (SHG_sum henceforth) is
not independent of the error term. In more formal terms, the condition of explanatory
variables being stochastic or independent of the error term (or E(u,X) = 0) does not hold.
The main aim of this study is to find out the impact of SHG microfinance. The rest of
the sources are secondary regarding our research interests. Thus, given the impossibility
of finding good instruments for every source of credit, the approach is only attempted
for the SHG borrowing and not for the rest of sources.
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Table 31 FE, IV and MM approaches. Income per capita including negative values.
Income per capita
FE with negs IV with negs. MM with negs
Year 2007 intercept -839.269** -828.257** 419.025**
(-2.26) (-2.20) (2.38)
Age of the HH head -3.869 -1.694 28.808***
(-0.09) (-0.04) (4.04)
Household size -501.461** -475.227* -140.934**
(-2.03) (-1.85) (-2.57)
Shock in last 12 mths -1491.329** -1445.542** -1176.350***
(-2.13) (-2.03) (-6.88)
Asset index 563.463 549.217 127.040
(1.07) (1.02) (1.21)
SHG 0.086** 0.110* 0.073***
(2.78) (1.82) (3.59)
BANK 0.006 -0.003 -0.031***
(0.12) (-0.06) (-5.41)
NGO 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.289***
(5.36) (5.15) (32.51)
Moneylenders/others -0.005 -0.005 0.001
(-0.16) (-0.16) (0.15)
Family/Friends -0.017 -0.018 0.010
(-0.79) (-0.81) (0.82)
Others -0.067 -0.062 -0.024
(-1.49) (-1.32) (-0.74)
Constant 8876.049*** 3623.643***
(3.62) (8.70)
Obs. 2906 2906 2906
F 3.375 9.09
P 0.002 0.000
t statistics in parenthesis * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
There are two different instruments. Both are in relation to participation in SHGs. The
first is the maximum SHG membership duration within the household. Thus, in the case
that a household had two different members, the value of this variable would be the
membership duration of the household member that joined first. The second instrument
is the maximum percentage of attended meetings within the household. Thus, if one
person attends all the meetings, this variable takes the value of 100 and if only half of
them the value would be 50.
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These variables are significantly correlated with the variable containing the amount
borrowed from SHGs29. On the other hand, SHGs have a tradition in Indian society and
they are not constrained to a way of having access to loans. They can be incardinated as
a traditional Indian community organization and aim at giving response to not only
development issues but also other type of problems. In Andhra Pradesh, for example,
these SHGs were created around education or anti-alcohol campaigns. The creation of
bank-linkages has contributed to their proliferation but, for instance, they have also been
promoted by politicians, such as Chandrababu Naidu, as community organizations in
the Janmabhoomi program.
In the particular framework of the present study, SHGs participate in watershed
programs as their members are represented in the watershed committees. These are in
charge of the day-to-day management of the activities in the projects, and thus this is
another incentive to belong to a SHG. In the RLP, this task is assigned to the Village
Organizations, in which SHGs are also represented. They can take decisions about
whether more funds should be assigned to soil conservation rather than to water
harvesting which can benefit small rather than wealthier farmers, for example.
Although pure independence between instruments and outcome variables is impossible
to prove unless we could use an instrument obtained through some sort of
randomization, an attempt to show the plausibility or our argument is to find out
correlations among variables. Table 72 at the appendix shows Pearson’ and Spearman’
correlation coefficients between instruments and outcome variables. In all cases the
correlation coefficients are low. We test the null of them being equal to zero and it
cannot be rejected in any case.
In addition, the variables used as instruments were regressed over a set of variables30
plus dummies of income per capita quintiles (Table 74 for outcomes using income per
29 We can strongly reject the null of correlation = 0. Correlations were calculated:
 Pearson’s correlation coefficients:
o SHGs borrowed sum – duration: Coefficient = 0.4214; p-value = 0.000
o SHGs borrowed sum – % attendance: coefficient = 0.4593; p-value = 0.000
 Spearman’s correlation coefficients:
o SHGs borrowed sum – duration: Coefficient = 0.5362; p-value = 0.000
o SHGs borrowed sum – % attendance: coefficient = 0.5038; p-value = 0.000
30 Independent variables were: intercept for year 2007, age, age squared and gender of the household head,
household size, dummies with the social groups (omitted category: highest caste), district dummies
(omitted: Nalgonda), index of asset ownership and household population of the village. Finally, quantiles
of income per capita (and income), where the omitted category was the fifth quintile.
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capita and income quintiles). None of these quintiles show any significance and this
comes to underpin the argument of independence. Thus, although the IV approach in
any study might be slightly vague because of the difficulty of proving independence, we
find no correlation and, when controlling for other variables, income per capita quintiles
dummies do not show any significance. These outcomes suggest that they can be used
as instruments.
The specification of the model remains as it was for the fixed effects approach. The
approach used in this case is two stage least squares (2SLS) for the IV applied to panel
data. This was run with the command xtivreg2.
The first point when tackling the IV approach is to test for the relevance of the
instruments. This is done through the F value. Quite a common approach is to follow
the Stock and Staiger “rule of thumb” which establishes that for an instrument to be
considered relevant the F value has to be higher than 10. If the instrument is not relevant
this means that the correlation with the endogenous variable is too weak and the
deviation of the standard errors with respect to the original fixed effect model would be
too great to do a proper inference.
Apart from being relevant, the instruments have to be orthogonal to the error term. This
is tested through the Hansen J statistic, based on the same grounds as the Sargan-
Hansen test. The null in this case is that the instrument is orthogonal to the error term
and therefore if we can reject the null then the instrument would not be considered
adequate because there might be some kind of relationship between the instrument and
the error term. The main problem with this test is that not rejecting the null does not
guarantee that the instrument is not related in any way with the outcome variable. This
is why IV approaches should be grounded on very solid theoretical arguments or,
preferably, on some kind of randomized instruments.
Once we are satisfied with the relevance and orthogonality of the instrument, it is
possible to test whether the variable is endogenous or not. The endogeneity test is based
on the Wu-Hausmann test and the null hypothesis is that the variable is exogenous. If
we cannot reject the null then there is no point in using the IV approach as the bias of
the standard errors is greater.
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Outcomes for these tests are found in Table 32. The relevance, orthogonality and
exogeneity tests are discussed first. The F value to apply the Stock and Staiger “rule of
thumb” is far higher than 10 so we are confident that the instruments are relevant. In the
case of the orthogonality test we cannot reject the null of the instrument being
independent of the error term. Thus, we have relevant and orthogonal instruments and
therefore we can go on testing for their exogeneity. In the case of the Wu-Hausman test,
again we cannot reject the null of exogeneity and therefore it would be more adequate to
use the original panel fixed effects approach rather than the IV. IV estimates are in any
case shown and briefly commented on for illustrative purposes.
The estimates of the panel IV approach can also be seen in Table 31 above. They are
quite close to the estimates from the original panel FE. Again, the impact of
microfinance is positive and significant, slightly higher than in the case of the FE. The
rise in income per capita would in this case be 618 rupees per annum, on average and
ceteris paribus.
In the descriptive statistics the presence of outliers was clear. This is not unusual in
dependent variables such as income/income per capita. It is also quite common in
variables such as profits or revenues so a discussion on this issue would have been
expected in Tedeschi (2008). The chosen approach to deal with the outliers issue was an
MM estimator, running a user-written command in Stata, mmregress (Verardi and
Croux, 2008).
The main drawback of the presence of outliers is that their residuals are abnormally high
and in the process of squaring them, they become even greater. Thus, the minimization
of squared residuals tends to fit these extreme values at the expense of the remaining
observations. The consequence is that the coefficients from these regressions might be
biased. There are methods that attempt to deal with these issues, such as Least Absolute
Deviation, in which the absolute value of the residuals is minimized instead of their
squared values. Other methods just try to look for “influential” observations using
Cook’s D31 value to test for this influential quality. Those values with a D > 1 are
31 Cook’s D tries to measure whether an observation is influential or not. Basically it is calculated doing
two regressions, one with all the sample and the second with all observations but the controversial one.
Then the sum of squared differences of both predictions is found. Finally, this is divided by two times the
Mean Squared Error. If the value is higher than one the observation is considered influential.
159
withdrawn from the sample. However, this approach might not be robust to outlier
clustering.
Other methods already discussed are S and M estimators, but both have drawbacks, the
former in terms of Gaussian efficiency and the latter regarding robustness. MM
combine the former two in order to surmount these drawbacks.
This MM regression cannot be run as a panel and therefore the method had to be applied
to the pooled dataset. In Table 31, under the column MM, the estimates are shown. The
coefficient of SHG borrowing remains statistically significant at 5% level although in
this case the impact seems to be slightly smaller. The average rise in income per capita
at household level would in this case be around 465 rupees per annum, around a 8.5%
of the mean income per capita. As with the fixed effects approach, SHG borrowing
shows positive and significant impact and in this case bank borrowing also shows
significance but with a negative value.
In general the fixed effects approach and the IV produce quite similar coefficients. This
is not so in the case of the MM approach where most of the covariates change.
However, the variables household size, shock and SHG and NGO borrowing remain
significant and with the same sign, which lead to the conclusion that these estimates are
quite robust to the presence of outliers. In the particular case of SHG borrowing, it
comes to support the argument of the positive effect of borrowing from SHGs.
Table 32 Tests of the IV approach
Relevant
Orthogonal Exogenous
Hansen J Wu-Hausman
F Stat p-value Stat p-value
Income p/c 37.5 0.353 0.5526 0.000 0.9969
Negative values.
The presence of households reporting negative income/income per capita might cast
doubts over the reported estimates. The reasons for the presence of these negative
values have been discussed above, although there is also the possibility that some
households just misreported their income.
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The presence of negative income values is not unusual and in development economics is
particularly problematic when calculating poverty indexes. Sandoval and Urzua (2009)
suggest setting the negative income values to zero. In other sources such as and Hunter
et al., (2002) and Shaefer and Edin (2012) the approach is to test for sensitivity of the
conclusions in the original models after they drop the negative income observations and
rerun the same models.
The same steps are followed in the present study. The observations with negative
income per capita values are withdrawn and therefore they are not considered in the
model. The idea is to check if without these abnormal observations the estimates remain
similar and statistically significant or if the change is great or the significance is lost.
The outcomes are shown in the following Table 33.
There is actually a small difference with respect to the SHG estimates. In the case of the
FE, the estimate is slightly higher but remains statistically significant at the 1% level.
The average rise in income per capita would in this case be 643 instead of the former
548 from the model including negative values. The estimate for the MM approach is
slightly lower and the IV approach provides a slightly higher estimate.
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Table 33 FE, MM and IV with no negative income values
Income per capita (no negative values)
FE MM IV
Year 2007 intercept -645.727* 76.897 -637.442*
(-1.87) (0.48) (-1.80)
Age of the HH head -22.683 18.490*** -21.870
(-0.72) (2.81) (-0.67)
Household size -793.078*** -186.322*** -786.635***
(-3.47) (-3.68) (-3.34)
Shock in last 12 mths -1281.124* -579.940*** -1323.187*
(-1.79) (-3.69) (-1.83)
Asset index 714.269 258.171*** 702.487
(1.15) (2.76) (1.10)
SHG 0.101*** 0.067** 0.131*
(2.95) (2.49) (1.72)
BANK 0.084* -0.017** 0.087
(1.89) (-2.25) (1.55)
NGO 0.202*** 0.286*** 0.203***
(6.35) (55.88) (6.25)
Moneylenders/others 0.013 0.004 0.014
(0.28) (0.85) (0.30)
Family/Friends -0.008 0.011** -0.009
(-0.39) (2.08) (-0.42)
Others 0.026 -0.003 0.027
(0.92) (-0.22) (0.93)
Constant 4434.248***
(11.56)
t statistics in parenthesis * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Regarding the relevance of the instruments, the F-value is noticeably lower than that
found when the dataset includes negative income values. The value is now 10.89 which
is at the limit of the Stock and Staiger rule. Thus, the option in this case was to run a
Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) which is more adequate in the
presence of weak instruments. The outcomes regarding the relevance, orthogonality test
and exogeneity test are shown in the appendix Table 75.
Again, the outcomes show relevant instruments that are orthogonal to the error term. In
addition, we cannot reject the null of exogeneity and thus the original FE model should
be used. With respect to the alternative sources of funds, again NGOs show consistently
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a positive and significant impact and the rest are either non significant or they do not
show consistent patterns.
The outcomes in Table 33 underpin the outcomes originally obtained, given the fact that
they do not seem to be quite sensitive to the presence of the negative income/income per
capita values. This is a sign of the robustness of the positive and significant impact of
microfinance on income per capita at household level.
With respect to income, the outcomes are quite similar and outcomes can be found in
Table 76 when the dataset includes all the observations and in Table 77 when the
negative income observations are dropped from the dataset. The impact from SHG
borrowing remains significant and positive across the different models and datasets.
Conclusion
The aim of the present research was to study the impact of SHG microfinance in Andhra
Pradesh on household income per capita and income. The study follows mainly the
theoretical and technical framework in (Coleman, 1999 and 2006) and its adaptation to a
two-period panel dataset in Tedeschi (2008) where she runs a panel data fixed effects
approach. This technique has also been used in the past (Copestake et al, 2005;
Khandker, 2005 and Bruhn and Love, 2009).
The dataset contained a good number of outliers, some of them negative income and
income per capita observations that had to be considered in the analysis. In order to test
the robustness of the fixed effect approach to the presence of outliers, an MM method
was applied. In addition to that, an IV approach was also run to test for the possible
endogeneity of the SHG borrowing variable.
In a second stage the three models were run again on the dataset where the negative
income observations had been dropped. The aim of these second regressions was to test
whether the original results could be driven by the presence of these negative values.
The final conclusion is that the effect of borrowing from SHG has a positive and
significant impact at household level. This outcome is quite robust across the different
models and remains after dropping the households reporting negative income.
The positive and significant outcomes come to confirm previous outcomes with respect
to microfinance and provides a quite robust argument in favour of these village banks or
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microfinance in general, in tune with other studies such as, , Pitt and Khandker (1998),
Khandker (2005), Coleman (2006), Chemin (2008), Kondo et al. (2008) and Tedeschi,
(2008). However, the moderation in impact raised by the MM method might suggest
that outcomes mainly in the latter, but also in other studies could be revised.
Finally, although this study answers the question of whether there is any impact of
microfinance on income and income per capita, the outcomes refer to the whole sample
and it is not possible to see whether it is affecting the poorest households. Descriptives
suggest that borrowers come mainly from slightly better off backgrounds and therefore
our next interest would be to test whether this impact is homogeneous at all points of
the outcome variables distribution or whether it is significant only at some of them.
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Introduction
The previous chapter showed a positive and significant impact of borrowing from
microfinance at household level for both income per capita and income. The more
conservative estimations from MM method reported increases of annual income per
capita and income of 4.1% and 5.6% respectively. This means that if a household
withdrawn from the population is a SHG borrower, it is expected to have a higher
income/income per capita than a non SHG borrower, ceteris paribus. In these models, it
does not matter whether the individuals are poorer or richer as the impact is considered
constant for the whole sample.
The interest of the effective impact on the less favoured extends to the case of pro-poor
interventions in general, not just microfinance literature. When evaluating the effects of
a particular policy, it might happen that those most in need of it are not benefitting at
all. As Heckman argued when confronting Average Treatment Effects (ATE) and
Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATT), in some occasions the core aim of a
research study is not whether the impact is significant for the whole population. The
main issue is if it is making any difference on those agents at which the policies are
aimed. OLS or DID significant estimates might be driven by the significant impact at
some points of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable. But this policy
might not have been designed for them. Thus it is pertinent to complement this analysis
with additional techniques that provide with a more focused picture of impact effects.
In microfinance literature in particular there have been attempts to answer the question
of significant impact for different groups, mainly defined by poverty measures. For
example, Hulme and Mosley (1996) conclude that the impact of microfinance takes
place at those households that are relatively better off. Coleman (2006) distinguishes
between “rank and file” and “committee” members in village banks in Thailand. The
impact is not significant in the former group but it certainly is in the latter, which is
normally constituted of wealthier individuals that used to forge the rules and manage to
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borrow more money than they would be entitled to. But this issue is also raised in other
studies such as Copestake et al.(2005) or Kondo et al. (2008), who find that impact
could be even negative for the poorest
They use different means to find the estimates for the poorest. For example, in Coleman
(2006) the impact is differentiated between committee and rank-and-file members, the
latter being the poorest. In Copestake et al. (2005) they just split the sample into two
parts and find the DID of observations above and below the median. Quantile regression
is a more efficient way of finding the estimates at any point of the outcome variable
distribution. By using all observations quantile regression also avoids truncation
problems. Quantile regression can slice up the conditional distribution into pieces and
can find the impact estimate at each of these slices. Thus, if the impact is found at the
lower income per capita quantiles it could be said that this is the impact for the poor. If
this is done at the top of the distribution we could state that this is the impact for the
richest.
Quantile regression has its origin in the 18th century (Hao and Naiman, 2007). It was
conceived as a median regression and is not based on least squares but on least absolute
distance. This is more useful when the distribution is very skewed, for example. The
median is just the second quartile or the 50th percentile, but other distributional locations
can be used. Thus, quantile regression allows to measure not just a single impact effect
for the whole sample but the different effects that intervention exerts on households
allocated at different points of the conditional distribution (Hao and Naiman 2007).
The quantile regression as such was first introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) and
has been applied for more than 30 years, mainly in labor economics. An example is
Chamberlain (1994) where it is found that the premium for union workers is higher for
those at the bottom of the wage distribution. Koenker (2005) quotes other examples
referred to alcohol consumption, (Manning et al., 1995) and birthweights (Abrevaya,
2001) and in both cases there are differences between OLS estimates and estimates at
different levels of the outcome variable distribution.
Literature extended from labour to other fields within economics such as development
economics. Examples of these are Mwabu and Schultz (1996) studying the effect of
education on wage returns. Khandker, et al. (2009) focus on the impact of road
construction in rural Bangladesh at households with different levels of income and
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Emran et al. (2009) find that the impact of an anti-poverty program in Bangladesh is
more effective at the top deciles of income distribution of eligible households than at
the bottom, where it doesn’t show any significant effect. This latter outcome links with
the above mentioned works by Hulme and Mosley (1996) and Coleman (2006) as an
instance of policies that affect the relatively better off among the poor.
As already discussed in the past chapter, an additional reason in favour of quantile
regression is the presence of outliers, as it is a method that is insensitive to vertical
outliers. Other methods such as MM methods are more appropriate in the presence of
“bad leverage points” (Verardi and Croux, 2008). Quantile regression is also convenient
in the present case as the presence of a relatively high share of negative values in the
dependent variables does not recommend to drop these observations and log transform
the positive ones.
Thus, so far it has been found a positive and significant impact of microfinance over
income per capita and income through pooled OLS and DID techniques. The interest
now is whether or not this impact is different along the conditional distribution of the
outcome variables. Quantile regression has been scarcely used, if at all, in microfinance
impact evaluation literature. Significant differences at different points would suggest
that other policy interventions complementing or substituting microfinance might be
needed. The main aim of this study is, therefore, finding whether these differences in
impact effect are taking place and where the impact is not noticed by households.
It follows some descriptive statistics of the dataset in terms of the different quantiles.
Then the study includes the outcomes of the cross sectional quantile regression in years
2005 and 2007. After this, the quantile regression is done over differenced dependent
and independent variables and also including 2005 level variables in order to control for
initial values. Then some review about quantile regression models and panel datasets
follows before introducing the panel analysis. The panel quantile regression technique is
applied in the same fashion as in Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) and Khandker et al. (2009),
using the Correlated Random Effects (CRE) model. Finally, conclusions are obtained.
Overall, the outcomes of these three approaches confirm a positive and significant
impact at the middle of the income per capita and income distribution. This underpins
what had been suggested in the previous literature regarding the different impacts in
different distribution locations and refines the former studies by placing impact at a
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location within the dependent variables distribution. This might be especially
problematic for the poorest. Thus, alternative or complementary policies might be
needed to fill this void.
Descriptive statistics
Descriptives of the dependent variables. Percentiles and other statistics
The dataset has been amply described in the third section of chapter three. In this
section we will focus mainly in the quantiles of the dependent variable distribution. Non
normality in the distribution has been clearly described in the previous chapter. There,
in Table 66 it was seen that in both years the means are above the medians. In 2007, the
value of the means decreases and the medians do the contrary, which is a sign of
decreasing skewness.
Table 34 shows some of the percentiles of the distributions of the dependent variables
for both years (quintiles are shadowed in grey). In both variables the figures in 2007
show higher up to the third quintile where this trend turns the other way round. This is
clearly seen in the CRE model below, where the year 2007 dummy is positive and
significant at the lower end and negative at the top end of the distribution of income and
income per capita.
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Table 34 Quantiles Income Income PC
Income Income PC
2005 2007 2005 2007
p1 -35,604 -48,700 -9,556 -14,400
p5 -12,835 -10,950 -2,640 -2,257
p10 -4,308 -490 -1,096 -115
p20 2,289 5,318 494 1,408
p25 4,445 8,150 1,069 1,983
p30 6,450 10,980 1,561 2,465
p40 12,351 15,000 2,736 3,390
p50 17,274 18,807 3,866 4,271
p60 23,987 23,900 5,061 5,168
p70 31,732 29,568 6,867 6,352
p75 36,851 33,140 7,934 7,200
p80 43,003 38,143 9,290 8,196
p90 65,018 54,250 13,872 11,448
p95 92,699 70,986 20,114 16,200
p99 205,958 155,020 42,448 35,980
A more intuitive view was found in Figure 7 (See also Figure 12 for income at appendix
of chapter 2). It was clear the presence of vertical outliers at the top and bottom of the
distribution. This makes quantile regression an appropriate estimation method, not only
because it allows studying the impact at the different points of the conditional
distribution but also because it is not sensitive to the presence of these vertical outliers.
It was also shown in the descriptive statistics section of the previous chapter the
presence of a considerable share of negative observations and it was not possible to
discard a small share of them in order to log the dependent variables.
In Table 35 it can be seen that although the range is mainly driven by the presence of
outliers, 2007 normally shows lower values in the dispersion measures such as standard
deviation or interquartile range. Also, the skewness decreases as it is suggested by the
Table 66 . Despite this, skewness and kurtosis still remain very high. This feature is one
of the main drawbacks when using income and income per capita as dependent
variables in impact studies. It would have been preferable to have measured the impact
on consumption using a measure such as consumption expenditures. They tend to be
less volatile than income, as it was seen in the first impact study. No information was
available in the present survey about the latter, though.
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Table 35 Other statistics of distributions
Income Income_pc
2005 2007 2005 2007
min -94,555 -198,722 -30,117 -71,476
max 395,330 490,500 144,614 98,100
range 489,885 689,222 174,732 169,576
sd 41,399 37,307 9,939 8,305
skew 3.24 3.21 5.28 1.72
kurtosis 20.79 37.43 61.08 34.16
Coeff of variation 1.56 1.55 1.72 1.61
iqr 32,406 24,990 6,865 5,217
Income per capita is better suited for development studies as takes into account the size
of the household. In developing countries, where the household’s number of members
tend to be large, this is an important point given the fact that a great impact found at
household level might need to be shared among too many members of the household
ending up into a negligible effect at individual level. Therefore, the analysis will be
centred around income per capita and additional comments will be done about income.
The distribution of the dependent variables is split into quintiles in the descriptive
section. In the analysis the split is done over 19 quantiles for the sake of precision, but
descriptives based on all these quantiles would be too detailed and therefore quintiles
were preferred for this section. Other quantiles could have been used, though. The
presence of two time periods enriches the study and allows to control for the time effect
as will be seen in the CRE model.
Descriptives of differenced dependent variables
Another way of taking advantage of variation between years is to find the impact over
the differenced variables. This was seen in the former chapter where a DID approach
was attempted. However, quantile regression is not linear as it is the case of OLS and
the use of the differenced variable will be used as a preliminary approach.
In Table 35 it could be seen that income and income per capita don’t follow a normal
distribution. Differencing them clearly reduces the skewness but still the kurtosis
remains far from the normal (Table 36). The differenced versions of both dependent
variables are slightly skewed to the left and thus median and mean are different. This is
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again due to the presence of outliers and therefore quantile regression is again a
plausible approach.
Table 36 Descriptives differenced dependent variables
mean sd median skewness kurtosis
Δincome -2,388 54,050 1,420 -0.449 17.2
Δincome p/c -496 11,908 273 -0.533 20.4
In the quantitative section, two different approaches are attempted with differenced
dependent variables. In the first only differenced covariates are included in the model.
Literature suggests, however, that level variables should be included as explanatory
variables in order to control for differences that were already present in the first period.
In the present case it was of interest to check whether wealthier households in 2005
were more prone to have a higher increase in the dependent variables with the past of
time, that is, were more prone to become richer.
As a first approximation to this possibility it was found the rate of growth of each
dependent variable. Then the sample was split into the quintiles of income per capita or
income in 2005. Finally, the growth variable (in percentage) was regressed over the
level explanatory variable in order to know how the level of income per capita or
income can explain the percentage increase of the variable between years. The formula
would be:
ܩݎ݋ݓݐℎܽݎ ݁ݐ (݀ ݌݁ܽݒ ݎ)௤ = ݋ܿ݊ ݏܽݐ ݊ݐ+ ݀ ݌݁ܽݒ ݎଶ଴଴ହ,௤
where depvar can be either income or income per capita and q refers to quantiles one to
five.
The outcomes are found in Table 37. In the case of the first quintile an increase of one
rupee in 2005 income per capita would increase the growth rate in income per capita by
0.2494 of a percentage point. The estimate is not statistically significant however.
Significant estimates are consistently negative meaning that the level of dependent
variables in 2005 and growth rate have a negative relationship. This means that poorer
households in 2005 show greater growth rates than better off households, something
that seems to be quite consistent for both variables apart from the first quintile.
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Table 37 Correlation coefficients differenced income per capita
Regress growth over Income PC
estimate p-value
q1 0.2494 0.35
q2 -0.1091 0.00
q3 -0.0169 0.00
q4 -0.0054 0.00
q5 -0.0012 0.00
Dynamic descriptives by quintiles and districts.
The first two parts of the analysis are based on the application of quantile regression to
a cross sectional dataset with level variables, differenced variables or both. In the third
part the quantile regression is applied to the proper panel dataset, with a time variable
and two observations per household. Different techniques have been used to apply
quantile regression to panel data. Due the particular characteristics of our dataset, only
CRE could be used as it will be discussed below.
Quintiles are shadowed in grey in Table 34. It is of interest to study the quantile
mobility: how households change among quantiles. For this purpose the sample was
tabulated into unconditional quintiles of the dependent variables using two-way tables.
Outcomes are shown regarding income per capita variable, although the case of income
is similar. The diagonal of Table 3832 contains those households that remain in the same
quantile of income per capita at both years. The maximum value is seen at quintile 5,
meaning that approximately a 29.7% of households in quintile 5 in 2005 remained at the
same quintile in 2007 (see row 5, col 5). The first quintile (row 1, col 1) is the second in
this diagonal with about a 26% of non moving households.
32 In each cell there are three rows. The first row is the number of household in those coordinates. The
second row of the cell is the percentage that the first row number represents with respect to the total
households in the quintile in 2005 (totals in the right hand side column). The third row is the percentage
that the number in the first row of the cell represents with respect to the total of households in that
quintile in 2007 (totals down the column).
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Table 38: Quintile mobility. Income per capita. All districts
Quintiles 2005
Income per capita all districts
Quintiles 2007
1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 77 59 62 37 59 293
26.12 20.03 21.3 12.56 19.98 100
26.23 20.11 21.38 12.61 20.11 20.09
2 53 63 59 69 48 291
18.03 21.51 20.24 23.6 16.61 100
17.98 21.45 20.18 23.52 16.6 19.95
3 49 78 70 51 44 293
16.81 26.68 24.07 17.56 14.88 100
16.83 26.72 24.09 17.57 14.94 20.03
4 45 55 63 75 55 292
15.28 18.95 21.59 25.5 18.67 100
15.3 18.98 21.61 25.51 18.74 20.03
5 69 37 37 61 86 291
23.78 12.81 12.8 20.91 29.7 100
23.66 12.75 12.73 20.79 29.61 19.9
Total 292 292 292 292 291 1460
20 20.01 20.01 20.02 19.96 100
100 100 100 100 100 100
The most apparent feature of the table is the great mobility among quintiles. In this
there is a remarkable figure which is the share of households that were in 2005 in
quintile 5 and moved lower down the distribution to quintile 1 in the second period (in
table row 5, column 1). They represent almost 24% of households that were in quintile
five in 2005, only below the 29.5% of those that remained. On the other hand, around
20% of households that were in 2005 in quintile one moved to quintile five in 2007.
This proportion is also quite high given the big difference in income per capita between
quantiles one and five. These swings are even clearer by districts. Prakasam and
Anantapur are examples of these changes from quintiles one in 2005 to five in 2007 and
Kurnool for the contrary (At the appendix table 78, 79 and 80 for Prakasam, Kurnool
and Anantapur, respectively)
In order to see how the proportion of households of the different districts moved of
quintiles among years, Table 39 is created with income per capita quintiles. The figures
are found by subtracting, at each quintile, proportion2005 – proportion2007. Thus, in
the case of Anantapur, the proportion of households in the first quintile in 2005 was
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35.43% and in 2007 this is reduced to 25.32% and therefore the Anantapur value for the
first quintile is -10.11%.
The main feature of Anantapur is that in 2007 less households were at the poorer
quintiles and more at the top two quintiles. Kurnool shows a great increase in the
households at the first quintile and a decrease at the top of the distribution. This same
pattern although to a smaller extent is found in Mahabub Nagar. The last row of the
table finds the mean of the changes in absolute values. These means are higher at the
first and fifth quintiles, which confirms that the swings at the bottom and the top of the
distributions are greater.
Table 39 Swings 05 - 07 by district33
Income p.c. share2005 – share2007
1 2 3 4 5
Prakasam -0.99 3.6 -0.54 -2.72 0.65
Kurnool 12.48 4.03 -9.31 1.97 -9.17
Anantapur -10.11 -4.69 0.85 6.05 7.9
Mahabub Nagar 8.48 -3.64 6.61 -3.72 -7.71
Nalgonda -6.53 1.84 4.1 -4.83 5.44
mean (abs values) 7.72 3.56 4.28 3.86 6.17
In order to check whether this pattern of big swings is followed by a particular group of
households, rather than randomly, a binary variable was created. It takes the value of
one for households moving by four quintiles between 2005 and 2007 and zero otherwise
(moving three quantiles or less and not moving households). Then, some variables that
are considered relevant in rural areas were chosen. These were “household head’s main
activity is agriculture” and “household head’s is self-employed”. Also household’s plots
area, a binary indicating if the household had suffered a shock or not (shock) and the
proportion of SHG borrowing households at each group. Then a mean test is done,
using a two-sided and a single sided test.
The test is whether household swinging by four quintiles (swing = 1 in the table) have a
higher proportion of household heads self employed and working in agriculture or if the
average plot size is higher in this group of households. Also, if they are more likely to
have a shock or to borrow from SHGs. It seems plausible to think that these households
33 Quintiles referred to the national income per capita.
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that moved four quintiles could come from better off farmers that invest bigger sums of
money per year. Thus, an average year should take them to the top of the income or
income per capita distribution. However, bad years can also move households further
down their normal quintiles as they might lose more money than average. The test is
formulated as follows34:
H0 : Mean(treated =1) = Mean(control = 0)
Ha1: Mean(treated =1) > Mean(control = 0).
Outcomes in Table 40 show that it is quite likely that these households are composed as
described. It has to be remarked also that the average plot size for swingers almost
doubles the plot size of those that did not swing. In addition, swinger households are
more prone to suffer a shock at some point. These differences are not found, however,
in the proportion of households that have borrowed at least one year from SHGs35. In
this case we cannot reject the null of equal proportions at 5% significance level.
Table 40 Mean test swingers/not swingers
t-test quintiles income per capita
variables mean (swing = 1) mean (swing=0) p-val (Ha1) p-val (Ha2)
HH head self-employed 0.78 0.539 0.000 0.000
HH agriculture 0.822 0.771 0.035 0.069
Plot area 6.554 3.337 0.000 0.000
Shock 0.627 0.569 0.040 0.080
SHG borrower 0.424 0.473 0.930 0.140
In general, one of the main issues with income and income per capita in datasets from
poor areas of developing countries is its volatility. This feature is more acute in this case
as households normally depend on the same sources of income, mainly the harvests and
livestock production. The economies are poorly diversified, as not many alternative
activities are possible, and highly weather-dependent. These great fluctuations may be
due to profit reversals in farming and livestock production. But also the accounting
34 In table it is also reported the p-value versus the alternative Ha2: Mean(treated =1) ≠  Mean(control = 
0)
35 From last chapter, the participation dummy for SHG borrowers was called “everborrow” and took the
value of one if the household had borrowed at least one of the years, 2005 or 2007.
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methods to calculate the variables together with the measurement errors in the inputs
used to create them can be a source of this volatility.
In order to check if this quantile mobility matches with wealth mobility, changes in
other proxies can also be observed. Two of these proxies are the total cultivable land
area owned by the household and also a domestic asset index. The latter is the same
index used in DID models in the former chapter.
Table 81 at the appendix shows some quantiles of the plot area variable. The main
feature is that most of the observations below the median have no cultivable land. In
2007 it cannot be seen one acre of land until the third decile. Differences increase above
the median.
Table 41 is another transition matrix to show how households moved among cultivable
area quintiles. It is clearly much less volatile. The diagonal, giving the households that
do not move of plots area quintiles, shows the greater figures. Also, mobility happens
mostly between quintiles which are closer to each other. There were only two cases of
households that moved from the first quintile to the fifth and two observations moved
from quintile five to quintile three. Thus this proxy for wealth shows no such mobility
as seen in the income/income per capita cases. Mobility in plot area quintiles can also be
seen in Table 82 at the appendix.
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Table 41 Plot area mobility
Quintiles 2005
Plots area all districts
Quintiles 2007
1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 376 35 11 8 2 432
87.04 8.1 2.55 1.85 0.46 100
100 17.77 3.65 2.38 0.8 29.61
2 0 129 8 2 2 141
0 91.49 5.67 1.42 1.42 100
0 65.48 2.66 0.6 0.8 9.66
3 0 33 273 31 4 341
0 9.68 80.06 9.09 1.17 100
0 16.75 90.7 9.23 1.61 23.37
4 0 0 7 224 17 248
0 0 2.82 90.32 6.85 100
0 0 2.33 66.67 6.83 17
5 0 0 2 71 224 297
0 0 0.67 23.91 75.42 100
0 0 0.66 21.13 89.96 20.36
Total 376 197 301 336 249 1459
25.77 13.5 20.63 23.03 17.07 100
100 100 100 100 100 100
With respect to asset index variable36, Table 42 shows that 439 household didn’t own
any assets at both years. Overall, in year 2005 households with none or just one asset
represented the 82.4% of the households, while in 2007 this share decreased to 72.2%.
The mobility, although a bit higher than in the case of plot area, is not as volatile as the
case of income or income per capita. None of the households owned the set of six
assets in 2007 and only one did in 2005. As seen in Table 83 at the appendix, the 84.9%
of the households remain within the range of ∓1 index value.
36 Although already defined, as a reminder, asset index is a variable created with 6 different assets: radio,
television, fridge, bicycle, motorcycle and car. The variable takes the value of 0 if none of these assets are
present in the household. It can take up to the value of 6.
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Table 42 Asset index mobility
Asset Index in 2005
Asset Index in 2007
0 1 2 3 4 5 Total
0 439 184 92 22 2 0 739
59.4 24.9 12.45 2.98 0.27 0 100
71.85 41.53 30.77 25 11.11 0 50.62
1 133 187 109 32 3 0 464
28.66 40.3 23.49 6.9 0.65 0 100
21.77 42.21 36.45 36.36 16.67 0 31.78
2 28 50 76 18 5 0 177
15.82 28.25 42.94 10.17 2.82 0 100
4.58 11.29 25.42 20.45 27.78 0 12.12
3 10 15 20 13 4 0 62
16.13 24.19 32.26 20.97 6.45 0 100
1.64 3.39 6.69 14.77 22.22 0 4.25
4 1 4 2 2 4 0 13
7.69 30.77 15.38 15.38 30.77 0 100
0.16 0.9 0.67 2.27 22.22 0 0.89
5 0 2 0 1 0 1 4
0 50 0 25 0 25 100
0 0.45 0 1.14 0 100 0.27
6 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 100 0 0 0 0 100
0 0.23 0 0 0 0 0.07
Total 611 443 299 88 18 1 1460
41.85 30.34 20.48 6.03 1.23 0.07 100
100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Given the scarce variability of these plot area and asset index variables, it would not be
feasible to run quantile or other sort of regression to analyse the impact of borrowing
from SHGs. However, they contribute to show that the volatility in income and income
per capita quintiles might not match exactly social mobility as other factors are
intervening as well. Also, they are good indicators of the incidence of poverty in the
dataset used.
Shocks
Another vital issue with respect to this volatility is the presence of shocks37. The studied
survey devoted a whole section to shocks and collects detailed information about the
37 As explained in the former chapter, shock is defined in several ways: loss of property or livestock,
death, severe illness or injury of a member or failure of crops.
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type of shock, whether the shock seriously affected the household, how the household
responded to the shock and, when it was due to crop failure, the causes of it. The
abundance of these shocks would justify to some extent this volatility between quintiles.
The information is summarized by quintile in Table 43 and Table 44. In the tables are
shown the households that suffered a shock together with some percentages. The
column %fail crop represents the proportion of these shocks that were due to a bad
crop. In addition to this, it was seen that overall the main reason for failed crops was a
lack of water. Column % lack water represents the percentage of those failed crops
caused by the lack for water.
Table 43 Shocks by quintiles 2005
Shock by quintile 2005
Quintiles income per capita Shock=1 % shocks % fail crop %lack water
1 228 78% 89% 83%
2 195 67% 79% 76%
3 169 58% 84% 82%
4 152 52% 77% 69%
5 152 52% 78% 68%
Averages (Total for column Shock = 1) 896 61% 82% 76%
Table 44 Shock by quintiles 2007
Shock by quintile 2007
Quintiles income per capita Shock=1 % shocks % fail crop %lack water
1 203 70% 86% 74%
2 171 59% 74% 59%
3 128 44% 60% 55%
4 149 51% 56% 44%
5 155 53% 53% 49%
Averages (Total for column Shock = 1) 806 55% 66% 57%
It is clear that households in the sample were subject to many shocks and the incidence
of crop failures is quite high, especially in 2005. On average, 82% of the shocks were
due to this in 2005 and the 66% in 2007. In this kind of weather dependent economies
one of the main points is to see whether the rainfall is important. It is also clear that the
lack of water is important in 2005 and 2007 although the proportion of shocks for this
reason is higher in 2005.
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The first quantile suffered in proportion more shocks than the rest, followed by the
second quantile, and this happened in both years, although differences are clearer in
2005. By district, Kurnool and Anantapur show a higher percentage of shocks and
Prakasam and Nalgonda a bit lower than overall (Table 45). In the former two the share
of shocks due to failed crops is very high as well as the proportion of shocks for this
reason in 2005. The pattern shows that Prakasam and Nalgonda suffered proportionately
less than Kurnool and Anantapur in both years. These figures are consistent with the big
switches found in these latter districts.
Table 45 Shock by districts 2005 and 2007
Year 2005 Year 2007
District % shocks %fail crop %lackwater % shocks
% fail
crop
% lack
water
PRAKASAM 53% 57% 44% 54% 49% 46%
KURNOOL 64% 96% 92% 58% 76% 71%
ANANTAPUR 68% 83% 80% 63% 73% 65%
MAHABUB NAGAR 64% 93% 88% 48% 63% 46%
NALGONDA 55% 74% 66% 49% 57% 47%
Total 61% 82% 76% 55% 66% 57%
Given the importance of rainfall in this type of agricultural economy, in Table 46
rainfall is shown by district. Normal rainfall is the average rainfall in the district. The
columns are found with the equation [(actual rainfall / normal rainfall) – 1], to have
proportionate figures rather than the absolute values. Measures are taken from June of
the current year to May of the following year. Regarding normal rainfall, it is clear that
Prakasam and Nalgonda are less dry districts and probably for this reason the drop in
rainfall doesn’t affect them so greatly. On the other hand Anantapur is the driest and
probably the most sensitive district to the scarcity of rainfall so that a lower percentage
decrease in rainfall with respect to the average brings about worse consequences. The
differences are not so high between 2005 and 2007.
180
Table 46 Rainfall by district (% over mean rainfall38)
Normal % Δ normal rainfall 
District Average 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07
PRAKASAM 871 -37% 16% -19%
KURNOOL 670 -19% 25% -19%
ANANTAPUR 553 -21% 43% -26%
MAHABUB NAGAR 604 -32% 61% -20%
NALGONDA 751 -31% 33% -27%
Overall 675 -27% 36% -21%
Finally, a rough regression could be done to see the effects on the differenced quintiles.
The regressand is the difference quintile07-quintile05 and ranges from -4 to 4. The
regressors will be binaries for shocks. The survey allows to distinguish between those
shocks that were reported to seriously affect the life of the household members and
those which were not. The equation would end as follows:
∆ݍ(݀ ݌݁ܽݒ ݎ) = ݋ܿ݊ ݏܽݐ ݊ݐ+݁ݏ ݅ݎ݋ݑݏ_ݏℎ݋ܿ ௧݇+ ݊݋݊ − ݁ݏ ݅ݎ݋ݑݏ_ݏℎ݋ܿ ௧݇+ ݑ௜
where ∆ݍ is equal to quintile07-quintile05, ݀ ݌݁ܽݒ ݎcan be either income per capita or
income and t refers to 2005 or 2007.
Outcomes are shown in Table 47 and are different for shocks happening in years 2005
and 2007. In 2005 the base category (no shock) shows a negative estimate meaning that
not having a shock has a negative impact of the differenced quantiles. On the contrary,
an affecting shock means an increase in the dependent variable. Actually, households
that suffered a shock in the first period increase ∆ݍfor almost half a quintile, on average
and ceteris paribus. This is because they have more potential to grow as they depart
from level of income / income per capita that is lower than usual. No significant effect
is found for any category in 2007, although the sign is negative as expected.
38 38 http://www.apdes.ap.gov.in/Dist@glance/rainfall.htm 22/09/11 @ 11.00 am
and http://www.apdes.ap.gov.in/publications/Outline%202006-2007.pdf 22/09/11 @ 11.00 am
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Table 47 Δ Quintiles over shocks 
Regression dep. var: quintile07-quintile05
Income quintiles Income per capita quintiles
Year of the shock
2005 2007 2005 2007
Shock seriously affected 0.482*** -0.159 0.552*** -0.145
(4.659) (-1.584) (5.440) (-1.466)
shock not seriously affected 0.081 0.153 -0.050 0.171
(0.517) (0.975) (-0.323) (1.113)
Constant -0.268*** 0.047 -0.262*** 0.062
(-3.471) (0.642) (-3.460) (0.872)
Observations 1460 1455 1460 1455
Adjusted R-squared 0.014 0.001 0.021 0.001
Borrowing
In the presence of shocks households respond in different ways: they might sell animals
or jeweller or they can ask for help from a relative or friend, etc. The survey contains
several of these responses under categories and they gather information about the first,
the second and the third response or means through which the household tried to get
over each shock faced. The most usual response was to borrow money in a proportion
of 77.9% in 2005 and 69% in 2007. Previous literature suggests that it might be
important to know the amount borrowed by quintile as some sources contend that those
groups that had access to bigger loans were the ones reaping the benefits of
microfinance (Coleman 2006).
Tables will show whether there is some concentration of borrowers at some quintiles or,
more importantly, if there is a pattern in the amount of money borrowed at different
quintiles of income per capita. In the first case, shown in Table 48, there seems not to be
any pattern and no great changes are seen between years. Overall, the most popular
source of credit is moneylenders and landlords, followed by banks and SHGs.
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Table 48 Nr of borrowers per source and quintile
Nr of households everborrow=1 for different sources by quintiles Income_PC
Bank SHG Moneylender Family Friends
2005 2007 2005 2007 2005 2007 2005 2007
q1 159 175 139 125 192 186 96 81
q2 138 142 136 134 180 160 85 101
q3 119 110 116 134 174 199 85 83
q4 116 117 160 150 188 186 97 96
q5 142 130 133 141 178 181 97 99
In Table 49 it is found the average sum borrowed by income per capita quintile for the
different sources. Overall there is a decrease from 2005 to 2007 except in the case of
SHG where this is not so evident. In the case of banks high values are shown at the tails
of the distribution. In these figures households that swing between the first and fifth
quintiles may well have something to do with it. In the case of moneylenders the higher
values are found at the bottom of the distribution and theoretically they should serve to
the informal sector. It is seen that it is not only the most popular source but also the one
that shows greater average loan sizes.
Table 49 Mean loan size by quintiles, source and year (take into account non borrowing households)
Sums borrowed from different sources by quintiles Income PC
Bank SHG Moneylender Family Friends
2005 2007 2005 2007 2005 2007 2005 2007
q1 7,049 9,362 1,332 1,856 11,173 9,357 3,302 2,550
q2 5,890 4,675 1,312 1,776 10,696 7,187 1,902 3,345
q3 5,247 2,286 1,294 1,610 7,772 6,638 3,428 4,069
q4 4,266 3,848 2,160 2,253 9,970 5,202 3,766 2,896
q5 7,451 4,668 2,723 1,959 8,777 6,587 5,615 3,301
In the case of SHGs, the amounts are sensibly lower than banks. Certain rules in village
banks cap the amount that a member can borrow. These have to do with the amount that
the member has in savings, for example, or the total size of the group’s fund. These
norms can explain the smaller average. The two upper quintiles are the ones that borrow
more intensively from SHGs. Coleman (2006) argues that “committee members” get
advantage of microfinance because they manage to access greater loan sizes. However,
as it will be seen in the analysis, this doesn’t seem to hold here. The impact is found at
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the middle of the distribution instead where mean loan sizes don’t reach their
maximums.
Thus, descriptives show some differences between 2005 and 2007 in the distribution of
the dependent variable. Given the weather dependence of household economies, some
of these differences between years and also among districts could well be explained by
differences in rainfall and number of shocks suffered.
Quantile mobility is omnipresent when dealing with income and income per capita
variables. This volatility is most likely due to the sensitivity of these variables to current
profit/losses as other proxies for wealth such as owned land extension or an asset index
weren’t so volatile. Explanation for the biggest swings in quintiles (first to fith quintile
or vice versa) could be profit reversals of relatively wealthy farmers. Shocks can explain
some of this volatility but the number of households switching quintile is abnormally
high.
The extra volatility could therefore most likely be attributed to the accounting methods
when calculating income as in many cases the valuing methods cause great differences.
For example when valuing the inputs produced at home as no prices are established for
them. Also, as in any household survey of this kind, the measures of variables included
in income are greatly affected by measurement errors.
There is not a especially high concentration of borrowers at the middle quintiles. Nor do
they borrow more intensively. However, as will be seen in the analysis, the impact of
SHG microfinance is mostly seen at the middle of the distribution.
Finally, it has to be made clear that the impact is said to take place with respect to some
quantiles. When two time periods are included, impact takes place at the different points
of the distribution of the dependent variable at which the difference between
participants and non participants is significant. As clearly explained in Dammert (2009)
the impact clearly do not refer to the individuals in particular, unless it could be
assumed that the same households remain at the same points of the dependent variable
distribution. This assumption is called “rank preservation assumption” and is quite
important in other quantile approaches for panel data such as Quantile Treatment
Effects (QTE) or Quantile Difference In Difference (QDID). It clearly doesn’t hold in
the present case.
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Analysis
PSM, OLS, DID... etc all are techniques that provide a single estimate of the impact.
Quantile regression allows the researcher to refine further this coarse estimation and
find the impact at a particular point of the conditional distribution of the dependent
variable. Quantile regression started to be used as Least Absolute Deviation (LAD)
which is a quantile regression at the median. It tries to minimize not the sum of the
squared errors (OLS) but the sum of absolute residuals. These residuals are given a
weight of q (where q is the quantile) when the residual is positive and (1-q) when it is
negative39. The formula was already shown above (1.39). As it is not differentiable
minimization is done through linear programming. As errors are not squared, it is a less
sensitive method to vertical outliers and therefore suitable for the present dataset.
If we are able to measure the impact at many quantiles (q) of the conditional distribution
of the dependent variables, the method is extremely interesting in our quest of the
effects of microfinance at different points of this distribution, especially at the bottom
tail which includes the poorest.
The analysis that follows is based in three main approaches. In the first stage the
quantile regression is done over the cross sectional datasets for 2005 and 2007. We still
stick in these regressions to the assumption from Coleman’s model in which
unobservables leading participation are controlled for with the “everborrow” dummy,
which takes the value of one if the household borrowed at least once (2005 or 2007 or
both). In the second stage, the quantile regression is done over the differenced
dependent and independent variables from stage one. Later, the level variables from
2005 are also called into the model in order to control for initial conditions. In the third
stage the Correlated Random Effect model is applied, showing the graphs of the
evolution of estimates.
All the quantile regressions henceforth are implemented over 18 quantiles starting at the
fifth percentile and going up by 5 percentiles each time until the 95th. In quantile
regression literature it is usual to report only the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th although
we tried to report more quantiles in order to show outcomes as clearly as possible at the
appendix.
39 In the case of Least Absolute Deviation, the quantile used is the median q = 0.5, (1-q) = 0.5 and
therefore all the residuals are equally weighted.
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Cross sectional quantile regression for years 2005 and 2007
The first approach is a cross sectional quantile regression done over both years
independently. The models try to replicate as closely as possible the models previously
seen in the former chapter and “everborrow” still controls for unobservables. Again the
impact is measured with the loan size variables. The standard errors are calculated
through bootstrapping method, withdrawing random samples with replacement by the
method of paired bootstrap.
Cross sectional: Income per capita
In this first stage, the main outcome is that SHG borrowing has a significant impact at
the middle of the conditional distribution of income per capita in 2005. In 2007 the
impact is reduced and affects lower percentiles, closer to the bottom: 10th to 30th. Banks
show positive estimates at the bottom and positive at the top of the distribution but
significance changes with years. Moneylenders show also differences in significance.
Outcomes for a limited number of per capita income percentiles in 2005 and 2007 are
shown in Table 50. At the appendix, Table 84 shows more percentiles for the quantile
regression in 2005. Variables controlling for having ever borrowed from any of the
sources show, when significant, a negative bias rather than a positive one. Thus no
evidence of positive selection bias is found, according to Coleman’s set up.
The impact of borrowing from different sources showed negative and significant
estimates in the case of banks at the lowest quantiles and it turned positive and
significant at the top of income per capita distribution. In the case of moneylenders,
estimates are positive and statistically significant only at the middle of the distribution.
Our main interest is on the impact of borrowing from SHGs. This shows a more
homogeneous pattern of positive and significant impact at percentiles ranging from the
20th to the 70th percentiles, almost matching the interquartile range. In 2005, a rise of
100 rupees in a microfinance loan increased income per capita in 2005 by 10.1 rupees at
the 20th percentile and only by 7 at the 70th, with slight downward trend. Benefits from
microfinance were grabbed neither by the richest nor by the poorest households given
this analysis.
In 2007 (Table 50 for limited number of percentiles, Table 85 at the appendix with more
percentiles), in the case of borrowing from banks, significant impact disappears from
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the top quantiles and shifts towards the bottom of the distribution of income per capita.
Below the median there is an overall negative and significant impact and the positive
estimates above the median are no longer significant. In the case of moneylenders, the
impact in 2007 is found negative and significant from the 5th to the 25th percentiles.
The shift towards the bottom of the distribution can be clearly seen also in the case of
SHG borrowing. In 2007 the range of quantiles where the estimates are significant is
only between the 10th and the 40th percentiles. Also, at quantiles that are significant at
both years the estimates are lower in the case of 2007. Interpreted from a policy point of
view, in 2007 the benefits seemed to be reaped by poorer households which would be
the target for microfinance programs and this would be a sign of the success of
microfinance programs.
Table 50 Cross sectional quantile regression income per capita. Years 2005-2007
Income_pc 2005 Income_pc 2007
Source \ Percentiles 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
banks -0.026 -0.006 0.015 0.125** 0.193*** -0.136*** -0.036* -0.032** 0.012 0.131
z-scores (-1.448) (-0.331) (0.519) (2.327) (4.132) (-2.686) (-1.721) (-2.163) (0.347) (1.337)
NGO 0.384 0.326 0.290 0.247 0.173 1.176 0.246 0.307 0.021 0.430
z-scores (1.159) (1.037) (0.867) (0.519) (0.267) (0.850) (0.331) (0.685) (0.047) (0.694)
Moneylender 0.016 0.010 0.027** 0.018 0.001 -0.047** -0.038** -0.008 -0.007 -0.018
z-scores (0.864) (1.161) (2.021) (1.308) (0.012) (-2.267) (-2.168) (-1.007) (-0.738) (-1.012)
Family & Friends -0.020 -0.002 0.022 0.013 -0.007 -0.008 0.007 0.004 0.001 0.037
z-scores (-1.243) (-0.087) (1.137) (0.831) (-0.116) (-0.187) (0.583) (0.363) (0.022) (0.839)
Other -0.039 0.005 0.058 0.067 0.052 -0.243* -0.110 -0.080 0.031 0.747*
z-scores (-0.785) (0.111) (1.358) (0.998) (0.413) (-1.907) (-1.240) (-1.055) (0.114) (1.939)
SHG -0.002 0.099** 0.087** 0.065 0.041 0.065* 0.049** 0.027 0.063 0.001
z-scores (-0.034) (2.475) (2.542) (1.348) (0.586) (1.820) (2.202) (0.966) (1.513) (0.006)
t statistics in parenthesis; * p<0.10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; Year 2005 Nr. of observations: 1,460. Year
2007 Nr of observations 1,466. In yellow, blue and orange estimates that are significant at least at 10%
level for loan size from SHG, bank and moneylenders respectively.
Quantile regression over differenced variables
In this approach the significance of bank borrowing is only present when level variables
from 2005 are included in the model. Moneylender borrowing, when significant, shows
negative signs at different quantiles on income per capita and income. Borrowing from
SHG shows a positive and significant effect on income per capita and income, although
in the latter case this is constrained to a few quantiles.
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One of the advantages of the present dataset is that it contains two years and this allows
for time variability. However, quantile regression is not linear and this implies that
ܳ௤൫ݕ௜,ଶหݔ௜ଶ ௜ܽ൯− ܳ௤൫ݕ௜,ଵหݔ௜ଵ ௜ܽ൯≠ ܳ ௤൫ݕ௜,ଶ− ݕ௜,ଵหݔ௜ଵ,ݔ௜ଶ,ܽ൯ that is, the difference of
quantile regressions is not equal to the quantile regression of the difference. Therefore,
one of the basic properties that allowed us to implement the DID technique and remove
the selection bias does not hold. However, the implementation of the quantile regression
over differenced dependent variables can also be illustrative of the impact of
microfinance over income and income per capita.
Variables again refer back to the previous chapter and basically reproduce the model
used in the DID approach, just that in this instance the applied technique is quantile
regression. The standard errors are again found through paired bootstrapping.
In a first step the differenced dependent variables are regressed over the differenced
independent variables. The model is set as follows:
∆ݕ௜= ߚ଴ + ߚଵΔܺ௜+ ߚଶ∆ ݋݈ܽ ݊݅ݏ ݁ݖ ௜+ ߚଷ∆ ܵܪܩ_ݏݑ݉ ௜+ ߝ௜ (1.45)
where y can be income or income per capita, X is a vector of variables including
household size, shocks in the household, the maximum of education level achieved in
the household, the asset index and the work per working capita. “Loansize” refers to the
amount borrowed by the ith household from the different sources and the SHG_sum is
the amount borrowed from the village banks.
Some variables from the right hand side of the equation were dropped in comparison
with the cross sectional models. This is due to the fact that many of the variables could
not be differenced out, such as district dummies. Others such as marital status scarcely
change and variation is zero in most of cases.
Outcomes are shown with respect to income per capita in Table 51, for regressions with
and without level variables in 2005. (For a wider range of variables and percentiles see
Table 86 and Table 87, respectively, at the appendix of the chapter). In the model with
no level variables, estimates of the change in the amount borrowed from banks, NGOs,
family and friends and others do not show any significance at any of the quantiles.
When the source is moneylenders and landlords, the estimates show consistently
negative and significant only at the median and some higher quantiles from the 75th
percentile upwards.
188
The impact of borrowing from SHGs is positive and significant consistently from the
20th percentile upwards the differenced income per capita distribution, with an upward
trend in the impact as we move up the quantiles. The differences between SHG loan size
estimates at different quantiles were tested in order to see if they were statistically
significant. A Wald test40 is used being the null hypothesis that the estimates are equal
across quantiles. The null of equal estimates could not be rejected in the following
pairwise comparisons: 25-50, 25-75, 25-90, 50-90, 75-90. Thus, the impact is
homogeneous across the different quantiles.
Table 51 Quantile regression Δ income per capita without and with 2005 level variables. 
Δincome per capita Δincome per capita with 2005 levels 
Source \ Percentiles 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
banks -0.069 -0.017 -0.004 -0.005 -0.061 -0.040 -0.068** -0.022 0.012 0.077
z-scores (-1.19) (-0.48) (-0.19) (-0.26) (-1.40) (-0.859) (-2.233) (-0.709) (0.376) (1.032)
NGO 0.250 0.188 0.240 0.275 -0.033 0.844 0.427 0.241 -0.034 1.064
z-scores (0.50) (0.44) (0.59) (0.93) (-0.11) (0.616) (0.525) (0.356) (-0.036) (1.029)
Moneylender 0.000 -0.009 -0.020* -0.019* -0.037*** -0.119* -0.019 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002
z-scores (0.02) (-0.50) (-1.73) (-1.86) (-3.00) (-1.871) (-0.803) (-0.194) (-0.057) (-0.064)
Family & Friends -0.016 -0.008 0.017 0.005 0.019 -0.044 -0.039 -0.006 0.002 0.035
z-scores (-0.39) (-0.43) (1.17) (0.28) (0.84) (-0.524) (-1.241) (-0.256) (0.058) (0.697)
Other -0.068 -0.021 -0.012 0.037 -0.035 -0.257 -0.150 -0.196 0.150 0.670**
z-scores (-0.92) (-0.51) (-0.24) (0.38) (-0.28) (-1.139) (-1.276) (-1.251) (0.681) (2.093)
SHG 0.021 0.086*** 0.080*** 0.128*** 0.127* 0.057 0.036 0.096 0.124* 0.110
z-scores (0.28) (3.97) (2.69) (3.02) (1.86) (0.358) (0.731) (1.537) (1.703) (0.619)
t statistics in parenthesis; * p<0.10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; Nr. of observations: 1,460. In yellow, blue
and orange estimates that are significant at least at 10% level for loan size from SHG, bank and
moneylenders respectively.
Regressions done over differenced variables can be improved by controlling for
differences at the beginning of the survey. This can be done in this case adding 2005
level variables. This is a very common practice also in DID analysis (Masset and White
2006).
The model will therefore end up as follows:
40 The Wald test is implemented following Hao, L. and D. Q. Naiman (2007). Quantile regression, SAGE
Publications, Inc., page49. Wald statistic =
(ఉ෡ೕ(೛)ିఉ෡ೕ(೜))మ
ఙෝమ(ഁ෢
ೕ
(೛)
షഁ෡
ೕ
(೜)) where p and q refer to the different quantiles and
ܸ ܽݎቀߚመ௝
(௣)
− ߚመ௝
(௤)
ቁ= ܸ ܽݎቀߚመ௝(௣)ቁ+ ܸ ܽݎ(ߚመ௝(௤)) − 2ܥ݋ݒ(ߚመ௝(௣),ߚመ௝(௤)). The null hypothesis of equal
estimates, the Wald statistic follows a ߯ଶ distribution with one degree of freedom.
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∆ݕ௜= ߚ଴ + ߚଵΔܺ௜+ ߚଶ∆ ݋݈ܽ ݊݅ݏ ݁ݖ ௜+ ߚଷ∆ ܵܪܩ_ݏݑ݉ ௜+ ߚସܺ௜,ହ+ ߚହ ݋݈ܽ ݊݅ݏ ݁ݖ ௜,ହ+ߚ଺ ܵܪܩ_ݏݑ݉ ௜,ହ + ߝ௜ (1.46)
where the subscript 5 stands for year 2005. ܺ௜,ହ includes household size, shocks in the
household, maximum education level in the household, asset index and work per
working capita in levels of year 2005.݈݋ܽ ݊݅ݏ ݁ݖ ௜,ହ is the amount borrowed from the
different credit sources by household i in year 2005. And finally, ܵܪܩ_ݏݑ݉ ௜,ହ is the
amount borrowed from Village Banks in 2005.
Table 51 shows the outcomes regarding income per capita (Δ income  per capita). With 
respect to the differenced loan size variables, the effect on the differenced income per
capita is negative for quantiles below the median with respect to banks and
moneylenders.
Our interest is focused on the differenced microfinance loan size. The estimates are
significant at 10% level only and in the 30th, 35th, 45th, 60th, 65th, 70th and 75th (not all
seen in table). An increase of 100 rupees in the differenced loan size from SHG raises
the differenced income per capita by 8.1 rupees at the 30th percentile and by 12.4 at the
75th. There is a clear upward trend moving up the differenced income per capita
distribution. A similar pattern is found in the case of income (Table 90 and Table 91,
appendix).
Overall, the addition of 2005 level variables constrains the number of quantiles at which
the impact of SHG borrowing is significant. This is shown to a smaller extent when
quantile regression is done over differenced income per capita but in the case of income
significance almost disappears.
Overall, it can be said that the impact of SHG borrowing is significant at the middle of
the conditional distribution of income per capita, as it was shown in the 2005 cross
sectional outcomes and at the differenced models, with and without 2005 level
variables. For income the pattern is similar although when including 2005 level
variables the significance is seen only in two quantiles.
The differenced approach in quantile regression is the weakest when controlling for
selection bias. The time invariant unobservables are not wiped as happens when doing
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DID. Everborrow takes the value of one in both years and therefore it would work as
other time invariant variables such as race or sex that cannot be included in the
differenced models. The outcomes are illustrative of the possible impact of
microfinance, but should be improved. On the other hand, cross sectional approaches
control for selection bias through the “everborrow” variable but cannot get advantage of
the time dimension of the dataset and only relies on the variation across households.
Thus, the aim is to surmount the weaknesses of the former approaches by finding a
method that allows us to exploit the time dimension of the panel but also to avoid
selection bias. For this purpose, panel techniques are combined with quantile regression.
Quantile regression applied to panel datasets.
Non linearity of quantile regression has forced to find some means to allow for time
variability. Some have been suggested in the literature in order to surmount this
problem. The one adopted in the present study is the Correlated Random Effect, used in
Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) and Khandker et al. (2009) for datasets with similar
characteristics.
Khandker et al. (2010) describe some other ad hoc techniques that have been proposed
so far for this purpose. The first of them is Quantile Treatment Effect (QTE) which is
found by calculating the horizontal differences between the quantiles of the treated and
control distributions. The method assumes that there is a baseline survey and a
subsequent random allocation of the program. For this reason its use becomes
problematic when the dataset at hand comes from a non-randomised intervention. The
technique is developed in Firpo (2007) and practical approaches can be found in works
about the impact of cash transfers in Mexico (Djebbari and Smith 2008) and Guatemala
(Dammert 2009). Also in labour economics (Bitler, Gelbach et al. 2008).
Athey and Imbens (2006) show other methods such as Changes in Changes (CIC) and
Quantile Difference in Difference (QDID). In both it is assumed that the intervention
takes place after the baseline survey. Poterba et al. (1995) and Meyer et al. (1995)
pioneered in the use of QDID and later studies include Song and Manchester (2007) in
the field of labor economics and Bitler et al. (2006) in connection with the study of
impact of a program targeting the ultra poor in Bangladesh.
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Finally, Koenker (2004) suggests an approach for conditional quantile regression with
panel data under the assumption that T is increasing together with N, covariates are
fixed and the disturbance terms are serially independent. The fixed effects are assumed
to be constant for every value of q but in this case T is limited to two time periods.
The dataset at hand neither comes from a randomised intervention nor includes a
baseline survey collected before the intervention had taken place. Also it has just two
time periods. These characteristics make the former techniques ill suited to attempt a
quantile regression analysis with them. Abrevaya and Dahl (2008), however, use the
Correlated Random Effect (Chamberlain 1982; Chamberlain 1984) to find out the effect
of different variables on two birthweights from the same mother. Khandker et al. (2009)
borrow from this technique in order to find the distributional impact of rural roads in
Bangladesh. This method suits the characteristics of the present dataset, where baseline
survey before the intervention is not available and only two time periods are available.
Thus, it will be applied in our aim of improving the cross sectional and differenced
variables approaches.
Correlated random effects model (CRE).
Basics of the model
In this method it is assumed that the unobservables are linearly related to the
observables. If this can be argued, unobservables can be controlled for and the impact
effect is freed of selection bias providing with an accurate impact effect estimate. With
respect to the time dimension, the model assumes that the impact of covariates remains
constant at both periods and the time effect is measured on a dummy for the second year.
It follows a more technical description of the CRE model followed by how it is applied
to quantile regression and the section ends with the discussion of the outcomes when
this technique is used.
This model is based in Chamberlain’s work (Chamberlain 1982; Chamberlain 1984).
We depart from the standard linear panel data model:
ݕ௜௧ = ݔ′௜௧ߚ+ ௜ܽ+ ݑ௜௧; ݐ= 1,2 (1.47)
where ௜ܽstands for the time invariant unobservables for individual (household) i and u
is the error term. ௜ܽ is supposed to be correlated with the observables x. It is also
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assumed that the error term is uncorrelated with the observables and the unobservables,
that is
ܧ(ݑ௜ଵ|ݔ௜ܽ ௜) = ܧ(ݑ௜ଶ|ݔ௜ܽ ௜) = 0 ∀݅ (1.48)
The unobservables are considered as a linear function of the covariates:
௜ܽ= ߰ + ݔ′௜ଵߣଵ + ݔ′௜ଶߣଶ + ݒ௜ (1.49)
where ߰is a scalar, ߣ 1 x K vectors (where K is the number of independent variables
but not the time dummy) and ݒ௜a disturbance uncorrelated with the covariates. If (1.47)
is represented for the 2 time periods and ௜ܽ is substituted by its formula in (1.49), it
results into:
ݕ௜ଵ = ߰ + ݔ′௜ଵ(ߚ+ ߣଵ) + ݔ′௜ଶߣଶ + ݒ௜+ݑ௜ଵ (1.50)
ݕ௜ଶ = ߰ + ݔ′௜ଵߣଵ + ݔ′௜ଶ(ߚ+ ߣଶ) + ݒ௜+ ݑ௜ଶ (1.51)
The estimation of the parameters ߰ ,ߣଵ,ߣଶ,ߚcan be done through a OLS method but
also GMM estimators can be used. The effects of the covariates on the
contemporaneous dependent variable are split in two parts: a direct effect which is
measured through the coefficient ߚ and an indirect effect which is measured through the
coefficientߣ. This is nothing else than the effect of the unobservables. Covariates of the
previous or ulterior time period have only an indirect effect on the dependent variable
given by the ߣcoefficient.
Adding a final assumption:
ܧ(ݒ௜|ݔ௜) = 0 (1.52)
we can find the value of ߚ:
డா(௬೔భ|௫೔)
డ௫೔భ
= ߚ+ ߣଵ and డா(௬೔మ|௫೔)డ௫೔భ = ߣଵ, and therefore
ߚ = ߲ܧ(ݕ௜ଵ|ݔ௜)
߲ݔ௜ଵ
−
߲ܧ(ݕ௜ଶ|ݔ௜)
߲ݔ௜ଵ
(1.53)
In the same vein, it can be seen that
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ߚ = ߲ܧ(ݕ௜ଶ|ݔ௜)
߲ݔ௜ଶ
−
߲ܧ(ݕ௜ଵ|ݔ௜)
߲ݔ௜ଶ
(1.54)
Estimation of effects on conditional quantiles with panel data with two time periods
Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) borrow from the correlated random effects framework above
described. The utility for the present study is that they find a solution to the problem of
the non observables under non linearity in the case of a panel with two time periods.
They try to find the effect of the covariates on the conditional quantiles in the same
manner as in equations (1.53) and (1.54) for conditional expectation:
߲ܳ௤(ݕ௜ଵ|ݔ௜)
߲ݔ௜ଵ
−
߲ܳ௤(ݕ௜ଶ|ݔ௜)
߲ݔ௜ଵ
(1.55)
߲ܳ௤(ݕ௜ଶ|ݔ௜)
߲ݔ௜ଶ
−
߲ܳ௤(ݕ௜ଵ|ݔ௜)
߲ݔ௜ଶ
(1.56)
If for conditional expectation the necessary assumption was (1.52) in the conditional
quantiles we need to establish the assumption of independence of all the disturbance
terms, ݒ௜,ݑ௜ଵ,ݑ௜ଶ with respect to ݔ௜. Hence, the equations for the conditional quantiles
would be:
ܳ௤(ݕ௜ଵ|ݔ௜) = ߰௤ଵ + ݔ′௜ଵߠ௤ଵ + ݔ′௜ଶߣ௤ଶ (1.57)
ܳ௤(ݕ௜ଶ|ݔ௜) = ߰௤ଶ + ݔ′௜ଵߣ௤ଵ + ݔ′௜ଶߠ௤ଶ (1.58)
where ߰௤ଵ and ߰௤ଶ are location shifts in the qth quantiles in years 1 and 2, respectively
which gather the effect of disturbances. ߣ௤ଵ is the effect of unobservables on the
conditional quantiles for the first year. Therefore, the searched effect of the observables
on the conditional quantiles for year one (1.55) will be equal to ߠ௤ଵ− ߣ௤ଵ and ߠ௤ଶ− ߣ௤ଶ for
the second time period (1.56).
Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) add another assumption which is that the effect of covariates
is constant along both periods and therefore ߠ௤ଵ− ߣ௤ଵ =ߠ௤ଶ− ߣ௤ଶ =ߚ௤. This is the same
assumption that is done in equation (1.47) that characterizes the “within” estimator in
panel data approaches.
With this restriction, equations (1.57) and (1.58) can be rewritten:
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ܳ௤(ݕ௜ଵ|ݔ௜) = ߰௤ଵ + ݔ′௜ଵߚ௤+ݔ′௜ଵߣ௤ଵ + ݔ′௜ଶߣ௤ଶ (1.59)
ܳ௤(ݕ௜ଶ|ݔ௜) = ߰௤ଶ + ݔ′௜ଶߚ௤+ݔ′௜ଵߣ௤ଵ + ݔ′௜ଶߣ௤ଶ (1.60)
The estimation of the parameters is done through a pooled linear quantile regression for
each q in which the observations corresponding the same household are stacked
together:
Source: (Abrevaya and Dahl 2008)
The parameters ߰௤ଵǡ ߰௤ଶ െ ߰௤ଵǡߣ௤ଵ and ߣ௤ଶ are estimated. ߰௤ଶ െ ߰௤ଵ stands for the “year
effect” as is the difference between the locational shifts between the first and the second
years. This is equivalent to the constant in the DID approach when an OLS is done over
differenced variables. Time invariant variables can be added but it would be impossible
to distinguish what share of their estimates is due to direct and which to indirect effects
(Abrevaya and Dahl 2008).
As mentioned above, the standard asymptotic formula in Koenker and Bassett (1978) is
not normally used in quantile regression. Bootstrapping is used instead. However,
quantile regression is normally used with cross-sectional data where each observation
corresponds to one subject. In the case of panel data, the observations are clustered by
subject and therefore they are not independent. The bootstrap method used to find out
the standard errors is the paired bootstrap method but each time two observations
corresponding to the same household are withdrawn from the sample (Abrevaya and
Dahl 2008; Khandker, Bakht et al. 2009).
This model is original in the sense that it takes advantage of the linear approach of the
correlated random effects model and applies it to quantile regression. In both cases, the
assumption of independence of the covariates with respect to the disturbances is
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essential. If the assumption doesn’t hold the linear form (1.50)/(1.51) is valid only in
certain cases of conditional quantile functions.
Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) contend that although the conditional quantiles are linear on
the covariates under very particular circumstances, even when the data-generating
process is linear, this approximation should not be seen as restrictive. In traditional
quantile approaches, working with cross sectional datasets, they fit a linear model to ݕ௜,
using the formula
ܳ௡൫ߚ௤൯= ෍ ݍหݕ௜− ݔ௜ᇱߚ௤ห+௡
௜:௬೔ஹ௫೔ᇲఉ ෍ (1 − ݍ)หݕ௜− ݔ௜ᇱߚ௤ห
௡
௜:௬೔ழ௫೔ᇲఉ (1.61)
and in the seminal work by (Koenker and Bassett 1978) the conditional quantile
regression is assumed to be linear (Angrist and Pischke 2009). The approach, thus,
should be seen as a reduced form trying to model the conditional quantile and not the
data generating process.
Panel Correlated Random Effects
Thus, the model includes the parameters ߣ௤ଵ and ߣ௤ଶ which control for the effects of the
unobservables over the dependent variable so that the estimates of the independent
variables will be neat of bias. Following Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) in a first stage a
quantile regression was implemented over the pooled cross sectional dataset, without
the parameters of the CRE 41 . Subsequently, parameters ߣ௤ଵ and ߣ௤ଶ are included to
control for the unobservables, constituting thus the CRE model. The main difference in
the calculation of the quantile regression in this model is the bootstrapping process. In
the case of cross sectional data, the bootstrapping is done over observations. However,
in the CRE model the resampling is done at household level. Thus, when a household is
dropped the two observations of the sample corresponding to that household are
dropped.
Hao and Naiman (2007) establish a number between 500 and 2,000 in order to estimate
confidence intervals, in our case 750 repetitions are used. Then, the 5th, 50th and 95th
percentiles are found. The median is reported to be the estimate of the quantile. The 5th
and the 95th percentiles will constitute the limits of the 90% confidence interval. If zero
41 Estimates available upon request
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is not within this confidence interval, the estimate is said to be significant and otherwise
if it is.
Tables include the estimates and the corresponding asymptotic t values are also
reported. There is also a graphical representation in the case of estimates for income per
capita. The outcomes omits the coefficients of the CREs, ߣ௤ଵ and ߣ௤ଶ, reported separately
in the appendix. In the graphs, the envelope corresponding to the 90 confidence interval
is shadowed in grey and the quantile regression line of the CRE approach has a solid
pattern.
As comparative references, the dashed lines correspond to the cross sectional quantile
regression pooling both years, when ߣ௤ଵ and ߣ௤ଶ are not included and therefore no
unobservables are controlled for. Finally the dashed-dotted straight line provides with
the pooled OLS estimate of the variable. This is included to highlight how the quantile
regression provides with a richer picture of the impact of covariates and doesn’t restrict
this to a single figure.
Outcomes for Figure 15 to Figure 18 below refer to income per capita and Figure 26 to
Figure 29 at the appendix refer to income. The confidence intervals of both the OLS and
the cross sectional regressions are not included for the sake of clarity.
Evolution of variables for income per capita
The effects of borrowing from SHG on income per capita can be seen very intuitively in
Figure 15 which corresponds to the year 2007 dummy. When the envelope doesn’t cross
the zero line we can say that the estimate is significant. In the case of SHG borrowing
the impact is mostly noticed at the middle of the dependent variables distribution. The
estimates evolve from positive and significant at the bottom of the distribution to
negative and significant at the top.
With regard to the household level variables (Figure 16), the negative impact of shocks
and household size show the expected negative sign. The great disparity between the
dashed line and the continuous line in the case of the worktime variable illustrates the
great difference in estimates between the simpler pooled regression and the CRE model.
In the case of the credit source variables (Figure 17), the evolution of estimates for
banks starts with negative estimates at the bottom of the distribution and become
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positive at the upper half. This is consistent with the outcomes observed in the first
cross sectional analysis. The estimates are not well determined, though. Thus, no
statistically significant impact is obtained. In the case of moneylenders, estimates are
negative along the whole distribution but they are only significant at the top.
Figure 15 Year 2007 dummy. Income per capita.
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Figure 16 Household variables. Income per capita
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Figure 17 Loan size variables. Income per capita
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CRE model estimates for income per capita and t values are found in Table 52.
Regarding the SHG loan size, significant estimates range from the 40th percentile to the
85th with a slight rising trend as long as quantiles increase. This can be seen the positive
slope in the graph (Figure 18). For each 100 rupees borrowed from SHG, the impact at
the 50th percentile is an increase in annual income per capita of 6.9 rupees, ceteris
paribus. This figure rises to 10.1 at the 90th percentile. This difference is quite
noticeable as it represents roughly that the impact at the 90th percentile is around a 45%
higher than at 50th percentile. Differences are to be tested for statistical significance
below. With respect to income, graphs and table are included in the appendix and the
pattern is similar: the impact is significant at the middle of the distribution. At the
bottom or the top of the distribution this impact is not noticed.
Further tests are needed in order to assess whether the differences in estimates are
statistically significant or not.
Figure 18 SHG loan sum. Income per capita
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Table 52 CRE Income per capita
Nr. of observations: 2,907. In yellow, blue and orange estimates that are significant at least at 10% level for loan size from SHG, bank and moneylenders
respectively.
Quintiles q5mn q10mn q15mn q20mn q25mn q30mn q35mn q40mn q45mn q50mn q55mn q60mn q65mn q70mn q75mn q80mn q85mn q90mn q95mn
21.60- 777.40 760.41 666.10 582.21 563.69 486.50 348.02 177.38 21.60- 189.06- 345.71- 455.81- 628.50- 758.13- 904.45- 1,132.51- 1,786.04- 2,756.53-
0.10- 3.11 3.47 3.43 2.85 2.78 2.22 1.66 0.85 0.10- 0.82- 1.40- 1.74- 2.20- 2.43- 2.17- 2.35- 2.77- 2.28-
211.86- 92.50 19.62 27.51- 63.30- 98.37- 127.01- 155.81- 176.48- 211.86- 275.12- 334.48- 400.49- 465.31- 509.37- 549.07- 570.96- 582.03- 780.26-
1.41- 0.45 0.11 0.16- 0.40- 0.66- 0.90- 1.16- 1.29- 1.41- 1.68- 1.72- 1.86- 2.01- 2.16- 2.42- 2.22- 1.72- 1.36-
791.13- 959.61- 919.82- 961.54- 956.96- 893.12- 791.19- 777.69- 809.73- 791.13- 807.55- 864.64- 920.64- 954.16- 1,035.45- 1,034.97- 933.55- 987.46- 985.65-
2.80- 2.63- 3.18- 3.75- 3.79- 3.55- 3.04- 2.95- 3.07- 2.80- 2.45- 2.42- 2.48- 2.28- 2.18- 1.74- 1.37- 1.04- 0.64-
162.47 351.29- 433.43- 299.88- 149.30- 134.35- 71.85- 59.78 147.02 162.47 115.89 97.88 179.78 329.64 337.30 129.90 112.44- 294.42- 774.00
0.52 0.94- 1.39- 0.92- 0.45- 0.41- 0.23- 0.20 0.47 0.52 0.35 0.27 0.47 0.74 0.68 0.22 0.14- 0.28- 0.49
563.25 42.90- 178.54 304.30 326.92 319.97 366.76 445.92 497.48 563.25 654.41 719.57 764.46 871.99 1,030.44 1,220.76 1,531.46 1,778.25 2,935.70
2.44 0.15- 0.69 1.41 1.66 1.64 1.80 2.15 2.32 2.44 2.55 2.87 3.14 3.06 3.03 3.16 3.32 3.01 2.37
-0.5479 -0.5248 -0.4936 -0.4689 -0.4504 -0.4642 -0.5122 -0.533 -0.5487 -0.5479 -0.5274 -0.4242 -0.357 -0.3838 -0.4738 -0.4021 -0.2252 -0.1369 -0.3499
1.73- 1.50- 1.67- 1.66- 1.59- 1.65- 1.87- 1.90- 1.77- 1.73- 1.48- 1.12- 0.92- 0.95- 1.06- 0.75- 0.36- 0.14- 0.25-
-0.0278 -0.0369 -0.0247 -0.0216 -0.0224 -0.0239 -0.0275 -0.0305 -0.0315 -0.0278 -0.0208 -0.0144 -0.0125 -0.00914 -0.00414 0.0115 0.0506 0.0778 0.0565
1.17- 1.03- 1.02- 1.13- 1.26- 1.23- 1.31- 1.41- 1.38- 1.17- 0.83- 0.55- 0.45- 0.29- 0.12- 0.25 0.90 1.15 0.65
0.1486 0.4637 0.313 0.2564 0.2323 0.1922 0.1722 0.1615 0.1547 0.1486 0.1358 0.126 0.1022 0.0766 0.0494 0.0217 0.00143 -0.0172 -0.0446
0.49 1.14 0.82 0.73 0.69 0.61 0.56 0.53 0.53 0.49 0.45 0.41 0.32 0.24 0.15 0.06 0.00 0.05- 0.11-
-0.0133 -0.0164 -0.0193 -0.0159 -0.0121 -0.012 -0.0136 -0.0145 -0.0139 -0.0133 -0.0141 -0.0163 -0.0195 -0.022 -0.0244 -0.0327 -0.0454 -0.0629 -0.0976
1.04- 0.88- 1.19- 1.18- 0.97- 1.03- 1.18- 1.27- 1.13- 1.04- 1.14- 1.33- 1.64- 1.77- 1.69- 1.74- 2.00- 2.02- 1.61-
0.00309 -0.013 -0.00281 0.00348 0.00662 0.00961 0.0113 0.0101 0.00658 0.00309 0.00168 0.00241 0.00205 -0.00313 -0.00901 -0.0131 -0.0179 -0.0309 -0.0766
0.21 0.63- 0.16- 0.27 0.54 0.77 0.91 0.77 0.46 0.21 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.15- 0.39- 0.46- 0.55- 0.74- 0.92-
-0.0574 -0.1124 -0.0947 -0.0793 -0.0694 -0.0653 -0.0628 -0.0587 -0.0572 -0.0574 -0.058 -0.0515 -0.0436 -0.0498 -0.06 -0.0712 -0.0697 0.0029 0.1474
1.14- 1.84- 1.72- 1.42- 1.27- 1.15- 1.05- 0.99- 1.05- 1.14- 1.21- 1.10- 0.78- 0.70- 0.68- 0.66- 0.52- 0.01 0.45
0.0687 0.0384 0.0347 0.0376 0.0418 0.0496 0.0542 0.0608 0.0662 0.0687 0.0698 0.0724 0.0736 0.0734 0.0728 0.0746 0.0926 0.1005 0.0439
2.27 0.79 0.94 1.15 1.29 1.55 1.63 1.87 2.14 2.27 2.30 2.46 2.43 2.29 2.04 1.74 1.81 1.51 0.31
3,759.72 187.33- 306.90 786.30 1,232.59 1,665.37 2,227.35 2,847.04 3,335.98 3,759.72 4,181.31 4,684.51 5,314.95 6,042.59 6,661.00 7,679.67 9,292.90 11,199.53 15,640.80
6.72 0.32- 0.57 1.72 2.55 3.30 4.26 6.08 6.76 6.72 7.22 7.74 7.36 7.75 8.62 8.67 9.07 8.66 6.26
sum family friend
sum others
sum SHGs
constant
Correlated Random Effects Model Income PC
Asset index
worktime p_c_working
sum from bank
sum from NGO
sum moneylender
year 2007
HH size
shock
Max education
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The final tables in the appendix contain the coefficients for ,ߣଵ,ߣଶ for income per capita
(Table 93 and Table 94 for 2005 and 2007 respectively) and income (Table 95 and
Table 96). These measure how the unobserved heterogeneity shifts the estimates
through their linear relation with the observables. In graphical terms, this can be
explained as whether the gap between the dashed line (pooled cross sectional only
estimates) and the solid line (CRE estimates) in the graphs is statistically significant. In
both income and income per capita, the variables for which ߣଵ and ߣଶ show significance
are shock, asset index and mostly work per working capita.
Given these results, two tests follow. The first test of the correlated random effects
allows us to have some criterion in order to prefer CRE rather than the more common
random effects model. If CRE is accepted, then the next step will be to test for statistical
differences between the estimates of the SHG loan size in the models for income per
capita an income.
Test of the correlated random effects and difference in estimates for SHG size
As stated in Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) the first test has to be formulated with a null
hypothesis that all the coefficients for the correlated random effects are jointly and
significantly equal to 0 or ߣ௤ଵ = ߣ௤ଶ = 0 for each of the quantiles q. Following this
source, the test is run for the standard range of quantiles, 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 and 0.90.
(See Table 53 below for both income and income per capita, tests of correlated random
effects and test of equality across quantiles)
The test for CRE is implemented as a Wald test done over the variance-covariance
matrix of quantile estimates obtained after the bootstrap method. The null is amply
rejected when income and income per capita are the dependent variables, as can be seen
in tables. Even in the case of the maximum p value the null can be rejected at 1.3%
significance level. This outcome underpins the assumption that the unobservables are
correlated with the observed variables x and, therefore, the correlated random effect
approach is preferred over the traditional random effect model in which the
unobservables are random and uncorrelated with the observables.
The second step would be to test the difference in the estimates of SHG loans between
two different quantiles. The aim in this case is to establish whether the estimates of two
different quantiles are statistically different or not. The outcomes are seen in table 24
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and show a coherent pattern: the estimates of the variables are less likely to be
statistically different as long as quantiles come closer. Tests are implemented again as
Wald tests following the test suggested in Hao and Naimann, (2007) . They are done for
all the pairs of percentiles 10, 25, 50, 75 and 90. In both income and income per capita
the estimates are significantly different when the quantiles are more distant. Differences
that were found significant were between quantiles 10-90, 10-75, 25-90, 25-75, 10-50
and 50-90, although the two latter pairwise combinations only at 10% significance
level. The closer pairs 10-25, 25-50 and 75-90 do not show statistically significant
differences.
Table 53 CRE test and equality test
Income Income per capita
Correlated Random Effects test Correlated Random Effects test
Null: CRE coefficients jointly equal to 0 Null: CRE coefficients jointly equal to 0
Quantiles Wald value p-value Quantiles Wald value p-value
Q_10 245.184 0.000 Q_10 101.373 0.000
Q_25 107.581 0.000 Q_25 200.397 0.000
Q_50 519.849 0.000 Q_50 106.241 0.000
Q_75 9,886.48 0.000 Q_75 71.88 0.000
Q_90 55,918.27 0.000 Q_90 44.61 0.013
Quantile equality tests Quantile equality tests
Null: Quantiles are equal Null: Quantiles are equal
Quantiles Wald Pvalue Quantiles Wald Pvalue
test_1090 55.336 0.000 test_1090 32.005 0.004
test_1075 49.791 0.000 test_1075 34.536 0.002
test_1050 21.758 0.084 test_1050 21.282 0.095
test_1025 5.242 0.982 test_1025 8.498 0.862
test_2590 38.145 0.000 test_2590 34.302 0.002
test_2575 34.849 0.002 test_2575 25.987 0.026
test_2550 16.558 0.281 test_2550 11.023 0.684
test_5090 22.331 0.072 test_5090 26.101 0.025
test_5075 14.031 0.447 test_5075 13.625 0.478
test_7590 9.331 0.809 test_7590 17.798 0.216
Outcomes withdrawing the negative income per capita observations
The presence of negative income per capita values might cast some doubts over the
robustness of these outcomes to the withdrawal of these observations. As in previous
chapters, the approach is to drop those households with negative income per capita and
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rerun all the models. These were the cross section quantile regression in years 2005 and
2007, quantile regression over the differenced variables (including or not additional
variable levels in 2005) and, finally, the CRE approach. The latter is shown in Table 54.
The main conclusion is that the estimates are slightly higher and significant than the
model with all households. Also, estimates at lower quantiles that did not show
significance in Table 52 are now significant and the range of significant estimates
comes from the 15th percentile to the 80th. For the rest of the models the outcomes are
similar to those found with the whole set of households. The only difference is that in
the regression over the differenced covariates including the 2005 level, no estimates are
significant.
Table 54 CRE Income per capita. Negative income per capita values withdrawn
CRE Income per Capita
Source \ Percentiles 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
banks -0.005 -0.005 0.017 0.066 0.1222*
(-0.423) (-0.249) (0.892) (1.446) (1.818)
NGO 0.099 0.111 0.133 0.094 0.124
(0.332) (0.308) (0.402) (0.252) (0.324)
Moneylender 0.001 -0.010 -0.012 -0.025 -0.042
(0.118) (-0.927) (-0.967) (-1.445) (-1.166)
Family & Friends 0.0203* 0.0243** 0.011 -0.006 -0.023
(1.720) (2.490) (0.740) (-0.232) (-0.503)
Other -0.004 -0.004 -0.013 0.034 0.183
(-0.213) (-0.158) (-0.414) (0.472) (0.682)
SHG 0.040 0.0599* 0.0757** 0.0805* 0.098
(1.330) (1.821) (2.549) (1.727) (1.149)
t statistics in parenthesis; * p<0.10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; Nr. of observations: 1,138
This outcome reinforces the positive impact for households in the middle of the income
per capita distribution, and this would be the main conclusion. It also suggests that
poorer households might be benefitting from microfinance. However, the negative per
capita income observations cannot be overlooked and therefore further research is
needed with other surveys in order to confirm this effect at the bottom of the
distribution.
Estimates for the rest of the models when the negative income or income per capita
values have been dropped can be found in the appendix, from Table 97 to Table 101.
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Conclusion
The question of whether microfinance has a significant effect on the poor is quite
present in microfinance impact evaluation literature. However we felt that the
methodologies used so far, such as running the models for two different groups of
borrowers (Coleman, 2006) or splitting the sample in two (Copestake et al. 2005) were
not the best approaches. Instead, we propose to use quantile regression which estimates
the impact at different points of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable.
The technique is applied in the chapter in three different ways. The latter, CRE,
estimates the impact taking advantage of the panel data condition of the dataset.
The overall outcome after the three approaches is that SHG borrowing shows a
significant impact that takes place mostly at the middle of the income and income per
capita distributions and this outcome is especially robust in the latter. Banks also show a
quite consistent pattern of negative signs at the bottom and positive at the top of the
distributions but significance is not always present. The rest of the credit sources do not
show consistency in their estimates.
The difference between quantile regression and OLS is clearly seen in the graphs where
OLS estimates show a flat line as takes the same value for the whole distribution. In fact
the effect differs from quantile to quantile and these differences were found significant
between more distant quantiles in the CRE model. This model complements the
weaknesses of the previous two quantile approaches and comes to confirm the
heterogeneity in the impact of microfinance.
Although the sample is taken from a poorer than average area, neither the poorest nor
the richest in the sample are affected by the impact of microfinance. However the
poorest should be the target of these programs and therefore this poses a question from a
policy point of view, mainly if the poorest really need credit. This is quite relevant as
other interventions more focused on the poorest could be financed with the funds that
today support microfinance schemes.
206CONCLUSION
The present work studies two datasets from Bangladesh and India and follows different
quasi-experimental techniques to establish the impact of microfinance on several
variables at household level. In the first two empirical chapters we follow mainstream
microfinance impact evaluation literature. The third uses again the India dataset and
uses an innovative approach to find whether the poor are benefitting from microfinance.
Overall each of these chapters corresponds to the three different groups of studies into
which quasi-experimental studies are split.
The first study revisits the Bangladesh survey in its second round. It contributes to
literature in different ways. It is the first that takes into account the around 1,000 new
households that were not surveyed in the first round and therefore are not part of the
panel. The propensity score technique uses a wider range of matching algorithms and
matching quality parameters than in Chemin (2008) and Duvendack and Palmer-Jones
(2011). We also test the impact for other expenditures that are not always observed in
impact evaluation studies and use different treatment-control group specifications.
In the second we contribute to literature analysing a dataset originally used for
evaluating the impact of watershed programs. We took advantage of its rich
microfinance information and we used a panel fixed effects approach for the analysis.
We also include additional impact evaluation with an IV approach and MM estimator.
In the final empirical chapter we depart from mainstream microfinance evaluation
literature and use a quantile regression to answer the question of whether microfinance
has an effect on the poorest. The question has been raised in the past but we think that
the methodologies used so far to answer it were not adequate. Our contribution is to use
quantile regression and in particular the panel correlated random effects model adapted
to quantile regression. This is methodologically a more consistent approach to solve this
question.
In the first chapter we discussed the controversy between “randomistas” and academics
that are more sceptical about the excellence of RCTs vs. quasi-experimental approaches.
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From the review of the RCTs studies and other quasi-experimental sources in the
particular field of microfinance we conclude that RCTs studies sometimes do not study
exactly the impact of borrowing but the impact of having a saving account or receiving
a grant (De Mel, McKenzie et al. 2008; De Mel, McKenzie et al. 2009; Dupas and
Robinson 2009). In other occasions the randomization in the treatment and control
group was imperfect and therefore some of the assumptions of RCTs needed to be reset
to adapt to these departures from ideal randomization (Karlan and Zinman 2007;
Banerjee, Duflo et al. 2009; Karlan and Zinman 2009).
So far the main sources have been quasi-experimental studies done on datasets obtained
with surveys whose quality on many occasions was clearly improvable. In particular the
Bangladesh survey that served as base for Pitt and Khandker (1998) and Khandker
(2005) lacks good documentation and difficulties to reconstruct the data has been
appointed in Chemin (2008) and Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011). And these flaws
in the collection of data also cast some doubt on some of the outcomes reported so far.
We conclude that RCTs and quasi-experimental studies can complement each other in
the future and from this debate about the pros and cons and empirical applications of
both will enrich the impact literature and will contribute to the improvement in the
assessments of the effects of microfinance programs. This will need to be accompanied
by a leap in the quality of the surveys as, as contended in Copestake et al. (2011),
sophisticated econometric techniques cannot always compensate the lack of adequate
datasets.
In the first empirical chapter we revisit a common place in microfinance impact
evaluation, the Bangladesh survey, in this case in its second round. The main study
including this part is Khandker (2005) which finds a quite remarkable impact at
individual level mainly on expenditures. Our aim was to tackle the evaluation impact
using a technique that suits the characteristics of the dataset. We study the impact of
borrowing from microfinance but also from all sources of credit, and we do not find any
significance in the impact on current expenditures or food expenditures per capita at
household level. But microfinance is seen to have a great and robust impact on
extraordinary expenses and in particular in the expenses per capita on home repairs or
extensions and investments of homes or land. These outcomes show quite stable in the
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presence of confounders that mimic the effect of unobservables. Income per capita
outcomes were probably less reliable due to the difficulties in the construction of the
variable. Estimates show overall negative impact but significance depended on the
configuration of treatment and control groups.
The aim of the second paper was to replicate the approach in Tedeschi (2008) to our
dataset from Andhra Pradesh. She borrowed from Coleman’s model and applied it to a
panel from Peru, concluding that the previous AIMS study on this same data was
overstating the impact as it was not controlling properly for selection bias. The methods
used was a panel fixed effects. The outcome shows a positive and significant impact
effect of microfinance on income per capita. The presence of outliers and the possibility
of endogeneity led us to complement the study with two further techniques. First, a MM
method was used that is less sensitive to extreme values. The impact remains positive
although to a lesser extent. Second, an IV approach tests for endogeneity but we fail to
reject the null of exogeneity and therefore endogeneity is discarded.
But in these two approaches the impact is necessarily given by an estimate for the whole
sample, a single figure that assumes that all the households in the sample are affected
(or not affected) to the same extent by the microfinance intervention. We discuss that
many sources have pointed out the fact that the ones taking advantage from
microfinance were not the poorer households. On the contrary, better off households
were benefitting from this instrument that is supposed to contribute to poverty
alleviation and should target the poorest.
Thus, it was of great interest to complement the former analysis with a distributional
study of impact effects of microfinance. This was done through a quantile regression
that has been scarcely used in microfinance evaluation. The technique was run in three
different ways, the latter of which followed the adaptation of the CRE model to quantile
regression (Abrevaya and Dahl 2008). This allows us to take advantage of the panel
characteristics of the dataset. The outcomes confirm that microfinance is not having an
effect at the bottom of the income and income per capita distributions, where this
impact is most needed.
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We have to agree with Copestake et al. (2011) with respect to the difficulties when
trying to get information out of the datasets. In the first case the Bangladesh data needed
much work in the reconstruction of some variables that were poorly documented and
had to be identified in the raw datasets. In the case of India, the dataset was by far better
documented but had some flaws in the design as, for instance, at village level there are
some questions in the second survey that were not formulated in the same way as they
were in the first. Thus, this information cannot be used for the analysis.
In the debate RCTs vs. quasi-experimental techniques, it would be of extraordinary help
to have a proper randomized study and use it as the benchmark to measure if quasi-
experimental methods match its outcomes. This is what happened in the case of
LaLonde (1986) in the field of labour economics. Also, to challenge works from the
past using different approaches can be a great means of improving the evaluations.
With respect to microfinance in particular, the overall conclusion is that we find a
positive and significant microfinance impact although not for all households According
to our results, the impact is not noticed by the poorest which would be the main target
for these microfinance projects. The story in the Bangladesh chapter comes to confirm
this outcome. The impact is not significant in current expenditures or food expenditures.
The poor are less likely to do the kind of “expenditures” where microfinance was found
to have an effect, such as home extensions or investments in home/land.
This also poses a question about the fungibility of loans and how they are diverted to
different ends than those applied for. In addition, these investments in houses/lands are
supposed to have an effect on expenditures and income variables in the future, although
this is out of the reach of these surveys. There has not been done yet a panel dataset
covering a greater number of years in order to study what is the evolution of borrowing
households in the mid term.
It is also important to investigate the household mechanisms that make it possible that
microfinance has a positive impact effect (Orso 2011). A great help for this would be to
have insider information such as that is contained in Collins et al. (2009). In it they
studied many financial diaries that were given to poor households in India, Bangladesh
and South Africa. The members were trained in how to use the diary and it was checked
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regularly. The book is an invaluable source of information and shows how people that
live with $2-a-day are economically active. As long as their income is quite volatile they
need to turn to several means to smooth consumption. Although they use informal
sources frequently, from the diaries it can be inferred that they greatly value
microfinance services. They consider MFIs as reliable institutions where, for instance,
they can deposit their money and be sure that it will be there ready for withdrawal.
These kind of sources cannot support a statistically robust empirical study but can help
researchers to understand, for example, whether the role of females at home change
when they have access to loans and if this has an effect on children’s education. Or they
can suggest the collection of some particular information in the surveys that would have
gone unnoticed without this inside view. Finally, understanding how the poor manage
their meagre cash flows can help to test for impact on those variables that are important
for the poor. In some studies a great number of variables are studied in an attempt to
assess any possible impact effect of microfinance. This qualitative information will help
to narrow down these variables.
Evidence of microfinance impact is so far mixed. Examples of failures to help the poor
are in Andhra Pradesh state itself where there was a microfinance crisis and thousands
of households went overindebted and could not cope with their payments. This raises
the question of whether it makes sense to subsidize something that might make the poor
worse off. Although with respect to this crisis not all the microfinance experts would
agree.
We think that microfinance has a great potential to help the poor but whether it can help
the poorest of the poor is yet to be seen. Evidence is not yet consistent enough to
strongly argue in favour or against this point. In fact, sometimes the microfinance
debate seems to be marked more by pre-established ideological position rather than by
evidence. Assessing correctly the impact of microfinance is not a question of picking
the sources or examples that best match prejudices in favour or against microfinance but
a scientific task in which serious qualitative and quantitative research methods have to
be combined to provide an accurate answer. It would not be sensible to waste efforts in
empty debates when there are so many people needing a correct answer.
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Appendix 1: Chapter 2
List of variables in the logit calculating the scores:
The variables are:
 Household characteristics/composition variables:
o Household head age and age squared
o Children 1-5: number of Children between 1-5 years old
o Children 6-15: number of Children between 6-15 years old
o H.head married: Binary stating whether the household head is married or
not
o H.head Islamic: Binary stating if the household head follows Islamic
religion
o No toilet: Binary that takes the value of 1 if the household has no toilet
and 0 otherwise
o Dist Pucca rd: Distance from the household to a Pucca road
o Dist busns centr: Distance from household to the closest business centre.
 Village variables
o Village average wage male for no agricultural job
o Village average price of rice
o Village average price of flour
o Average 3-months interest rate for private loans in the village
o Average 3-6 months interest rate for private loans in the village
o Hat/Bazar village: Binary stating whether the village has a hat or bazaar
in it.
o FoodXEducation: Binary stating if there is a food for education program
implemented in the village.
 Household education variables
o HH highest education: what is the maximum number of education years
completed by any member of the household
o HH head primary: Binary stating if the household head has some primary
education
o HH head secondary: Binary stating if the household head has some
secondary education
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o HH head secondary+: Binary stating if the household head has some
higher-secondary or tertiary education (Omitted variable: No education)
 Household labor variables
o Main s-emp agric: Binary stating if the household head’s main activity is
agriculture and he/she is self-employed
o Main s-emp no-agric: Binary stating if the household head’s main
activity is not agriculture but he/she is self-employed
o Main wage agric: Binary stating if the household head’s main activity is
agriculture and he/she is an employee.
o Main wage no-agric: Binary stating if the household head’s main activity
is not agriculture and he/she is an employee. (Omitted variable:
unemployed).
 Household borrowing variables:
o Source bank: Total amount borrowed from a bank.
o Source mlender: Total amount borrowed from a moneylender
o Source relative: Total amount borrowed from a relative
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Figure 19 Histogram Income per capita by MFI borrowing status
Figure 20 Histogram current expenditures per capita by MFI borrowing status
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Figure 21 Common support Kernel graph
Figure 22 Common support histogram
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Outcomes from the propensity score using pscore command
Note: the common support option has been selected
The region of common support is [.06616695, .935185]
Description of the estimated propensity score
in region of common support
Estimated propensity score
-------------------------------------------------------------
Percentiles Smallest
1% .1791818 .0661669
5% .3204578 .0721116
10% .4030083 .0882637 Obs 2521
25% .5241014 .0937959 Sum of Wgt. 2521
50% .6524663 Mean .6322413
Largest Std. Dev. .1669881
75% .7619108 .926154
90% .8333885 .9311788 Variance .027885
95% .8637184 .9320907 Skewness -.6093332
99% .9006045 .935185 Kurtosis 2.962687
******************************************************
Step 1: Identification of the optimal number of blocks
Use option detail if you want more detailed output
******************************************************
The final number of blocks is 7
This number of blocks ensures that the mean propensity score
is not different for treated and controls in each blocks
**********************************************************
Step 2: Test of balancing property of the propensity score
Use option detail if you want more detailed output
**********************************************************
The balancing property is satisfied
This table shows the inferior bound, the number of treated
and the number of controls for each block
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Inferior | HH does actually
of block | participate
of pscore | 0 1 | Total
-----------+----------------------+----------
.0661669 | 50 18 | 68
.25 | 91 47 | 138
.375 | 161 143 | 304
.5 | 277 321 | 598
.625 | 237 457 | 694
.75 | 97 511 | 608
.875 | 6 87 | 93
-----------+----------------------+----------
Total | 919 1,584 | 2,503
Note: the common support option has been selected
*******************************************
End of the algorithm to estimate the pscore
*******************************************
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Table 55 Mean test before - after matching
Variable Match Mean %bias %reductbias
t-test
Treated Control t p>|t|
Ho
m
e
Hhead age Before 45.3 45.1 1.2 0.29 0.768
After 45.3 45.7 -2.8 -135 -0.85 0.393
Hhead age2 Before 2,206 2,260 -3.9 -0.97 0.334
After 2,209 2,251 -3 22 -0.93 0.350
Children 1-5 Before 0.73 0.79 -7 -1.74 0.083
After 0.72 0.70 3 57.3 0.87 0.387
Children 6-15 Before 1.44 1.19 21.2 5.21 0.000
After 1.45 1.45 0.4 98 0.12 0.907
Hhead married Before 0.89 0.87 7 1.72 0.086
After 0.89 0.89 -0.8 88.7 -0.23 0.815
Hhead islam Before 0.88 0.91 -10.2 -2.44 0.015
After 0.88 0.88 -1.8 82.1 -0.48 0.629
No toilet facility Before 0.25 0.27 -2.9 -0.71 0.477
After 0.25 0.24 2.8 2.8 0.81 0.415
Distance to pucca road Before 1.20 1.38 -12.2 -2.98 0.003
After 1.21 1.30 -6.5 46.3 -1.94 0.053
Distance to business
centre
Before 3.55 3.81 -10.4 -2.57 0.010
After 3.48 3.59 -4.2 59.5 -1.22 0.221
Vi
lla
ge
Av. wage male no-agri Before 72.49 75.50 -14.1 -3.45 0.001
After 73.07 73.68 -2.8 79.8 -0.83 0.406
Av. rice price Before 15.29 15.01 12.1 2.92 0.004
After 15.35 15.51 -6.8 43.9 -1.85 0.065
Av. flour price Before 12.74 12.80 -6.3 -1.58 0.115
After 12.75 12.75 -0.5 92 -0.15 0.881
Int. rate mlender 3 months Before 26.23 27.34 -2.6 -0.64 0.525
After 23.44 22.55 2.1 19.4 0.71 0.478
Int. rate mlender 3-6
months
Before 23.35 24.12 -2.2 -0.53 0.597
After 21.31 20.64 1.9 13.4 0.60 0.551
Hat/Bazar in village Before 0.43 0.33 20.8 5.04 0.000
After 0.43 0.41 5 76 1.37 0.171
FoodxEduc in village Before 0.16 0.14 3.9 0.95 0.343
After 0.16 0.15 1.9 51.7 0.53 0.597
ed
uc
at
io
n
Hhead highest educ Before 1.25 1.49 -24.8 -6.25 0.000
After 1.26 1.30 -4.1 83.5 -1.23 0.218
Hhead primary educ Before 0.25 0.26 -2.1 -0.51 0.613
After 0.26 0.23 4.9 -137.7 1.42 0.156
Hhead lower secondary
educ
Before 0.12 0.18 -18.4 -4.58 0.000
After 0.12 0.12 -1.3 92.7 -0.41 0.681
HH head above secondary
educ
Before 0.01 0.05 -19.6 -5.14 0.000
After 0.02 0.02 -0.8 95.9 -0.32 0.750
Jo
b
HH
he
ad
HHead self employed agric Before 0.19 0.25 -16.7 -4.11 0.000
After 0.19 0.18 1.9 88.5 0.58 0.564
HH head slf-employed no-
agric
Before 0.40 0.27 28.9 6.93 0.000
After 0.41 0.42 -2.4 91.7 -0.64 0.522
HH head wge-employed
agric
Before 0.14 0.16 -5.4 -1.33 0.183
After 0.14 0.12 3.4 37.1 1.02 0.306
HH head wge-employed
non-agric
Before 0.13 0.08 14.4 3.41 0.001
After 0.13 0.13 -2.1 85.4 -0.53 0.593
cr
ed
it
Bank/coop loan size Before 694 2,217 -10.7 -2.89 0.004
After 690 760 -0.5 95.4 -0.29 0.775
Informal loan size Before 716 1,552 -6.7 -1.85 0.065
After 726 710 0.1 98 0.09 0.927
Relative loan size Before 1,670 3,952 -17 -4.60 0.000
After 1,705 1,777 -0.5 96.8 -0.26 0.799
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Table 56 Alternative logit models for different treated / control groups
Models
Borrowers vs. non
borrowers
MFI borr vs. MFI
noborrVariables
Age of the hh head 0.117*** 0.150***
(5.40) (6.05)
Age of the hh head squared -0.001*** -0.001***
(-5.05) (-5.71)
Nr. of children under 6 years 0.035 -0.035
(0.58) (-0.53)
Nr. of children between 6-15 (inclusive)years old 0.216*** 0.171***
(4.59) (3.33)
HH head Currently married 0.121 0.159
(0.78) (0.92)
Religion of the hhead is islam -0.498*** -0.570***
(-2.87) (-3.13)
No toilet facility -0.473*** -0.392***
(-3.97) (-3.06)
Distance to Pucca Road -0.052 -0.066*
(-1.40) (-1.65)
Distance to business centre 0.022 0.005
(0.96) (0.20)
Village avg. wage male for no agric job -0.002 -0.006**
(-0.98) (-2.40)
Village avg. Price rice 0.056** 0.073***
(2.47) (3.03)
Village avg. price flour -0.236*** -0.186***
(-4.91) (-3.60)
HH head highest educ -0.070 -0.189**
(-1.00) (-2.48)
HH head primary educ -0.013 -0.115
(-0.10) (-0.84)
HH head lower secondary educ -0.390** -0.497***
(-2.28) (-2.61)
HH head above secondary educ -1.012*** -1.355***
(-3.23) (-3.47)
HH head self employed agric 0.461*** 0.284
(2.99) (1.63)
HH slf-employed no-agric 0.854*** 0.892***
(5.61) (5.31)
HH wge-employed agricultural 0.232 0.258
(1.29) (1.30)
HH wge-employed non agric 0.878*** 0.921***
(4.37) (4.27)
Constant 0.478 -0.927
(0.55) (-0.96)
Observations 2504 1878
Adjusted R-squared 0.0759 0.0933
LR chi2(20) 213.25 221.3
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Table 57 Logit regression for the three different specifications of treated-control. Negative income per capita
values dropped
dy/dx
spec 1 spec 2 spec 3
Age of the hh head 0.024*** 0.019*** 0.027***
(5.56) (5.07) (5.60)
Age of the hh head squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(-5.22) (-4.69) (-5.21)
Nr. of children under 6 years -0.020* 0.007 -0.005
(-1.85) (0.68) (-0.39)
Nr. of children between 6-15 (inclusive)years old 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.037***
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(4.08) (4.79) (3.71)
HH head Currently married 0.012 0.024 0.027
(0.40) (0.90) (0.79)
Religion of the hhead is islam -0.088*** -0.086*** -0.116***
(-2.79) (-2.96) (-3.27)
Avge wage male labor in NON agriculture -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001**
(-3.07) (-0.56) (-2.05)
Average price of rice 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.014***
(3.48) (2.74) (2.93)
Average price of flour -0.030*** -0.041*** -0.037***
(-3.24) (-5.09) (-3.66)
Int. rate priv. loan moneylender (up 3 months) -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.51) (-1.30) (-0.73)
Int. rate priv. loan moneylender (3-6 months) -0.000 0.001 0.000
(-0.06) (1.21) (0.18)
Is there any Hat/Bazar in this 0.068*** 0.021 0.052**
(3.56) (1.17) (2.39)
Is there any Food for education -0.000 -0.021 0.015
(-0.02) (-0.91) (0.52)
HH highest level of education -0.050*** -0.014 -0.041***
(-3.86) (-1.17) (-2.75)
HH head with primary education or equiv -0.034 0.003 -0.015
(-1.45) (0.14) (-0.56)
HH head with lower secondary education or equiv -0.084*** -0.062** -0.090**
(-2.63) (-2.15) (-2.44)
HHead education above secondary -0.186*** -0.158*** -0.246***
(-2.89) (-3.02) (-3.26)
Main job self employment in agriculture 0.026 0.080*** 0.066*
(0.88) (3.08) (1.95)
Main self-emp job of head is non agriculture 0.181*** 0.144*** 0.179***
(6.36) (5.69) (5.59)
Main job waged agricultural job 0.038 0.040 0.057
(1.08) (1.30) (1.47)
Main wage-emp job of head is non agriculture 0.172*** 0.150*** 0.189***
(4.66) (4.48) (4.58)
No toilet facility -0.080*** -0.082*** -0.077***
(-3.51) (-4.05) (-3.06)
Distance to the nearest pucca road -0.008 -0.008 -0.009
(-1.12) (-1.20) (-1.20)
Distance to the nearest business centre -0.010** 0.004 -0.000
(-2.28) (0.95) (-0.05)
Source of loan: bank or cooperative -0.000*
(-1.87)
Source of loan: informal i.e. moneylender 0.000
(0.01)
Source of loan: any relative -0.000***
(-3.48)
Observations 2472 2472 1851
Pseudo R-squared 310.63 214.98 228.57
chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
p 0.095 0.0779 0.098
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Table 58 Matching quality in model Borrowers vs. non borrowers
Matching quality model Borrowers vs. non Borrowers
Pseudo-R
squared before
Pseudo-R
squared after
P-value
after
Median
absolute
bias
before
Median
absolute
bias after
NN 0.0759 0.0113 0.000 8.20 2.63
Radius .01 0.0759 0.0114 0.000 8.20 2.67
Radius .001 0.0759 0.0091 0.001 8.20 3.61
Radius .0001 0.0759 0.0079 0.565 8.20 3.31
Kernel .02 0.0759 0.0032 0.653 8.20 2.26
Kernel .04 0.0759 0.0032 0.648 8.20 2.13
Kernel .06 0.0759 0.0036 0.506 8.20 2.42
Mahalanobis 0.0759 0.0131 0.000 8.20 2.89
Table 59 Matching quality MFI borrowers vs. non borrowers at all
Matching quality model MFI borr vs. MFI noborrws
Pseudo-R
squared
before
Pseudo-R
squared
after
P-value
after
Median
absolute
bias before
Median
absolute bias
after
NN 0.093 0.010 0.027 10.13 3.31
Radius .01 0.093 0.009 0.034 10.13 3.25
Radius .001 0.093 0.007 0.281 10.13 2.68
Radius .0001 0.093 0.023 0.055 10.13 3.56
Kernel .02 0.093 0.004 0.891 10.13 3.30
Kernel .04 0.093 0.003 0.937 10.13 3.29
Kernel .06 0.093 0.003 0.960 10.13 2.73
Mahalanobis 0.093 0.014 0.000 10.13 3.09
Table 60 Rest of the algorithms MFI borrowers vs. MFI non-borrowers
PSM MFI borrowers vs. MFI non borrowers. Rest of algorithms
Algorithm ATT t-statistic Lower
bound C.I.
Upper
bound C.I.
In
co
m
e
p/
c
NN -1,297 -1.87 -2,834 -105
Radius .01 -1,296 -1.86 -2,832 -89
Radius .001 -1,151 -1.53 -2,658 256
Radius .0001 -1,267 -0.92 -4,094 1,043
Kernel .04 -980 -1.76 -2,133 45
Mahalanobis -72 -0.15 -862 749
Cu
rr
en
t
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
sp
/c NN -42 -0.17 -551 381
Radius .01 -41 -0.17 -573 379
Radius .001 4 0.01 -522 490
Radius .0001 84 0.18 -1,009 843
Kernel .04 -80 -0.41 -469 269
Mahalanobis 211 1.24 -29 524
232
Fo
od
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s
p/
c
NN 168 1.50 -37 386
Radius .01 169 1.56 -24 382
Radius .001 196 1.71 -20 434
Radius .0001 219 1.07 -146 643
Kernel .04 69 0.67 -148 263
Mahalanobis 172 1.69 9 409
Ex
tr
ao
rd
in
ar
y
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
sp
/c NN 563 3.69 264 853
Radius .01 563 3.77 309 869
Radius .001 548 3.24 275 1,011
Radius .0001 781 1.61 38 2,116
Kernel .04 523 3.65 260 823
Mahalanobis 593 4.61 352 862
Ho
m
e
re
al
at
ed
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
sp
/c NN 734 3.38 333 1,166
Radius .01 755 3.69 399 1,174
Radius .001 560 2.33 129 1,074
Radius .0001 800 0.98 -470 2,805
Kernel .04 636 3.39 266 1,017
Mahalanobis 549 2.27 92 1,114
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Table 61 PSM Borrowers from any source vs. Non borrowers at all
PSM Borrowers any source vs. Non borrowers at all. Rest of algorithms
Algorithm ATT t-statistic Lower
bound C.I.
Upper
bound C.I.
In
co
m
e
p/
c
NN -1,297 -1.96 -2,628 -139
Radius .01 -1,296 -1.98 -2,704 -120
Radius .001 -1,151 -1.58 -2,795 45
Radius .0001 -1,267 -0.93 -4,604 879
Kernel .04 -980 -1.91 -2,033 -3
Mahalanobis -72 -0.17 -653 780
Cu
rr
en
t
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
sp
/c NN -42 -0.18 -556 367
Radius .01 -41 -0.17 -644 362
Radius .001 4 0.01 -485 492
Radius .0001 84 0.17 -999 863
Kernel .04 -80 -0.40 -544 264
Mahalanobis 211 1.21 -35 663
Fo
od
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s
p/
c
NN 168 1.46 -37 441
Radius .01 169 1.49 -63 395
Radius .001 196 1.73 -47 402
Radius .0001 219 1.14 -96 656
Kernel .04 69 0.66 -129 308
Mahalanobis 172 1.71 18 485
Ex
tr
ao
rd
in
ar
y
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
sp
/c NN 563 3.71 268 866
Radius .01 563 3.83 277 850
Radius .001 548 3.27 259 907
Radius .0001 781 1.71 19 1,874
Kernel .04 523 3.64 247 800
Mahalanobis 593 4.56 343 830
Ho
m
e
re
al
at
ed
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
sp
/c
NN 734 3.60 373 1,130
Radius .01 755 3.94 458 1,179
Radius .001 560 2.25 120 1,149
Radius .0001 800 1.00 -400 2,814
Kernel .02 646 3.47 297 1,010
Kernel .04 636 3.43 216 970
Kernel .06 612 3.25 222 930
Mahalanobis 549 2.32 157 1,078
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Table 62 PSM MFI Borrowers vs. Non borrowers at all
PSM MFI Borrowers vs. Non borrowers at all. Rest of algorithms
Algorithm ATT t-statistic Lowerbound C.I.
Upper
bound C.I.
In
co
m
e
p/
c
NN -968 -1.30 -2,778 230
Radius .01 -957 -1.30 -2,667 219
Radius .001 -875 -1.16 -2,780 371
Radius .0001 -2,838 -1.67 -7,158 -302
Kernel .04 -780 -1.54 -1,823 212
Mahalanobis 133 0.28 -644 1,120
Cu
rr
en
t
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
sp
/c NN -114 -0.48 -535 327
Radius .01 -107 -0.47 -501 368
Radius .001 -140 -0.54 -674 290
Radius .0001 -395 -1.05 -1,100 372
Kernel .04 -212 -1.18 -565 120
Mahalanobis 7 0.05 -241 333
Fo
od
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s
p/
c
NN 138 1.10 -68 452
Radius .01 142 1.24 -60 361
Radius .001 104 0.80 -120 389
Radius .0001 -137 -0.57 -629 317
Kernel .04 12 0.11 -181 247
Mahalanobis 67 0.61 -133 289
Ex
tr
ao
rd
in
ar
y
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
sp
/c NN 179 1.09 -152 395
Radius .01 197 1.15 -187 491
Radius .001 194 1.06 -230 512
Radius .0001 -204 -0.47 -1,108 593
Kernel .04 346 2.71 90 616
Mahalanobis 375 2.80 93 620
Ho
m
e
re
al
at
ed
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
sp
/c NN 317 1.34 -304 678
Radius .01 326 1.38 -202 691
Radius .001 207 0.50 -625 999
Radius .0001 198 0.20 -1,784 2,134
Kernel .04 490 2.45 110 872
Mahalanobis 430 1.81 -22 924
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Table 63 Sensitivity analysis Borrowers vs. Non Borrowers at all
Borrowers (any source) vs. Non borrowers at all
estimates & sensitivity Confounder effect
ATT(target) ATT(conf) % U Outcome Selection
In
co
m
e
p/
c
Hhead Old -983 -846 14.0% 0.58 0.75
Electric -983 -568 42.2% 3.66 0.63
Agriculture job -983 -942 4.1% 0.33 0.70
Asset high -983 -1,115 -13.5% 5.74 1.52
Land high -983 -786 20.0% 0.99 0.22
Av. Rice price high -983 -810 17.6% 1.42 1.20
Development activities -983 -796 19.1% 1.20 1.81
Ex
tr
ao
rd
in
ar
y
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
sp
/c
Hhead Old 516 528 -2.2% 0.78 0.74
Electric 516 493 4.6% 1.84 0.64
Agriculture job 516 517 -0.2% 1.36 0.69
Asset high 516 529 -2.6% 1.97 1.51
Land high 516 481 6.8% 1.49 0.22
Av. Rice price high 516 494 4.2% 1.14 1.19
Development activities 516 560 -8.6% 1.90 1.83
Ho
us
in
g
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s
p/
c
Hhead Old 612 610 0.3% 1.25 0.74
Electric 612 607 0.8% 1.49 0.63
Agriculture job 612 620 -1.3% 0.81 0.68
Asset high 612 626 -2.2% 1.43 1.49
Land high 612 616 -0.6% 1.53 0.22
Av. Rice price high 612 618 -1.0% 1.13 1.21
Development activities 612 600 2.0% 1.22 1.79
Table 64 Sensitivity analysis MFI borrowers vs. Non Borrowers at all
MFI borrowers vs. Non borrowers at all
estimates & sensitivity Confounder effect
ATT(target) ATT(conf) % U Outcome Selection
Ex
tr
ao
rd
in
ar
y
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
sp
/c
Hhead Old 340 347 -2.0% 0.78 0.74
Electric 340 344 -1.1% 1.84 0.64
Agriculture job 340 325 4.3% 1.36 0.69
Asset high 340 368 -8.3% 1.97 1.51
Land high 340 340 0.1% 1.49 0.22
Av. Rice price high 340 324 4.8% 1.14 1.19
Development activities 340 315 7.3% 1.90 1.83
Ho
us
in
g
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s
p/
c
Hhead Old 482 446 7.4% 1.54 0.71
Electric 482 500 -3.8% 1.66 0.59
Agriculture job 482 498 -3.3% 0.72 0.80
Asset high 482 473 1.8% 1.32 1.68
Land high 482 438 9.2% 1.90 0.21
Av. Rice price high 482 503 -4.4% 1.77 1.24
Development activities 482 499 -3.5% 1.05 1.98
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Appendix 2. Chapter 3
Table 65 Mean test in 2005 Whole sample vs. Panel sample
ttest All = 1482 vs. Panel = 1,461
Whole sample Just panel (no migr) t_value p_value
HH head age 45.81 45.76 0.09 0.93
HH head age2 2,237 2,232 0.10 0.93
HH head sex 0.90 0.90 0.12 0.90
HH head married 0.90 0.90 0.23 0.82
HH head muslim 0.96 0.96 0.05 0.96
HH size 4.84 4.86 0.26 0.79
HH nr of males 2.52 2.53 0.23 0.82
HH nr of females 2.32 2.33 0.17 0.86
HH nr child <=6 0.23 0.23 0.05 0.96
HH head education 1.40 1.40 0.10 0.92
Female max education 1.62 1.62 0.11 0.91
Male max education 2.11 2.12 0.24 0.81
HH max education 2.23 2.24 0.15 0.88
Scheduled caste 0.22 0.22 0.04 0.97
Scheduled tribe 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.93
Backward caste 0.46 0.48 0.02 0.99
Upward caste 0.18 0.18 0.02 0.99
HH head unemployed 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.95
HH head main job agric 0.77 0.77 0.09 0.93
HH head main job non-agric 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.96
HH head no job 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.95
HH head self employed 0.55 0.55 0.16 0.88
HH head wage employed 0.35 0.35 0.13 0.90
HH head job time 1,194 1,193 0.00 1.00
HH job time 3,427 3,439 0.12 0.90
Job time per capita 1,279 1,278 0.02 0.98
Walls of composite material 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.95
Time spent to get water 21 21 0.03 0.98
Value of Jewelry 5,186 5,174 0.03 0.97
Asset Index 0.72 0.72 0.02 0.98
Land area 3.36 3.37 0.08 0.94
Land value 31,922 32,080 0.10 0.92
Livestock value 3,344 3,367 0.12 0.91
Suffered shock 0.61 0.61 0.18 0.86
Borrowed from bank y/n 0.36 0.36 0.08 0.93
Borrowed from SHG y/n 0.29 0.29 0.07 0.95
Borrowed from NGO y/n 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.99
Borrowed from moneylender y/n 0.49 0.49 0.02 0.99
Borrowed from family-friends y/n 0.15 0.15 0.08 0.94
Borrowed from others y/n 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.96
Loan size bank
Loan size SHG
16,691
6,121
16,685
6,144
0.01
0.02
1.00
0.99
Loan size NGO 18,679 18,970 0.02 0.99
Loan size moneylender 19,592 19,689 0.08 0.94
Loan size family-friends 23,361 23,399 0.01 0.99
Loan size others 15,546 15,566 0.01 0.99
Total amount borrowed all sources 26,388 26,465 0.05 0.96
Income 26,551 26,552 0.00 1.00
Income per capita 5,833 5,768 0.14 0.89
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Table 66 Mean & Median of outcome variables by year
income income per capita
mean median mean median
year
2005 26,552 17,166 5,768 3,866
2007 24,071 18,807 5,173 4,271
Figure 23 Box & Whisker Income by year
Table 67 Quantiles income distribution
p1 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p99
year 2005 -35,604 -4,308 4,445 17,166 36,851 65,018 205,958
2007 -48,700 -490 8,150 18,807 33,140 54,250 155,020
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Figure 24 Quantiles income distribution
Table
68 Mean & Median income, by district & year
mean income year Δ2005- 
2007median income 2005 2007
1_PRAKASAM 33,012 30,448 -7.77%
22,657 23,400 3.28%
2_KURNOOL 37,775 25,486 -32.53%
27,108 19,007 -29.88%
3_ANANTAPUR 10,888 18,613 70.95%
7,486 16,660 122.56%
4_MAHABUB NAGAR 37,057 22,781 -38.52%
23,998 18,800 -21.66%
6_NALGONDA 20,864 25,096 20.28%
16,976 20,000 17.82%
-50,000 0 50,000 100000 150000 200000
2007
2005
Years 2005 and 2007
Percentiles for income
p 1 of income p 10 of income
p 25 of income p 50 of income
p 75 of income p 90 of income
p 99 of income
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Figure 25 Mean & median income by district and year
Table 69 Income per watershed area
Table 70 Median outcome variables by year and credit source
Income per capita Income
2005 2007 2005 2007
Bank 3,063 3,650 15,186 18,570
NGO 1,044 4,700 4,176 18,800
SHG 4,277 4,467 20,793 21,297
Moneylender 3,251 4,133 16,010 18,910
Family&fr 3,822 4,238 17,513 19,600
Others 2,515 2,488 12,716 15,040
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by year and district
Median income
mean income
median income 2005 2007 Δ 2005 - 2007 
non-watershed 21,034 22,776 8.3%
13,768 18,750 36.2%
watershed 28,955 24,635 -14.9%
19,831 18,807 -5.2%
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Table 71 Income Mean & Median, by SHG-borrowing status
Household income
mean median
SHG non-borrow SHG everborrow SHG non-borrow SHG everborrow
year
2005 25,840 27,448 16,646 18,390
2007 22,005 26,678 18,000 21,000
Table 72 Pearson's & Spearman's correlation coefficients instruments - outcome variables. Dataset with negative
income values.
Income Inc. p/cap
duration
Pearson coeff 0.0224 -0.0134
p-value 0.2268 0.4695
Spearman coeff 0.0291 -0.0054
p-value 0.1156 0.7697
attendance
Pearson coeff 0.0367 0.0062
p-value 0.1475 0.7364
Spearman coefficient 0.0292 0.0001
p-value 0.1148 0.995
Table 73 Pearson's & Spearman's correlation coefficients instruments - outcome variables. Dataset dropping
negative income values
Income Inc. p/cap
duration
Pearson
coeff 0.0126 0.0015
p-value 0.1932 0.9385
Spearman
coeff 0.0194 0.0300
p-value 0.2659 0.1284
attendance
Pearson
coeff 0.0231 0.0293
p-value 0.1198 0.1379
Spearman
coefficient 0.0298 0.0389
p-value 0.1368 0.1201
241
Table 74 Regresssion instruments over quintiles of dependent variables
Income per capita Income
duration %attendance duration %attendance
Year 2007 intercept -0.449*** -11.103*** -0.445*** -11.242***
(-2.87) (-5.73) (-2.82) (-5.81)
Age of the HH head 0.084** 0.324 0.077* 0.169
(2.02) (0.59) (1.83) (0.31)
Age of the HH head sqared -0.001** -0.007 -0.001* -0.005
(-2.01) (-1.21) (-1.78) (-0.89)
Sex of the HH head 0.313 5.300* 0.267 4.622
(1.24) (1.74) (1.06) (1.53)
Soc group: Scheduled Caste 0.235 -1.058 0.244 -1.555
(0.97) (-0.33) (1.01) (-0.49)
Soc group: Scheduled Tribe 1.909*** 1.467*** 1.941*** 1.515***
(4.83) (2.86) (4.93) (2.89)
Soc group: Backward Caste 0.059 -1.558 0.075 -1.772
(0.27) (-0.54) (0.36) (-0.62)
Index of asset ownership 0.275 5.209 0.240 4.858
(1.39) (1.21) (0.96) (0.58)
Nr of village households -0.001*** -0.014*** -0.001*** -0.013***
(-4.25) (-5.11) (-4.09) (-4.97)
Prakasam -0.872*** -18.937*** -0.876*** -18.570***
(-3.69) (-5.76) (-3.72) (-5.64)
Kurnool -0.477** -4.927 -0.479** -4.397
(-2.11) (-1.43) (-2.12) (-1.28)
Anantapur 0.733** 0.427 0.800*** 1.490
(2.48) (0.13) (2.71) (0.45)
Mahabub-Nagar 0.553** 0.678 0.552** 1.032
(2.12) (0.21) (2.12) (0.32)
quintile 1 -0.204 -2.670 -0.637 -1.168
(-0.87) (-1.13) (-0.73) (-0.95)
quintile 2 0.013 -0.267 -0.396 -4.071
(0.06) (-0.08) (-1.63) (-1.27)
quintile 3 0.127 -1.267 0.214 1.311
(0.54) (-0.40) (0.86) (0.41)
quintile 4 0.296 -2.861 0.068 1.851
(1.27) (-0.92) (0.28) (0.59)
Constant 0.527 52.128*** 0.885 55.615***
(0.49) (3.71) (0.82) (3.91)
Observations 2560 2560 2560 2560
Adjusted R-squared 0.078 0.083 0.084 0.089
F 10.161 13.956 11.013 14.865
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 75 Relevance, orthogonality and exogeneity test. Dataset with no negative income values.
Relevant Orthogonality Exogeneity
Hansen J Wu-Hausman
F Stat p-value Stat p-value
Income 10.86 0.071 0.7899 0.005 0.9436
Income pc 10.86 0.004 0.9514 0.012 0.913
Table 76 Income outcomes. Dataset including negative income observations
Income
FE with negatives MM with negatives IV with negatives
Year 2007 intercept -3813.006*** 1944.223** -3772.210**
(-2.17) (2.44) (-2.11)
Age of the HH head -28.085 89.255*** -18.755
(-0.11) (3.09) (-0.07)
Household size 4813.405*** 2452.286*** 4939.968***
(3.24) (9.99) (3.22)
Shock in last 12 mths -4813.405** -5283.869*** -4544.985*
(-1.97) (-7.01) (-1.75)
Asset index 3139.077 866.493* 3087.938
(1.61) (1.67) (1.55)
SHG 0.405** 0.278*** 0.376*
(2.19) (2.60) (1.82)
BANK -0.000 -0.146*** -0.046
(-0.00) (-5.03) (-0.18)
NGO 0.817*** 1.149*** 0.820***
(4.95) (30.30) (4.74)
Moneylenders/others -0.118 0.003 -0.119
(-1.12) (0.12) (-1.13)
Family/Friends -0.093 0.115*** -0.095
(-1.12) (3.79) (-1.12)
Others -0.250 -0.161 -0.233
(-1.04) (-1.17) (-0.92)
Constant 3588.757*
(1.87)
Observations 2906 2906 2906
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Table 77 outcomes. Dataset NOT including negative income observations
Income
FE NO negatives MM NO negatives IV NO negatives
Year 2007 intercept -3799.656** 444.044 -2344.099
(-2.16) (0.61) (-1.42)
Age of the HH head -39.500 42.287 -137.702
(-0.15) (1.57) (-0.86)
Household size 4812.880*** 2306.679*** 4131.344***
(3.24) (9.67) (2.85)
Shock in last 12 mths -4813.526** -2799.056*** -4110.045*
(-1.97) (-3.96) (-1.66)
Asset index 3139.818 1463.784*** 3974.474**
(1.61) (3.03) (2.02)
SHG 0.405** 0.255** 0.396*
(2.19) (2.52) (1.77)
BANK -0.000 -0.076** 0.387*
(-0.00) (-2.07) (1.65)
NGO 0.816*** 1.137*** 0.858***
(4.95) (41.37) (7.03)
Moneylenders/others -0.118 0.019 -0.073
(-1.12) (0.96) (-0.58)
Family/Friends -0.093 0.112*** -0.050
(-1.12) (3.89) (-0.67)
Others supplier -0.047 0.150
(-1.04) (-0.63) (1.14)
Constant 6649.815 6938.122***
(0.46) (3.82)
Observations 2560 2560 2560
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Appendix 3. Chapter 4.
Table 78 Quintile mobility Income per capita Prakasam
Quintiles 2005
Income per capita Prakasam
Quintiles 2007
1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 7 7 13 4 14 45
15.85 15.76 28.9 9.29 30.2 100
16.96 14.38 20.84 7.21 16.14 15.2
2 8 3 8 6 13 39
21.55 8.59 21.31 15.59 32.96 100
19.79 6.73 13.18 10.38 15.11 13.05
3 8 23 14 14 5 64
12.9 36.07 21.61 21.73 7.69 100
19.64 46.85 22.16 23.99 5.85 21.63
4 12 5 15 15 19 66
18.04 6.95 22.41 23.1 29.5 100
28.33 9.31 23.7 26.3 23.12 22.31
5 6 11 13 19 34 82
7.81 13.61 15.25 22.62 40.71 100
15.28 22.73 20.11 32.11 39.79 27.81
Total 42 49 62 58 84 296
14.21 16.65 21.09 19.59 28.46 100
100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 79 Quintile mobility. Income per capita. Kurnool
Quintiles 2005
Income per capita Kurnool
Quintiles 2007
1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 2 10 7 2 5 26
8.63 37.61 26.11 7.54 20.11 100
3.55 16.61 13.23 3.13 8.39 8.72
2 9 10 7 13 8 46
19.57 21.09 14.13 28.84 16.37 100
14.5 16.79 12.9 21.59 12.31 15.71
3 17 15 17 13 16 78
21.68 18.98 21.63 16.7 21.01 100
27.11 25.49 33.33 21.1 26.66 26.51
4 7 12 12 18 8 56
11.87 21.11 21.52 32.06 13.43 100
10.64 20.34 23.79 29.05 12.22 19.01
5 28 12 8 16 25 89
31.17 13.64 9.58 17.53 28.08 100
44.2 20.77 16.75 25.12 40.41 30.06
Total 63 58 51 62 62 295
21.2 19.74 17.2 20.98 20.89 100
100 100 100 100 100 100
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Table 80 Quintile mobility. Income per capita. Anantapur
Quintiles 2005
Income per capita Anantapur
Quintiles 2007
1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 38 18 15 13 20 104
36.86 16.88 14.03 12.88 19.34 100
51.58 28.12 24.54 25.39 45.14 35.43
2 14 22 19 16 6 76
17.93 28.58 24.7 21.29 7.51 100
18.38 34.88 31.64 30.76 12.84 25.96
3 10 14 15 11 8 57
16.8 24.27 25.52 18.49 14.93 100
12.88 22.15 24.45 19.97 19.09 19.41
4 6 7 8 9 5 35
16.87 20.12 23.98 25.43 13.6 100
7.94 11.28 14.1 16.87 10.68 11.92
5 7 2 3 4 5 21
32.06 10.45 14.65 17.28 25.56 100
9.22 3.57 5.26 7 12.25 7.28
Total 74 62 59 53 44 293
25.32 21.27 20.26 17.97 15.18 100
100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 81 Quantiles for plot area and asset index
Plot area (acres) Asset index
2005 2007 2005 2007
p1 0 0 0 0
p5 0 0 0 0
p10 0 0 0 0
p20 0 0 0 0
p25 0 0 0 0
p30 0 1 0 0
p40 1 1.5 0 0
p50 2 2 0 1
p60 3 3.5 1 1
p70 4 5 1 1
p75 5 5 1 2
p80 5 6 1 2
p90 8 9 2 2
p95 11 12 3 3
p99 20 20 4 4
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Table 82 Land quintile mobility
Quintile_07-Quintile_05 Freq. Percent
-2 2 0.14
-1 111 7.61
0 1,226 84.03
1 91 6.24
2 17 1.17
3 10 0.69
4 2 0.14
Table 83 Asset index mobility
Index07-Index05 Frequ Percent
-5 1 0.07
-4 3 0.21
-3 14 0.96
-2 46 3.15
-1 205 14.04
0 720 49.32
1 315 21.58
2 129 8.84
3 25 1.71
4 2 0.14
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Table 84 Cross sectional Q-reg Income per capita 2005
t statistics in parenthesis; * p<0.10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; Nr. of observations: 1,460. In yellow, blue
and orange estimates that are significant at least at 10% level for loan size from SHG, bank and
moneylenders respectively.
Quintiles 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.9 0.95
430.753* 214.017 123.706 108.944 146.529* 204.468** 198.740** 250.116** 313.635*** 269.786* 350.011** 349.622 49.331
(1.908) (1.646) (1.343) (1.414) (1.952) (2.577) (2.214) (2.486) (2.600) (1.927) (2.146) (1.345) (0.113)
-4.553* -2.145 -1.060 -1.003 -1.307* -1.911** -1.837* -2.200** -2.913** -2.543* -3.248* -3.193 0.792
(-1.844) (-1.555) (-1.102) (-1.275) (-1.657) (-2.254) (-1.917) (-2.028) (-2.234) (-1.665) (-1.801) (-1.057) (0.169)
-1166.886 -548.057 -50.858 486.343 496.119 963.723** 758.931 408.762 740.135 1125.539 1708.353* 1997.150 1822.345
(-1.208) (-1.083) (-0.108) (1.132) (1.223) (2.033) (1.349) (0.559) (1.010) (1.367) (1.813) (1.514) (0.784)
193.231 126.317 -59.454 -107.453 -126.284 -212.389** -348.967*** -451.445*** -678.885*** -682.492*** -727.581*** -935.769*** -1664.923***
(1.256) (1.436) (-0.650) (-1.258) (-1.439) (-2.344) (-3.354) (-3.478) (-4.155) (-4.234) (-4.526) (-3.264) (-3.939)
1315.417 579.871 519.560 311.548 43.479 -182.455 -301.459 288.256 -1080.383 -1519.251 -2512.197* -4046.279* -3593.886
(1.274) (0.787) (0.901) (0.539) (0.076) (-0.267) (-0.397) (0.282) (-0.964) (-1.171) (-1.785) (-1.774) (-0.934)
-1622.589*** -1413.278*** -1466.592*** -1376.394*** -1554.953*** -1483.244*** -1829.511*** -2017.820*** -2023.076*** -2095.554*** -2443.127*** -2990.650*** -4262.231**
(-3.310) (-4.468) (-5.104) (-4.479) (-4.719) (-4.365) (-5.277) (-5.066) (-3.492) (-3.084) (-3.497) (-3.055) (-2.444)
-1448.793** -1217.018** -1209.082*** -1141.988*** -1149.372** -1090.925** -823.336 -269.115 123.120 -132.691 -307.611 -156.351 823.716
(-2.062) (-2.483) (-2.694) (-2.645) (-2.412) (-2.019) (-1.233) (-0.340) (0.131) (-0.131) (-0.277) (-0.094) (0.283)
705.189 614.905 646.274 685.706 728.729 828.536 762.888 885.613 806.548 450.185 290.880 141.495 1239.243
(1.091) (1.309) (1.268) (1.303) (1.251) (1.430) (1.092) (1.075) (0.831) (0.441) (0.248) (0.080) (0.427)
0.426 0.234 0.747*** 0.766*** 0.773*** 0.895*** 1.256*** 1.256*** 1.607*** 2.097*** 2.528*** 3.545*** 5.123**
(0.891) (0.792) (2.628) (2.801) (2.851) (3.506) (4.847) (4.319) (3.350) (4.240) (4.544) (3.423) (2.417)
533.897 375.174 308.779 402.859 323.270 247.501 187.487 399.747 -46.293 32.978 442.017 -192.296 1.382
(0.997) (1.059) (1.008) (1.318) (1.070) (0.775) (0.557) (1.009) (-0.090) (0.058) (0.681) (-0.160) (0.001)
497.024 -46.715 161.078 110.477 83.951 386.435 281.650 317.603 678.673 413.328 607.020 1326.154 3383.594
(0.483) (-0.101) (0.331) (0.219) (0.165) (0.804) (0.606) (0.611) (1.007) (0.565) (0.736) (0.905) (1.182)
385.696 1062.894** 1528.642*** 1550.817*** 1350.912*** 1881.534*** 1981.998*** 2404.274*** 3328.157*** 3623.008*** 4563.991*** 6024.447*** 9401.937***
(0.371) (1.998) (3.442) (3.309) (2.708) (3.588) (3.425) (3.468) (4.122) (3.959) (3.943) (3.927) (3.070)
-1403.724 -1093.938* -803.851* -843.965* -1214.028*** -1530.147*** -2001.226*** -2268.366*** -2292.549*** -2642.901*** -2536.374*** -2457.640** -1981.940
(-1.153) (-1.747) (-1.769) (-1.798) (-2.794) (-3.485) (-4.077) (-4.110) (-3.385) (-3.529) (-3.008) (-2.161) (-0.830)
1318.381 563.943 649.527 653.393 411.302 921.450 1596.357*** 1409.351** 2096.777** 2530.875** 3865.375*** 6367.043*** 12420.217***
(1.337) (1.163) (1.316) (1.373) (0.843) (1.567) (2.645) (2.012) (2.170) (2.219) (2.910) (3.479) (2.712)
604.152 290.838 452.534 233.310 23.227 2.210 -21.025 36.295 47.757 402.265 207.921 109.008 -563.577
(1.064) (0.740) (1.518) (0.725) (0.067) (0.006) (-0.045) (0.067) (0.079) (0.586) (0.263) (0.089) (-0.281)
-3702.965 -6955.346** -1544.770 -2005.891 -1870.814 -1497.065 -1447.692 945.619 -80.433 -86.994 -636.857 1756.174 -1226.438
(-1.099) (-2.020) (-0.550) (-0.766) (-0.762) (-0.698) (-0.695) (0.511) (-0.041) (-0.040) (-0.242) (0.553) (-0.284)
-801.812 -420.358 -573.771* -629.285** -596.318** -327.408 -502.137 -311.908 -539.430 -931.911* -1190.649* -1192.519 -434.537
(-1.417) (-1.244) (-1.920) (-2.195) (-2.029) (-1.031) (-1.530) (-0.768) (-1.047) (-1.656) (-1.946) (-1.104) (-0.190)
-1086.266* -717.575* -319.246 -425.001 -256.631 -155.880 -468.128 -763.289 -619.089 -718.166 -392.085 624.962 -22.920
(-1.927) (-1.805) (-1.075) (-1.388) (-0.820) (-0.419) (-1.095) (-1.645) (-1.141) (-1.128) (-0.569) (0.549) (-0.013)
340.780 88.578 -241.282 -120.148 -72.808 -6.256 -69.144 -77.848 115.258 316.224 643.320 1237.830 450.495
(0.567) (0.226) (-0.769) (-0.363) (-0.222) (-0.018) (-0.190) (-0.176) (0.238) (0.536) (0.924) (1.063) (0.254)
-1436.608 -543.755 -958.339* -974.467* -817.341 -921.609 -841.590 -394.076 -586.173 -825.556 251.833 1567.159 3339.071
(-1.245) (-0.696) (-1.887) (-1.799) (-1.481) (-1.590) (-1.346) (-0.551) (-0.537) (-0.660) (0.180) (0.713) (0.874)
-0.124*** -0.026 -0.024 -0.006 0.004 0.016 0.015 0.039 0.093* 0.125** 0.146*** 0.193*** 0.260***
(-2.830) (-1.448) (-1.380) (-0.331) (0.215) (0.700) (0.519) (0.951) (1.803) (2.327) (3.007) (4.132) (2.808)
0.317 0.384 0.047 0.326 0.315 0.300 0.290 0.257 0.251 0.247 0.236 0.173 0.162
(0.951) (1.159) (0.160) (1.037) (0.962) (0.842) (0.867) (0.694) (0.585) (0.519) (0.449) (0.267) (0.219)
-0.014 0.016 0.014 0.010 0.005 0.011 0.027** 0.025** 0.020 0.018 0.013 0.001 0.218
(-0.443) (0.864) (1.590) (1.161) (0.601) (0.870) (2.021) (2.075) (1.549) (1.308) (0.921) (0.012) (1.383)
-0.035 -0.020 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 0.006 0.022 0.024 0.018 0.013 0.006 -0.007 0.112
(-1.118) (-1.243) (-0.349) (-0.087) (-0.169) (0.268) (1.137) (1.342) (1.410) (0.831) (0.321) (-0.116) (1.182)
0.028 -0.039 -0.030 0.005 0.024 0.017 0.058 0.048 0.059 0.067 0.036 0.052 0.020
(0.492) (-0.785) (-0.655) (0.111) (0.581) (0.402) (1.358) (0.975) (0.959) (0.998) (0.476) (0.413) (0.113)
0.031 -0.002 0.101** 0.099** 0.081** 0.091*** 0.087** 0.079** 0.070* 0.065 0.059 0.041 0.018
(0.233) (-0.034) (2.121) (2.475) (2.333) (2.802) (2.542) (2.476) (1.714) (1.348) (1.152) (0.586) (0.161)
-1.09e+04** -4757.765 -2286.347 -1342.074 -1282.804 -2021.763 -137.268 -699.249 955.115 2648.844 1333.993 4755.921 11927.191
(-2.126) (-1.539) (-1.041) (-0.724) (-0.747) (-1.090) (-0.061) (-0.268) (0.311) (0.783) (0.349) (0.812) (1.013)
Sum from Family or Friends
Other sources: Coops, etc
Sum from SHG or Vill. Orgs
Constant
Borrowed family_fr ever
Borrowed other ever
Sum from Bank
Sum from NGO
Sum from Moneylenders or Landlords
Mahabub-Nagar
Borrowed bank ever
Borrowed NGO ever
Borrowed SHG ever
Borrowed mnl_lrd ever
Worktime per working capita
Watershed program in village
Prakasam
Kurnool
Anantapur
Household size
HH head married
Suffered shock in the last 12m
HH head self-employed
HH head wage-employed
Cross sectional Income PC 2005
Age of the HH head
Age of the HH head sqared
Sex of the HH head
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Table 85 Cross sectional Q-reg Income per capita 2007
t statistics in parenthesis; * p<0.10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; Nr. of observations: 1,446. In yellow, blue
and orange estimates that are significant at least at 10% level for loan size from SHG, bank and
moneylenders respectively.
Quintiles 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.9 0.95
145.781 136.262 -28.007 2.075 20.465 69.745 72.022 100.537 154.416 237.246** 109.154 -82.468 -119.520
(0.974) (1.095) (-0.283) (0.028) (0.294) (0.975) (0.862) (1.149) (1.557) (2.099) (0.840) (-0.357) (-0.379)
-1.349 -1.277 0.382 0.088 -0.077 -0.456 -0.494 -0.634 -1.118 -1.830 -0.535 1.250 1.786
(-0.896) (-0.994) (0.378) (0.119) (-0.109) (-0.625) (-0.562) (-0.662) (-1.056) (-1.484) (-0.378) (0.520) (0.556)
-982.335 519.536 -363.434 -127.355 -181.315 -733.537 -951.739* -1249.011** -1482.098** -1626.794* -2656.695** -1482.909 -3550.993
(-0.400) (0.668) (-0.629) (-0.254) (-0.356) (-1.359) (-1.919) (-2.339) (-2.139) (-1.763) (-2.359) (-0.818) (-1.320)
258.924* 211.743** 118.813 54.877 21.235 -26.002 -188.079** -325.169*** -438.399*** -563.640*** -677.093*** -1001.771*** -1182.444***
(1.881) (2.161) (1.538) (0.731) (0.296) (-0.357) (-2.263) (-3.807) (-4.626) (-5.356) (-5.518) (-5.818) (-3.773)
863.347 -242.642 107.206 169.394 138.941 531.130 227.443 772.167* 632.036 803.366 1692.274* 1561.439 656.709
(0.432) (-0.317) (0.207) (0.389) (0.337) (1.138) (0.522) (1.693) (1.086) (1.037) (1.754) (0.958) (0.244)
-1393.072** -1060.048** -929.577*** -671.330** -706.198*** -689.977*** -567.358** -592.910* -574.147 -466.801 -639.765 -70.874 -35.060
(-2.058) (-2.554) (-3.092) (-2.418) (-2.671) (-2.883) (-2.271) (-1.960) (-1.526) (-1.094) (-1.204) (-0.084) (-0.023)
-786.787 -730.017 -482.614 -342.647 97.169 236.024 13.984 584.843 20.935 -138.200 -145.536 1366.868 1998.393
(-0.868) (-1.122) (-1.144) (-0.798) (0.230) (0.520) (0.027) (0.877) (0.025) (-0.160) (-0.149) (0.841) (0.588)
2005.257** 1323.070** 904.005** 1083.581*** 1278.885*** 885.033* 430.421 699.059 -212.993 -637.517 -1005.841 -2183.687 -3184.536
(2.175) (2.016) (2.137) (2.604) (2.945) (1.950) (0.835) (1.077) (-0.252) (-0.738) (-1.025) (-1.407) (-0.945)
-0.527 -0.106 -0.067 -0.020 0.354 0.665*** 1.010*** 1.149*** 1.291*** 1.496*** 1.885*** 2.498*** 1.899
(-1.004) (-0.345) (-0.311) (-0.079) (1.450) (2.773) (3.303) (3.352) (3.591) (3.338) (3.782) (3.356) (1.386)
-17.608 -114.050 -127.520 -7.945 164.756 121.284 121.860 33.555 -116.426 -51.295 37.115 762.767 556.269
(-0.032) (-0.312) (-0.458) (-0.031) (0.659) (0.492) (0.454) (0.116) (-0.350) (-0.136) (0.082) (0.994) (0.327)
891.593 964.659* 793.010** 556.646* 409.089 609.463 1145.012*** 1616.688*** 1735.196*** 2064.592*** 2327.508*** 3251.727** 5749.816**
(0.936) (1.764) (2.132) (1.653) (1.245) (1.608) (3.051) (3.608) (3.153) (3.218) (2.807) (2.137) (2.028)
490.137 162.921 383.589 559.290 430.992 547.225 382.682 814.615* 911.705* 994.059 955.331 -125.110 -124.038
(0.543) (0.280) (0.816) (1.376) (1.104) (1.522) (1.063) (1.910) (1.734) (1.481) (1.167) (-0.115) (-0.073)
-829.622 -188.299 45.070 100.577 -39.089 22.729 -172.930 2.933 -329.544 -378.287 -526.724 -715.005 -210.714
(-0.563) (-0.255) (0.089) (0.235) (-0.103) (0.059) (-0.467) (0.007) (-0.673) (-0.660) (-0.712) (-0.529) (-0.073)
240.231 494.228 541.387 367.539 345.227 175.459 219.105 560.969 223.929 266.821 188.147 -209.472 -1055.472
(0.232) (0.960) (1.448) (0.999) (0.957) (0.476) (0.527) (1.281) (0.448) (0.426) (0.237) (-0.183) (-0.584)
-421.255 -450.933 -708.889** -783.999** -728.519** -705.683** -193.970 -231.126 -50.209 -285.081 -125.512 6.827 -515.629
(-0.735) (-0.993) (-2.139) (-2.575) (-2.441) (-2.266) (-0.597) (-0.720) (-0.154) (-0.702) (-0.224) (0.007) (-0.251)
-8856.468 -4174.433 3353.900 2527.822 2119.213 1617.683 1002.245 1158.723 1838.424 1773.268 2160.077 -3603.960 -5538.249*
(-1.172) (-0.566) (0.728) (0.750) (1.004) (1.425) (0.680) (0.633) (0.976) (0.927) (1.109) (-1.470) (-1.785)
-204.593 203.918 419.082 196.206 316.182 380.432 462.781 428.823 164.526 195.022 498.051 497.682 328.675
(-0.319) (0.481) (1.524) (0.726) (1.273) (1.470) (1.620) (1.392) (0.466) (0.483) (0.994) (0.538) (0.225)
118.808 199.136 241.506 46.074 -3.066 -175.213 -14.546 -115.930 17.015 170.129 193.307 392.117 1349.574
(0.229) (0.505) (0.827) (0.167) (-0.012) (-0.669) (-0.055) (-0.351) (0.045) (0.362) (0.353) (0.445) (1.005)
321.912 223.908 389.163 217.826 -14.913 64.092 320.652 516.781* 223.050 470.566 51.799 -259.927 904.681
(0.518) (0.510) (1.180) (0.762) (-0.055) (0.211) (0.976) (1.661) (0.603) (1.121) (0.102) (-0.298) (0.574)
-579.058 -417.528 6.091 192.804 453.108 188.633 -32.915 -23.990 -258.526 -209.681 -189.155 -1072.737 1788.883
(-0.509) (-0.606) (0.012) (0.394) (0.944) (0.449) (-0.067) (-0.044) (-0.354) (-0.213) (-0.156) (-0.637) (0.665)
-0.182*** -0.136*** -0.039 -0.036* -0.024 -0.029*** -0.032** -0.017 0.003 0.012 0.024 0.131 0.168
(-3.015) (-2.686) (-1.349) (-1.721) (-1.637) (-2.977) (-2.163) (-0.827) (0.132) (0.347) (0.461) (1.337) (1.501)
1.840 1.176 0.217 0.246 0.260 0.298 0.307 0.233 0.041 0.021 0.038 0.430 0.669
(1.258) (0.850) (0.249) (0.331) (0.454) (0.717) (0.685) (0.457) (0.087) (0.047) (0.094) (0.694) (0.793)
-0.074** -0.047** -0.042*** -0.038** -0.016 -0.007 -0.008 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 -0.018 -0.022
(-2.150) (-2.267) (-3.408) (-2.168) (-0.993) (-0.773) (-1.007) (-0.578) (-0.567) (-0.738) (-0.669) (-1.012) (-0.744)
-0.071 -0.008 0.006 0.007 0.019* 0.011 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.039 0.037 -0.032
(-1.240) (-0.187) (0.338) (0.583) (1.706) (1.179) (0.363) (0.468) (0.200) (0.022) (1.336) (0.839) (-0.446)
-0.240 -0.243* -0.116 -0.110 -0.116 -0.110 -0.080 -0.077 0.025 0.031 0.120 0.747* 0.663*
(-1.191) (-1.907) (-1.018) (-1.240) (-1.501) (-1.539) (-1.055) (-0.753) (0.124) (0.114) (0.358) (1.939) (1.770)
0.086 0.065* 0.052** 0.049** 0.045* 0.036* 0.027 0.039 0.043 0.063 0.018 0.001 0.248
(1.201) (1.820) (2.192) (2.202) (1.883) (1.748) (0.966) (1.060) (1.066) (1.513) (0.375) (0.006) (0.822)
-4216.502 -3533.309 2033.323 1755.738 1083.358 679.940 2229.568 1751.628 2948.442 1689.423 5907.916* 12766.656** 19846.398**
(-0.930) (-1.262) (0.878) (0.939) (0.598) (0.392) (1.194) (0.969) (1.454) (0.686) (1.941) (2.280) (2.416)
Sum from Family or Friends
="Sum from Coops.
Sum from SHG or Vill. Orgs
Constant
Borrowed family_fr ever
Borrowed other ever
Sum from Bank
Sum from NGO
Sum from Moneylenders or Landlords
Mahabub-Nagar
Borrowed bank ever
Borrowed NGO ever
Borrowed SHG ever
Borrowed mnl_lrd ever
Worktime per working capita
Watershed program in village
Prakasam
Kurnool
Anantapur
Household size
HH head married
Suffered shock in the last 12m
HH head self-employed
HH head wage-employed
Cross sectional income PC 2007
Age of the HH head
Age of the HH head sqared
Sex of the HH head
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Table 86 Differenced variables Q-regression Income per capita
t statistics in parenthesis; * p<0.10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; Nr. of observations: 1,460. In yellow, blue
and orange estimates that are significant at least at 10% level for loan size from SHG, bank and
moneylenders respectively.
Quintiles 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.9 0.95
153.205 -34.266 -47.508 -40.228 -26.553 -37.395 -43.475 -10.435 11.804 25.201 22.459 46.688 94.661
(0.79) (-0.43) (-1.19) (-1.02) (-0.67) (-0.90) (-1.12) (-0.38) (0.45) (0.78) (0.62) (0.68) (0.77)
-327.268 -192.029 -477.758* -395.567* -340.488 -375.494*** -346.533** -397.241** -413.483** -480.388*** -427.550** -400.695 -996.765**
(-0.33) (-0.31) (-1.74) (-1.77) (-1.61) (-2.71) (-2.03) (-2.10) (-2.21) (-2.61) (-2.57) (-1.43) (-1.97)
-2097.421 -830.262 -1288.997** -1134.576*** -1035.645*** -949.347*** -909.122*** -967.738*** -1232.201*** -1078.482*** -850.437** -1045.702 -741.331
(-1.10) (-0.82) (-2.38) (-2.62) (-2.76) (-3.21) (-3.08) (-3.17) (-4.05) (-3.45) (-2.22) (-1.24) (-0.47)
2776.333** 1862.210*** 946.127*** 848.855*** 759.792*** 707.778*** 607.662*** 354.862 497.511** 440.256* 594.566** 714.245 774.828
(2.06) (3.12) (2.88) (2.97) (3.11) (3.72) (2.94) (1.53) (2.21) (1.74) (2.27) (1.63) (0.97)
-0.070 -0.069 -0.013 -0.017 -0.019 -0.008 -0.004 0.011 -0.002 -0.005 -0.022 -0.061 0.007
(-0.92) (-1.19) (-0.31) (-0.48) (-0.59) (-0.35) (-0.19) (0.51) (-0.08) (-0.26) (-1.06) (-1.40) (0.10)
-0.006 0.250 0.165 0.188 0.205 0.222 0.240 0.259 0.267 0.275 -0.073 -0.033 0.324
(-0.01) (0.50) (0.37) (0.44) (0.46) (0.52) (0.59) (0.76) (0.89) (0.93) (-0.24) (-0.11) (0.85)
0.007 0.000 -0.006 -0.009 -0.013 -0.016 -0.020* -0.017 -0.017 -0.019* -0.021** -0.037*** -0.058*
(0.15) (0.02) (-0.29) (-0.50) (-0.79) (-1.28) (-1.73) (-1.35) (-1.43) (-1.86) (-2.08) (-3.00) (-1.90)
-0.026 -0.016 -0.021 -0.008 -0.001 0.003 0.017 0.016 0.010 0.005 -0.002 0.019 0.032
(-0.35) (-0.39) (-1.02) (-0.43) (-0.07) (0.21) (1.17) (1.01) (0.62) (0.28) (-0.09) (0.84) (1.21)
-0.124 -0.068 -0.030 -0.021 -0.025 -0.041 -0.012 -0.003 0.023 0.037 -0.024 -0.035 -0.068
(-1.32) (-0.92) (-0.64) (-0.51) (-0.69) (-1.04) (-0.24) (-0.04) (0.27) (0.38) (-0.25) (-0.28) (-0.43)
-0.016 0.021 0.074*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.075*** 0.080*** 0.108*** 0.125*** 0.128*** 0.095* 0.127* 0.184*
(-0.11) (0.28) (2.63) (3.97) (4.08) (2.81) (2.69) (3.13) (3.65) (3.02) (1.93) (1.86) (1.73)
-1.81e+04*** -1.08e+04*** -5742.010*** -4276.075*** -3158.761*** -1379.836*** 16.893 1374.941*** 2878.032*** 3714.054*** 4766.904*** 8128.539*** 12816.156***
(-11.36) (-14.45) (-14.88) (-13.37) (-12.46) (-6.53) (0.08) (6.48) (13.88) (15.86) (19.18) (14.86) (11.16)
Δ Other sum
Δ SHG sum
Constant
Δ asset index
Δbank sum
Δ NGO sum
Δ Moneylender sum
Δ family and friend sum
Δincome per capita
Δ Age HH head
Δ HH size
Δ shock
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Table 87 Differenced variables Q-regression Income per capita (including 2005 level variables)
t statistics in parenthesis; * p<0.10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; Nr. of observations: 1,460. In yellow, blue
and orange estimates that are significant at least at 10% level for loan size from SHG, bank and
moneylenders respectively.
Quintiles 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.9 0.95
499.050 -18.295 65.985 162.649 108.023 -53.773 -141.700 -212.277 -472.528** -453.729** -438.986** -889.097*** -1121.689***
(0.914) (-0.056) (0.257) (0.690) (0.538) (-0.342) (-0.812) (-0.898) (-2.074) (-2.179) (-2.276) (-3.370) (-2.586)
1141.024 -702.448 -545.395 -415.848 -549.695 -414.096 -276.557 -537.895 -315.775 -48.245 -70.887 473.779 103.558
(0.715) (-0.721) (-0.854) (-0.759) (-1.177) (-0.941) (-0.685) (-1.252) (-0.649) (-0.095) (-0.131) (0.578) (0.066)
-537.670 -628.063 -263.946 -167.283 87.207 202.849 132.052 -192.885 49.205 10.448 -87.515 -363.550 100.166
(-0.337) (-0.651) (-0.510) (-0.361) (0.211) (0.512) (0.372) (-0.547) (0.124) (0.023) (-0.167) (-0.445) (0.062)
-1319.414 -270.363 -396.208 -255.458 -54.492 -62.984 45.761 119.171 169.578 149.619 411.457 668.723 1945.990**
(-1.175) (-0.437) (-1.027) (-0.767) (-0.193) (-0.244) (0.173) (0.454) (0.582) (0.473) (1.289) (1.391) (2.023)
-2.368 -2.390** -1.767*** -1.422*** -1.427*** -1.128** -0.868** -0.806** -0.446 -0.359 -0.323 -0.311 0.009
(-1.618) (-2.250) (-2.964) (-2.916) (-3.337) (-2.530) (-2.283) (-2.278) (-1.081) (-0.750) (-0.598) (-0.353) (0.006)
-0.127 -0.040 -0.055* -0.068** -0.073** -0.056* -0.022 -0.019 0.008 0.012 0.012 0.077 0.076
(-1.154) (-0.859) (-1.737) (-2.233) (-2.516) (-1.725) (-0.709) (-0.629) (0.254) (0.376) (0.339) (1.032) (0.859)
0.874 0.844 0.553 0.427 0.428 0.310 0.241 0.133 0.039 -0.034 -0.079 1.064 0.173
(0.686) (0.616) (0.544) (0.525) (0.649) (0.490) (0.356) (0.188) (0.045) (-0.036) (-0.076) (1.029) (0.180)
-0.159** -0.119* -0.028 -0.019 -0.016 -0.020 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.032
(-2.115) (-1.871) (-0.737) (-0.803) (-0.993) (-1.323) (-0.194) (-0.537) (-0.313) (-0.057) (-0.112) (-0.064) (-0.674)
-0.247 -0.044 -0.034 -0.039 -0.034 0.005 -0.006 0.004 0.007 0.002 -0.001 0.035 -0.001
(-1.372) (-0.524) (-0.932) (-1.241) (-1.137) (0.191) (-0.256) (0.169) (0.262) (0.058) (-0.032) (0.697) (-0.017)
-0.240 -0.257 -0.088 -0.150 -0.142 -0.181* -0.196 -0.032 0.110 0.150 0.203 0.670** 0.659*
(-0.797) (-1.139) (-0.599) (-1.276) (-1.511) (-1.942) (-1.251) (-0.165) (0.566) (0.681) (0.771) (2.093) (1.750)
-0.068 0.057 0.044 0.036 0.081* 0.076 0.096 0.110* 0.127* 0.124* 0.105 0.110 0.507*
(-0.267) (0.358) (0.793) (0.731) (1.760) (1.449) (1.537) (1.668) (1.946) (1.703) (1.288) (0.619) (1.857)
-1450.924 -1048.258 277.556 787.065 72.700 300.513 -407.800 -483.798 137.348 437.536 768.174 969.805 2607.600
(-0.637) (-0.728) (0.331) (1.013) (0.098) (0.436) (-0.605) (-0.665) (0.166) (0.503) (0.790) (0.561) (0.838)
-8173.468*** -6482.785*** -3308.577*** -2315.473** -2161.909** -1864.864** -2160.927*** -1608.995** -895.390 -772.595 -202.799 -1838.278 -3036.536
(-3.708) (-3.895) (-3.009) (-2.450) (-2.488) (-2.523) (-2.774) (-2.143) (-1.126) (-0.928) (-0.236) (-1.466) (-1.420)
2232.896 2118.438* 2853.865*** 3023.148*** 2266.524*** 1937.954*** 1211.181* 982.776 870.024 678.976 566.489 -307.358 -109.381
(1.185) (1.903) (3.511) (4.357) (3.398) (2.872) (1.693) (1.471) (1.200) (0.835) (0.617) (-0.193) (-0.041)
-4789.141 -2923.287* -1569.131 -960.042 -1174.365 -1089.276 -1050.226 -1214.893* -1026.392 -1076.137 -1028.461 -2047.834 -2642.983
(-1.566) (-1.902) (-1.521) (-1.058) (-1.542) (-1.440) (-1.340) (-1.776) (-1.494) (-1.375) (-1.237) (-1.533) (-1.239)
2470.065*** 1237.112*** 797.483*** 633.640*** 580.407*** 475.843*** 325.378** 152.202 0.116 -112.243 -378.325** -475.936* -1021.579**
(6.124) (4.623) (4.224) (3.840) (3.772) (3.111) (2.168) (0.991) (0.001) (-0.686) (-2.120) (-1.947) (-2.479)
3540.871 1095.028 1306.184 1305.489* 1043.319* 1390.534** 1458.080** 1649.283*** 2253.127*** 2518.018*** 2480.073*** 3065.570*** 2595.526
(1.480) (0.721) (1.480) (1.804) (1.748) (2.292) (2.360) (2.710) (3.407) (3.552) (3.396) (2.671) (1.383)
-1694.595 -1087.236 -518.515 -409.154 -258.650 -378.421 -387.771 -717.932** -505.464 -584.292 -190.971 -884.811 -1602.632
(-1.610) (-1.561) (-1.023) (-0.928) (-0.682) (-1.096) (-1.289) (-2.301) (-1.410) (-1.443) (-0.419) (-1.125) (-1.174)
-6321.153*** -4157.024*** -3025.570*** -2254.618*** -2116.391*** -1731.820*** -1123.201*** -935.586*** -798.957** -885.555** -150.664 275.050 2507.631*
(-3.729) (-5.351) (-5.301) (-5.006) (-6.015) (-4.286) (-3.320) (-2.765) (-2.240) (-2.220) (-0.375) (0.391) (1.817)
-2.323 -2.798** -2.102*** -1.279** -1.407*** -1.341*** -0.804* -0.691 -0.133 0.193 0.460 0.418 0.445
(-1.106) (-2.470) (-2.853) (-2.102) (-2.705) (-2.725) (-1.783) (-1.394) (-0.205) (0.269) (0.601) (0.344) (0.224)
-0.241** -0.184** -0.111* -0.107** -0.100** -0.064* -0.045 -0.041 -0.020 -0.011 0.046 0.139* 0.208
(-1.981) (-2.542) (-1.929) (-2.172) (-2.416) (-1.762) (-1.276) (-1.228) (-0.505) (-0.228) (0.853) (1.724) (1.583)
0.921 0.825 0.424 0.250 0.250 0.112 0.013 -0.106 -0.209 -0.295 -0.369 0.750 -0.218
(0.672) (0.572) (0.394) (0.284) (0.326) (0.148) (0.016) (-0.133) (-0.227) (-0.300) (-0.350) (0.702) (-0.208)
-0.238* -0.154** -0.052 -0.043 -0.036 -0.035 -0.006 0.011 0.022 0.023 0.017 0.024 -0.021
(-1.946) (-2.274) (-1.246) (-1.436) (-1.449) (-1.566) (-0.254) (0.438) (0.896) (0.914) (0.589) (0.649) (-0.391)
-0.219 -0.020 -0.025 -0.039 -0.035 -0.000 -0.012 0.001 -0.007 0.004 0.004 0.029 -0.037
(-1.179) (-0.231) (-0.623) (-1.103) (-1.062) (-0.001) (-0.410) (0.030) (-0.202) (0.102) (0.096) (0.497) (-0.511)
-0.221 -0.231 -0.127 -0.165 -0.166 -0.186* -0.178 -0.028 0.161 0.252 0.344 0.857** 0.863**
(-0.682) (-0.991) (-0.812) (-1.290) (-1.601) (-1.868) (-1.100) (-0.142) (0.765) (1.042) (1.209) (2.428) (1.992)
-0.115 0.051 0.012 -0.004 0.034 0.011 0.006 0.009 0.001 -0.001 -0.011 0.018 0.292
(-0.261) (0.310) (0.165) (-0.069) (0.579) (0.181) (0.080) (0.124) (0.017) (-0.013) (-0.117) (0.099) (0.906)
-1.25e+04*** -4011.519 -2890.215** -3060.906** -1835.743 -425.301 832.902 3418.792*** 3509.674** 4423.679*** 4806.005*** 9465.362*** 16234.617***
(-3.444) (-1.641) (-2.068) (-2.575) (-1.602) (-0.346) (0.722) (2.728) (2.451) (2.930) (2.839) (3.926) (3.962)
Sum others
Sum SHG
Constant
Δincome per capita
Worktime per working capita
Sum Bank
Sum NGO
Sum Moneylenders
Sum Family
Mahabub-Nagar
Household size
Suffered shock
Max educ level in HH
Index of asset ownership
Δother_sum                             
ΔSHG_sum                               
Prakasam
Kurnool
Anantapur
Δworktime_pcw                          
Δbank_sum                              
ΔNGO_sum                               
ΔmnΔlrd_sum                           
Δfamily_fr_sum                         
ΔHHsize                                
Δshock                                 
Δeduc_max                              
Δasset_indx                            
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Table 88 Cross sectional Q-regression Income 2005
t statistics in parenthesis; * p<0.10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; Nr. of observations: 1,460. In yellow, blue
and orange estimates that are significant at least at 10% level for loan size from SHG, bank and
moneylenders respectively.
Quintiles 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.9 0.95
2314.514** 1095.387 643.701 558.866 601.704* 735.509** 1109.654*** 1015.935** 1312.856*** 1237.406** 1271.883* 1779.096 -502.830
(1.998) (1.629) (1.380) (1.604) (1.904) (1.984) (2.629) (2.545) (2.844) (2.235) (1.875) (1.617) (-0.249)
-24.553* -11.378 -6.182 -5.124 -5.305 -6.669* -10.569** -9.411** -12.218** -11.434* -12.100 -17.050 12.499
(-1.890) (-1.602) (-1.257) (-1.403) (-1.590) (-1.682) (-2.301) (-2.209) (-2.451) (-1.868) (-1.585) (-1.337) (0.568)
-8174.409* -3911.834 242.586 2032.344 3342.227* 5132.272*** 4022.640* 4980.014 2294.605 4949.718 6827.299 6313.928 5568.262
(-1.723) (-1.373) (0.119) (1.047) (1.898) (2.624) (1.652) (1.556) (0.603) (1.258) (1.582) (0.986) (0.633)
934.986 657.597 834.269** 1105.010*** 1412.752*** 1977.630*** 2303.828*** 3050.861*** 4046.507*** 4736.534*** 5495.816*** 6590.526*** 6747.308***
(1.388) (1.487) (2.259) (2.788) (3.200) (4.300) (4.586) (5.500) (5.561) (6.581) (6.493) (5.691) (3.216)
9600.960* 5319.564 3244.971 2402.772 1187.465 396.676 -87.835 -1247.412 -3234.318 -7090.599 -9235.866* -1.24e+04 -1.85e+04
(1.894) (1.477) (1.359) (1.071) (0.563) (0.149) (-0.032) (-0.350) (-0.758) (-1.523) (-1.790) (-1.101) (-1.468)
-7352.554*** -6293.960*** -6969.558*** -5771.908*** -6017.107*** -7200.718*** -8043.224*** -8719.498*** -1.01e+04*** -1.08e+04*** -1.11e+04*** -1.39e+04*** -1.75e+04**
(-3.186) (-3.838) (-5.823) (-4.351) (-4.024) (-4.310) (-5.009) (-5.264) (-4.377) (-3.608) (-3.657) (-3.211) (-2.316)
-7001.562** -6735.272*** -7086.209*** -5949.517*** -5146.302*** -3930.590 -3852.690 -4641.657 -795.639 1604.233 1232.858 4979.046 2547.581
(-1.962) (-2.871) (-3.706) (-3.188) (-2.591) (-1.558) (-1.196) (-1.285) (-0.211) (0.401) (0.268) (0.659) (0.214)
2325.099 1891.013 908.145 2484.016 2833.376 3579.266 2758.844 -529.876 1722.019 1984.812 -341.913 1390.493 4407.493
(0.675) (0.830) (0.444) (1.281) (1.270) (1.333) (0.898) (-0.151) (0.443) (0.471) (-0.072) (0.168) (0.365)
2.369 0.686 3.595*** 3.699*** 4.004*** 3.974*** 5.978*** 6.685*** 6.625*** 6.720*** 9.182*** 12.899*** 25.110***
(1.113) (0.490) (3.133) (3.587) (4.120) (3.469) (5.051) (4.661) (3.858) (3.184) (4.043) (2.997) (3.016)
1274.823 1506.886 2459.407* 2304.861* 1460.603 2019.357 1038.680 1584.732 1193.712 1261.798 2398.746 1892.456 3609.291
(0.504) (0.938) (1.920) (1.763) (1.111) (1.348) (0.684) (0.866) (0.553) (0.504) (0.872) (0.398) (0.452)
3099.933 -19.925 1943.513 1170.353 383.402 565.261 -70.332 1251.417 2308.903 2094.899 2787.234 6853.765 12750.224
(0.718) (-0.008) (0.879) (0.520) (0.174) (0.272) (-0.031) (0.558) (0.812) (0.673) (0.762) (1.226) (1.194)
3053.161 5874.669* 9402.538*** 7650.727*** 6849.268*** 9569.708*** 9545.095*** 11764.002*** 14531.070*** 16703.557*** 19086.086*** 28017.240*** 43344.033***
(0.785) (1.863) (4.180) (3.656) (3.009) (3.542) (3.528) (4.091) (3.886) (3.654) (3.505) (3.910) (2.988)
-6055.903 -4405.619 -1983.311 -3697.980* -4203.145** -5613.469*** -9105.316*** -1.00e+04*** -1.13e+04*** -1.12e+04*** -1.17e+04*** -1.34e+04*** -1.06e+04
(-1.228) (-1.530) (-0.920) (-1.773) (-2.018) (-2.739) (-4.549) (-4.327) (-3.993) (-3.596) (-3.374) (-2.882) (-1.080)
5720.845 3117.567 3813.411* 2564.815 2669.240 5504.384* 6213.207** 7496.899*** 8309.919** 9804.220** 12698.136** 34244.615*** 57207.284**
(1.484) (1.321) (1.803) (1.173) (1.154) (1.951) (2.243) (2.726) (2.145) (2.193) (2.267) (3.644) (2.560)
1507.780 556.580 1759.092 1054.658 578.817 532.375 237.186 557.659 426.205 620.049 -507.260 1788.710 -2165.592
(0.635) (0.296) (1.263) (0.732) (0.392) (0.293) (0.113) (0.219) (0.158) (0.199) (-0.139) (0.357) (-0.238)
-1.26e+04 -2.71e+04* -1.30e+04 -7096.936 -6236.018 -6117.633 -8683.007 3265.435 1599.341 -2461.946 -4701.163 3817.416 9305.632
(-0.926) (-1.960) (-0.966) (-0.552) (-0.540) (-0.647) (-0.943) (0.385) (0.188) (-0.260) (-0.446) (0.278) (0.431)
-2920.318 -1577.463 -2910.554** -2629.468* -2787.011** -1739.348 -2560.148* -2124.168 -2411.623 -3877.242 -4363.537* -7958.204* 1434.464
(-1.071) (-0.919) (-2.110) (-1.924) (-2.020) (-1.159) (-1.715) (-1.217) (-1.088) (-1.606) (-1.659) (-1.796) (0.158)
-3421.441 -3514.759* -1766.186 -866.571 -1028.875 -1527.687 -2858.725* -2140.471 -2146.424 -2848.315 -1798.093 -1602.212 794.410
(-1.310) (-1.798) (-1.270) (-0.647) (-0.737) (-0.936) (-1.755) (-1.128) (-0.907) (-1.021) (-0.593) (-0.325) (0.096)
2144.293 651.461 163.268 308.093 -368.685 14.227 33.393 -501.430 1331.758 1830.314 2682.211 6743.886 13619.398*
(0.732) (0.319) (0.123) (0.224) (-0.263) (0.009) (0.021) (-0.270) (0.613) (0.685) (0.927) (1.298) (1.814)
161.014 -1159.963 -4547.350** -4048.690* -4476.856* -3047.717 -2981.595 -3331.660 -3125.174 -2834.296 40.494 -707.240 11182.058
(0.035) (-0.426) (-2.051) (-1.659) (-1.698) (-0.943) (-1.155) (-1.168) (-0.679) (-0.465) (0.006) (-0.075) (0.733)
-0.381* -0.172* -0.111 -0.070 -0.033 0.051 0.071 0.127 0.462* 0.554** 0.727*** 0.787*** 1.082*
(-1.900) (-1.899) (-1.259) (-0.805) (-0.347) (0.417) (0.502) (0.603) (1.923) (2.379) (3.469) (3.222) (1.925)
0.940 1.543 0.348 1.278 1.252 1.212 1.195 1.034 0.996 1.009 0.987 0.746 0.597
(0.723) (1.199) (0.274) (0.925) (0.893) (0.798) (0.790) (0.622) (0.538) (0.485) (0.441) (0.260) (0.158)
0.042 0.058 0.065* 0.046 0.038 0.059 0.093* 0.079 0.065 0.071 0.052 0.050 0.752
(0.346) (0.782) (1.804) (1.290) (0.871) (1.075) (1.805) (1.484) (1.172) (1.103) (0.636) (0.166) (0.815)
-0.197 -0.113 -0.049 -0.047 0.048 0.009 0.041 0.081 0.068 0.058 0.032 -0.029 -0.128
(-1.102) (-1.289) (-0.590) (-0.502) (0.481) (0.095) (0.454) (1.047) (1.195) (0.914) (0.392) (-0.180) (-0.598)
0.473 -0.262 -0.326 -0.003 0.069 0.090 0.020 0.241 0.220 0.293 0.233 0.033 -0.067
(-1.315) (-1.379) (0.345) (0.169) (0.431) (0.093) (1.179) (1.112) (1.004) (0.661) (0.113) (1.060) (-0.275)
0.080 -0.049 0.505* 0.586*** 0.489*** 0.542*** 0.498*** 0.475*** 0.432** 0.398* 0.361* 0.263 0.161
(0.153) (-0.163) (1.723) (2.621) (2.587) (3.283) (3.259) (3.201) (2.392) (1.945) (1.819) (0.783) (0.284)
-5.92e+04** -2.41e+04 -1.82e+04* -1.75e+04** -1.76e+04** -2.12e+04** -2.47e+04*** -2.18e+04** -2.62e+04** -2.27e+04* -2.53e+04* -3.42e+04 -6487.253
(-2.234) (-1.528) (-1.777) (-2.243) (-2.463) (-2.444) (-2.616) (-2.228) (-2.363) (-1.749) (-1.794) (-1.513) (-0.136)
Age of the HH head
Age of the HH head sqared
Sex of the HH head
HH head self-employed
Suffered shock in the last 12m
HH head married
Household size
Borrowed SHG ever
Borrowed NGO ever
Borrowed bank ever
Mahabub-Nagar
Worktime per working capita
Cross sectional Income 2005
Constant
Sum from SHG or Vill. Orgs
Other sources: Coops, etc
Sum from Family or Friends
Borrowed family_fr ever
Borrowed other ever
Sum from Bank
Sum from NGO
Sum from Moneylenders or Landlords
Anantapur
Kurnool
Prakasam
Watershed program in village
HH head wage-employed
Borrowed mnl_lrd ever
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Table 89 Cross sectional Q-regression Income 2007
t statistics in parenthesis; * p<0.10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; Nr. of observations: 1,460. In yellow, blue
and orange estimates that are significant at least at 10% level for loan size from SHG, bank and
moneylenders respectively.
Quintiles 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.9 0.95
1538.463* 550.657 46.018 137.720 156.080 328.224 264.818 684.969 769.214 912.166* 574.103 -438.319 -717.949
(1.881) (0.874) (0.127) (0.458) (0.541) (0.984) (0.770) (1.624) (1.577) (1.824) (1.031) (-0.416) (-0.568)
-14.412* -5.433 0.419 -0.986 -1.317 -2.559 -1.900 -6.006 -6.177 -7.598 -3.594 5.346 10.126
(-1.799) (-0.834) (0.116) (-0.327) (-0.442) (-0.734) (-0.525) (-1.328) (-1.164) (-1.385) (-0.585) (0.488) (0.776)
-640.130 370.891 457.722 219.555 539.282 -1304.771 -4393.494** -4071.252* -5514.693** -6528.589** -7628.547* -4865.122 -6681.525
(-0.100) (0.130) (0.190) (0.113) (0.296) (-0.598) (-2.366) (-1.915) (-2.137) (-2.098) (-1.924) (-0.783) (-0.734)
1638.189** 1421.625** 2372.251*** 2663.539*** 2738.369*** 3413.624*** 3772.650*** 3855.724*** 3904.161*** 4087.013*** 4574.495*** 5825.029*** 7310.938***
(2.137) (2.523) (6.804) (8.043) (8.150) (9.510) (10.906) (11.026) (9.480) (7.544) (7.243) (5.296) (4.488)
4310.474 2109.538 438.450 -299.428 290.422 -481.195 1204.413 2916.717* 4664.946** 4347.533* 6048.378** 2730.035 8312.805
(1.045) (0.784) (0.215) (-0.176) (0.200) (-0.280) (0.768) (1.753) (2.324) (1.877) (2.038) (0.462) (1.008)
-5714.021* -5303.894*** -3808.294*** -3338.693*** -2969.765** -2761.919*** -2520.872** -2284.098* -1904.321 -1757.371 -1103.086 -1593.883 -3673.562
(-1.768) (-2.771) (-2.947) (-2.921) (-2.546) (-2.656) (-2.327) (-1.709) (-1.276) (-0.986) (-0.515) (-0.412) (-0.686)
-2110.566 -5956.922** -1876.797 -923.688 -1111.677 928.499 192.809 741.780 -1273.316 -577.848 499.426 4466.040 8786.568
(-0.439) (-2.207) (-1.035) (-0.527) (-0.593) (0.443) (0.091) (0.275) (-0.368) (-0.155) (0.130) (0.661) (0.627)
11169.667** 2954.139 4743.031*** 4622.016*** 3888.627** 3927.611* 2478.796 628.109 -2577.316 -3685.374 -5403.508 -1.12e+04* -1.56e+04
(2.494) (1.109) (2.743) (2.752) (2.064) (1.884) (1.176) (0.247) (-0.743) (-0.989) (-1.362) (-1.817) (-1.263)
-3.770 -1.464 -0.551 -0.353 0.664 2.365** 2.881*** 4.367*** 6.259*** 6.685*** 7.872*** 10.595*** 10.689**
(-1.583) (-1.041) (-0.618) (-0.363) (0.622) (2.461) (2.671) (3.083) (4.481) (4.034) (3.911) (2.976) (2.573)
-849.378 -1073.051 452.062 815.810 377.216 740.962 1053.123 967.295 232.745 -51.533 1029.302 2291.042 3216.164
(-0.340) (-0.634) (0.374) (0.767) (0.337) (0.684) (0.933) (0.730) (0.158) (-0.030) (0.512) (0.616) (0.589)
5712.357 4217.523 2882.498* 2912.677** 3287.523** 2300.146 4806.481*** 5539.326*** 7606.856*** 9359.310*** 8821.389*** 12194.659* 24730.570***
(1.430) (1.586) (1.850) (2.048) (2.216) (1.394) (2.864) (3.120) (3.334) (3.726) (2.680) (1.852) (2.615)
3549.656 432.766 1866.149 2404.359 2327.718 921.731 1899.473 2782.646 3186.565 3138.467 2962.820 -4137.124 -1536.486
(0.846) (0.160) (1.025) (1.465) (1.328) (0.544) (1.282) (1.473) (1.392) (1.018) (0.932) (-0.866) (-0.211)
-1373.463 -651.798 196.244 921.609 1333.103 122.180 -8.470 -539.735 -1624.940 -2160.008 -3003.387 -2504.374 3103.037
(-0.212) (-0.179) (0.087) (0.514) (0.785) (0.070) (-0.005) (-0.311) (-0.788) (-0.826) (-1.025) (-0.461) (0.284)
1967.511 1887.742 1916.989 1788.076 2029.731 582.488 328.981 1198.054 247.624 -374.109 -639.124 -1636.711 -3909.862
(0.401) (0.721) (1.190) (1.182) (1.269) (0.335) (0.180) (0.606) (0.120) (-0.126) (-0.201) (-0.292) (-0.526)
-3016.042 -1904.920 -2687.474** -3347.684*** -2879.667** -2968.673** -2003.641 -1254.946 -294.046 -140.452 -1944.219 -823.242 -2573.193
(-1.035) (-0.968) (-2.081) (-2.676) (-2.259) (-2.213) (-1.428) (-0.853) (-0.186) (-0.076) (-0.833) (-0.172) (-0.361)
-2.95e+04 -2.12e+04 13255.644 11792.637 8893.905 6839.053 8630.516 5105.549 10314.695 7532.795 6581.551 -1.82e+04* -2.55e+04*
(-0.903) (-0.680) (0.650) (0.756) (0.833) (0.950) (1.139) (0.641) (1.303) (0.980) (0.851) (-1.852) (-1.764)
559.509 1962.113 1991.441 1091.129 1707.145 1633.543 1876.421 1668.418 1569.314 2198.961 2339.643 5268.944 4102.933
(0.187) (1.052) (1.587) (0.942) (1.519) (1.420) (1.493) (1.129) (1.005) (1.155) (1.119) (1.185) (0.688)
2028.323 411.627 1396.721 94.930 -97.401 -103.178 386.167 -7.299 -242.815 157.719 -743.863 -1620.891 2906.365
(0.879) (0.223) (1.139) (0.083) (-0.087) (-0.092) (0.305) (-0.005) (-0.167) (0.081) (-0.326) (-0.411) (0.534)
3648.285 2192.685 1931.598 720.622 -158.071 332.839 1350.549 1675.178 1403.151 2465.122 1603.623 -3104.365 3756.991
(1.216) (1.111) (1.562) (0.597) (-0.125) (0.245) (0.989) (1.092) (0.862) (1.264) (0.787) (-0.826) (0.570)
-2460.160 -1723.222 -321.310 225.764 523.371 531.830 -316.284 -377.391 -1671.738 -1486.103 -1560.052 -4382.053 991.067
(-0.455) (-0.513) (-0.135) (0.091) (0.218) (0.253) (-0.157) (-0.166) (-0.563) (-0.439) (-0.294) (-0.551) (0.077)
-0.925 -0.575** -0.245* -0.217* -0.171** -0.167** -0.154** -0.049 0.018 0.096 0.169 0.532 0.947*
(-1.548) (-2.352) (-1.739) (-1.950) (-2.001) (-2.469) (-2.195) (-0.447) (0.137) (0.604) (0.696) (1.135) (1.655)
7.668 5.971 1.533 1.402 1.516 1.570 0.922 1.375 0.138 0.080 0.647 1.760 2.822
(1.235) (0.958) (0.368) (0.385) (0.513) (0.639) (0.380) (0.599) (0.066) (0.038) (0.333) (0.616) (0.684)
-0.414* -0.160* -0.179*** -0.143** -0.097 -0.043 -0.035 -0.061 -0.025 -0.035 -0.044 -0.064 -0.113
(-1.924) (-1.700) (-2.677) (-2.017) (-1.448) (-0.775) (-0.907) (-1.457) (-0.558) (-0.772) (-0.906) (-0.725) (-0.924)
-0.293 0.019 0.028 0.052 0.063 0.070 0.008 0.025 -0.002 -0.023 -0.065 0.059 -0.014
(-0.919) (0.078) (0.324) (0.753) (0.929) (1.242) (0.132) (0.394) (-0.034) (-0.268) (-0.574) (0.238) (-0.043)
-0.943 -0.562 -0.594 -0.520 -0.476 -0.536 -0.354 -0.324 0.052 0.049 0.605 3.050* 2.745
(-0.629) (-1.037) (-1.260) (-1.202) (-1.203) (-1.355) (-1.001) (-0.657) (0.053) (0.038) (0.392) (1.767) (1.625)
0.395 0.223 0.244** 0.222** 0.198* 0.158 0.123 0.120 0.212 0.224 0.119 -0.164 0.673
(1.218) (1.250) (2.311) (2.135) (1.858) (1.495) (0.887) (0.725) (1.249) (1.286) (0.689) (-0.272) (0.398)
-4.92e+04** -1.32e+04 -6870.348 -6092.939 -6773.642 -1.09e+04 -8121.491 -1.82e+04** -1.76e+04* -1.98e+04* -1.26e+04 20312.099 19850.874
(-2.182) (-0.933) (-0.790) (-0.776) (-0.949) (-1.416) (-1.058) (-2.054) (-1.792) (-1.766) (-1.021) (0.788) (0.664)
Cross sectional Income 2007
Age of the HH head
Age of the HH head sqared
Sex of the HH head
Household size
HH head married
Suffered shock in the last 12m
HH head self-employed
HH head wage-employed
Worktime per working capita
Watershed program in village
Prakasam
Kurnool
Anantapur
Mahabub-Nagar
Borrowed bank ever
Borrowed NGO ever
Borrowed SHG ever
Borrowed mnl_lrd ever
Sum from Family or Friends
Other sources: Coops, etc
Sum from SHG or Vill. Orgs
Constant
Borrowed family_fr ever
Borrowed other ever
Sum from Bank
Sum from NGO
Sum from Moneylenders
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Table 90 Differenced variables Q-regression Income
t statistics in parenthesis; * p<0.10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; Nr. of observations: 1,460. In yellow, blue
and orange estimates that are significant at least at 10% level for loan size from SHG, bank and
moneylenders respectively.
Quintiles 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.9 0.95
315.870 -113.283 -143.240 -111.812 -213.326 -204.276 -130.159 -22.136 126.738 81.397 79.001 1.923 56.032
(0.43) (-0.30) (-0.55) (-0.51) (-0.02) (-0.94) (-0.79) (-0.16) (0.97) (0.61) (0.45) (0.01) (0.07)
9773.562** 5824.613** 3804.112** 4197.633*** 3789.282*** 3061.834*** 2753.335*** 2004.140*** 2485.174*** 2568.900*** 3369.213*** 4434.879*** 8041.152**
(2.12) (2.14) (2.43) (3.16) (3.54) (3.26) (3.93) (2.79) (3.27) (3.01) (4.30) (3.01) (2.40)
-8354.795 -9150.711* -5599.125** -3959.185** -4403.739 -3408.622** -3171.256*** -4035.549*** -5553.406*** -5364.958*** -5040.768*** -5842.740* -5657.751
(-0.94) (-1.80) (-2.18) (-2.32) (-0.23) (-2.27) (-2.89) (-3.25) (-3.50) (-3.36) (-3.13) (-1.74) (-0.85)
12265.509*** 7498.046*** 3612.760** 2979.523** 3577.779 3122.889*** 2178.397** 1494.966 1414.739 1686.033 1908.256 1445.790 3255.832
(2.76) (2.81) (2.39) (2.14) (1.50) (3.16) (2.33) (1.63) (1.49) (1.48) (1.41) (0.75) (0.84)
-0.237 -0.350 -0.091 -0.104 -0.111 -0.063 -0.014 0.000 0.025 0.076 -0.047 -0.100 -0.107
(-0.66) (-1.35) (-0.43) (-0.56) (-0.04) (-0.51) (-0.14) (0.00) (0.26) (0.73) (-0.37) (-0.61) (-0.34)
0.118 0.333 0.664 0.777 0.764 0.842 0.912 0.943 1.031 1.069 -0.480 0.157 0.728
(0.03) (0.14) (0.35) (0.41) (0.30) (0.47) (0.53) (0.62) (0.77) (0.83) (-0.38) (0.12) (0.34)
0.005 -0.051 -0.015 -0.042 -0.061 -0.077 -0.094 -0.118** -0.078 -0.086* -0.076 -0.128 -0.325**
(0.02) (-0.31) (-0.17) (-0.60) (-0.02) (-1.18) (-1.60) (-2.46) (-1.50) (-1.72) (-1.40) (-1.64) (-2.08)
-0.131 -0.138 -0.102 -0.085 -0.038 0.037 0.033 0.060 0.038 0.057 0.006 -0.032 0.025
(-0.43) (-0.74) (-0.95) (-1.03) (-0.01) (0.53) (0.52) (0.94) (0.58) (0.73) (0.07) (-0.25) (0.12)
-0.333 -0.298 -0.132 -0.066 -0.194 -0.116 -0.084 0.010 0.065 -0.001 -0.331 -0.045 0.357
(-0.71) (-0.93) (-0.54) (-0.30) (-0.14) (-0.56) (-0.40) (0.04) (0.21) (-0.00) (-0.74) (-0.07) (0.45)
0.124 0.227 0.472** 0.406** 0.366 0.270* 0.267* 0.303* 0.453** 0.435** 0.474** 0.430 0.958*
(0.20) (0.53) (2.33) (2.47) (0.04) (1.73) (1.67) (1.68) (2.37) (2.06) (2.01) (1.39) (1.82)
-8.22e+04*** -5.21e+04*** -2.50e+04*** -1.86e+04*** -1.48e+04 -5430.738*** 357.415 6411.616*** 12815.272*** 17035.290*** 22202.370*** 37718.722*** 62894.393***
(-14.63) (-13.40) (-13.01) (-13.68) (-0.24) (-4.77) (0.43) (6.88) (14.31) (13.92) (17.03) (15.16) (12.84)
Δincome
Δ Age HH head
Δ HH size
Constant
Δ SHG sum
Δ Other sum
Δ family and friend 
sum
Δ Moneylender sum
Δ NGO sum
Δbank sum
Δ asset index
Δ shock
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Table 91 Differenced variables Q-regression Income (including 2005 level variables)
t statistics in parenthesis; * p<0.10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; Nr. of observations: 1,460. In yellow, blue
and orange estimates that are significant at least at 10% level for loan size from SHG, bank and
moneylenders respectively.
Quantiles 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.9 0.95
5313.586** 4886.901*** 4396.312*** 3546.361*** 3584.735*** 4490.048*** 4272.581*** 3570.096*** 4230.544*** 4620.265*** 5057.701*** 5263.191*** 5968.964**
(2.223) (2.655) (3.149) (2.983) (3.193) (4.154) (4.191) (3.310) (4.431) (4.763) (4.640) (3.227) (2.278)
-422.647 -868.034 -3347.193 -1348.990 -1043.040 -247.764 -382.061 -1473.008 -704.374 -486.691 -985.225 1646.318 3307.443
(-0.066) (-0.196) (-1.200) (-0.588) (-0.494) (-0.125) (-0.208) (-0.747) (-0.361) (-0.232) (-0.426) (0.474) (0.518)
-4518.451 -4359.638 1000.593 1144.812 611.133 -382.220 -260.621 -494.313 604.648 -204.671 -1185.526 946.375 1189.266
(-0.730) (-1.108) (0.436) (0.548) (0.312) (-0.204) (-0.166) (-0.313) (0.376) (-0.121) (-0.598) (0.255) (0.193)
-8843.701 -3072.529 -1046.446 -84.008 136.702 -9.961 153.225 79.118 31.810 968.767 1403.535 944.888 7781.951*
(-1.636) (-1.107) (-0.641) (-0.054) (0.107) (-0.008) (0.128) (0.066) (0.029) (0.754) (0.961) (0.413) (1.890)
-13.625** -5.647 -7.387*** -6.260*** -5.735*** -4.767*** -3.637** -3.857** -2.703 -2.287 -1.485 -2.744 -5.038
(-2.397) (-1.373) (-2.956) (-2.589) (-2.759) (-2.591) (-2.087) (-2.279) (-1.520) (-1.229) (-0.732) (-0.922) (-1.122)
-0.471 -0.706* -0.328** -0.347*** -0.378*** -0.290* -0.211 -0.141 0.048 0.046 0.183 0.511 0.632
(-0.930) (-1.687) (-2.406) (-2.827) (-2.879) (-1.870) (-1.402) (-0.804) (0.277) (0.267) (1.055) (1.358) (1.449)
-2.102 3.423 3.279 2.502 2.286 1.452 0.988 0.276 -0.077 -0.299 -0.367 4.260 -0.907
(-0.306) (0.607) (0.726) (0.744) (0.786) (0.534) (0.340) (0.093) (-0.021) (-0.079) (-0.087) (0.992) (-0.195)
-1.164*** -0.884** -0.152 -0.119 -0.092 -0.109 -0.032 -0.033 -0.027 -0.046 0.019 0.029 0.002
(-3.622) (-2.038) (-0.820) (-1.173) (-1.246) (-1.386) (-0.426) (-0.492) (-0.390) (-0.574) (0.201) (0.181) (0.007)
-0.209 -0.233 -0.312 -0.225 -0.238 -0.119 -0.028 -0.005 0.005 -0.020 -0.033 0.191 0.084
(-0.361) (-0.782) (-1.616) (-1.245) (-1.317) (-0.686) (-0.200) (-0.036) (0.043) (-0.159) (-0.214) (0.819) (0.295)
-2.236** -2.456* -0.652 -0.804 -0.912 -0.946* -0.742 -0.255 0.672 0.927 1.341 2.333* 2.221*
(-1.988) (-1.890) (-0.735) (-1.199) (-1.633) (-1.866) (-0.951) (-0.250) (0.655) (0.886) (1.235) (1.916) (1.738)
0.114 -0.356 0.217 0.186 0.154 0.359 0.475* 0.539* 0.444 0.475 0.463 0.679 2.022
(0.153) (-0.646) (0.788) (0.834) (0.745) (1.545) (1.695) (1.817) (1.524) (1.628) (1.485) (0.839) (1.490)
-5924.791 -3477.612 403.563 720.711 -585.130 2467.136 -740.930 -1997.468 2301.471 1936.412 2328.730 7092.658 10798.003
(-0.669) (-0.696) (0.118) (0.217) (-0.181) (0.806) (-0.247) (-0.651) (0.725) (0.589) (0.582) (0.787) (0.807)
-3.57e+04*** -2.74e+04*** -1.59e+04*** -1.26e+04*** -1.10e+04*** -7936.285** -1.05e+04*** -6729.667* -4268.656 -2147.921 -3754.896 -1.32e+04** -1.73e+04*
(-3.527) (-3.405) (-3.409) (-2.838) (-2.748) (-2.285) (-2.776) (-1.918) (-1.305) (-0.649) (-1.030) (-2.168) (-1.818)
4718.269 12146.034** 11452.508*** 12530.742*** 10940.311*** 10506.868*** 5782.757* 3678.028 3688.708 3250.532 1536.489 -533.288 -2644.237
(0.568) (2.348) (3.334) (4.061) (3.585) (3.420) (1.842) (1.284) (1.271) (1.013) (0.398) (-0.074) (-0.221)
-3.19e+04** -1.32e+04* -8051.279** -4691.102 -5522.402* -4791.625 -4487.696 -2654.163 -4568.324 -4107.251 -5526.173 -1.20e+04* -1.77e+04*
(-2.492) (-1.901) (-1.986) (-1.336) (-1.702) (-1.370) (-1.182) (-0.815) (-1.631) (-1.350) (-1.545) (-1.810) (-1.732)
2204.642 541.743 -102.331 558.246 836.460 1753.400** 1920.961*** 2072.967*** 2839.414*** 3143.037*** 3528.574*** 3368.718*** 5120.399***
(1.195) (0.421) (-0.126) (0.798) (1.199) (2.504) (3.024) (3.078) (4.820) (5.097) (5.146) (2.951) (2.687)
13343.033 10391.228 3176.819 6245.380* 6355.795** 8398.985*** 7997.362*** 7103.865*** 9778.156*** 9813.930*** 10021.621*** 14390.857*** 12025.784
(1.383) (1.560) (0.837) (1.947) (2.220) (2.930) (2.818) (2.744) (3.569) (3.366) (3.023) (2.805) (1.535)
-5379.977 -5577.327 -2180.543 -2621.792 -2370.456 -2830.310* -1789.875 -2426.170* -1686.386 -1847.496 -1711.574 -1932.624 -3873.647
(-0.979) (-1.509) (-0.974) (-1.352) (-1.329) (-1.892) (-1.332) (-1.669) (-1.136) (-1.169) (-0.931) (-0.603) (-0.692)
-2.95e+04*** -2.24e+04*** -1.32e+04*** -1.18e+04*** -9251.950*** -7819.691*** -5296.185*** -3446.852** -3456.882** -2514.786 -548.384 369.309 10917.274*
(-4.016) (-5.227) (-5.995) (-6.231) (-5.211) (-4.484) (-3.356) (-2.166) (-2.249) (-1.466) (-0.278) (0.112) (1.764)
-18.796** -9.596** -10.032*** -7.220*** -6.574*** -5.646*** -4.616** -2.843 -1.317 0.053 1.123 2.351 0.338
(-2.405) (-2.016) (-3.699) (-2.757) (-2.935) (-2.912) (-2.239) (-1.406) (-0.589) (0.022) (0.415) (0.521) (0.053)
-1.116** -1.292*** -0.596** -0.571*** -0.533*** -0.460** -0.384** -0.201 -0.068 -0.025 0.216 0.831** 1.273**
(-2.147) (-2.713) (-2.453) (-2.765) (-2.694) (-2.470) (-2.235) (-1.028) (-0.323) (-0.110) (0.864) (2.146) (2.031)
-1.666 3.570 2.881 2.074 1.733 0.728 0.124 -0.651 -1.131 -1.397 -1.605 2.763 -2.781
(-0.226) (0.595) (0.599) (0.556) (0.504) (0.218) (0.036) (-0.188) (-0.286) (-0.349) (-0.372) (0.616) (-0.551)
-1.657*** -1.030** -0.198 -0.176 -0.167 -0.186* -0.036 0.055 0.062 0.023 0.046 0.016 0.002
(-3.180) (-2.192) (-0.997) (-1.326) (-1.527) (-1.738) (-0.354) (0.544) (0.622) (0.217) (0.372) (0.071) (0.009)
-0.004 -0.103 -0.243 -0.180 -0.207 -0.113 -0.043 -0.002 0.000 0.016 0.007 0.138 -0.141
(-0.006) (-0.325) (-1.157) (-0.918) (-1.068) (-0.601) (-0.279) (-0.011) (0.002) (0.102) (0.036) (0.502) (-0.394)
-2.690* -2.133 -0.703 -0.847 -0.954 -0.850 -0.700 -0.236 0.678 1.439 1.897 3.411** 3.013*
(-1.897) (-1.620) (-0.772) (-1.198) (-1.586) (-1.547) (-0.881) (-0.228) (0.640) (1.273) (1.601) (2.478) (1.880)
-0.533 -0.227 -0.038 -0.110 -0.174 0.206 0.129 0.157 0.183 0.132 -0.051 0.137 0.866
(-0.485) (-0.354) (-0.093) (-0.299) (-0.516) (0.600) (0.359) (0.426) (0.509) (0.347) (-0.125) (0.160) (0.548)
3615.004 4709.675 7036.789 2264.998 2525.246 1015.251 3075.214 5881.377 2743.843 1837.184 1767.786 13695.885 22286.221
(0.292) (0.540) (1.324) (0.468) (0.585) (0.235) (0.697) (1.360) (0.606) (0.369) (0.313) (1.550) (1.578)
Sum NGO
Sum Bank
Worktime per working
capita
Index of asset ownership
Max educ level in HH
Constant
Sum SHG
Sum others
Sum Family
Sum Moneylenders
Suffered shock
Household size
Mahabub-Nagar
Anantapur
Kurnool
Δ HHsize                                
Prakasam
ΔSHG_sum                               
Δother_sum                             
Δfamily_fr_sum                         
ΔmnΔlrd_sum                           
ΔNGO_sum                               
Δbank_sum                              
Δworktime_pcw                          
Δasset_indx                            
Δeduc_max                              
Δ shock                                 
Δincome
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Figure 26 Year 2007 Income
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Figure 27 Household variables. Income
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Figure 28 Loan size variables. Income
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Figure 29 SHG loan size. Income
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Table 92 CRE Income
Nr. of observations: 2,907. In yellow, blue and orange estimates that are significant at least at 10% level for loan size from SHG, bank and moneylenders
respectively.
Quintiles 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
129.01 3,697.81 3,640.82 3,403.93 2,971.14 2,638.06 2,166.77 1,613.13 986.36 129.01 699.15- 1,402.82- 2,201.69- 3,126.47- 3,917.18- 4,256.77- 5,553.04- 8,657.48- 11,270.63-
0.13 3.43 3.91 4.09 3.60 3.07 2.38 1.78 1.08 0.13 0.69- 1.30- 1.99- 2.70- 3.08- 2.67- 2.40- 3.02- 2.44-
2,882.10 865.55 756.15 867.41 1,164.52 1,559.27 1,874.90 2,205.61 2,562.93 2,882.10 3,208.46 3,481.27 3,713.30 4,045.92 4,653.64 5,360.81 6,183.05 7,397.80 8,462.66
4.53 0.95 0.98 1.07 1.52 2.24 2.90 3.47 4.24 4.53 4.44 4.29 4.16 4.05 4.20 4.97 4.49 4.10 2.86
3,108.10- 3,987.75- 3,731.98- 3,779.82- 3,783.59- 3,669.95- 3,354.10- 3,228.38- 3,169.76- 3,108.10- 3,210.65- 3,665.70- 4,251.09- 4,609.63- 4,695.60- 4,197.41- 3,356.46- 3,059.03- 4,383.74-
2.80- 2.56- 2.91- 3.18- 3.27- 3.50- 3.12- 2.92- 2.98- 2.80- 2.57- 2.47- 2.71- 2.75- 2.61- 1.84- 1.12- 0.79- 0.67-
406.49 1,240.48- 1,506.84- 1,133.37- 558.50- 329.19- 175.17- 25.15 105.31 406.49 764.29 977.76 1,406.11 1,535.28 1,109.07 880.47 1,046.53 1,744.24 1,522.88
0.32 0.70- 0.99- 0.76- 0.40- 0.26- 0.14- 0.02 0.09 0.32 0.54 0.60 0.81 0.77 0.50 0.35 0.30 0.36 0.23
2,490.43 77.58- 870.83 1,326.04 1,582.16 1,566.78 1,794.66 2,165.09 2,362.97 2,490.43 2,740.97 3,149.43 3,523.34 3,842.78 4,561.70 5,138.27 6,098.31 8,471.38 11,170.96
2.45 0.05- 0.83 1.40 1.65 1.71 1.89 2.23 2.34 2.45 2.51 2.64 3.01 3.06 2.99 3.03 2.50 2.70 2.22
-2.1 -2.2907 -1.7185 -1.6744 -1.9853 -2.2685 -2.317 -2.2741 -2.2596 -2.1 -1.9422 -1.752 -1.6631 -1.9573 -2.382 -2.4501 -1.8629 -1.7723 0.301
1.46- 1.51- 1.54- 1.67- 1.75- 1.87- 1.99- 1.95- 1.76- 1.46- 1.29- 1.10- 1.07- 1.16- 1.32- 1.11- 0.65- 0.48- 0.05
-0.136 -0.2334 -0.1731 -0.1383 -0.1232 -0.1256 -0.1292 -0.1428 -0.1496 -0.136 -0.1086 -0.0796 -0.0587 -0.0451 -0.0149 0.0632 0.2313 0.4006 0.4065
1.30- 1.50- 1.57- 1.45- 1.43- 1.37- 1.30- 1.38- 1.47- 1.30- 0.95- 0.64- 0.44- 0.30- 0.08- 0.27 0.83 1.36 1.24
0.4922 1.7049 1.1031 0.8628 0.7541 0.6353 0.5671 0.5239 0.5146 0.4922 0.4524 0.4321 0.3477 0.2204 0.1713 0.1614 0.1268 0.1099 0.000834
0.35 0.94 0.64 0.54 0.50 0.45 0.41 0.38 0.37 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.24 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.00
-0.0635 -0.0771 -0.0687 -0.0572 -0.0528 -0.061 -0.0743 -0.0762 -0.068 -0.0635 -0.0734 -0.0854 -0.0985 -0.109 -0.1145 -0.141 -0.1846 -0.2974 -0.6625
1.05- 0.84- 0.88- 0.90- 0.86- 1.03- 1.26- 1.32- 1.13- 1.05- 1.23- 1.46- 1.74- 1.84- 1.79- 1.86- 1.88- 1.78- 1.80-
0.0242 -0.0756 -0.0143 0.0179 0.0315 0.0493 0.0632 0.0606 0.0428 0.0242 0.0105 0.00452 -0.000964 -0.0187 -0.0548 -0.1084 -0.1647 -0.2481 -0.36
0.33 0.69- 0.16- 0.27 0.49 0.81 1.10 1.02 0.63 0.33 0.13 0.05 0.01- 0.20- 0.51- 0.74- 0.90- 1.29- 1.04-
-0.2514 -0.5334 -0.4385 -0.343 -0.2837 -0.2651 -0.2733 -0.2698 -0.2572 -0.2514 -0.2424 -0.2225 -0.2097 -0.2439 -0.3189 -0.3751 -0.4204 -0.2481 0.4766
0.94- 1.71- 1.67- 1.36- 1.07- 1.01- 1.06- 1.02- 0.96- 0.94- 0.96- 0.85- 0.65- 0.57- 0.62- 0.68- 0.68- 0.29- 0.37
0.3262 0.2111 0.1879 0.1871 0.1912 0.2271 0.2717 0.3034 0.3215 0.3262 0.3172 0.3176 0.331 0.3362 0.3383 0.3147 0.3355 0.3833 0.5197
1.86 0.89 1.07 1.12 1.14 1.35 1.57 1.74 1.87 1.86 1.76 1.77 1.83 1.81 1.85 1.48 1.34 1.25 0.85
853.81- 2,489.09- 1,937.03- 1,675.29- 1,870.94- 2,260.97- 2,155.70- 1,667.03- 1,290.21- 853.81- 1,082.50- 1,334.26- 1,320.49- 1,388.02- 1,047.77- 947.59- 470.96 4,933.81 9,494.55
0.48- 1.21- 1.03- 0.99- 1.10- 1.37- 1.36- 1.06- 0.78- 0.48- 0.54- 0.67- 0.62- 0.64- 0.47- 0.36- 0.13 1.15 1.45
sum
moneylender
sum family
friend
sum others
sum SHGs
constant
Max education
Asset index
worktime
p_c_working
sum from bank
sum from NGO
Correlated Random Effects Model Income
year 2007
HH size
shock
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Table 93 λ parameter. Income per capita 2005 
Nr. of observations: 2,907. In red, estimates significant at least at 10% level..
Quintiles 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
-115.186 -39.600 -12.145 3.454 13.672 9.729 -17.184 -56.046 -94.293 -115.186 -127.228 -133.291 -115.694 -115.223 -146.725 -213.876 -313.577 -500.879 -845.037
-1.077 -0.275 -0.102 0.031 0.118 0.080 -0.142 -0.486 -0.840 -1.077 -1.130 -0.979 -0.771 -0.745 -0.948 -1.205 -1.471 -1.948 -1.737
-320.373 -399.672 -433.615 -400.847 -388.190 -400.997 -426.889 -449.009 -398.131 -320.373 -253.854 -194.352 -105.630 -40.677 129.365 287.225 355.928 649.292 1064.124
-1.435 -1.278 -1.602 -1.748 -1.616 -1.712 -1.911 -2.215 -1.850 -1.435 -1.015 -0.699 -0.357 -0.121 0.319 0.597 0.657 1.050 0.867
295.686 543.444 490.940 379.518 287.269 276.255 275.411 259.203 268.420 295.686 348.125 397.483 382.916 348.682 412.396 610.945 665.793 526.865 -104.035
1.490 1.593 1.839 1.572 1.156 1.075 1.064 1.074 1.249 1.490 1.579 1.639 1.510 1.202 1.198 1.454 1.260 0.809 -0.091
-67.902 -497.525 -489.513 -478.345 -433.739 -349.089 -267.663 -199.548 -124.517 -67.902 -51.346 -39.982 -6.066 41.351 105.350 256.144 488.329 723.784 1717.427
-0.417 -2.306 -2.355 -2.613 -2.521 -2.134 -1.642 -1.265 -0.774 -0.417 -0.307 -0.232 -0.033 0.195 0.407 0.809 1.346 1.489 1.703
1.094 0.511 0.651 0.741 0.810 0.873 0.928 0.964 1.019 1.094 1.161 1.215 1.335 1.510 1.746 1.879 2.057 2.570 2.771
4.270 1.648 2.722 3.128 3.213 3.625 4.032 4.279 4.257 4.270 3.967 4.053 4.108 4.046 4.535 4.705 4.629 3.963 2.748
-0.005 -0.029 -0.023 -0.021 -0.019 -0.015 -0.011 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 0.000 0.005 0.009 0.013 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.047
-0.257 -1.145 -1.255 -1.264 -1.101 -0.803 -0.578 -0.420 -0.266 -0.257 -0.184 -0.013 0.274 0.498 0.647 0.589 0.515 0.395 0.645
-0.034 -0.304 -0.189 -0.137 -0.113 -0.075 -0.056 -0.046 -0.041 -0.034 -0.027 -0.028 -0.018 -0.012 -0.019 -0.056 -0.119 -0.209 -0.373
-0.105 -0.632 -0.423 -0.328 -0.277 -0.201 -0.160 -0.135 -0.126 -0.105 -0.087 -0.093 -0.066 -0.049 -0.077 -0.257 -0.538 -0.833 -0.849
0.006 -0.019 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.012 0.018 0.026 0.036 0.113
0.681 -1.080 -0.397 -0.210 -0.205 -0.156 -0.008 0.177 0.382 0.681 0.778 0.746 0.811 0.823 0.821 1.035 1.489 1.592 1.493
-0.005 -0.011 -0.013 -0.016 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.010 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.012 0.069
-0.390 -0.608 -0.853 -1.098 -1.071 -1.037 -0.971 -0.671 -0.462 -0.390 -0.413 -0.456 -0.410 -0.296 -0.192 -0.056 0.084 0.226 0.758
0.023 0.004 -0.009 -0.011 -0.001 0.008 0.011 0.013 0.017 0.023 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.031 0.036 0.045 0.050 0.030 -0.038
0.833 0.098 -0.288 -0.346 -0.044 0.331 0.621 0.697 0.722 0.833 0.963 0.826 0.588 0.542 0.487 0.487 0.517 0.355 -0.326
0.016 -0.016 0.002 0.011 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.011 0.005 0.000 -0.005 -0.016 -0.040 -0.060 -0.053
0.552 -0.223 0.045 0.323 0.573 0.568 0.468 0.475 0.537 0.552 0.535 0.394 0.182 -0.010 -0.177 -0.555 -1.179 -1.395 -0.573
sum others
sum SHGs
λ parameters CRE 05 INCOME PC
worktime p_c_working
sum from bank
sum from NGO
sum moneylender
sum family friend
HH size
shock
Max education
Asset index
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Table 94 λ parameter. Income per capita 2007 
Nr. of observations: 2,907. In red, estimates significant at least at 10% level..
Quintiles 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
61.423 106.715 122.302 107.771 70.108 50.285 46.221 55.520 58.772 61.423 75.495 72.737 36.983 11.143 0.147 -17.956 -60.067 -80.150 -12.877
0.535 0.632 0.790 0.720 0.535 0.463 0.488 0.623 0.594 0.535 0.599 0.506 0.227 0.060 0.001 -0.096 -0.299 -0.307 -0.034
-203.186 -252.606 -201.998 -215.120 -221.857 -248.756 -306.462 -296.918 -234.152 -203.186 -140.171 -17.114 126.428 218.185 266.355 182.579 -145.787 -294.089 -605.401
-0.709 -0.798 -0.726 -0.857 -0.968 -1.132 -1.278 -1.191 -0.887 -0.709 -0.427 -0.049 0.355 0.574 0.625 0.338 -0.231 -0.334 -0.455
-480.117 -134.964 -90.636 -162.841 -216.710 -211.034 -276.710 -398.453 -473.206 -480.117 -436.916 -440.292 -521.542 -665.820 -724.144 -640.079 -422.652 43.075 -252.938
-1.917 -0.463 -0.355 -0.585 -0.789 -0.872 -1.285 -1.916 -1.994 -1.917 -1.510 -1.399 -1.578 -1.778 -1.741 -1.412 -0.664 0.052 -0.200
-96.066 -49.938 -114.805 -147.696 -101.144 -40.090 -35.571 -72.425 -94.737 -96.066 -82.583 -49.596 -26.971 -18.787 66.411 147.563 132.063 103.928 -57.810
-0.484 -0.244 -0.602 -0.814 -0.586 -0.231 -0.204 -0.415 -0.520 -0.484 -0.372 -0.222 -0.124 -0.073 0.220 0.463 0.365 0.224 -0.063
1.440 0.562 0.685 0.860 1.006 1.119 1.235 1.313 1.383 1.440 1.519 1.583 1.636 1.756 1.876 1.825 1.699 1.580 1.803
5.402 2.081 2.655 3.600 4.267 4.689 5.247 5.605 5.246 5.402 5.346 5.245 4.983 4.920 4.651 3.860 2.955 1.831 1.260
0.010 -0.016 -0.011 -0.008 -0.007 -0.005 0.001 0.008 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.012 0.019 0.024 0.022 0.016 0.021 0.016
0.598 -0.690 -0.621 -0.531 -0.474 -0.312 0.048 0.507 0.703 0.598 0.428 0.354 0.475 0.676 0.871 0.730 0.435 0.434 0.280
0.090 -0.127 0.078 0.177 0.204 0.205 0.176 0.143 0.116 0.090 0.051 0.003 -0.023 -0.036 -0.037 -0.051 -0.076 -0.109 -0.396
0.410 -0.161 0.123 0.381 0.575 0.767 0.726 0.658 0.549 0.410 0.240 0.012 -0.077 -0.106 -0.097 -0.114 -0.137 -0.186 -0.543
0.005 -0.014 -0.011 -0.007 -0.002 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.015 0.026 0.043 0.067
0.426 -0.896 -0.956 -0.710 -0.183 0.192 0.363 0.462 0.437 0.426 0.424 0.454 0.608 0.671 0.620 0.737 1.036 1.267 1.222
-0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.015 0.026 0.035 0.042 0.055 0.111
-0.131 0.140 0.148 0.135 0.004 -0.197 -0.379 -0.380 -0.239 -0.131 -0.099 -0.093 0.086 0.576 0.953 1.142 1.272 1.434 1.218
0.018 -0.061 -0.035 -0.024 -0.025 -0.023 -0.014 -0.003 0.007 0.018 0.029 0.038 0.051 0.076 0.101 0.117 0.130 0.159 0.229
0.312 -0.733 -0.514 -0.415 -0.456 -0.401 -0.228 -0.051 0.112 0.312 0.545 0.718 0.879 1.080 1.365 1.593 1.391 0.913 0.742
-0.028 0.009 0.005 0.003 -0.003 -0.014 -0.020 -0.025 -0.027 -0.028 -0.027 -0.027 -0.029 -0.031 -0.033 -0.031 -0.038 -0.030 0.138
-1.060 0.220 0.165 0.095 -0.132 -0.547 -0.803 -0.965 -1.031 -1.060 -1.031 -1.099 -1.173 -1.094 -0.849 -0.616 -0.626 -0.385 0.735
sum others
sum SHGs
λ parameters CRE 07 INCOME PC
worktime p_c_working
sum from bank
sum from NGO
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Table 95 λ parameter. Income 2005 
Nr. of observations: 2,907. In red, estimates significant at least at 10% level..
Quintiles 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
-528.050 -515.429 -265.337 -176.156 -118.814 -126.618 -207.182 -344.978 -450.033 -528.050 -596.284 -637.990 -608.731 -590.973 -700.917 -869.159 -1097.679 -1394.202 -1470.419
-1.435 -0.827 -0.580 -0.402 -0.289 -0.321 -0.507 -0.838 -1.153 -1.435 -1.467 -1.463 -1.336 -1.201 -1.279 -1.499 -1.498 -1.231 -0.646
-1943.396 -1972.395 -2025.883 -1962.991 -1942.904 -1907.732 -2063.798 -2208.255 -2221.761 -1943.396 -1677.490 -1271.526 -854.918 -482.079 73.706 394.761 -389.167 -1034.675 945.236
-2.093 -1.370 -1.686 -1.956 -1.985 -2.054 -2.280 -2.503 -2.537 -2.093 -1.583 -1.120 -0.686 -0.375 0.048 0.212 -0.158 -0.422 0.233
1318.774 2246.519 1893.922 1517.642 1206.589 1101.235 1073.717 1094.792 1260.872 1318.774 1488.543 1671.018 1541.225 1456.206 1618.784 1689.152 1761.500 863.889 -1878.888
1.498 1.452 1.590 1.516 1.237 1.121 1.073 1.074 1.369 1.498 1.576 1.569 1.351 1.328 1.351 0.962 0.741 0.293 -0.426
-257.794 -2629.307 -2412.416 -2135.150 -2007.487 -1701.077 -1354.918 -1149.809 -804.396 -257.794 88.962 135.439 179.414 391.973 466.416 897.883 2228.638 4293.223 9604.452
-0.350 -2.290 -2.640 -2.490 -2.372 -2.246 -1.879 -1.706 -1.186 -0.350 0.116 0.181 0.235 0.449 0.437 0.643 1.208 1.792 2.222
4.214 2.534 2.680 2.846 3.143 3.433 3.590 3.779 4.005 4.214 4.617 5.051 5.452 5.956 6.680 7.593 8.718 10.014 11.121
4.027 1.990 2.923 3.384 3.595 4.395 4.804 4.438 4.316 4.027 3.792 3.995 4.335 4.533 4.623 4.721 4.824 4.359 2.996
-0.017 -0.085 -0.073 -0.072 -0.079 -0.073 -0.054 -0.034 -0.022 -0.017 -0.007 0.013 0.035 0.054 0.077 0.110 0.134 0.089 0.056
-0.204 -0.718 -0.883 -0.978 -1.097 -0.888 -0.648 -0.418 -0.278 -0.204 -0.080 0.149 0.426 0.638 0.756 0.868 0.828 0.448 0.205
-0.041 -1.074 -0.626 -0.401 -0.307 -0.191 -0.138 -0.097 -0.088 -0.041 -0.047 -0.092 -0.075 -0.053 -0.123 -0.339 -0.645 -1.097 -1.997
-0.029 -0.505 -0.321 -0.216 -0.172 -0.117 -0.088 -0.064 -0.060 -0.029 -0.035 -0.071 -0.062 -0.050 -0.125 -0.382 -0.672 -0.903 -1.052
0.037 -0.093 -0.029 -0.012 -0.002 0.007 0.013 0.021 0.030 0.037 0.043 0.045 0.047 0.049 0.048 0.058 0.075 0.155 0.668
0.968 -0.922 -0.377 -0.217 -0.047 0.134 0.270 0.465 0.739 0.968 1.083 1.124 1.167 1.141 0.968 0.951 1.073 1.282 1.650
-0.014 -0.047 -0.053 -0.065 -0.060 -0.053 -0.050 -0.039 -0.022 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 -0.009 0.004 0.035 0.073 0.117 0.111
-0.249 -0.497 -0.685 -0.960 -0.878 -0.810 -0.802 -0.592 -0.366 -0.249 -0.247 -0.243 -0.190 -0.118 0.050 0.289 0.461 0.668 0.368
0.061 0.017 0.006 -0.016 -0.005 0.025 0.037 0.035 0.042 0.061 0.085 0.091 0.101 0.138 0.197 0.249 0.285 0.221 0.011
0.538 0.069 0.037 -0.108 -0.032 0.189 0.403 0.465 0.472 0.538 0.593 0.493 0.382 0.378 0.441 0.521 0.591 0.464 0.020
0.078 -0.103 0.018 0.070 0.083 0.076 0.066 0.064 0.071 0.078 0.076 0.062 0.037 0.004 -0.031 -0.061 -0.129 -0.261 -0.507
0.578 -0.260 0.068 0.427 0.653 0.635 0.519 0.486 0.524 0.578 0.583 0.518 0.312 0.034 -0.252 -0.468 -0.800 -1.469 -1.666
sum others
sum SHGs
λ parameters CRE 05 INCOME
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sum from bank
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Table 96 λ parameter. Income 2007 
Nr. of observations: 2,907. In red, estimates significant at least at 10% level..
Quintiles 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
541.187 614.137 764.726 851.257 752.564 655.958 673.193 677.911 617.943 541.187 437.238 351.779 267.384 155.708 -137.609 -502.752 -795.930 -1322.032 -2086.489
0.965 0.842 1.147 1.187 1.127 1.120 1.272 1.314 1.201 0.965 0.690 0.475 0.330 0.166 -0.133 -0.504 -0.636 -0.871 -1.089
-1139.053 -1095.136 -1048.822 -1066.993 -936.929 -985.874 -1110.872 -1220.609 -1234.430 -1139.053 -737.136 180.041 1023.900 1404.763 1481.451 1383.082 381.484 -451.959 -77.470
-0.952 -0.785 -0.843 -0.925 -0.888 -0.955 -1.094 -1.164 -1.145 -0.952 -0.548 0.120 0.674 0.902 0.904 0.665 0.134 -0.121 -0.013
-1551.349 -557.052 -369.074 -548.356 -723.040 -813.699 -947.859 -1103.347 -1227.651 -1551.349 -1861.973 -2061.694 -2211.600 -2156.682 -1815.431 -1359.730 -1052.621 -1166.549 2136.720
-1.629 -0.381 -0.290 -0.423 -0.605 -0.783 -1.026 -1.275 -1.421 -1.629 -1.610 -1.518 -1.479 -1.237 -0.939 -0.691 -0.382 -0.284 0.391
-273.575 -323.420 -526.193 -695.923 -512.295 -139.721 -57.137 -272.698 -374.961 -273.575 -188.422 -207.289 -227.730 -59.841 472.857 1283.785 1492.606 993.021 2327.817
-0.316 -0.308 -0.635 -0.930 -0.637 -0.171 -0.071 -0.327 -0.426 -0.316 -0.203 -0.192 -0.206 -0.052 0.356 0.879 0.744 0.401 0.655
5.080 2.363 2.607 3.172 3.808 4.491 4.940 5.095 5.109 5.080 5.313 5.716 6.249 7.071 7.639 7.630 7.014 7.635 6.385
3.990 2.190 2.785 3.458 3.685 3.940 4.557 4.740 4.423 3.990 4.076 4.184 4.272 4.392 4.600 3.739 2.599 2.105 1.237
0.022 -0.082 -0.050 -0.033 -0.033 -0.031 -0.025 0.002 0.026 0.022 0.011 0.014 0.035 0.081 0.109 0.119 0.107 0.161 0.239
0.270 -0.773 -0.562 -0.428 -0.484 -0.434 -0.313 0.023 0.312 0.270 0.129 0.147 0.300 0.577 0.793 0.850 0.599 0.610 0.825
0.670 0.169 0.979 1.344 1.412 1.356 1.152 0.956 0.758 0.670 0.514 0.269 0.091 0.001 -0.086 -0.334 -0.508 -0.930 -1.952
0.644 0.049 0.353 0.660 0.917 1.188 1.125 1.076 0.812 0.644 0.519 0.227 0.063 0.001 -0.048 -0.169 -0.219 -0.345 -0.547
0.025 -0.041 -0.059 -0.048 -0.022 -0.005 0.004 0.013 0.019 0.025 0.031 0.035 0.037 0.041 0.043 0.062 0.103 0.211 0.593
0.430 -0.648 -1.225 -0.952 -0.407 -0.106 0.093 0.250 0.332 0.430 0.553 0.647 0.724 0.785 0.715 0.805 0.914 1.094 1.876
-0.018 0.019 0.022 0.019 0.003 -0.014 -0.031 -0.038 -0.032 -0.018 -0.002 0.009 0.022 0.053 0.090 0.142 0.234 0.320 0.468
-0.213 0.260 0.375 0.340 0.058 -0.250 -0.574 -0.631 -0.435 -0.213 -0.019 0.090 0.214 0.470 0.691 0.781 1.110 1.820 1.221
0.078 -0.177 -0.161 -0.159 -0.141 -0.098 -0.052 0.003 0.041 0.078 0.124 0.187 0.298 0.449 0.659 0.738 0.899 1.159 0.979
0.249 -0.615 -0.634 -0.616 -0.512 -0.345 -0.178 0.011 0.134 0.249 0.396 0.582 0.873 1.113 1.590 1.795 1.379 1.587 1.143
-0.123 0.009 -0.014 -0.014 -0.011 -0.047 -0.092 -0.116 -0.126 -0.123 -0.108 -0.105 -0.111 -0.110 -0.116 -0.125 -0.162 -0.122 0.415
-0.958 0.046 -0.087 -0.106 -0.083 -0.381 -0.764 -0.921 -0.979 -0.958 -0.845 -0.829 -0.902 -0.805 -0.693 -0.569 -0.586 -0.358 0.556
sum others
sum SHGs
λ parameters CRE 07 INCOME
worktime p_c_working
sum from bank
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sum moneylender
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Table 97 Cross sectional Q-regression Income per capita 2005. Negative income per capita observations
withdrawn.
Q-regression cross sectional 2005 income per capita Q-regression cross sectional 2007 income per capita
Source \ Quintiles 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
banks -0.014 0.017 0.047 0.146*** 0.191*** -0.014* -0.004 0.020 0.097* 0.203**
(-0.677) (0.891) (1.195) (3.176) (3.024) (-1.750) (-0.298) (0.814) (1.793) (2.418)
NGO 0.199 0.292 0.269 0.242 0.192 0.527 0.370 0.291 0.227 0.511
(0.736) (0.812) (0.499) (0.414) (0.233) (1.610) (1.413) (0.700) (0.572) (0.679)
Moneylender 0.006 0.005 0.019 0.006 0.025 0.012* 0.003 0.000 -0.004 -0.020
z-scores (1.804) (0.511) (1.511) (0.521) (0.269) (1.851) (0.734) (0.064) (-0.280) (-1.169)
Family and frieds 0.045 0.016 0.028** 0.012 0.025 0.016* 0.019** 0.012 0.024 0.029
(0.779) (1.168) (2.125) (0.553) (0.389) (1.661) (2.436) (1.128) (0.808) (0.716)
Other sources -0.006 0.005 0.038 0.003 -0.009 0.010 -0.018 -0.025 0.210 0.742**
(1.043) (0.127) (0.687) (0.047) (-0.064) (0.312) (-0.381) (-0.254) (0.707) (2.115)
SHGs 0.005 0.097*** 0.081** 0.060 0.039 0.036* 0.040* 0.029 0.027 0.038
(0.952) (3.058) (2.469) (1.114) (0.639) (1.646) (1.663) (0.867) (0.704) (0.296)
t statistics in parenthesis; * p<0.10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; Nr. of observations: 1,256 for 2005 and
1,311 for 2007.
Table 98 Differenced variables Q-regression Income per Capita. Negative income per capita observations
withdrawn.
Δ income per capita with no 2005 levels  Δ income per capita with 2005 levels 
Source \ Quintiles 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
banks 0.083* 0.032 0.020 0.027 0.056 -0.140** -0.102 -0.074* 0.055 0.173*
(1.681) (0.979) (0.774) (0.860) (0.522) (-1.967) (-1.499) (-1.825) (0.685) (1.840)
NGO 0.086 0.201 0.236 0.263 -0.343 1.698 0.034 -0.274 -0.522 -0.187
(0.151) (0.422) (0.634) (1.008) (0.921) (0.192) (0.014) (-0.065) (-0.237) (-0.059)
Moneylender 0.003 -0.006 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.067 -0.012 0.031 0.036 0.068*
(0.135) (-0.416) (-0.994) (-0.992) (-1.738) (-0.558) (-0.389) (1.366) (1.184) (1.678)
Family and frieds -0.013 -0.004 0.016 0.012 0.004 -0.034 -0.039 -0.044 -0.025 0.008
(-0.501) (-0.282) (1.459) (0.749) (0.137) (-0.459) (-0.986) (-1.087) (-0.498) (0.117)
Other sources 0.074 -0.004 0.006 0.037 0.072 0.221 -0.042 -0.075 0.215 0.694
(0.918) (-0.087) (0.312) (0.930) (0.962) (0.681) (-0.217) (-0.267) (0.552) (1.639)
SHGs 0.101** 0.101*** 0.075** 0.129*** 0.125 -0.149 -0.048 -0.092 -0.078 -0.116
(2.085) (4.340) (2.421) (3.413) (2.463) (-0.704) (-0.548) (-1.293) (-0.870) (-0.619)
t statistics in parenthesis; * p<0.10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; Nr. of observations: 1,138
265
Table 99 Cross sectional Q-regression Income 2005. Negative income observations withdrawn.
Q-regression cross sectional 2005 income Q-regression cross sectional 2007 income
Source \ Quintiles 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
banks 0.033 0.052 0.251 0.755*** 0.786** -0.090** -0.047 0.093 0.306 0.915*
z-scores (-0.641) (0.563) (1.240) (4.291) (2.114) (-2.190) (-0.660) (0.744) (1.253) (1.729)
NGO 1.423 1.149 1.063 0.995 0.774 3.002 2.462 1.622 1.187 2.138
z-scores (0.506) (0.470) (0.449) (0.431) (0.221) (1.468) (1.556) (0.881) (0.602) (0.683)
Moneylender 0.036 0.017 0.054 0.025 -0.020 0.064** 0.027 -0.007 -0.007 -0.071
z-scores (1.641) (0.436) (1.020) (0.430) (-0.050) (2.292) (1.218) (-0.254) (-0.122) (-0.811)
Family & Friends 0.113 0.073 0.108* 0.059 -0.029 0.072 0.104** 0.061 -0.042 0.101
z-scores (0.616) (1.242) (1.856) (0.719) (-0.165) (1.395) (2.204) (1.060) (-0.439) (0.440)
Other 0.074 0.045 0.229 0.022 0.092 0.022 -0.163 -0.092 1.589 3.057**
z-scores (1.343) (0.235) (1.099) (0.071) (0.139) (0.106) (-0.665) (-0.166) (1.254) (2.003)
SHG 0.216 0.572*** 0.488*** 0.388** 0.266 0.190* 0.193* 0.124 0.139 -0.266
z-scores (1.369) (4.121) (4.113) (2.157) (0.927) (1.847) (1.789) (0.672) (0.961) (-0.440)
t statistics in parenthesis; * p<0.10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; Nr. of observations: 1,256 for 2005 and
1,311 for 2007.
Table 100 Differenced variables Q-regression Incom. Negative income observations withdrawn.
Δ with no 2005 levels income Δ with 2005 levels income 
Source \ Quintiles 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
banks 0.334 0.206 0.128 0.239 0.163 -0.641 -0.345 -0.498** 0.406 0.866*
z-scores (1.319) (1.067) (0.847) (1.416) (0.909) (-1.562) (-1.180) (-2.144) (1.069) (1.812)
NGO 0.275 0.785 0.900 1.054 -0.284 8.646 1.881 -0.294 -2.580 -2.463
z-scores (0.065) (0.274) (0.568) (0.840) (-0.182) (0.281) (0.073) (-0.022) (-0.196) (-0.148)
Moneylender 0.021 -0.053 -0.086** -0.071** -0.102* -0.378 -0.101 0.112 0.127 0.457*
z-scores (0.109) (-0.992) (-2.249) (-1.988) (-1.796) (-0.633) (-0.687) (1.057) (0.907) (1.907)
Family & Friends -0.043 -0.057 0.042 0.081* 0.090 -0.084 -0.270 -0.235 -0.079 0.035
z-scores (-0.213) (-0.958) (0.936) (1.678) (0.653) (-0.230) (-1.168) (-1.000) (-0.363) (0.115)
Other -0.077 0.201 0.067 0.149 0.359 others " 0.196 -1.054 1.197 2.253
z-scores (-0.259) (0.998) (0.457) (0.937) (0.753) (0.539) (-0.197) (-0.482) (1.321) (1.195)
SHG 0.608** 0.426** 0.247* 0.422 0.267 -0.474 -0.360 -0.291 -0.296 -0.744
z-scores (2.246) (2.247) (1.709) (1.592) (0.941) (-0.535) (-0.741) (-0.705) (-0.695) (-0.994)
t statistics in parenthesis; * p<0.10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; Nr. of observations: 1,138
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Table 101 Table 23 CRE Income. Negative income values withdrawn
CRE Income
Source \ Quintiles 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
banks -0.039 -0.021 0.073 0.333 0.5829**
z-scores (-0.647) (-0.212) (0.775) (1.556) (2.340)
NGO 0.204 0.386 0.524 0.590 0.790
z-scores (0.147) (0.268) (0.378) (0.409) (0.536)
Moneylender 0.002 -0.051 -0.067 -0.110 -0.187
z-scores (0.042) (-0.957) (-1.298) (-1.472) (-1.077)
Family and frieds 0.1026* 0.1121** 0.055 -0.040 -0.165
z-scores (1.876) (2.502) (0.756) (-0.326) (-0.772)
Other sources -0.029 -0.039 -0.026 0.155 0.702
z-scores (-0.234) (-0.277) (-0.136) (0.509) (0.602)
SHGs 0.191 0.2885* 0.3703** 0.325 0.294
z-scores (1.346) (1.847) (2.030) (1.325) (0.877)
t statistics in parenthesis; * p<0.10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; Nr. of observations: 1,138
